State of Iowa v. Christopher Wayne Beamer

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 25-0975
Filed May 13, 2026
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State of Iowa,
Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
Christopher Wayne Beamer,
Defendant–Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County,
The Honorable Meghan Corbin (motion to suppress) and the Honorable
Jeffrey C. McDaniel (sentencing), Judges.
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AFFIRMED
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Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Bradley M. Bender,
Assistant Appellate Defender, attorneys for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Genevieve Reinkoester, Assistant
Attorney General, attorneys for appellee.
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Considered without oral argument
by Schumacher, P.J., and Ahlers and Badding, JJ.
Opinion by Schumacher, P.J.

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SCHUMACHER, Presiding Judge.

Following his convictions for possession with intent to deliver a
schedule II controlled-substance, in violation of Iowa Code
section 124.401(1)(c)(6) (2022) and operating while intoxicated (OWI), first
offense, in violation of section 321J.2(a), Christopher Beamer appeals,
claiming the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence
following a search of his vehicle. Beamer also challenges the sentence
imposed by the court. We review his constitutional claim de novo, State v.
Harbach, 3 N.W.3d 209, 217 (Iowa 2024), and his sentencing challenges for
abuse of discretion, State v. Schooley, 13 N.W.3d 608, 616 (Iowa 2024).

MOTION TO SUPPRESS
Shortly after 7:00 a.m. on November 16, 2022, a Bettendorf police
officer responded to a head-on collision in which Beamer’s vehicle crossed
the center line and struck another vehicle. The other driver reported, “He
just came into my lane.” The officer observed no inclement weather
conditions that could have caused the accident. The officer further noted the
accident occurred near a school, “a pretty unusual location and . . . time of
day to have an accident of that circumstance.” Fire and medical teams were
dispatched to the scene, and there was a significant amount of damage to the
vehicles. The officer observed Beamer sitting in the driver’s seat of his
vehicle with his legs hanging out the door. Beamer stated he was “trying to
get home,” which the officer felt was “odd” because he was “going the
opposite direction of his house.” The officer did not smell alcohol on Beamer,
but he noted that Beamer’s speech “was very slow,” “a little slurred;
problems kind of opening his mouth and speaking,” which he opined was
“[c]onsistent with impairment.”

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The officer learned that police “had just dealt with [Beamer] the night
before” on a call for a fire at Beamer’s residence in his bedroom. During that
investigation, Beamer admitted he was “a regular meth user” and drug
paraphernalia—a glass pipe with residue—was found in plain view.

Beamer was transported to a hospital, where the officer interviewed
him about the accident. Beamer admitted to drinking alcohol “earlier that
day,”1 but he didn’t respond to an inquiry about drug use. In contrast to his
initial statement, Beamer reported that he was driving to a relative’s house.
Beamer’s responses were “incoherent” and “slurred,” and his pupils were
“constricted,” which led the officer to believe that “he was impaired, either
under the influence of alcohol or drugs.” Beamer would not give a proper
breath sample. Based on his training and experience, the officer opined there
was probable cause to apply for a warrant to search Beamer’s vehicle, which
was executed.2 Packages of methamphetamine were found in the vehicle.

Beamer moved to suppress the evidence found in his vehicle and his
statements, claiming the officer’s warrant application relied on evidence that
did not have a nexus with the area to be searched, namely, Beamer’s
admission to being a regular meth user and Beamer “having an (empty) glass
pipe at his home” the night before the accident. The district court concluded:
Here, the Court interprets the Defendant’s Motion as attacking the
probable cause for the warrant. Essentially, Defendant is arguing that the
State impermissibly used the contraband found in his home as a lever to
secure a warrant for his vehicle.

....

1
Beamer also told a fire medic at the scene that he had been drinking earlier.
2
Police also obtained a warrant for a blood draw. Beamer’s blood tested positive
for methamphetamine and amphetamine.

3
The judge who issued the warrant had before him the following
facts (exclusive of the meth pipe): Mr. Beamer had been in a serious car
accident; he had admitted to drinking “earlier”; he had shown physical
manifestations of impairment, including droopy eyes, persistent
sleepiness, slurred speech, and pupil constriction; and he had stated earlier
that morning that he was a “regular meth user.” Taken together these facts
amply support an inference that Mr. Beamer was operating under the
influence either of alcohol (he admitted at approximately 7:11 a.m. that he
had been drinking “earlier”) or of illegal narcotics (he admitted at about
midnight on the day in question that he was a “regular meth user”).
Moreover, the warrant application is not solely focused on meth
paraphernalia, it also states, “Your Affiant believes that he has shown
probable cause that a search of the vehicle . . . will yield open alcoholic
beverages . . . .” Altogether, the warrant application provides probable
cause to justify issuing a warrant for Mr. Beamer’s vehicle.

....

Here, the police report containing Mr. Beamer’s admissions that
he was “a regular meth user” could not alone support a finding of probable
cause. When it comes to search warrant applications, a brick is not a wall:
a piece of evidence in isolation may not be enough to support a finding of
probable cause, but cumulative evidence can. Alone, the report containing
Beamer’s admissions could not support a finding of probable cause, but it
certainly bolsters [the officer]’s suspicion that Mr. Beamer was impaired at
the time of the accident.

(Citation footnotes omitted).

Upon our review of the record, we affirm the district court’s denial of
the motion to suppress and affirm Beamer’s convictions without further
opinion pursuant to Iowa Court Rule 21.26(1)(a), (d), and (e).

SENTENCING CHALLENGES
Beamer also challenges the sentence imposed by the district court. On
the controlled-substance charge, the court sentenced Beamer to a term of
incarceration not to exceed ten years, suspended the sentence, and placed

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Beamer on probation for three years. On the OWI charge, the court
sentenced Beamer to sixty days in jail. The court also ordered Beamer to pay
victim restitution.

Because Beamer’s sentence falls within the statutory limit, there is “a
strong presumption in its favor.” State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 105–06
(Iowa 2020). A sentence “will only be overturned for an abuse of discretion
or the consideration of inappropriate matters.” State v. Wilbourn, 974 N.W.2d
58, 65 (Iowa 2022) (citation omitted).

I. Right of Allocution

Beamer first claims the district court erred in not granting him the
right of allocution before sentencing, as required by Iowa Rule of Criminal
Procedure 2.23(2)(b), (d)(2)–(3). At sentencing, the prosecutor, defense
counsel, and Beamer appeared personally. After defense counsel provided
Beamer’s sentencing recommendation, the following colloquy took place:
COURT: Okay. . . . [Defense counsel], does your client wish to
address the Court at this time, before the Court imposes sentence and
judgment?

(An off-the-record discussion was held between counsel and the
defendant.)

DEFENSE COUNSEL: My client does not wish to address the
Court, Your Honor.

COURT: Very good.

[Prosecutor], what is your recommendation?

In determining whether the court has provided a defendant their
opportunity for allocution, “[n]o special language is required to fulfill the
rule’s mandate,” and the question “is whether the defendant is given an
opportunity to volunteer any information helpful to the defendant’s cause.”

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State v. Lumadue, 622 N.W.2d 302, 304 (Iowa 2001) (cleaned up). Substantial
compliance is met if the record establishes that the court “invited, or
afforded an opportunity for the defendant to speak regarding punishment.”
Id. (cleaned up). Here, the court asked whether Beamer wished to make any
statements as the court considered his ultimate sentence. See State v. Oo,
No. 22-0661, 2023 WL 4104028, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. June 21, 2023). “[B]y
asking his attorney whether [Beamer] wanted to make any statement, the
court invited [Beamer] to speak.” See State v. Hernandez, No. 23-1462, 2024
WL 4615629, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 30, 2024). Beamer’s claim that he
was denied allocution is unpersuasive.

II. Reasons for Sentence Imposed

Beamer next claims the court “abused its discretion by failing to
provide adequate reasons for imposing the suspended sentence as part of
Beamer’s sentence on [the controlled-substance charge]” “rather than
granting his request for a deferred judgment.” Although the sentencing court
is “required to state on the record its reason for selecting the particular
sentence,” it is “not obligated to give its reasons for rejecting particular
sentencing options.” Wilbourn, 974 N.W.2d at 67 (cleaned up). Here, during
the sentencing hearing, the district court recited the following reasons for the
sentences imposed:
So, Mr. Beamer, it’s my duty under the law to review what is
available to me in terms of community resources and to determine what
the appropriate rehabilitative plan is for you, and also consider that the
public must be protected. In doing so, I look at the seriousness of the crime,
the effect that the crime has had upon members of the community, your
willingness to accept change and treatment, and what is available in this
community to assist you in that process. Throughout my entire thought
process I start with the least restrictive alternative first before moving on
to the more restrictive alternative.

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The Court has reviewed the presentence investigation report
[(PSI)] and has considered the information contained within that report;
however, the Court has not considered the criminal history section to the
extent that it does not reveal either an admission or adjudication of guilt.

The Court has considered the statements of counsel for the
defense and for the State, as well as the PSI; notes that the PSI author
recommends probation. That was a substantial factor, among other things,
in considering this decision of the Court.

A couple of observations: Oftentimes, Mr. Beamer, the reason
people find themselves in the court system is because they do not have
stable income, and when they do not have stable income, they have idle
hands. And we know the adage about idle hands being the devil’s
workshop. So employment for people that can be employed, it’s always a
good thing.

What I noticed for you is that the PSI author indicated you had a
lack of stable income. The PSI author also indicated that you had been
living with your . . . aunt and an uncle for housing. And as you sit here, at
age fifty-two, that probably is not going to be a permanent solution for you.
So not working leads to a lack of income, a lack of income leads to an
inability to afford housing, which sometimes can lead to an unfortunate
decision-making process.

So I’m going to share with you a quick story. So years ago I was
acquainted with somebody who worked in a person’s house, cleaning their
house. And they did it for cash. Did it for cash. We’re not going to pay taxes
to the federal government; we’re not going to pay taxes to the state
government; we’re not going to pay payroll taxes; we’re not going to pay
unemployment taxes. And this continued for about ten years, until this
person approached their late fifties or early sixties and their body gave way,
and they were no longer able to work. That person, because they were
working for cash, didn’t pay unemployment taxes, didn’t pay social
security disability, FICA, Medicare/Medicaid sort of things. When they
couldn’t work, they had no income. They couldn’t apply for social security
disability because they had no income.

And I know that’s not exactly your situation, but you have worked
for cash on and off, apparently, over the years. But my genuine concern
comes out of the fact that a person who works for cash and does not file

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income taxes and does not pay FICA, social security sort of taxes, down
the line when their body gives out, they don’t have disability or they don’t
have the full, sort of, social security retirement benefits that they kind of
expect. So I don’t want you to find yourself in that situation.

I’m going to have some terms of probation that are going to be
responsive, I think, to these economic concerns. And I say that because I
want the best for you. I want you to be in a position down the line so that
you can be successful, as well as in the short term.

I am going to accept the recommendation of the parties and the PSI
author and will conclude that probation is the best step for you, as well as
for the community.

....

The seriousness of the crime is such that a vehicle was totaled, the
seriousness of the crime is that two people could have lost their lives that
morning. We’re glad that didn’t happen, but obviously, it’s a serious event.

....

Conditions of probation. . . . You are to take, Mr. Beamer, the
victim impact class that’s offered through the QCA Labor-Management
Council and successfully complete that. And supervision will be through
the Seventh Judicial District Department of Corrections. You are to
undergo a substance-abuse evaluation and follow and complete any
recommended treatment. I think all of the attorneys understand that the
CADS evaluation may be less thorough than can otherwise be provided
through probation. You are to undergo a mental-health evaluation and
follow any recommended treatment to the extent that mental-health issues
affect your ability to make good decisions. You are to abstain from any
controlled substances. You are to abstain from alcohol. You are to obtain
and maintain employment. And that’s W-2 employment, unless you can
provide proof that you are paying payroll taxes and you are paying state and
federal income taxes. And I hope that you will agree in the end that that’s
the best way for you to secure a firm financial future. And I’m sure that
your probation officer will be able to assist you in finding meaningful
employment that meets those criteria.

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Beamer acknowledges that the court “need not give specific reasons
for rejecting a sentencing option,” but he claims “[t]he record contains no
acknowledgment by the district court that Beamer sought a deferred
judgment on [the controlled-substance] charge.” We disagree. Defense
counsel specifically requested the court enter “a deferred judgment and
minimum civil penalties.” See State v. Lavenz, No. 21-1062, 2023
WL 1814289, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2023) (observing the defendant
failed to show the sentencing court was unaware it could suspend the
sentences where defense counsel told the court the defendant agreed with
the recommendation in the PSI to suspend the sentences).

Contrary to Beamer’s claim, there was no misunderstanding about the
sentencing options, and the court provided adequate reasons for the sentence
imposed. See State v. Crooks, 911 N.W.2d 153, 171 (Iowa 2018). We affirm on
this issue.

III. Unreasonable Probation Requirement

Beamer also argues the court imposed an unreasonable probation
requirement by ordering “that he obtain and maintain W-2 employment.”
Beamer’s argument ignores some of the details of this probation condition,
specifics of which are detailed above. As noted, the court did not limit
Beamer only to W-2 employment; it permitted him to have other forms of
employment for which he could “provide proof that [Beamer was] paying
state and federal income taxes.” We further note that the PSI noted that
Beamer “has lived with the support of his relatives for a significant portion
of his adult life” and opined Beamer “needs to secure and maintain gainful
employment.”

“Probation is a set of conditions exacted by a court of law as a
consequence for the defendant’s criminal conduct.” State v. Jepsen, 907

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N.W.2d 495, 502 (Iowa 2018). The sentencing court is “authorized to impose
any reasonable conditions that either promote rehabilitation of the defendant
or the protection of the community.” State v. Valin, 724 N.W.2d 440, 445–46
(Iowa 2006) (cleaned up). “In trying to achieve that goal, district courts
routinely require employment as a condition of probation.” State v. Edwards,
No. 24-1988, 2026 WL 521493, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 25, 2026) (citing
cases). Here, the requirement that Beamer maintain employment “to secure
a firm financial future” was reasonable and promotes Beamer’s
rehabilitation. See id.; see also State v. West Vangen, 975 N.W.2d 344, 355 (Iowa
2022) (“The sentencing court has broad discretion to impose the sentence it
determines is best suited to rehabilitate a defendant and protect society.”).
Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm the court’s sentencing decision.

AFFIRMED.

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