Rolling Hills Bank and Trust v. Jacobsen

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 25-0395
Filed April 15, 2026
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Rolling Hills Bank and Trust,
Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
Walter Jacobsen, Theresea Jacobsen and Jacobsen-Holz Corporation,
Defendants–Appellants,
Daniel Brubaker and Claudia Brubaker,
Intervenors–Appellees.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dallas County,
The Honorable Terry Rickers, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Matthew J. Hemphill of Bergkamp, Hemphill & McClure, P.C., Adel,
attorney for appellants.

C. Scott Finneseth and Nicholas J. Spellman of Finneseth, Dalen & Powell,
P.L.C., Perry, attorneys for intervenor appellees.
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Considered without oral argument
by Ahlers, P.J., and Chicchelly and Sandy, JJ.
Opinion by Ahlers, P.J.

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AHLERS, Presiding Judge.

Walter Jacobsen, Theresea Jacobsen, and Jacobsen-Holz Corporation
(collectively “the Jacobsens”) defaulted on promissory notes secured by
mortgages on three of their properties—two in Dallas County and one in
Greene County. The bank holding the notes filed this foreclosure action in
Dallas County and obtained a decree foreclosing the mortgages on all three
properties. Only the Greene County property is at issue in this appeal.

The Greene County property was sold at a sheriff’s sale held in
Greene County. Daniel and Claudia Brubaker were the purchasers at the
sale. The sale was subject to a one-year redemption period.

The Jacobsens attempted to redeem the Greene County property by
paying the Dallas County clerk of court on September 20, 2023—the final
day of the one-year redemption period. When no action occurred in response
to the attempted redemption, the Jacobsens filed an application asking the
Dallas County district court to provide guidance on disbursing the funds and
canceling the certificate of purchase. The Brubakers filed a motion seeking
to intervene as interested parties, and the court granted that motion.

At the hearing on the Jacobsens’ application, the Brubakers argued
that the attempt to redeem the property failed. They relied on Iowa Code
section 628.1 (2023), which states “[a]ll redemptions made under the
provisions of this chapter shall be made in the county where the sale is had.”
Because the Jacobsens attempted to redeem by paying the Dallas County
clerk of court rather than the Greene County clerk of court, the Brubakers
argued the attempt to redeem failed. The district court agreed, and the
Jacobsens appealed. The issue on appeal is whether the Jacobsens’ payment
to the wrong county clerk of court constituted valid redemption.

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I. Standard of Review

Foreclosure actions are equitable proceedings under Iowa Code
section 654.1, so our review of those proceedings is de novo. Iowa R. App.
P. 6.907; Mlady v. Dougan, 967 N.W.2d 328, 332 (Iowa 2021). “We give
weight to the factual findings of the trial court, but we are not bound by
them.” Mlady, 967 N.W.2d at 332 (quoting Decorah State Bank v. Wangsness,
452 N.W.2d 438, 439 (Iowa 1990)). “We review questions of statutory
interpretation for correction of errors at law.” Id. (quoting Standard Water
Control Sys., Inc. v. Jones, 938 N.W.2d 651, 656 (Iowa 2020)).

II. Analysis

On appeal, the Jacobsens claim they successfully redeemed the Greene
County property by making the required redemption payment in Dallas
County. In support of this claim, the Jacobsens argue that substantial
compliance with the statute is all that is required, and their payment to the
wrong county clerk substantially complied. They also argue that, even if
strict compliance with the statute is required, this court should find they
successfully redeemed the property based on equitable principles.

A. Applicable Standard of Compliance with Section 628.1

The parties disagree whether strict or substantial compliance with the
redemption statute is required. But our supreme court has resolved that
debate. “The right of redemption is purely a statutory proceeding, and the
provisions of the statute relative thereto must be strictly complied with.” Nw.
Mut. Life Ins. v. Hansen, 218 N.W. 502, 505 (Iowa 1928). Redemption “may
only be exercised as the statute prescribes.” Mlady, 967 N.W.2d at 332. “The
statute confers on the court no discretion nor power of mercy in relation
thereto.” Id. (quoting Tharp v. Kerr, 119 N.W. 267, 269 (Iowa 1909)).

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As noted, Iowa Code section 628.1 requires “[a]ll redemptions made
under the provisions of this chapter [to] be made in the county where the sale
is had.” There is no question the Jacobsens failed to strictly comply with this
requirement by paying in the wrong county. But they argue that the strict-
compliance standard used in Mlady only applies to the timeliness of the
redemption and the proper amount required for redemption. Because the
Jacobsens’ payment to the Dallas County clerk was timely and in the correct
amount, the Jacobsens contend they substantially complied and the
redemption was valid.

The Jacobsens’ argument that our caselaw only requires strict
compliance as to the amount and timeliness of redemption ignores the
context of the decisions upon which they rely. In the cases relied upon by the
Jacobsens where the court applied a substantial-compliance standard, it was
interpreting the statutory requirement for an affidavit that must be submitted
with the redemption amount for a lienholder to redeem property. See
Waterloo Sav. Bank v. Carpenter, 9 N.W.2d 818, 819 (Iowa 1943); Guar. Life
Ins. Co. v. Schmidt, 294 N.W. 893, 894 (Iowa 1940); Green Bay Lumber Co. v.
Leitzen, 215 N.W. 639, 640 (Iowa 1927). The statute at issue in those cases
required the affidavit to “stat[e] as nearly as practicable the nature of the lien
and the amount still due and unpaid thereon.”1 See Iowa Code § 628.18. The
“as nearly as practicable” language creates a range of potential statements
that might satisfy the statute’s requirement. It makes sense that the court

1
Iowa Code section 11789—the code section interpreted in Waterloo Savings Bank,
9 N.W.2d at 819, Guaranty Life Insurance Company, 294 N.W. at 894–95, and Green Bay
Lumber Company, 215 N.W. at 640–41—was recodified as section 628.18 in the 1946 Iowa
Code. It was later edited in 1985 to use gender-neutral phrasing, but it has not been
substantively amended.

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only required substantial compliance with this statutory provision, because,
by its terms, the statute contemplates a lack of precision.

Unlike the range of potential statements that might satisfy
section 628.18, section 628.1 creates a clear duty for “all” redemptions.
Section 628.1’s absolute requirement and duty is more like the absolute
requirements and duties related to the amount and timeliness of redemption.
Compare Iowa Code § 628.3, with id. § 628.13. Therefore, the strict-
compliance requirements applicable to those sections also apply to
section 628.1. See Mlady, 967 N.W.2d at 332.

The Jacobsens also argue that the policy reasons for requiring strict
compliance with the amount and timing of redemption do not support
requiring strict compliance with section 628.1. According to the Jacobsens,
strict compliance with the time for redemption ensures marketability and
finality of title, and strict compliance with the amount of redemption ensures
the purchaser or lender is fully compensated. The Jacobsens claim these
policies are not furthered by requiring redemption only in the county where
the sale is had. See Iowa Code § 628.1.

We do not find these policy arguments convincing given the statute’s
clear requirements and notable lack of any exceptions. Cf. Jahn v. Hyundai
Motor Co., 773 N.W.2d 550, 560 (Iowa 2009) (finding no exception to
application of comparative-fault principles in enhanced-injury cases despite
policy reasons favoring such exceptions because the legislature did not
provide exceptions in the statute). Further, we question whether redeeming
in the wrong county constitutes even substantial compliance with
section 628.1. Therefore, we reject these arguments.

The Jacobsens also contend the Brubakers would not be prejudiced by

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application of a substantial-compliance standard and a finding that the
Jacobsens met that standard because they would still be repaid in full. But
the Jacobsens cite no controlling caselaw supporting this contention—nor
have we found any—and there is no such exception outlined in the statute
itself. Therefore, any lack of prejudice to the Brubakers does not persuade
us that substantial compliance with the requirements of section 628.1 is
sufficient.

The statutory language and our caselaw support requiring strict
compliance with section 628.1. Because the Jacobsens attempted to redeem
the property sold in Greene County by making payment to the Dallas County
clerk of court, they failed to strictly comply with section 628.1 and thus failed
to properly redeem.

B. Equitable Exceptions to Strict Compliance

The Jacobsens also argue that even if strict compliance is required, the
court should find their redemption valid based on equitable exceptions to our
strict-compliance requirement. We have granted such equitable relief when
a redeemer attempted to redeem in good faith but failed due to a nonnegligent
mistake. See Olson v. Sievert, 30 N.W.2d 157, 159 (Iowa 1947); Wakefield v.
Rotherham, 25 N.W. 697, 699 (Iowa 1885).

The Jacobsens argue their case is analogous to Olson and Wakefield and
we should grant them the same equitable relief. We disagree because both
cases are distinguishable. In Olson, 30 N.W.2d at 159, and Wakefield, 25 N.W.
at 698–99, the clerk of court’s mistake caused the amount the redeemer paid
by the statutory deadline to be insufficient. In those cases, the court relied
on equitable principles to extend the time for redemption because the
redeemer attempted to redeem the property in good faith, did not make the

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mistake that led to the deficient redemption attempt, and was not negligent
in relying on the clerk’s information. Olson, 30 N.W.2d at 159; Wakefield, 25
N.W. at 698–99. But when the mistake is attributable to the redeemer, Olson
and Wakefield do not apply. Mlady, 967 N.W.2d at 335 (denying relief based
on the equitable principles in Olson and Wakefield when the redeemer’s
attorney miscalculated the redemption amount).

We do not doubt the Jacobsens attempted to redeem in good faith. But
there is no evidence that the mistake was attributable to anyone other than
the Jacobsens, so the equitable principles utilized in Olson and Wakefield do
not apply. See Mlady, 967 N.W.2d at 335. The Jacobsens argue their mistake
was not negligent because the foreclosure proceeding was held in Dallas
County, all relevant sale documents referenced the Dallas County case
number, and the payment from the sale went to Dallas County. While we
understand these details may have caused confusion, the fact remains that it
was solely the Jacobsens’ mistake that caused them to make payment in the
wrong county. Parties are generally assumed to have knowledge of the law,
and ignorance of the law is no excuse. Millwright v. Romer, 322 N.W.2d 30,
33 (Iowa 1982) (“Every citizen is assumed to know the law and is charged
with knowledge of the provisions of statutes.”); Lolkus v. Vander Wilt, 141
N.W.2d 600, 604 (Iowa 1966) (“[I]gnorance of the law excuses not.” (citation
omitted)). Section 628.1 unambiguously required the redemption to occur
in Greene County, and the failure to meet the requirement is attributable only
to the Jacobsens. “Courts of equity are ʻbound by statute, and in the absence
of fraud or mistake, equity must follow the law.’” Mlady, 967 N.W.2d at 335
(quoting Kuehl v. Eckhart, 608 N.W.2d 475, 477 (Iowa 2000)). Here, the
statute requires redemption in the county where the sale is had, and neither
the statute nor our caselaw allows us to subvert the statutory requirement
under equitable principles when the mistake is attributable to the party

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seeking the equitable remedy. See Iowa Code § 628.1; Mlady, 967 N.W.2d
at 335. Therefore, we cannot grant the equitable relief the Jacobsens request.

III. Conclusion

Because section 628.1 requires strict compliance and the Jacobsens
failed to redeem the Greene County property in the county where the sale
occurred, the attempt failed. Equitable relief is unavailable, as the mistake
was attributable only to the Jacobsens. Accordingly, we affirm the district
court’s decision.

AFFIRMED.

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