State of Iowa v. Guy Christopher Johns

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 24-1157
Filed April 1, 2026
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State of Iowa,
Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
Guy Christopher Johns,
Defendant–Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Buena Vista County,
The Honorable Andrew Smith, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Christopher Kragnes Sr., Des Moines, attorney for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Adam Kenworthy, Assistant Attorney
General, attorneys for appellee.
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Considered without oral argument
by Greer, P.J., and Schumacher and Ahlers, JJ.
Opinion by Ahlers, J.

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AHLERS, Judge.

After being evicted from the mobile home lot he rented, Guy Johns
moved some of his personal belongings out of his mobile home. But he left
behind eleven dogs and never returned. Seven days later, complaints of
barking coming from the mobile home led to law enforcement being called.

A law enforcement officer and representatives of an animal shelter and
veterinary clinic arrived on the scene. Due to the aggressive nature of two of
the dogs in the mobile home, those dogs had to be sedated before anyone
could go inside. Once inside, the officer discovered five puppies and three
adult dogs loose in the mobile home. Two other adult dogs were confined to
a single kennel. The remaining adult dog was dead and had been partially
eaten by the other dogs. There was no food or water accessible to any of the
dogs.

The State charged Johns with four counts of animal neglect in
violation of Iowa Code section 717B.3 (2022) and four counts of
abandonment of dogs in violation of Iowa Code section 717B.8. Following a
bench trial, the court found Johns guilty of all eight counts, either as charged
or as lesser-included offenses.

Johns appeals. He contends: (1) the evidence was insufficient to
establish that he failed to provide adequate food and water to the dogs; (2) the
evidence was insufficient to prove he had ownership or custody of the dogs;
and (3) the evidence was insufficient to negate the exception to abandonment
found in Iowa Code section 717B.8(2)(a).

I. Standard of Review

We review challenges to the sufficiency of evidence for the correction
of errors at law. State v. Lindaman, 30 N.W.3d 547, 554–55 (Iowa 2025). In

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conducting such review, a jury verdict binds us if it is supported by
substantial evidence. Id. at 555. The same binding effect applies to the
district court’s factual findings in a bench trial. State v. Hawkins, 27 N.W.3d
562, 567–68 (Iowa 2025). Substantial evidence is “evidence that would
convince a rational factfinder the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Id. at 568. In assessing whether substantial evidence supports the
determination of guilt, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
verdict, including all inferences and presumptions that can be fairly drawn
from the evidence. Id.

II. Analysis

We address each of Johns’s sufficiency challenges in turn.

A. Adequate Food and Water

For each of the four counts of animal neglect, the State was required
to prove that Johns failed to provide the dogs with “[a]ccess to food in an
amount and quality reasonably sufficient to satisfy [their] basic nutrition
level” or “[a]ccess to a supply of potable water in an amount reasonably
sufficient to satisfy the animal’s basic hydration level.” See Iowa Code
§ 717B.3(1)(a), (b). Johns contends the State failed to establish either of these
facts.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the district court’s
finding of guilt, we reject Johns’s contention. A rational factfinder could
conclude from the evidence that, after he was evicted from the mobile home
lot, Johns removed personal items from his mobile home on September 25,
2022, and never returned. He did not take the dogs with him nor did he
arrange for their care. When law enforcement and others arrived on
October 2, there was no food or water accessible to the dogs in the mobile

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home. One of the dogs was dead and had been partially eaten by the other
dogs. Evidence established that dogs do not eat each other except as a last
resort, which further supports the conclusion that inadequate food and water
was left for the dogs in the mobile home. And, by Johns’s own testimony, he
only left enough food and water to last the dogs two days even though he had
no plan to return to the mobile home and had not arranged for others to care
for the dogs.

In short, a rational factfinder could conclude beyond a reasonable
doubt that Johns failed to provide adequate food and water for the dogs, so
substantial evidence supports the district court’s finding of guilt on the four
counts of animal neglect.

B. Ownership or Custody of the Dogs

The crimes of animal neglect and abandonment of dogs both require
proof that the defendant was the owner or had custody of the dogs. See id.
§§ 717B.3(1), .8(1). Johns claims the State failed to prove this element
because, once he was evicted, he no longer owned or had custody of the dogs.

The crux of Johns’s claim is that once he was evicted, the dogs became
the responsibility of the mobile home park owner, especially after Johns told
the judicial officer presiding at his eviction hearing that he didn’t have the
financial ability to take the dogs with him. Johns’s claim fails factually and
legally.

Factually, the evidence establishes that no one affiliated with the
mobile home park agreed to take responsibility for the dogs. The evidence
also establishes that Johns was evicted from the mobile home lot that he
rented, not from his mobile home that remained on that lot, and a notice
posted on the door of his mobile home stated that Johns could enter the

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mobile home park with prior permission from the owner or manager. Johns
never attempted to gain such permission in order to care for the dogs. In fact,
the evidence establishes that Johns had no intention of caring for his dogs
after he left on September 25.

Legally, the eviction did not foist responsibility for the care of Johns’s
dogs on the mobile home park owner. Our court has declined
to impose a duty of care upon a landlord to protect or care for an evicted
tenant’s personal property where our legislature has chosen not to do so.
Further, absent evidence that the landlord assumed possession or control
of the personal property of an evicted tenant, our law imposes no duty
upon the landlord to store or otherwise care for the property.

See Khan v. Heritage Prop. Mgmt., 584 N.W.2d 725, 730 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998).
No evidence was presented that the mobile home park owner assumed
possession or control of the dogs by evicting Johns from the lot. Further, the
Code provides for an option that would have given Johns reasonable access
to the mobile home even after the eviction judgment. Iowa Code
section 648.22A(1) allowed the parties to agree to leave Johns’s mobile home
on the lot from which he was evicted for sixty days. During that sixty days,
section 648.22A(2) would give Johns reasonable access to the mobile home
to remove any personal property, which would include his dogs. The
evidence establishes that Johns made no effort to pursue this option—nor
any other—to take care of his dogs.

Substantial evidence supports the district court’s findings that Johns
remained the owner and custodian of the dogs after he was evicted from the
mobile home lot. So Johns’s sufficiency challenge based on lack of ownership
or custody of the dogs fails.

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C. Statutory Exception to Abandonment

The statute prohibiting abandonment of dogs provides an exception
when the dogs are delivered “to another person who will accept ownership
and custody of the . . . dog[s].” Iowa Code § 717B.8(2)(a). Johns contends
this section applies to negate his criminal culpability for the four counts of
abandonment of dogs. In support of his contention, Johns repeats the same
arguments that his eviction somehow created an obligation of the mobile
home park owner to take over ownership and responsibility for his dogs. We
reject those arguments for the same reasons we previously rejected them in
this opinion. The State presented uncontroverted evidence that no other
person accepted ownership or custody of the dogs. Therefore, substantial
evidence supports the district court’s determination that the exception to
abandonment found in section 717B.8(2)(a) did not apply. Accordingly, we
reject Johns’s challenge.

III. Conclusion

All three of Johns’s challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence fail.
As a result, we affirm his convictions.

AFFIRMED.

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