Hendrik Christiaan Van Pelt v. Iowa Public Information Board

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 24-2039
Filed February 25, 2026
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Hendrik Christiaan Van Pelt,
Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
Iowa Public Information Board,
Defendant–Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Clayton County,
The Honorable Laura J. Parrish, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and John R. Lundquist, Assistant Attorney
General, attorneys for appellant.

Hendrik Christiaan Van Pelt, Guttenberg, self-represented appellee.
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Considered without oral argument
by Schumacher, P.J., and Badding and Langholz, JJ.
Opinion by Langholz, J.

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LANGHOLZ, Judge.

Like many cities, the City of West Des Moines contracted with a
private company, Flock Group, Inc., to install cameras on public roads to
capture vehicle information and send notifications to the City. Flock’s data
helps the City gather evidence for stolen cars, missing persons, and other
investigations. As part of the contract, Flock created a deployment plan—a
map of camera locations—for the City to approve. The contract also dictates
that the “entire agreement” between the City and Flock includes the
contract “together with” other documents, including the deployment plan.

Hendrick Van Pelt asked the City to see a copy of the contract with
Flock, including the deployment plan. The City produced the contract but
not the deployment plan, stating it never retained a copy so there was nothing
to produce. Van Pelt then complained to the Iowa Public Information Board,
which dismissed the complaint without investigation, reasoning that the
deployment plan was owned by Flock and thus the City had no obligation to
produce it. Van Pelt petitioned for judicial review and the district court
reversed, finding Flock was contracted to perform governmental functions
and thus the plan should have been disclosed. The Board now appeals.

The unique facts and posture of this case, as well as binding precedent
from our court, compel us to affirm. The City is a party to its contract with
Flock, and thus the entire agreement—which expressly includes the
deployment plan—belongs to the City just as much as it belongs to Flock.
And published precedent instructs that government bodies must produce
documents that are otherwise public records and readily available. Thus, Van
Pelt’s complaint is—at least at this preliminary stage—legally sufficient. So
we affirm the district court’s judgment reversing and remanding Van Pelt’s
complaint for further proceedings before the Board.

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I.

The City contracted with Flock in the spring of 2023 for license plate
recognition services. Generally, Flock installs cameras that capture photos
and videos of vehicles traveling on public roadways. Using the vehicle data
collected by that footage, Flock sends notifications to local law enforcement.
Flock thus provides a law enforcement investigative tool, aiding the City in
gathering evidence for missing persons, stolen vehicles, and the like.

Under the contract, Flock agrees to “advise” the City “on the location
and positioning of the [cameras] for optimal license plate image capture.”
The contract then requires the parties to “mutually agree” on the City’s
designated locations, positions, and angles of the cameras, which becomes
the “deployment plan.” Following the City’s review and approval of the
deployment plan—a map of the locations—any later changes to the plan
result in fees associated with reinstalling or repositioning the cameras.
Elsewhere in the contract, the City’s “installation obligations” include any
obligations “required by the Deployment Plan,” including possibly providing
adequate power sources for the cameras, securing permits, or paying taxes.
And the “Entire Agreement” representing the “complete and exclusive
statement of mutual understanding” between the City and Flock was defined
to include the principal contract signed by those parties “together with”
order forms, the reinstall policy, and the “Deployment Plan(s).”

In October 2023, Van Pelt submitted a records request to the City
asking for “a copy of the agreement between the City of West Des Moines
and Flock Safety, including any addenda like the deployment plan and
reinstall fee schedule.” In response, the City provided the contract and a later

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amendment but did not provide the deployment plan.1 According to the City,
it merely “reviewed a map online to approve it, but did not create the map,
print it, or save the record in any other means.” So it reasoned that the
deployment plan was not a public record because it was not in the City’s
possession, nor did the City have any duty to create the record by requesting
it from Flock or otherwise reconstructing it.

Unsatisfied, Van Pelt complained to the Iowa Public Information
Board and alleged the City violated our open-records laws when it refused to
obtain and produce the deployment plan since the “agreement incorporates
the missing documents by reference.” The Board dismissed the complaint
without investigation, finding it legally insufficient. See generally Iowa Admin.
Code r. 497-2.1(2)(b) (2024) (allowing the Board to dismiss a complaint
without investigation if it determines the complaint is “legally insufficient,”
“frivolous,” or “without merit”). The Board reasoned “[t]he City provided
Mr. van Pelt all the records in their possession.” As it read the contract, Flock
would “advise” the City on the deployment plan for the City’s approval, and
thus “[t]he City did not own the record, the vendor did.” Thus, the Board
concluded that the City did not violate Iowa’s open-records laws.

Van Pelt petitioned for judicial review and the district court reversed
the Board’s dismissal. The court found that the deployment plan was not “of
or belonging to” the City. But it agreed with Van Pelt that the City contracted
with Flock to have it perform governmental functions—“facilitating law
enforcement’s ability to enhance its purpose and function”—and so the
deployment plan was a public record subject to disclosure. See generally Iowa
Code § 22.2(2) (“A government body shall not prevent the examination or

1
The City also did not provide the reinstall fee schedule, but that request is not
part of this appeal. So we do not discuss it further.

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copying of a public record by contracting with a nongovernment body to
perform any of its duties or functions.”); Gannon v. Bd. of Regents,
692 N.W.2d 31, 39–44 (Iowa 2005) (interpreting section 22.2(2) and finding
the records of a university’s foundation were public records because the
foundation was “performing a government function pursuant to its contract
with” the university).

The Board appeals.2

II.

Iowa’s open-records laws give the public the right to examine all public
records, subject to some enumerated confidentiality exceptions. Iowa Code
§§ 22.2(1), 22.7. What qualifies as a public record is broad—the definition
includes “all” documents, “stored or preserved in any medium,” that are “of
or belonging to” a city. Id. § 22.1(3)(a). And that breadth informs the
“presumption in favor of disclosure” and our State’s “liberal policy in favor
of access to public records.” Ripperger v. Iowa Public Info. Bd.,
967 N.W.2d 540, 550 (Iowa 2021) (cleaned up).

The threshold question here is whether the development plan is “of or
belonging to” the City. On this point, KMEG Television, Inc. v. Iowa State
Board of Regents is instructive. 440 N.W.2d 382 (Iowa 1989), abrogated on other

2
The district court ruling did not specify which standard of review under Iowa
Code section 17A.19(10) was used. Because the court’s order turned both on its reading
of Iowa Code chapter 22 and its application to the contract between the City and Flock,
we presume the court applied paragraphs “c”—which asks whether the Board
erroneously interpreted “a provision of law whose interpretation has not clearly been
vested by a provision of law in the discretion of the agency”—and “m”—which asks
whether the Board irrationally, illogically, or wholly unjustifiably applied law to fact. Iowa
Code § 17A.19(10)(c), (m). We thus apply those same standards of review here. Carreras
v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 977 N.W.2d 438, 444 (Iowa 2022).

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grounds by Gannon, 692 N.W.2d at 42–43. There, the University of Iowa sold
broadcast rights to certain sporting events to a private company. Id. at 384.
That private company then solicited bids from local broadcasters to air
basketball and football games. Id. A passed-over broadcaster later sued to
obtain the bidding documents, arguing the company was acting on behalf of
the University and was thus subject to Iowa’s open-records laws. Id.

Our supreme court found the bidding documents were not “of or
belonging to” the state. Id. Working through the statute’s text, the court
reasoned that records are “of” the government if they were “produced in, or
originate[d] from, the government.” Id. at 385. And records are “belonging
to” the government if they “originate from other sources but are held by
public officers in their official capacity.” Id. (cleaned up). Applying those
principles, the bidding documents were “not now, nor [had] they ever been,
in the possession of the University.” Id. The records had never “been shared
with the University,” nor did the University ever “indicate[] an interest in
having or reviewing them.” Id. Indeed, under the parties’ contract, “all
network revenues inured to [the company’s] benefit in consideration of its
payment of a hefty sum to the University up front.” Id. Thus, the bidding
documents fell outside the scope of chapter 22, and the broadcaster’s policy
arguments that they “should belong to the University” were irrelevant. Id.

Here, the Board asserts that Flock created the document and the City
has never physically possessed the record, defeating any conclusion that the
record “belongs to” the City. We disagree. In contrast with KMEG, the City
executed a contract with Flock, which defined the “entire agreement”
between the parties to include the deployment plan. Thus, more than having
a mere interest in having or reviewing the plan, the City had approval rights
over that plan and Flock could not proceed unless and until the City reviewed

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and signed off. While the City never obtained a physical copy of the plan, it
did receive and review an electronic copy. And because the plan is expressly
incorporated into the contract itself, the City, as a party to the contract,
always has a right to the document. Thus, the entire contract between the
City and its contractor “belongs to” the City, and so the deployment plan
falls within the definition of a public record subject to examination.

Still, it is undisputed that the City does not physically possess the
deployment plan. As the Board sees it, whether the City should have retained
the full contract is outside the scope of chapter 22, and our open-records laws
do not require the City to retrieve documents from third parties on behalf of
requestors. To this end, the Board points us to Clark v. Banks, 515 N.W.2d 5
(Iowa 1994) (per curiam). There, a sheriff changed his policy regarding
firearms-justification forms, opting to return completed applications to the
applicant rather than retain the forms. See id. at 6. A citizen sued, alleging
that returning the forms to the applicant was an improper work-around the
sheriff’s open-records duties. See id. Our supreme court found the sheriff
had no duty to retain the forms, and thus they were not public records subject
to examination once they were out of the sheriff’s possession. Id. at 7. Indeed,
it cautioned that whether “a sheriff should be required to maintain” the forms
was “more appropriately addressed to the legislature.” Id.

Clark is distinguishable. Unlike the sheriff and private citizens who
could ignore any of requests by the sheriff to provide their already approved
and returned application forms, the City and Flock are in an ongoing
contractual relationship. The records request here does not invade Flock’s
private corporate files—which the City has no contractual right to inspect—
but asks for part of the “entire agreement” between the City and Flock.
Regardless of its decision to retain a physical copy, the contract belongs to

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the City just as much as it belongs to Flock. Cf. City of Dubuque v. Dubuque
Racing Ass’n, 420 N.W.2d 450, 453–54 (Iowa 1988) (finding a private
nonprofit’s meeting minutes were not public records because, among other
reasons, “there is no statutory requirement or contractual provision that
requires the DRA to provide copies of its board and executive committee
meetings to the City”).

This case is more like Diercks v. Malin, 894 N.W.2d 12 (Iowa Ct. App.
2016). In Diercks, a city contracted with a consulting firm. See id. at 14. A
citizen requested all invoices from the consulting firm, and the city gave what
was in its possession but did not produce one invoice because it was
cancelled, a city employee deleted the email containing the invoice, and it
was not elsewhere retained by the city. See id. at 15–16. The citizen sued, and
our court found that the city had “ready access to the invoice it had
destroyed” because the consulting firm and city attorney both still had
copies. Id. at 20–21. And so, the city “had a duty to produce that public
record from sources readily available,” including the consulting firm. Id.

Diercks is a published opinion from our court. Following its holding, as
we must, the City is charged with producing public records that exist and are
readily available to it. And the facts here are perhaps more compelling than
in Diercks, as the City has greater control and ownership of its contract with
a third party than a cancelled and therefore understandably deleted invoice
from a consulting firm. Cf. Consol. Irrigation Dist. v. Sup. Ct., 205 Cal. App.
4th 697, 710 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (interpreting California public-records
statute to contemplate both actual and constructive possession of a record
and explaining “an agency has constructive possession of records if it has the
right to control the records, either directly or through another person”).

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We ultimately need not resolve, as the district court did, whether
Flock was engaged in a governmental duty or function such that documents
it solely owns or controls could fall within the reach of chapter 22. See
Gannon, 692 N.W.2d at 38–44. Instead, at least at this preliminary stage and
on the limited record before us, Van Pelt’s complaint sufficiently alleged the
deployment plan belonged to the City, not just to Flock, and that it was
readily available to the City.

Finally, and relatedly, we stress the unique posture and facts of this
case. Van Pelt seeks judicial review of the Board’s decision to dismiss his
complaint without investigation. As the Board’s attorney phrased it below,
“we’re not weighing the merits of Mr. van Pelt’s complaint” but only
“determining whether or not, on its face,” the complaint “appears legally
sufficient” and “could have merit.” In this way, this judicial-review appeal
resembles appeals from grants of motions to dismiss civil petitions, where we
take all facts as true and ask whether the plaintiff failed to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.421(1)(f ). Based on the
limited record before us—mainly the contract between the parties—Van
Pelt’s complaint, on its face, is at least legally plausible under chapter 22 and
our governing caselaw. In so finding, we express no opinion on the ultimate
merits of the complaint or whether any confidentiality exceptions that have
not yet been asserted by the City could apply.

AFFIRMED.

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