In re the Marriage of Melcher

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 24-1930
Filed February 25, 2026
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In re the Marriage of Adam R. Melcher and Lyndsey C. Melcher
Upon the Petition of
Adam R. Melcher,
Petitioner–Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

And Concerning
Lyndsey C. Melcher,
Respondent–Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Jefferson County,
The Honorable Shawn R. Showers, Judge.
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AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED
WITH DIRECTIONS
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Abigail L. Brown of Leff Law Firm, L.L.P., Iowa City, attorney for
appellant.

Diana L. Miller and Sydnee M. Waggoner of Whitfield & Eddy, P.L.C.,
Mount Pleasant and Des Moines, attorneys for appellee.
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Considered without oral argument by Tabor, C.J., and Greer and Buller, JJ.
Opinion by Buller, J.

1
BULLER, Judge.

Adam Melcher appeals, and Lyndsey Melcher cross-appeals, from a
modification proceeding following the dissolution of their marriage. They
raise a variety of claims about physical care, the visitation schedule, Adam’s
income for purposes of child support, trial-attorney fees, fees owed to the
child and family reporter (CFR), and appellate-attorney fees. We affirm the
custodial provisions but reverse and remand for further proceedings related
to Adam’s income for purposes of child support and the CFR fees.

BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Adam and Lyndsey divorced in 2021 by stipulation. They share three
children born in 2010, 2013, and 2021. The stipulated decree established
joint legal custody and shared physical care for the two oldest children, while
Lyndsey had physical care of the youngest (who was a newborn at the time of
divorce).

As of trial, Adam was thirty-seven and lived with his girlfriend and her
children in Fairfield. He works for his parents’ automotive repair business, is
an EMT and firefighter, and owns several rental properties. The court set his
annual gross income for child support purposes at $100,000 after it
attributed no income for Adam’s multiple rental properties.

Lyndsey was thirty-nine as of trial and lived in Libertyville. She works
for an investment company, and the court determined her income to be
$77,000 per year.

According to Lyndsey, she and Adam “got along” and co-parented
reasonably well right after the divorce. And their public-facing interactions at
the children’s sporting and school events showed them supporting the
children as a team. But as time has passed, Adam’s communication with and

2
about Lyndsey has worsened significantly. For example, during a custody
exchange with the children nearby, he called her a “fucking cunt” and told
her “I hope you get cancer, you fucking bitch.” In a particularly concerning
recording, Adam and his girlfriend discussed murdering Lyndsey in such
detail that he mentioned wearing booties over his shoes and observed that
using a gun would be messy—a conversation that, at trial, a deputy sheriff
described as “disturbing.” The two also discussed their hope Lyndsey would
get a boyfriend so they could “Romeo and Juliet[1] the shit out of that deal.
She does him then she does herself.” And Adam said he was “stronger” than
Lyndsey, so he “could probably make it look like she killed herself.” Adam
also told the children’s daycare provider that Lyndsey is a “psycho” and “bad
mother.” And he told law enforcement she was a “bitch.” At trial, Adam
begrudgingly admitted to calling Lyndsey and her attorneys “a dumb bunch
of cunts”—though he waffled on taking responsibility even after being
confronted with his own recording of the comment.

According to Lyndsey, all of this strife and negative communication
negatively affected the children—in particular the older children’s academics
and mental health, and the youngest child’s toilet training. Lyndsey believed,
and other evidence confirmed, that Adam was putting the children in the
middle of their parenting disputes. For her part, Lyndsey testified that she
tried to “never talk poorly about Adam in front of the children” and tried to
be supportive of him spending time with the children whenever possible.

Adam surreptitiously created more than 700 audio or video recordings
of his interactions with Lyndsey (sometimes including the children and their

Spoiler alert: by the end of the play, both Romeo and Juliet are dead. See William
1

Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, act 5, sc. 3.

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sporting events), which the district court found was a “red flag.”2 Adam
claimed the recordings were evidence of Lyndsey “changing the story and
misrepresenting what had happened,” but he later admitted the recordings
did not support that claim. And he did not offer into evidence any recordings
demonstrating bad behavior by Lyndsey. Lyndsey testified that Adam drove
by her house so frequently she felt like she was “being watched.” At trial,
Adam denied stalking Lyndsey, but the district court wrote it specifically
“d[id] not believe this testimony.” Some of the other recordings include
statements Adam made to the children, where he can be heard manipulating
them or calling Lyndsey names. Adam testified that he wished he could get
along better with Lyndsey and that he regretted some of the worst things he
said. But he also described the recorded conversations—including the one
about murdering Lyndsey—as “talking and venting and doing the things that
most normal adults do.”

In addition to the interpersonal conflict with Lyndsey, Adam has also
created other parenting problems. He has refused to pay for necessary allergy
testing to address one of the children’s allergies to most common antibiotics.
And he refused to participate in multiple sessions with one of the children’s
counselors, even though the counselor concluded meeting with Adam and
Lyndsey separately for multiple sessions was necessary for the counselor to
make any progress with the child. Adam refused to introduce Lyndsey to his
girlfriend, even though she has lived with the children for more than a year
2
Adam also recorded some of his interactions with people other than Lyndsey, and
some were admitted as evidence at trial. We do not dwell on these, except to note they
generally support the district court’s ruling. For example, Adam recorded himself
disparaging Lyndsey to a stranger—a prospective tenant—and claimed he “gave up”
physical care of the youngest child to get more time with his “big kids.” He also recorded
interactions with the children in which he undermined Lyndsey’s parenting and told them
they could soon choose to live with him most of the time.

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and helps take care of them during Adam’s parenting time. Adam also
repeatedly failed to pay one of the children’s daycare providers on time,
forcing Lyndsey to cover Adam’s share so that the provider did not disenroll
the child. Adam threatened criminal kidnapping charges against the same
daycare provider when she asked him to not drop in unannounced and to
follow the custody agreement for picking up the child; Adam made her so
uncomfortable that she expressed concern to the local police chief. Before
trial, the court enjoined Adam from being on the daycare provider’s property.
Even with the injunction, the daycare provider testified at trial that she feared
reprisal from Adam.

For his part, Adam blamed Lyndsey for not allowing him more
parenting time with the youngest child after the child finished breastfeeding.
He also faulted Lyndsey for subpoenaing his financial records, which he
claimed was a “dig at financial control.” And he blamed the daycare provider
for asking questions, though he admitted to eventually agreeing to the
injunction.

A common theme among trial witnesses was that there was a “Jekyll
and Hyde”3 dynamic at play, especially with Adam’s behavior. One of
Lyndsey’s friends, who had witnessed ten-to-twenty custody exchanges,
testified that Adam yelled at Lyndsey during about half of the exchanges. The
district court credited this testimony, including that “Adam called Lyndsey
names while the kids were present.” This same friend observed that, when
members of the public were around, Adam would behave differently, like
everything was fine between him and Lyndsey—he would even touch

3
A second classical-literature spoiler: Mr. Hyde is the murderous alter-ego of the
gentlemanly Dr. Jekyll. See generally Robert Louis Stevenson, The Strange Case of Dr.
Jekyll and Mr. Hyde (London, Longmans, Green & Co. 1886).

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Lyndsey and put his arm on her back. Lyndsey testified that this behavior led
“people at soccer practice [to] still think we’re married,” even though she
had “asked [Adam] numerous times not to touch [her].” In a similar example
of presenting differently to different parties, Adam professed at trial that he
supported the children attending counseling throughout the relevant periods
of time, yet the CFR cast doubt on this claim, concluding that Adam had
“made some sort of communication to the school that he didn’t agree with
the counseling and then tried to walk it back.” Last, among its credibility
findings, the district court observed that Adam simultaneously appeared
“irritated” and “gregarious and mostly friendly.”

One of Lyndsey’s coworkers, who knows both parents from soccer
practices, testified that Adam and Lyndsey were both good parents who love
their kids. The court found this witness was Adam’s “best,” as she testified
that Adam and Lyndsey could at least occasionally co-parent successfully.

Lyndsey told the court that she had to take out loans on her home and
retirement account, as well as borrow from her parents, to pay attorney fees
for the modification action. A significant amount of Lyndsey’s legal expenses
related to dealing with the hundreds of recordings Adam created. And
additional costs were incurred by depositions because, in Lyndsey’s words,
Adam’s parents were “trying to hide the fringe benefits that they provide for
Adam” through the family business. Lyndsey and her parents also fronted
some of the fees for the court-appointed CFR. According to Lyndsey, both
Adam and his family told her she would “financially be destroyed” if she
sought court intervention regarding the children.

The CFR reported that the parenting dynamic had affected the
children. She observed that both parents loved the children, but they had
different parenting styles: Lyndsey is the more organized caregiver, while

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Adam “has a more joking style of personality that perhaps maybe doesn’t
mesh well with Lyndsey’s style of personality.” The CFR thought Lyndsey
had generally been more proactive about providing for the children’s medical
and mental-health needs. And she testified that the children overhearing the
disputes and disagreements between their parents was not in their best
interests. She described Adam’s habit of recording every interaction with
Lyndsey a “terrible idea,” particularly to the extent it put the children in the
middle at events like custody exchanges. And she testified that there was
consensus among people she talked to that at least one of the children had
struggled with mental health over the last few years.

The court’s ruling concisely summed things up: “Adam and Lyndsey
do not like each other.” The court found their animosity infected their
relationships with the children and negatively affected the family unit. And
the court expressly noted that, while not all blame for this was equal, both
parties contributed to the deterioration in their ability to co-parent. In much
the same vein, the court also credited the CFR report, which noted that
Adam and Lyndsey both loved their children but had lost sight of the
children’s best interests due to their dislike of each other.

Despite some less-than-ideal behavior by both parties, the district
court opined that “[t]he modification decision is not a close call.” Although
the court noted Lyndsey was somewhat preoccupied with money and control,
it found this was far outweighed by Adam’s “volatile behavior and
disrespectful communication.” And the court found the degree of conflict
between Adam and Lyndsey was “extraordinarily high.”

The court ultimately found a substantial change in circumstances and
that Lyndsey was the superior parent, resulting in the court placing physical
care of all three children with Lyndsey. But the court also increased Adam’s

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parenting time with the youngest child, at least partially consistent with both
parties’ stated preference for all three children sharing a similar schedule.
The court also ordered Adam to pay $15,000 of Lyndsey’s trial-attorney fees
and the outstanding CFR fees, based on his higher earning potential and his
“stubbornness regarding discovery.”

Lyndsey moved to enlarge or amend. As relevant to this appeal, she
sought to assign all of the CFR fees to Adam. Adam also moved to enlarge or
amend. As relevant to this appeal, he sought to further increase his time with
the children, make a related change to the child-support calculation, and
decrease the award of attorney fees. The court acknowledged Lyndsey’s
request on the CFR fees but then assigned the same portion of fees to Adam.
The court increased Adam’s parenting time to include a weekday overnight
but denied his request to decrease the award of attorney fees. Adam appeals,
and Lyndsey cross-appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
“Petitions to modify the physical care provisions of a divorce decree
lie in equity. [And] our review is de novo.” In re Marriage of Hoffman,
867 N.W.2d 26, 32 (Iowa 2015) (internal citation omitted). We give weight to
the district court’s factual findings, particularly regarding the credibility of
witnesses, but we are not bound by them. In re Marriage of Hansen,
733 N.W.2d 683, 690 (Iowa 2007). “The children’s best interest is the
controlling consideration,” providing “the flexibility necessary to consider
unique custody issues on a case-by-case basis.” Hoffman, 867 N.W.2d at 32
(cleaned up).

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DISCUSSION
Adam argues in his appeal that the district court should not have
placed physical care of the two older children with Lyndsey because he
believes there was not a material and substantial change in circumstances
and, even if there was, Lyndsey is not the superior parent. He also argues that
the court should have only modified physical care of the youngest child to be
equally shared or, in the alternative, he should have more visitation. And he
challenges the court’s order that he pay Lyndsey’s trial-attorney fees and the
remaining fees for the CFR. He also urges that, should he prevail on appeal,
he should receive appellate attorney fees. Lyndsey resists all of Adam’s
arguments. She also claims on cross-appeal that the district court erred in
altering the visitation schedule, erred in calculating Adam’s income for
purposes of child support, and erred in dividing the CFR fees. She also asks
for appellate attorney fees. Given the laundry list of issues pressed by the
parties and the sometimes-overlapping claims, we address the substance in a
slightly different order than the parties’ briefs.

I. Substantial Change in Circumstances

Adam first contests whether there was a substantial change in
circumstances. The legal standard is well established:
To change a custodial provision of a dissolution decree, the
applying party must establish by a preponderance of evidence that
conditions since the decree was entered have so materially and
substantially changed that the children’s best interests make it expedient
to make the requested change. The changed circumstances must not have
been contemplated by the court when the decree was entered, and they
must be more or less permanent, not temporary. They must relate to the
welfare of the children. A parent seeking to take custody from the other
must prove an ability to minister more effectively to the children’s well
being. The heavy burden upon a party seeking to modify custody stems

9
from the principle that once custody of children has been fixed it should be
disturbed only for the most cogent reasons.

In re Marriage of Frederici, 338 N.W.2d 156, 158 (Iowa 1983).

On review, we agree with the district court that the conflict between
Adam and Lyndsey is worse now than it was at the time of the divorce. This
is well corroborated by the record, including the CFR’s report and the
numerous audio-video and text-message exhibits that show first-hand the
deterioration in the parties’ interactions. Beyond the communication issues,
there is also record evidence detailing the problems with daycare, exchanges,
and payment for the children’s expenses. These changes in circumstance
relate directly to the welfare of the children, given the testimony establishing
how the conflict between parents affected the children in different ways—
whether with academics, their emotional health, or their toilet training. This
is the type of persistent parenting discord our courts have previously
recognized as a proper basis for modification. See, e.g., In re Marriage of
Harris, 877 N.W.2d 434, 442–44 (Iowa 2016); In re Marriage of Walton, 577
N.W.2d 869, 870 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998).

The gist of Adam’s argument on appeal is an attempt to re-litigate his
bad behavior as found by the district court, essentially incident by incident.
But even de novo appeals are not the trial redux. See Hora v. Hora, 5 N.W.3d
635, 645 (Iowa 2024). Suffice to say, we have considered Adam’s attempts at
minimizing or justifying his behavior, and—like the district court—we are
not persuaded. We also affirmatively reject Adam’s contention that his
discussions with his new paramour about killing Lyndsey reflect the ordinary
acrimony of divorce; most people don’t discuss in detail their plans for killing
an ex-spouse, let alone openly wish for their homicide or suicide (on a
recording of their own making, no less). In short, the discord between these

10
parties is beyond the norm, and Adam downplaying his conduct on appeal is
no basis for relief.

We single out one aspect of the district court’s ruling for more
discussion only because Adam does so in his appellate brief. According to
Adam, the “district court took an unusual interest” in the fact his live-in
girlfriend remained married to another man. But as we read the district court
ruling, it seems the court mentioned this fact due to the perceived hypocrisy
of Adam criticizing others and holding himself out as a man of faith and
positive role model. To this appellate panel, Adam’s girlfriend’s marital
status has no probative value in assessing whether there has been a material
and substantial change in circumstances since the divorce.4 But we share the
court’s underlying concerned that Adam is acting hypocritically—to put it
mildly—when he purports to be a role model for his sons while also calling
Lyndsey the four-letter words set forth in this opinion, hoping for her suicide,
and fantasizing about her murder. To the extent the district court’s comment
on Adam’s hypocrisy for living with a woman married to another man was
inartful or unnecessary, it did not prejudice Adam, and any error was
harmless given our de novo review. And to the extent Adam urges on appeal
he is owed relief because the district court was biased or engaged in unethical
conduct, we disagree.

II. Physical-Care Placement

Neither Adam nor Lyndsey, in the absence of the acrimony between
them, are bad parents. Both love their children and want what’s best for

4
We recognize there is record evidence that Adam’s girlfriend’s children—who
live at Adam’s house—receive preferential treatment compared to Adam’s children,
which is a source of strife. This could weigh in favor of changed circumstances. But we
don’t need to wade into that messy issue to resolve this appeal, so we don’t.

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them. And the primary dispute below was Adam seeking shared physical care
of the youngest child, while Lyndsey sought physical care of the older two—
in other words, each sought to have all three children on the same schedule
with differing opinions of what that schedule should be. But their excessive
discord and dysfunction have proven shared physical care unworkable.
Considering the Hansen factors, the district court found the parents “do not
come close” to satisfying two factors crucial to such an arrangement:
respectful communication and a low degree of conflict. See Hansen, 733
N.W.2d at 698–99. The court also found “Lyndsey presented a compelling
case” as to the children’s best interests overall. The remaining Hansen
factor—historical contribution to physical care—weighed in favor of shared
physical care, but it did not outweigh the other factors in this analysis. See id.
at 698. Considering Adam’s behaviors and Lyndsey’s responses, as well as
their differing approaches to home life, school priorities, and emotional
challenges, we agree with the district court that shared physical care is no
longer appropriate for this family. As for Adam’s arguments specific to
switching the youngest child to shared physical care, we reject this claim for
the same reasons discussed regarding the older children.

Once shared physical care was no longer in the children’s best
interests, the district court had to determine which parent would be the
superior caregiver for physical-care placement. Frederici, 338 N.W.2d at 158.
Our controlling consideration is which placement would be in the children’s
best interests. Hoffman, 867 N.W.2d at 32. We look at the factors from Iowa
Code section 598.41 (2023) “to place the children in the environment most
likely to bring them to health, both physically and mentally, and to social
maturity.” Hansen, 733 N.W.2d at 695–96 (applying section 598.41 custody
factors to a physical-care decision).

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On our review, we agree with the district court that Lyndsey is best
able to minister to the children’s needs. Although Adam is a major presence
in the children’s lives, the record makes clear that Lyndsey has the lion’s
share of responsibilities for the children’s day-to-day mental, physical,
financial, and emotional needs. The greatest disparity between these parents
is in their ability to treat the other with respect, such that it will foster the
children’s relationship with both parents—not just one. On this item, the
scales tip decisively in favor of Lyndsey: given the language Adam uses to
interact with Lyndsey and talk about her with third parties, some of which
has been deployed in front of the children, it is hard to imagine Adam
fostering the children’s relationship with their mother in any positive way.
And we note here our explicit conclusion that it is not just the vulgar and
threatening language used by Adam that matters, but also the underlying
animosity and disrespect—if not outright hatred—it communicates to all
listeners about how this father feels about the children’s mother. Healthy
communication between divorced parents is a necessary ingredient for
successful co-parenting, and Adam has proven again and again that he is
unable to communicate in a civilized manner. We affirm placing physical care
of the children with Lyndsey.

III. The Children’s Preferences

Adam also argues the district court erred by not adequately
considering the older children’s wishes. See Iowa Code § 598.41(3)(f ). We
assume Adam does not contend the three-year-old’s wishes could be readily
ascertained. And neither of the older children testified at trial, so the only
information we have about their preferences is from the CFR. Her report
includes paraphrases of her discussion with them: one child expressed that
he might like to spend more time at Adam’s house, though the CFR

13
speculated that may be in part because Adam does not limit that child’s time
playing a popular online videogame in his room and Lyndsey does; the other
child generally expressed that he would like things to stay the same, though
the CFR noted that was consistent with this child’s overall dislike of changes
or disruptions and that he was emotional yet generally hesitant to share his
feelings with her. The district court acknowledged these preferences, though
it found other interests outweighed the children’s preferences and warranted
modification.

We reject Adam’s contention the district court had “casual disregard”
for the children’s preferences. Although we shouldn’t have to say it, we
observe that attacking the district court’s motives is generally unhelpful to
appellate review. And here, Adam mischaracterizes the ruling. The district
court specifically acknowledged the children’s preferences and placed them
in an appropriate context—including concerns about their grades and mental
and emotional wellbeing. We discern no error. And on our de novo review,
we agree with the district court’s overall conclusion. So we reject Adam’s
inaccurate claims on this issue.

IV. Weekday Overnights for Adam

Lyndsey urges the court erred in awarding Adam the mid-week
overnight with the children. We tend to agree with Lyndsey that the post-trial
ruling is sparse on details of why the court ordered an additional overnight
with Adam during the week. But given the length of the original decree and
the state of the record, there is enough information before us we are
comfortable performing appellate review.

As noted throughout this opinion, we believe the district court was in
the best position to decide the important credibility questions in this case and
determine the children’s best interests. On that basis, and because we

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generally agree that spending significant time with Adam is important to the
children’s development and growth, we affirm. We recognize Lyndsey
speculates that this change will disrupt the children’s routine and negatively
affect their mental health and academics. But this claim is undercut by the
fact Lyndsey herself proposed a weekday overnight for Adam. And we
recognize that the frequent nature of the children’s after-school activities
would often fill a substantial portion of a shorter weekday parenting time.
Should the weekday overnight prove to be truly disruptive in a way the
district court could not have foreseen, Lyndsey may petition again for
modification—though we express no preemptive opinion on the merits of
such a petition. At this juncture, we have no cogent basis that would justify
disturbing the new visitation schedule.

V. Adam’s Income

Lyndsey next argues the district court undervalued Adam’s income
with its figure of $100,000. Specifically, she points to record evidence
establishing Adam makes roughly $106,000 per year from his automotive job,
another roughly $6,000 from his work as an EMT and firefighter, and some
amount of income from rental properties (seemingly in a gross amount as
high as $35,400). She also emphasizes that Adam listed his own income as
$135,400 in a sworn financial statement he provided a bank. Record
developed at trial indicates Adam failed to disclose the rental venture during
earlier stages of litigation. And Adam claimed at trial that he lied or
misrepresented his income to the bank on the financial statement.

We largely agree with Lyndsey’s position. The district court
underestimated Adam’s income by at least approximately $12,000, even
without counting the rental income. This record does not give us all of the
satisfactory answers about how much of the $35,400 gross rental income

15
should be considered net income for child-support purposes, in the sense
that we don’t know Adam’s expenses and cannot make a conclusion about
whether they are properly considered as reducing his income for purposes of
the child-support calculation. And we are not inclined to blame Lyndsey for
this deficit in the record, as she put forward competent proof of Adam’s gross
income.

Based on this peculiar record, we vacate the district court’s child-
support calculation and remand with directions to calculate Adam’s income
for purposes of child support based on his full wages at the automotive job,
his full wages from working as an EMT and firefighter, and his net rental
income. See In re Marriage of McCabe, No. 20-1121, 2022 WL 468738, at *5
(Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 16, 2022) (including income from rental properties as
part of the calculation of actual income for determining child support). If
Adam does not supply adequate information for the district court to
determine his net rather than gross income from rental properties, the court
shall impute the full gross rental income to Adam for purposes of child
support.

VI. CFR Fees

Lyndsey argues that, since she prevailed below and Adam was ordered
to pay court costs, he should bear the full cost of the CFR. We agree. See Iowa
Code § 598.12B(3) (“The court shall enter an order in favor of the . . . child
and family reporter for fees and disbursements, and the amount shall be
charged against the party responsible for court costs . . . .”); In re Marriage of
Drury, No. 22-0494, 2023 WL 152519, at *6 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2023)
(concluding the district court lacks discretion to divide CFR fees in light of
the clear statutory language of section 598.12B(3)). But the exact state of who
was ordered to pay what in regard to the CFR fees is a little murky at this

16
point in the litigation. Lyndsey advanced at least $10,500 in CFR fees before
trial, and it appears the district court only ordered Adam to pay the remaining
outstanding fees in the amount of approximately $4,327. Pursuant to
section 598.12B(3), Adam is responsible for the full amount. We therefore
reverse any contrary portion of the district court’s ruling and remand with
directions for the district court to order Adam to pay the full cost of the CFR,
including reimbursing Lyndsey for fees she advanced.

VII. Attorney Fees

Adam asks that, if he prevails on appeal, we reverse the district court’s
award of attorney fees to Lyndsey. He also asks us to award him appellate
attorney fees. Because he did not prevail on any of his appellate issues and his
income is substantially greater than Lyndsey’s, we reject both his claims
outright. See Iowa Code § 598.36; In re Marriage of Kisting, 6 N.W.3d 326,
337–38 (Iowa Ct. App. 2024).

Lyndsey also requests appellate attorney fees, asking us to award her
$10,000 in fees based on Adam’s income and substantial assets. Because
Lyndsey was required to defend the district court’s judgment from Adam’s
appeal, because she prevailed in part on her own cross-appeal, and because
we agree Adam has substantially greater income and assets, we conclude
Adam should pay no more than 75% of Lyndsey’s appellate-attorney fees.
Lyndsey submitted a fee affidavit detailing more than $20,000 in appellate-
attorney fees. We have reviewed the affidavit and conclude that, even
applying a 25% reduction, there is more than adequate billing to support her
$10,000 request. We order Adam to reimburse Lyndsey for $10,000 in
appellate-attorney fees.

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DISPOSITION
We affirm the district court ruling in all aspects but two: we reverse the
child-support calculation for further proceedings and remand for a new
calculation of Adam’s income, and we reverse and remand with directions
for the district court to order Adam to pay all CFR fees and vacate any
language to the contrary in the district court’s order. We also order Adam to
reimburse Lyndsey $10,000 in appellate-attorney fees. Costs on appeal are
assessed 75% to Adam and 25% to Lyndsey.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.

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