Damon Stalkfleet v. Edgar Stroughmatt

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 24-1816
Filed February 11, 2026
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Damon Stalkfleet,
Plaintiff–Appellant,
v.
Edgar Stroughmatt,
Defendant–Appellee.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Muscatine County,
The Honorable Patrick A. McElyea, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Gary Dickey and Matthew Sahag of Dickey, Campbell, & Sahag Law Firm,
PLC, Des Moines, attorneys for appellant.

Kent A. Gummert, Alexandra C. Galbraith Davis (until withdrawal), Jessica
L. McNamara, of Lederer Weston Craig PLC, West Des Moines, and
Andrew C. Johnson of Lamson Dugan & Murray LLP, West Des Moines,
attorneys for appellee.
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Considered without oral argument
by Schumacher, P.J., Ahlers, J., and Bower, S.J.
Opinion by Schumacher, P.J.

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SCHUMACHER, Presiding Judge.

Damon Stalkfleet appeals the district court ruling in favor of Edgar
Stroughmatt’s motion for summary judgment. He asserts there are genuine
issues of material fact regarding whether Stroughmatt possessed actual
knowledge of peril to be apprehended because of improper training and faulty
equipment leading to Stalkfleet’s brother’s death, based on alleged co-
employee gross negligence. He also claims a genuine issue of material fact
exists as to whether bystander liability extends to Stalkfleet because he
witnessed his brother’s injuries. Upon our review, we affirm.

BACKGROUND FACTS & PROCEEDINGS
Stalkfleet and his brother, Dillon, were a part of a switch operation
team at Bakery Feeds railyard in Muscatine, Iowa. A switch operation team’s
job duties include rearranging rail cars so they can be filled with product and
emptied. One of Stalkfleet’s work duties was to operate a Rail King railcar
mover (“Rail King”) to assist in pushing and pulling railcars. Dillon’s duty
as part of the two-man operation was to act as a “spotter.” The Rail King was
equipped with an air brake system. To use the air brake, the operator had to
connect the brake to a railcar intended to be moved and wait for the air
compressor to fill to the appropriate pressure. The railcars also had a wheel
brake which required manual force to slow or stop the railcar. The Rail King
at Bakery Feeds had non-functioning air brakes.

Bakery Feeds’ rail system is connected to the Canadian Pacific rail-
line, which transports product to their intended destinations. On Bakery
Fields’ property, there are two rail-lines, the White Line, a track meant to
hold railcars until they are needed to transport product, and the Red Line,
which runs uphill to the factory where product is made. There is a switch

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where the Red, White, and main lines connect, which allows employees to
change which line the cars travel on.

Around two weeks before the incident, Vascik, an employee from
another plant, told the operators and spotters that the spotters could no
longer ride on the railcars to manually engage the wheel brake. Instead, the
employees had to engage the wheel brake from a ground-level position while
positioning themselves in front of an oncoming railcar. The employees had
been riding the railcars to engage the wheel brake because of the
nonfunctional air brakes. In order to manually engage the wheel brake, a
spotter had to enter the “red zone,” which is the area ten feet in front and
behind a railcar and four feet on each side of the tracks. It is common practice
for a worker to never enter the red zone while a railcar is moving, and doing
so is to “foul the track,” which is considered dangerous.

Stalkfleet and another employee complained to management about the
dangerous nature of setting a wheel brake from the ground. The response was
that if there was a runaway car, to “let it go.” After Vascik’s instructions, a
contractor serviced the Rail King to fix the air brakes, but the brakes still
failed on occasion. Stalkfleet admitted later that he did not always test the air
brakes to see whether they were working prior to operating the Rail King.

By the time of the incident, Stalkfleet had been operating the Rail King
for six years. He was trained on how to use the Rail King by a fellow
employee. Stalkfleet, after becoming proficient at operating the Rail King,
trained other employees on how to use it. During those six years that
Stalkfleet operated the Rail King, no one had been injured.

Stroughmatt was the general manager at the plant. He was responsible
for general safety at the plant, but he did not train employees on how to

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properly use the Rail King or how to act as a spotter. Stroughmatt’s job duties
did not include directing operators’ and spotters’ daily work.

Stalkfleet’s brother, Dillon, was working as a temporary employee and
had been employed at the site for two years. Stalkfleet had trained Dillon to
be a spotter, they worked together as a team, and one of Dillon’s duties was
to perform the rail switching.

On the day of the incident, Dillon and Stalkfleet were working as a
team performing switching operations. That morning, upon the team arriving
at work, the Rail King was already attached to a railcar near the factory.
Stalkfleet warmed up the Rail King so the compressors on the air brake could
build pressure, inspected the Rail King, then filled the attached railcar with
product. But Stalkfleet did not connect the air brakes to the railcar.
Stroughmatt was not present at the site on this day.

The team’s duties that day included several trips with empty and filled
railcars being either pushed or pulled by the Rail King. These tasks required
switching from the Red and White Lines numerous times. Eventually, Dillon
and Stalkfleet needed to push cars down the Red Line. After Dillon made the
track switch, he signaled to Stalkfleet to show it was clear to begin pushing
the cars. After seeing this signal, Stalkfleet saw Dillon from around twenty
feet away, crossing over the track. Stalkfleet thought that Dillon had already
set the wheel brake halfway behind the furthest car and was waiting beside
the track to fully set the brake when they reached their destination.

Stalkfleet then engaged the Rail King and pushed the cars on the Red
Line without stopping until he arrived at the designated area, which was
around 300 feet from the rail switch. Stalkfleet waited for Dillon to fully set
the hand brake on the furthest car. But Stalkfleet noticed the Rail King and

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cars were still moving, so he knew Dillon had not fully set the hand brake. So,
he held the hand brake on the Rail King, waiting on Dillon. After waiting for
a time, Stalkfleet attempted to contact Dillon on the radio, but the radio was
dead. Dillon also did not answer his cell phone. Stalkfleet put the Rail King
in reverse, and because of the incline, he was able to stop the Rail King so he
could check on Dillon. After seeing various items belonging to Dillon on the
ground, Stalkfleet ran to the end of the furthest car, finding Dillon
underneath. He realized Dillon had been run over and drug under the railcar.
Dillon’s injuries were fatal.

Stalkfleet brought claims against Stroughmatt for co-employee gross
negligence under Iowa Code section 85.20(2) (2021) of the Iowa Worker’s
Compensation Act and a reckless-disregard-for-safety claim. Stalkfleet
asserted he sustained emotional damages from witnessing his injured brother
under the railcar. He alleged that Stroughmatt failed to provide proper
equipment and training, leading to the accident and mental injury.1

Stroughmatt filed a motion for summary judgment on both claims.
The district court granted his motion, concluding that Stalkfleet failed to
show a genuine issue of material fact on the co-employee gross negligence
claim regarding whether Stroughmatt possessed knowledge of the peril to be
apprehended and if he knew injury was a probable rather than a possible
result of the peril. The basis of this ruling was that Stroughmatt was not
aware of peril to Stalkfleet.

Stalkfleet then filed a motion to reconsider, amend, and enlarge the
court’s summary judgment ruling. He did not challenge the ruling on the

1
Stalkfleet also brought suit against Darling, the parent company of Bakery Feeds,
and other co-employees. Those parties were dismissed with prejudice. Stroughmatt is the
remaining defendant.

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reckless-disregard-for-safety claim and did not raise his bystander-emotional-
distress claim. The district court denied the motion. Stalkfleet now appeals,
arguing there are genuine issues of material fact on the co-employee gross
negligence claim and the bystander-emotional-distress claim.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review the district court’s order granting a motion for summary
judgment for correction of errors at law. DeSousa v. Iowa Realty Co., Inc., 975
N.W.2d 416, 420 (Iowa 2022). “In doing so, we ʻview the facts in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party.’” Id. (citation omitted). “Even if the
facts are undisputed, summary judgment is not proper if reasonable minds
could draw different inferences from them and thereby reach different
conclusions.” Banwart v. 50th St. Sports, L.L.C., 910 N.W.2d 540, 544–45
(Iowa 2018) (citation omitted). Stalkfleet “may not rest upon the mere
allegations of his . . . pleading but must set forth specific facts showing the
existence of a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 545 (citation omitted).

ANALYSIS
I. Co-Employee Gross Negligence

Stalkfleet asserts there are genuine issues of material fact concerning
Stroughmatt allegedly disregarding perils that placed Stalkfleet and Dillon in
a zone of imminent danger where injury was probable, so this claim should
have survived summary judgment.

Workplace injuries to employees are governed by the Iowa Workers’
Compensation Act, which only allows recovery from co-employees if the
injury was “caused by the other employee’s gross negligence amounting to
such lack of care as to amount to wanton neglect for the safety of another.”
Iowa Code § 85.20(2). To establish “gross negligence” under section 85.20

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a plaintiff must show that the co-employee possessed: “(1) knowledge of the
peril to be apprehended; (2) knowledge that injury is a probable, as opposed
to a possible, result of the danger; and (3) a conscious failure to avoid the
peril.” Thompson v. Bohlken, 312 N.W.2d 501, 505 (Iowa 1981).

For the first element, it must be shown that the co-employee possessed
actual, and not constructive, knowledge of the potential peril. Walker v.
Mlakar, 489 N.W.2d 401, 405 (Iowa 1992).

The second element requires “more than a showing of the defendant’s
actual or constructive knowledge” that their conduct placed the plaintiff in
“imminent danger so that someone would probably . . . be injured because of
the conduct.” Alden v. Genie Indus., 475 N.W.2d 1, 2 (Iowa 1991) (citation
omitted). This can be satisfied by evidence showing the defendant “knew or
should have known that his conduct placed the plaintiff in a zone of imminent
danger.” Id. Showing of a zone of imminent danger can be shown by two
methods: (1) “it can be made by proving defendant’s actual or constructive
awareness of a history of accidents under similar circumstances,” or; (2) “[a]
high probability of harm is manifest even in the absence of a history of
accidents or injury.” Id. at 2–3.

The third element is generally reliant on the other elements because
“it is theoretically and factually impossible for an employee to ʻconsciously
fail to avoid’ a peril if the employee did not actually know of it.” Walker, 489
N.W.2d at 405.

Here, Stalkfleet alleges that he was insufficiently trained and provided
nonfunctioning equipment, which shows that Stroughmatt possessed actual
knowledge of potential peril and that injury was a probable result of that peril.
Starting with the alleged failure to properly train, Stalkfleet argues that this

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failure can constitute gross negligence, citing Estate of Zdroik by Zdroik v.
Ostrowski, No. 22-1724, 2023 WL 5602852, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 30,
2023). But while that case mentions that the defendant “may have had a duty
to train Zdroik and his crew members on safety procedures,” it does not give
weight to training procedures in its analysis of the second element. See Est. of
Zdroik by Zdroik, 2023 WL 5602852, at *2.

Moreover, gross negligence claims cannot be solely based upon
improper safety protocols, training, or an identified safety violation after the
incident. See Walker, 489 N.W.2d at 405 (stating gross negligence claims
based on failure to provide a safe working environment absent actual
knowledge of peril is insufficient because it “would . . . require plant safety
managers . . . to become the insurers of other employees for every potential
peril, real or otherwise, within the plant”); see also Stokes v. Murillo, No. 23-
0289, 2024 WL 1553788, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 10, 2024) (“A safety
violation issued after the injury provides no support for the required
knowledge . . . .”). The record also does not indicate that Stroughmatt was
responsible for training Rail King operators or spotters.2

As to the alleged failure to provide proper equipment, Stalkfleet
asserts that because Stroughmatt had knowledge of the Rail King’s faulty air
brakes he consequently possessed actual knowledge of the peril to be
apprehended. But Stalkfleet’s claim is based upon his witnessing the result
of injuries to his brother, not on whether he was in imminent danger or peril.
2
We note that in Stalkfleet’s reply brief, he highlights a recent case from our court,
Griffith v. Kulper. We find the current case to be both factually and legally distinguishable
from the facts presented in Griffith. And the supreme court recently vacated our court’s
affirmance of a claim of co-employee gross negligence in such opinion. See Griffith v.
Kulper, ___ N.W.3d ___, 2026 WL 317927 (Iowa 2026).

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The record does not show that Stalkfleet himself was in peril, as he was inside
the Rail King during the accident, not in danger of injury due to poorly
functioning air brakes. And the record shows that Stalkfleet did not connect
the air brakes that day. There is no evidence indicating that Stroughmatt
possessed actual knowledge that if an injury occurred to Dillon, Stalkfleet
would witness it. It appears the peril to be apprehended was that without
working air brakes, an employee outside the Rail King was in danger of fouling
the track and being injured. This peril did not extend to Stalkfleet, as he was
not in danger of being injured by fouling the track. See Judge v. Clark, No. 05-
1219, 2006 WL 3313794, at *7 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 16, 2006) (analyzing a
gross negligence claim “under the facts and circumstances of the case” and
contextualizing the peril). We agree with the district court that imputation of
this knowledge to Stroughmatt would approach constructive knowledge, not
actual knowledge as required by precedent. See Walker, 489 N.W.2d at 405.

Further, Stalkfleet had operated the Rail King for almost six years
without incident even without completely functioning air brakes, was
considered proficient, and he had trained several other employees on how to
use it. There is no showing that Stroughmatt knew that injury was a probable,
as opposed to a possible result of the faulty air brakes. See id. at 406. Also,
Stalkfleet’s argument that utilizing manual operation of the hand brakes,
which places an employee in the “red zone” of a railroad, also qualifies as a
zone of imminent danger is without merit. See Est. of Morgan by Morgan v.
Union Pac. R.R. Co., 20 N.W.3d 232, 243–44 (Iowa 2025) (explaining that a
railroad’s “red zone” does not equate to a “zone of danger”). Because we
find that Stroughmatt did not possess actual knowledge of the peril to be
apprehended, there is no genuine issue of material fact that this claim fails on
the first element. See id.

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II. Bystander Liability

Stalkfleet asserts that he should be able to recover for the mental
distress he sustained because of witnessing the injuries to Dillon and that the
“personal injury” language within section 85.20 encompasses physical
injuries as well as psychological injuries.

Error was not preserved on this issue. Stalkfleet argues that error was
preserved because bystander liability was raised in Stroughmatt’s motion for
summary judgment and in the district court’s order granting Stroughmatt’s
motion. But the district court did not rule on the bystander liability claim in
its order granting summary judgment, Stalkfleet did not raise such in his
motion to reconsider, and the district court did not address such in its order
on Stalkfleet’s motion to amend, reconsider, or enlarge. “It is a fundamental
doctrine of appellate review that issues must ordinarily be both raised and
decided by the district court before we will decide them on appeal.” Meier v.
Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002) (emphasis added). Even if the
bystander liability issue was raised in Stroughmatt’s motion for summary
judgment, the district court did not decide the issue.

CONCLUSION
We affirm the district court’s ruling that there are no genuine issues of
material fact concerning the elements of co-employee gross negligence and
that summary judgment in favor of Stroughmatt was appropriate.

AFFIRMED.

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