State of Iowa v. Troy Douglas Meyer

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 25-0115
Filed February 11, 2026
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State of Iowa,
Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
Troy Douglas Meyer,
Defendant–Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County,
The Honorable Thomas A. Bitter, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Debra S. De Jong, Orange City, attorney for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Timothy M. Hau, Assistant Attorney
General, attorneys for appellee.
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Considered without oral argument
by Greer, P.J., and Schumacher and Ahlers, JJ.
Opinion by Schumacher, J.

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SCHUMACHER, Judge.

Troy Meyer appeals the district court’s sentencing order placing him
in the Department of Corrections Continuum and imposing restitution.
Meyer claims the district court abused its discretion by not considering all
relevant factors when formulating his sentence and failing to explain why the
sentence differed from the plea agreement. Meyer also contends the district
court erred in the restitution order. Upon our review, we conclude the district
court properly considered relevant sentencing factors, and we find no error
in the restitution as ordered. Upon our review, we affirm.

I. Background Facts & Proceedings

On April 14, 2023, Meyer along with an acquaintance, Sterling, stole a
towable boom lift from Roeder Implement, Inc. Following an investigation by
the Linn County Sheriff’s Department, an arrest warrant was issued, and
Meyer was taken into custody. Meyer was charged with first-degree theft.

Meyer later entered into a plea agreement wherein he agreed to plead
guilty to second-degree theft, and the agreement included the following
sentencing recommendation: a five-year suspended sentence, five years of
formal probation, a no-contact order, and a suspended fine of $1,025. As to
victim restitution, under the plea agreement, Meyer was to be jointly and
severally liable with Sterling. The plea agreement also provided notice to
Meyer that “the Court is not bound by the plea agreement and may sentence
[Meyer] up to the maximum sentence provided by law.” Following the guilty
plea, the district court ordered a presentence investigation report (PSI).

The PSI recommended Meyer be sentenced to a five-year suspended
sentence, placed on formal probation for a period of five years, and as a
condition of the probation, Meyer should be placed in the Corrections

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Continuum. The PSI did not mention the restitution amount other than
restating the plea agreement.

At sentencing, the district court stated:
My point is, you’re only 36 years old. You’ve got a significant
history, criminal history, including multiple thefts, and the deal that you’ve
reached with the State is for a suspended prison sentence where you don’t
go to prison, a suspended fine where you don’t pay the fine. . . . There’s
very little punishment for what you did here . . . .

The court sentenced Meyer to a suspended term of imprisonment not
to exceed five years, formal probation for a period of five years, placement in
the Department of Corrections Continuum, and ordered Meyer to pay
restitution in the amount of $6,711, jointly and severally with Sterling. Meyer
appeals.

II. Analysis

A. Whether the District Court Erred by Placing Meyer on the
Corrections Continuum

Meyer claims the district court did not properly consider all the mitigating
factors and did not state a sufficient reason for imposing a harsher sentence
than contained in the plea agreement. He alleges the district court abused its
discretion by placing him in the Corrections Continuum.

When reviewing a court’s sentencing decision we review for abuse of
discretion. State v. Barnes, 791 N.W.2d 817, 827 (Iowa 2010). “When
assessing a district court’s decision for abuse of discretion, we only reverse if
the district court’s decision rested on grounds or reasoning that were clearly
untenable or clearly unreasonable.” State v. Plain, 898 N.W.2d 801, 811 (Iowa
2017). A ground or reason is untenable when it is “based on an erroneous

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application of the law or not supported by substantial evidence.” State v.
Dudley, 856 N.W.2d 668, 675 (Iowa 2014).

When sentencing, Iowa courts “may consider a variety of
circumstances, including the nature of the offense and attending
circumstances, as well as the defendant’s age, character, propensities and
chance of reform.” State v. Boltz, 542 N.W.2d 9, 10 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995). A
court need not address every relevant circumstance when sentencing but
must articulate reasons sufficient for a reviewing court to determine whether
an abuse of discretion occurred. See id. at 11. In Boltz, this court determined
that the court’s stated reasons, the nature of the offense, the defendant’s age,
and his past record, were sufficient for appellate review for abuse of
discretion. See id. at 10–11.

Here, the record shows the court’s reasons for deviating from the plea
deal focused on Meyer’s age, his history of prior criminal activity, and the
nature of the offense. The court expressed great concern towards the
leniency of the plea deal based on his criminal history. The record shows that
the district court gave consideration of the relevant factors when sentencing
the defendant to a harsher sentence than the plea deal provided.

Meyer also contends that the district court failed to provide sufficient
reasoning for why it deviated from the plea deal. “Generally, a sentencing
court is not required to give its reasons for rejecting particular sentencing
options.” State v. Loyd, 530 N.W.2d 708, 713–14 (Iowa 1995). We find that the
district court provided sufficient reasoning here. The court stated “you’ve
got a history of repeated thefts and repeated criminal behavior, and I kind of
wonder . . . [,] when are you finally going to start obeying the law . . . [?]” The
court showed that it considered additional deterrence from reoffending was
needed, and the harsher punishment was to incentivize rehabilitation.

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We conclude that the district court considered sufficient relevant
factors when sentencing and stated sufficient reasons for imposing the
sentence. See State v. Kimbrough, No. 16-1280, 2017 WL 2876244, at *3–4
(Iowa Ct. App. July 6, 2017). Because we find that the court’s decision when
sentencing was not clearly untenable or unreasonable, we find no abuse of
discretion by the district court. See Boltz, 542 N.W.2d at 11.

B. Whether the District Court Erred in Determining Restitution
Amount

Meyer next asserts that the district court erred by ordering a
restitution amount of $6,711, arguing that there was not substantial evidence
to support that amount and that the court should have scheduled a separate
hearing to determine “the appropriate amount” of restitution.

“We review restitution orders for correction of errors at law.” State v.
Waigand, 953 N.W.2d 689, 694 (Iowa 2021) (citation omitted). We must
“determine whether the court’s findings lack substantial evidentiary
support, or whether the court has not properly applied the law.” Id. (citation
omitted). We afford the district court “broad discretion in determining the
amount of restitution when the record contains proof of a reasonable basis
from which the amount may be inferred.” Id. (citation omitted). “In all
criminal cases . . . [where] there is a plea of guilty . . . the sentencing court
shall order that pecuniary damages be paid by each offender to the victims
. . . .” Iowa Code § 910.2(1)(a) (2023). “ʻPecuniary damages’ means all
damages to the extent not paid by an insurer on an insurance claim by the
victim . . . .” Id. § 910.1(6). “We affirm the restitution award if it is within a
reasonable range of the evidence.” State v. Sogard, No. 06-0341, 2007
WL 461318, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 14, 2007).

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The victim filed a restitution claim estimating its economic losses
stemming from the crime at $6,711. An attachment to the restitution claim
form showed a specific, itemized list of parts needing replacement on the
boom lift. The plea agreement by the parties stated, pertaining to Meyer, that
“I understand that I will be assessed restitution. I understand that restitution
includes monetary damages to crime victims . . . .” At the sentencing hearing,
Meyer’s counsel indicated that Meyer was “concerned with the level of
amount of the restitution” but requested the court enter the sentencing order
that day “without the need for a future hearing on restitution,” leaving the
issue to the court’s discretion.

Meyer agreed to paying restitution as a condition of the plea
agreement. He did not request an additional hearing and was aware of the
requested amount for several months before sentencing. The district court,
in following the plea agreement regarding restitution, sentenced Meyer as
agreed to in the plea agreement. See Davis v. State, No. 23-1964, 2025
WL 1453344, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. May 21, 2025) (stating that on appeal, “a
defendant ʻwill not be permitted to allege an error in which he himself
acquiesced, or which was committed or invited by him, or was the natural
consequence of his own actions’” (quoting State v. Sage, 162 N.W.2d 502,
504 (Iowa 1986))). We conclude the district court did not err in determining
the amount of damages payable by restitution.

III. Conclusion

We determine that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
sentencing Meyer and did not err in imposing restitution.

AFFIRMED.

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