Schulte v. State

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 25-0051
Filed January 28, 2026
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Stephanie Schulte, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of
Lorena Schulte,
Plaintiff–Appellant,
v.
State of Iowa, Iowa Department of Corrections, Iowa Prison Industries,
Anamosa State Penitentiary, Jeremy Larson, William Spersflage,
Michael Heinricy, Robert Hartig, Dan Clark, Beth Skinner, Tracy
Dietsch, Chad Kerker, Jerome Greenfield, Samantha Tucker, and
Sarah Holder,
Defendants–Appellees.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Jones County,
The Honorable Michael Harris, Judge.
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AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, REMANDED FOR
FURTHER PROCEEDINGS
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Molly M. Parker (argued), Samuel E. Jones, and Caitlin L. Slessor of
Shuttleworth & Ingersoll, Cedar Rapids, attorneys for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, Halle B. Kissell (argued), Assistant
Solicitor General, Eric Wessan, Solicitor General, Patrick Valencia, Deputy
Solicitor General, and Christopher Deist, Assistant Attorney General,
attorneys for appellees.

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Heard at oral argument
by Tabor, C.J., and Badding and Sandy, JJ.
Opinion by Sandy, J.

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SANDY, Judge.

Stephanie Schulte, in her capacity as the administrator of Lorena
Schulte’s estate and in her individual capacity, appeals the district court’s
order granting the State of Iowa’s motion to dismiss.1 Stephanie argues the
district court erred in finding that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the
claims due to her failure to exhaust her administrative remedies under the
Iowa Tort Claims Act (ITCA).

After our review, we conclude the district court did not err in finding
that Stephanie failed to exhaust her administrative remedies regarding claims
brought in her capacity as executor of Lorena’s estate. We do, however,
conclude the district court erred in finding that Stephanie failed to exhaust
her administrative remedies regarding her individual claims. Accordingly, we
affirm in part and reverse in part the district court’s order and remand to the
district court for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS.
On January 9, 2024, Stephanie Schulte, individually and as
administrator of the estate of Lorena Schulte filed a petition and jury demand
against the defendants. In her petition, Stephanie asserts that Lorena was
murdered by two inmates while working as a nurse at the Anamosa State
Penitentiary on March 23, 2021. Stephanie further alleges the State’s
employees were grossly negligent in their conduct, resulting in Lorena’s

1
Initially, Stephanie named eleven employees of the State of Iowa, the Iowa
Department of Corrections, Iowa Prison Industries, and the Anamosa State Penitentiary
as parties to her claims. The State filed a motion to dismiss on February 15, 2024, arguing
in part that the individually named parties were not proper parties for Stephanie’s claims.
In her resistance to the motion to dismiss, Stephanie acknowledged that the State of Iowa
was the only proper party for her claims. Thus, we refer to the appellees as “the State.”

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death. Stephanie argues that the State was vicariously liable since the
employees’ actions were grossly negligent and were taken within the scope of
their employment. Stephanie asserts several claims of wrongful death
resulting from gross negligence by various employees, a claim for loss of
consortium, and a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

On April 1, 2021, Lorena’s estate was opened, and Stephanie was
appointed as the administrator. On December 27, 2021, Stephanie filed her
first tort claim with the State Appeal Board. On August 3, 2022, Lorena’s
estate was inadvertently closed, and Stephanie was discharged as its
administrator. Stephanie withdrew the first tort claim from the board on
October 3, 2022, after receiving no response from the attorney general for
more than six months. Stephanie filed her first suit in district court on
November 30, 2022, based on the first tort claim. 2 The State filed a pre-
answer motion to dismiss, arguing that Stephanie had failed to state a claim
and that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case.
Stephanie resisted the motion. On September 29, 2023, the district court
granted the State’s pre-answer motion to dismiss all counts brought by
Stephanie.

The district court found in its order that because the estate was closed
and Stephanie was discharged as the estate administrator before the
commencement of the action, Stephanie did not have standing to bring the
suit. The district court reasoned that “[i]n order to have capacity to sue on
behalf of the Estate of Lorena, the estate must have been open at the time of

2
The first suit named the State of Iowa, the Iowa Department of Corrections, Iowa
Prison Industries, the Anamosa State Penitentiary, and Jeremy Larson as parties.
Stephanie filed suit on the claims of co-employee gross negligence, intentional infliction
of emotional distress, deprivation of rights, deprivation of due process, and loss of
consortium.

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the commencement of this action in district court.” Iowa Code chapter 611
(2024) states that to bring a wrongful death claim on behalf of a decedent,
such a claim must be filed by the estate of the decedent. The district court
held Stephanie did not have standing to bring the matter before the district
court as she was not the administrator of the estate when the action
commenced since the estate was closed.

Lorena’s estate was not reopened until April 14, 2023. Stephanie filed
a second tort claim with the board on September 23, 2022, and a third tort
claim on March 13, 2023—both filed while the estate was closed. The statute
of limitations for the relevant claims passed on March 23, 2023, again, while
the estate was closed. Six months after filing claims two and three, Stephanie
withdrew the claims from the board based on the lack of a response from the
attorney general. The State acknowledged the withdrawals on December 14,
2023.

On January 9, 2024, Stephanie filed suit against the State in her
individual capacity and in her capacity as administrator of Lorena’s estate.
The State moved to dismiss the suit on February 15, 2024, arguing in relevant
part that by filing tort claims two and three on behalf of a closed estate and
failing to reopen the estate before the statute of limitation passed, Stephanie
failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. The State also argued that
Stephanie failed to properly present claims filed in her individual capacity,
thereby failing to exhaust her administrative remedies on those claims as well.
Stephanie resisted, arguing she had exhausted her administrative remedies
under the ITCA in both of her capacities.

On October 7, 2024, the district court granted the State’s motion to
dismiss, finding that Stephanie failed to exhaust her administrative remedies
both in her capacity as the administrator of Lorena’s estate and in her own

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individual capacity. Due to Stephanie’s failure to exhaust her administrative
remedies, the district court found that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the case.
Stephanie filed a motion to reconsider, enlarge, or amend. The State resisted,
and the court denied the motion. This appeal follows.

Below is a timeline summarizing key events and dates relevant to the
procedural posture of this appeal:

Date Event

March 23, 2021 Lorena Schulte is murdered by two Anamosa
State Penitentiary inmates.

April 1, 2021 Lorena’s estate is opened and Stephanie Schulte
is appointed to be the estate’s administrator.

December 27, 2021 Stephanie files her first tort claim with the board.

August 3, 2022 The estate is closed and Stephanie is discharged
as the estate’s administrator

September 23, 2022 Stephanie files her second tort claim with the
board.

October 3, 2022 Stephanie withdraws first tort claim from the
board.

November 30, 2022 Stephanie brings her first suit based on the first
tort claim.

March 13, 2023 Stephanie files her third tort claim with the
board.

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March 23, 2023 Two-year statute of limitation on tort claims
relating to Lorena’s murder expires pursuant to
Iowa Code section 669.13.

April 17, 2023 Stephanie’s petition to reopen Lorena’s estate is
granted, and Stephanie is reappointed as the
estate’s administrator.

September 9, 2023 District court grants the state’s pre-answer
motion to dismiss Stephanie’s first suit for lack
of standing and failure to exhaust administrative
remedies.

December 5, 2023 Stephanie withdraws her second tort claim from
the board.

December 7, 2023 Stephanie withdraws her third tort claim from
the board.

January 9, 2024 Stephanie brings present suit in district court
based on second and third tort claims.

October 7, 2024 District court dismisses Stephanie’s individual
and administrator claims from this suit.

STANDARD OF REVIEW.
“We review the granting of a motion to dismiss for errors at law.”
Askvig v. Snap-On Logistics Co., 967 N.W.2d 558, 560 (Iowa 2021) (citation
omitted). Our standard of review for a ruling on subject matter jurisdiction is
also for corrections of error at law. Iowa Individual Health Ben. Reinsurance
Ass’n v. State Univ. of Iowa, 876 N.W.2d 800, 804 (Iowa 2016).

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DISCUSSION.
Stephanie argues the district court erred in finding she failed to
exhaust her administrative remedies under the ITCA pursuant to Iowa Code
chapter 669 in both her administrative capacity and in her individual capacity.
Under section 669.5 (2022), no suit shall be permitted for a claim under the
ITCA unless (1) the attorney general has made final disposition of the claim,
or (2) the claimant waits six months after filing the claim with the director of
the department of management and subsequently withdraws their prior
claim. Stephanie brought her claims under the ITCA and was required to
exhaust her administrative remedies under Iowa Code chapter 669.

I. Administrative capacity
Section 669.2(3)(b) defines a claim as:

Any claim against an employee of the state for money only, on account of
damage to or loss of property or on account of personal injury or death,
caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the
state while acting within the scope of the employee’s office or employment.

Claims made under chapter 669 must be filed with the director of the
department of management, who shall acknowledge receipt of the claim on
behalf of the State. Id. § 669.3(2).

Stephanie first argues that the inadvertent closing of Lorena’s estate
does not preclude her from exhausting her administrative remedies as the
estate’s administrator. Section 669.13 imposes a two-year statute of
limitations for claims under the ITCA. The procedural requirements of the
ITCA are jurisdictional, and a district court does not have subject matter
jurisdiction over a claim unless the administrative procedures have been
exhausted. McGill v. Fish, 790 N.W.2d 113, 118 (Iowa 2010). “[A] suit
commenced without complying with this process is subject to dismissal.”

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Swagner v. State, 445 N.W.2d 344, 347 (Iowa 1989). “Suits filed prior to the
administrator’s appointment do not toll the statute of limitations.” Anderson
v. State, 2 N.W.3d 807, 818 (Iowa 2024).

In Anderson, a decedent child’s mother filed administrative tort claims
on behalf of the child’s estate twenty-one days before she was appointed as
the estate’s administrator. Id. at 817. The State moved to dismiss the estate’s
eventual lawsuit, arguing the estate had not exhausted its administrative
remedies since the mother was not the appointed administrator at the time
she filed the estate’s administrative claims. Id. Our supreme court held that
an administrator could ratify acts that occurred before that administrator was
appointed, reasoning that principles of estate law grant administrators that
power. Id. at 818 (citing 34 C.J.S. Executors and Administrators § 219, at 90–91
(2023)); see also Gardner v. Beck, 189 N.W. 962, 966 (1922).

Yet, the supreme court clarified that such ratification of pre-
appointment actions does not permit the estate administrator to circumvent
the statute of limitations. Anderson, 2 N.W.3d at 818 (“[I]f an administrator
is not appointed before the expiration of the statute of limitations, the suit
will be time-barred.”).

The supreme court in Anderson specifically distinguished its facts from
the facts in other cases where the statute of limitations had run, explaining
the mother’s “appointment fell within the statute of limitations for claims
arising from [the child’s] death.” Id. (distinguishing Gardner, 189 N.W.
at 966, and Pearson v. Anthony, 254 N.W. 10, 12–13 (Iowa 1934)). An estate
administrator cannot bypass the ITCA’s statute of limitations by
retroactively ratifying actions after the statute of limitations has passed.

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The district court did not err in finding that Stephanie failed to exhaust
her administrative remedies before filing the matter with the district court.
Tort claims two and three were filed while Lorena’s estate was closed and
while Stephanie was discharged as the estate’s administrator. The statute of
limitations passed on March 23, 2023, before Stephanie was reappointed as
the administrator of Lorena’s reopened estate on April 17, 2023. Stephanie
was not appointed before the March 23, 2023 statute of limitations deadline,
meaning that her suit on behalf of the estate is time-barred. See id. Her prior
suit does not toll the statute of limitations. See id.

Stephanie argues for an interpretation of Anderson that would ratify
her pre-appointment conduct so as to toll the statute of limitations. Because
that interpretation is at odds with the express holding of the supreme court,
we disagree. See id. A future appointment as an estate administrator should
not affect a statute of limitation that has expired. Est. of Dyer v. Krug, 533
N.W.2d 221, 224 (Iowa 1995) (finding that an administrator’s appointment
“after the limitations period has run” does not “relate back” to the time of
the action’s initiation and “prevent the expiration of the limitations period”).

Stephanie failed to exhaust her administrative remedies in her
administrative capacity, and the district court did not err in finding that it did
not have jurisdiction to hear her claims on behalf of the estate.

II. Individual capacity

Stephanie argues that the district court erred in finding that she failed
to properly present her individual capacity claims and thus failed to exhaust
her administrative remedies.

As mentioned, section 669.5 requires plaintiffs to exhaust their
administrative remedies. Segura v. State, 889 N.W.2d 215, 221 (Iowa 2017).

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Part of the exhaustion requirement is “presentment,” meaning the “plaintiff
must first present the claim to the appropriate administrative body.” Id. The
purpose of the presentment requirement and related administrative
processes is to “allow a prompt investigation of claims against the State and
facilitate an early settlement when possible.” Id. (quoting In re Est. of Voss, 553
N.W.2d 878, 881 (Iowa 1996)).

The appropriate administrative body here is the board, which derives
its authority from section 669.3. Id. at 225. Section 669.3 governs claim
processing, authorizing the board to “adopt rules and procedures for the
handling, processing, and investigation of claims.” Section 669.3(3) delegates
no authority to the board to adopt rules or procedures for presenting claims.
Id. The Segura court found the “administrative regulations promulgated
under section 669.3 do not define the jurisdictional ambit of the presentment
requirement under section 669.5. Instead, a claim is properly presented when
it, in writing, identifies sufficient information for the board to investigate the
claim and discloses the amount of damages claimed.” Id. at 226.

The district court found Stephanie did not properly present her tort
claims, as her claim forms did not comply with the board’s rule governing the
administrative claims process. At the time Stephanie filed her claims, this
rule stated that a “claim shall state whether it is against an employee or the
state. If the claim is against an employee the name of the employee and the
department where employed shall be stated. A separate claim shall be filed
for each type by each claimant.” Iowa Admin. Code r. 543-1.4 (2022). The
district court found that because Stephanie filed claim forms with her name
listed in her individual capacity and her administrative capacity, rather than
filing two separate claim forms (one for each capacity she was filing under),
she failed to properly present her claims and consequently failed to exhaust

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her administrative remedies so as to deprive the court of jurisdiction to hear
her individual claims. We disagree with the district court’s reasoning.

In its order, the district court stated:
Tort Claims Two and Three provide[d] Plaintiff Stephanie Schulte’s
personal and contact information, [and] the claim forms were signed by
Plaintiff Stephanie Schulte’s purported signature. While the claim forms
provide relevant facts to support the claims selected and provide legal
theories in which the Plaintiffs are asserting against the Defendants therein
the Petition, the Court finds that Stephanie was required to file a separate
tort claim form.

Segura expressly held that administrative regulations promulgated under
section 669.3 (the enabling statute for rule 543-1.4) “do not define the
jurisdictional ambit of the presentment requirement under section 669.5.”
Segura, 889 N.W.2d. at 226.

The purpose of the ITCA’s presentment requirement is “to allow a
prompt investigation of claims against the State and facilitate an early
settlement when possible.” Id. at 221. “The failure to comply with these
administrative rules alone should not deprive a district court of jurisdiction.”
Id. at 225. So, rules such as rule 543-1.4 govern handling and processing, but
they do not govern presentment. See id. And insofar as Stephanie’s
presentment is in question, she has met that jurisdictional threshold. As our
supreme court stated in Anderson, we must ask if “a fair reading of the claim
forms would . . . reveal what legal theories were being asserted by any
individuals.” 2 N.W.3d at 815–16. Unlike in Anderson, where the claim forms
failed to state that individuals were making claims for loss of consortium or
the amounts sought, see id., here the claim form contained that information.
There is no question that the wrongful-death, loss-of-consortium, and
intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claims Stephanie presented to

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the board clarified that, “Claimants in this matter are Stephanie Schulte,
individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Lorena Schulte.” We find
this adequate to “identif[y] sufficient information for the board to investigate
the claim,” and specifically to alert the board that Stephanie was pursuing
these claims individually.3 Segura, 889 N.W.2d. at 220.

The district court erred by dismissing Stephanie’s individual claims
for failure to exhaust her administrative remedies and failure to precisely
comply with rule 543-1.4.

CONCLUSION.
We affirm the district court’s order granting dismissing Stephanie’s
claims based on her failure to exhaust administrative remedies in her
administrative capacity. However, we reverse the district court’s finding that
Stephanie failed to properly present claims brought in her individual capacity.
We remand to the district court for further proceedings on Stephanie’s
individual claims.4
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, REMANDED
FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.

3
See Montague v. Skinner, ___ N.W.3d ___, ___, 2026 WL 70667, at *8 (Iowa
2026) (explaining that courts should read ITCA claims “as a whole,” including the
narrative sections, when evaluating compliance with presentment requirements, and
applying a holistic review rather than isolating technical defects).
4
We make no judgment on other potential dismissal grounds relative to the
individual claims as those potential grounds were not presented to us for review.

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