State of Iowa v. Joseph Harold Watson

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 24-1268
Filed January 7, 2026
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State of Iowa,
Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
Joseph Harold Watson,
Defendant–Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Clinton County,
The Honorable Mark R. Lawson, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Mary K. Conroy, Assistant
Appellate Defender, attorneys for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Martha E. Trout, Assistant Attorney
General, attorneys for appellee.
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Considered without oral argument
by Schumacher, P.J., and Badding and Langholz, JJ.
Opinion by Badding, J.

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BADDING, Judge.

In its closing argument at Joseph Watson’s trial for drug charges, the
State summarized the evidence for the jury:
[Watson] has the meth at his feet. He has the baggies. He has the
scale. He has the vehicle. He’s got two addict women in his vehicle with
him. He’s dealing drugs to them. Everything else is smoke screen.

The jury saw through the smoke screen and found Watson guilty of
possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver and failure to affix a
drug tax stamp.1 Watson appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence
to prove that he possessed methamphetamine and intended to deliver it.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we find the
jury’s verdict is supported by substantial evidence.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

Around 1:30 a.m. in July 2023, two officers with the Clinton Police
Department pulled Joseph Watson over for driving without taillights. There
were two female passengers in the car with Watson; both were known drug
users. One woman was sitting in the front passenger seat and the other was
directly behind Watson. As Watson was looking for the vehicle’s registration,
Officer Paul Giuliani noticed a marijuana pipe in the front console. Watson
admitted the pipe was his. And he handed over some marijuana from his
pocket.

The other officer, Kaleb Pritchard, asked Watson to step out of the
vehicle, but he didn’t immediately comply. K9 officer Brennen Roling, who
had arrived as backup, noticed that Watson was fidgeting, sweating, and

The jury also found Watson guilty of possession of marijuana, third offense, but
1

Watson does not challenge that conviction on appeal.

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nervous. From his position at the passenger window, Officer Roling saw
Watson “reach once or twice, like kind of under his seat, or right down kind
of by his feet.” The second time, Officer Roling ordered Watson to get out
of the car.

Officer Pritchard started his pat-down of Watson while Officer Roling
stayed by the two women in the car. Watson immediately informed the officer
that he had a BB gun and two pocketknives. Officer Pritchard didn’t find
anything else on Watson. Once Watson’s pat-down was done, the two
women were removed from the car and searched. 2 Officer Pritchard then
started his search of the vehicle.

Upon opening the driver’s side door, Officer Pritchard found a black
zippered pouch on the floorboard, leaning up against the inside trim. The
pouch contained a digital scale and a baggie with 15.07 grams of
methamphetamine. Next to the pouch, the officer found a backpack, which
would have been right between Watson’s legs as he was sitting in the driver’s
seat. Watson admitted the backpack was his but denied ownership of the
pouch. Inside the backpack, Officer Pritchard found several small empty
baggies, as well as a lens case with two needles and baggies with
methamphetamine residue. Watson was arrested and charged with
possession of more than five grams of methamphetamine with intent to
deliver and failure to affix a drug tax stamp.

Watson’s girlfriend, who owned the car that he was driving, testified
in his defense at the jury trial in May 2024. She said that Watson made
jewelry as a hobby and used small plastic bags to store it. As for the

2
The female passenger in the back seat had an outstanding warrant and was
arrested. Nothing illegal was found on the other woman, so she was allowed to leave.

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methamphetamine found in the car, Watson tried to pin it on the two
passengers, arguing they could have moved the pouch over to the driver’s
side floorboard while Watson was being searched. The jury did not buy these
explanations and found Watson guilty as charged. Watson appeals.

II. Standard of Review

We review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence for the
correction of errors at law. State v. Jones, 967 N.W.2d 336, 339 (Iowa 2021).
In conducting this review, “we are highly deferential to the jury’s verdict,”
which is binding on us if it is supported by substantial evidence. Id.
“Substantial evidence is evidence sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact
the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.

III. Analysis

Watson challenges the possession elements of both his convictions.
See State v. Padavich, 536 N.W.2d 743, 750–51 (Iowa 1995) (noting
“[p]ossession is an element of possession with intent to deliver and failure to
affix a drug tax stamp”). He argues “any finding that [he] knowingly
possessed the methamphetamine is based on nothing more than speculation,
suspicion, or conjecture.” We disagree.

Possession can be either actual or constructive. State v. Brown, 5
N.W.3d 611, 616 (Iowa 2024). The State relied on a constructive-possession
theory at Watson’s jury trial. 3 “Constructive possession exists when the
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On appeal, the State also argues that Watson had actual possession of the
methamphetamine even though it was not found on his person. “[O]ur appellate courts
have clarified a defendant can be in actual possession of a controlled substance when the
controlled substance is found on the defendant’s person or when substantial evidence
supports a finding it was on the defendant’s person at one time.” Jones, 967 N.W.2d at
341 (cleaned up); see also State v. Eubanks, No. 13-0602, 2014 WL 2346793, at *3 (Iowa Ct.
App. May 29, 2014) (discussing the evolution of actual possession under our case law).
But Watson contends the jury instruction on possession in this case—which mirrored the

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evidence shows the defendant has knowledge of the presence of the
controlled substance and has the authority or right to maintain control of it.”
State v. Reed, 875 N.W.2d 693, 705 (Iowa 2016) (citation omitted). Consistent
with this principle, the jury was instructed:
A person who, although not in actual possession, has both the
power and intention at a given time to exercise dominion or control over a
thing, either directly or through another person or persons, is in
constructive possession of it. A person’s mere presence at a place where a
thing is found or proximity to the thing is not enough to support a
conclusion that the person possessed the thing.

See id. (“Proximity to the contraband, though pertinent, is not enough to
show control and dominion.” (cleaned up)).

Constructive possession, which may be proved by inferences, “turns
on the peculiar facts of each case.” Brown, 5 N.W.3d at 616 (citation omitted).
Our supreme court has identified the following nonexclusive factors to
consider when contraband is discovered in a jointly occupied space, as it was
here:
(1) incriminating statements made by a person; (2) incriminating actions
of the person upon the police’s discovery of a controlled substance among
or near the person’s personal belongings; (3) the person’s fingerprints on
the packages containing the controlled substance; and (4) any other
circumstances linking the person to the controlled substance.

Reed, 875 N.W.2d at 706 (citation omitted). In motor vehicle cases, we may
also consider:

uniform instruction and went unchallenged by the State—gave a more restrictive
definition, requiring the State to prove that he “had the methamphetamine on his person.”
It is generally true that “[j]ury instructions, when not objected to, become the law of the
case for purposes of appellate review for sufficiency-of-evidence claims.” State v.
Schiebout, 944 N.W.2d 666, 671 (Iowa 2020). However, we need not decide the law of the
case or resolve the question of actual possession because there was substantial evidence
that Watson constructively possessed the methamphetamine.

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(1) was the contraband in plain view, (2) was it with the defendant’s
personal effects, (3) was it found on the same side of the car seat or next to
the defendant, (4) was the defendant the owner of the vehicle, and (5) was
there suspicious activity by the defendant.

State v. Kemp, 688 N.W.2d 785, 789 (Iowa 2004).

Watson is correct that some of these factors weigh in his favor. He
cooperated with the officers—even admitting that he had marijuana in his
pocket—and did not make any incriminating statements about the
methamphetamine in the pouch. In fact, Watson repeatedly denied that the
pouch was his. And no fingerprints were developed from the pouch or its
contents. Yet the factors outlined above “are only to be used as a guide in
determining whether the State has established constructive possession.” Id.
“Even if some of the facts are present, we are still required to determine
whether all of the facts and circumstances allow a reasonable inference that
the defendant knew of the drugs’ presence and had control and dominion
over the contraband.” Id. (cleaned up). When all the facts and circumstances
are examined in the light most favorable to the State, we find substantial
evidence supported the jury’s conclusion that Watson had constructive
possession of the methamphetamine.

Responding officers described Watson as “pretty nervous” and
sweating during the stop, which took place at 1:30 a.m. in a city where Watson
did not reside. Officer Roling observed that Watson delayed getting out of
the car and “just fidgeted a lot.” He further testified that after Watson told
the other officer that he would step out, he reached down by his feet twice.
See State v. Carter, 696 N.W.2d 31, 40 (Iowa 2005) (discussing a defendant’s
nervous behavior and furtive movements in analyzing constructive
possession). Once Watson exited the car, Officer Pritchard found a black
zippered pouch on the floorboard of the driver’s seat, between the door and

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Watson’s backpack. See Brown, 5 N.W.3d at 618 (stating a jury could
reasonably infer the defendant knew about the presence of a firearm in the
car “based on the location of the firearm directly under the seat where [he]
had recently been sitting to drive”); Carter, 696 N.W.2d at 40 (finding
constructive possession where “[t]he controlled substances were found on
the driver’s side of the console” within close reach of the defendant when he
was operating the vehicle).

Watson argues the back passenger—who was a known drug user—
could “have pushed the pouch through with her foot to the driver’s
floorboard from the backseat.” He highlights several brief moments from the
videos of the stop when Officer Roling looked away from the passengers while
Watson was being searched. But Officer Roling testified that he “was more
concentrating on the passengers” than on Watson. And Officer Pritchard,
who found the pouch, testified that it was unlikely the back passenger could
have pushed it through because “the pouch would have had to be pushed
under the seat, to the left, and up onto . . . the little lip where the door is.”
He also noted the backpack was blocking the space under the driver’s seat.

Watson presented his alternative explanations to the jury, which was
free to accept or reject his version of the facts. See Jones, 967 N.W.2d at 343
(“While the defendant has an alternative explanation for the evidence, the
jury was not required to accept the defendant’s version of the events.”
(cleaned up)). “It is not our place to resolve conflicts in the evidence, to pass
upon the credibility of witnesses, to determine the plausibility of
explanations, or to weigh the evidence; such matters are for the jury.” State
v. Brimmer, 983 N.W.2d 247, 256 (Iowa 2022) (citation omitted).
Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict on

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possession, we find that it “is supported by logical inferences drawn from the
record rather than impermissible speculation.” Brown, 5 N.W.3d at 619.

We reach the same conclusion on Watson’s challenge to the sufficiency
of the evidence that he intended to deliver the methamphetamine. “Because
it is difficult to prove intent by direct evidence, proof of intent usually consists
of circumstantial evidence and the inferences that can be drawn from that
evidence.” State v. Grant, 722 N.W.2d 645, 647–48 (Iowa 2006). Some of
those inferences include “the manner of packaging drugs, large amounts of
unexplained cash, and the quantity of drugs possessed.” Id. at 648. Watson
argues the State did not present substantial evidence on this element because
he was not found with a large amount of cash or individually packaged baggies
of methamphetamine. He also points out that officers searched his phone
and found no evidence of drug dealing. And Watson relies on his girlfriend’s
testimony about his jewelry-making hobby to explain the small baggies in his
backpack.

The State, however, presented testimony from Josh Winter, an officer
with an area drug task force, about his experience with drug trafficking. See
id. (recognizing that “in controlled-substance prosecutions opinion
testimony by law enforcement personnel experienced in the area of buying
and selling drugs may be offered as evidence for purposes of aiding the trier
of fact in determining intent”). Officer Winter testified “there’s not a lot of
money sitting around with the methamphetamine world.” He explained that
methamphetamine users often supply their habit by selling some of what they
buy: “The more you buy, the cheaper the rate, so a lot of times . . . an
individual may purchase, let’s say, an ounce of methamphetamine; may sell
half of that ounce. Well, if they sell it in smaller increments, they can
typically make their money back and be even.”

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Officer Winter also testified that individual users usually only make
“purchases of somewhere around 3 1/2 to 7 grams,” not 15.07 grams like
Watson possessed. While he thought it might be possible that a user would
have that amount, it was not “necessarily practical.” And Officer Winter
testified that clean, small plastic baggies—like those found in Watson’s
backpack—are common in methamphetamine sales because they allow for
easier handoff transactions. The presence of those baggies, along with the
digital scale and the amount of methamphetamine, led the officer to conclude
that Watson intended to deliver the drug. See State v. Round, No. 19-1174,
2020 WL 5650763, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2020) (“The three digital
scales and the plastic baggies found during the search of the Jeep reflected an
intent to deliver methamphetamine.”). Watson’s arguments otherwise ask
this court to weigh the evidence differently than the jury—which, again, is
something we cannot do. Brimmer, 983 N.W.2d at 256.

Giving appropriate deference to the jury’s verdict, we find substantial
evidence to support Watson’s convictions for possession with intent to
deliver more than five grams of methamphetamine and failure to affix a drug
tax stamp.

AFFIRMED.

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