State of Iowa v. Murrell Ladell Griffin

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 25-0820
Filed January 7, 2026
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State of Iowa,
Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
Murrell Ladell Griffin,
Defendant–Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County,
The Honorable Robert J. Richter, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Ella M. Newell, Assistant
Appellate Defender, attorneys for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Joshua Henry, Assistant Attorney
General, attorneys for appellee.
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Considered without oral argument
by Greer, P.J., and Schumacher and Ahlers, JJ.
Opinion by Schumacher, J.

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SCHUMACHER, Judge.

A criminal defendant appeals his sentence for the convictions of
driving while barred and eluding, asserting the district court abused its
discretion by relying on an improper sentencing factor and utilizing a fixed
sentencing scheme. Upon our review, we affirm.

I. Background Facts & Proceedings

Law enforcement observed a vehicle without a front license plate and
learned the registration for the vehicle expired three months earlier. An
officer pulled the vehicle over, and the driver, Murrell Griffin, stated that he
did not possess a valid driver’s license or insurance on the vehicle. Griffin’s
license was barred. When the officer informed Griffin that he was to be
arrested for driving while barred, Griffin stated, “fuck that” and drove away
at a high rate of speed. Law enforcement pursued Griffin for a time with
emergency lights activated. Eventually, law enforcement ended the pursuit
due to the high rate of speed.

A warrant was issued for Griffin’s arrest, and he was eventually located
and arrested. Griffin was charged with driving while barred, eluding, and
escape from custody. Griffin agreed to plead guilty to driving while barred
and eluding and to stipulate to a probation violation in exchange for the
State’s dismissal of the escape-from-custody charge and eleven traffic tickets.
Griffin agreed the court could rely on the minutes of testimony for the factual
basis for his pleas. The plea agreement provided that Griffin would receive
consecutive terms of incarceration of two years on the driving-while-barred
charge and one year for the eluding charge along with two years of probation,
with the terms of incarceration to be suspended. The agreement was
dependent on the district court’s approval.

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The district court announced before sentencing that it did not intend
to be bound by the plea agreement. The court offered Griffin the chance to
withdraw his pleas, which Griffin declined. The district court sentenced
Griffin to concurrent terms of incarceration based on the following:
Okay. Mr. Griffin, when the Court makes a decision about
sentencing, I’m required to take into account several factors. These are the
factors I’m considering in your case: I consider your age. You’re an
individual who has gone through a lot as far as criminal acts, and you
understand better than most that there are consequences for criminal
behavior.

I also do consider your family situation, the impact it could have on
[y]our relationship with others, your son especially.

I also consider the impact the sentence would have on current
employment as well as future employment. But I have to balance that
against the need for deterrence, rehabilitation, the nature of the charges,
and your criminal history.

Mr. Griffin, I think you should be commended for how well you did
on probation for the almost 19 months that you were on probation—or 20
months. Those are good things that you were taking the recommendations
from your probation officer and following the rules.

Unfortunately, I guess how I would sum it up is when you told that
officer “fuck that” when he told you that you were going to jail for driving
while barred and you sped through Dubuque—through the streets of
Dubuque eluding the officers, you blew it. That’s just all I can say.

You got a criminal history that suggests that you knew there would
be consequences for doing something like that. And even the prosecutor
wants to give you another shot and the probation officer does, sometimes
the way it is is that the judge has to be the heavy. And so that’s what I’m
doing today. Because with your kind of criminal history and behavior like
driving through town, putting everyone at risk, eluding the police
officers—it’s just unacceptable behavior. I can’t put you on formal
probation again, like I said, when you blew it once and you have that
horrible criminal history that you have.

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So I’m going to give you a two-year prison sentence on the driving
while barred imposed. One-year jail sentence on the eluding imposed.
They’ll run concurrent. And on the probation violation, I’ll revoke your
probation, but run that concurrent as well.

Griffin now appeals his sentence, asserting the district court relied on
an improper sentencing factor. Griffin argues that the district court
considered facts that established the basis for the escape-from-custody
charge, but since that charge was dismissed, those facts were improper to
consider. Griffin also asserts the district court relied on a fixed sentencing
scheme by focusing on a single factor, his criminal history.

II. Standard of Review

We review a defendant’s sentence for abuse of discretion by the district
court. State v. Duffield, 16 N.W.3d 298, 302 (Iowa 2025).
Sentencing decisions of the district court are cloaked with a strong
presumption in their favor. We will not reverse a sentence unless there is an
abuse of discretion or some defect in the sentencing procedure. A district
court abuses its discretion when it exercises its discretion on grounds clearly
untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable.

Id. (cleaned up).

III. Analysis

Griffin asserts that the district court’s consideration of his “fuck that”
statement to law enforcement within the minutes of testimony was improper
because it was not relevant to the driving-while-barred and eluding charges
to which he pled guilty. Instead, Griffin argues the statement was a factual
basis for the dismissed escape-from-custody charge, so it should not have
been considered by the district court.

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A sentencing court can use facts contained within the minutes of
testimony “to establish a factual basis for a charge to which a defendant
pleads guilty,” but the court “should only consider those facts . . . that are
admitted to or otherwise established as true.” State v. Chapman, 944 N.W.2d
864, 872 (Iowa 2020) (citation omitted). If a fact within the minutes of
testimony bears on an element of a charge to which the defendant pleads
guilty, that fact is appropriate for consideration by the sentencing court. See
State v. Keene, 630 N.W.2d 579, 581 (Iowa 2001).

The crime of eluding a law enforcement vehicle requires that the
defendant “willfully fails to bring the motor vehicle to a stop or otherwise
eludes.” Iowa Code § 321.279(1)(a) (2025). So, the district court was
required to establish a factual basis in the minutes of testimony showing that
Griffin willfully eluded the police to accept his guilty plea. Griffin’s
statement, “fuck that” bears directly on the willfulness of his eluding charge,
as the statement immediately preceded a high-speed chase where Griffin
avoided law enforcement. Because the statement provided a factual basis for
an element of the eluding charge, it was an appropriate fact to consider by the
sentencing court. See Keene, 630 N.W.2d at 581.

Next, Griffin argues that the district court improperly used a fixed
sentencing policy, alleging the court relied on one factor, his criminal history,
in its sentencing decision. The factors relevant to imposing sentence include
the nature of the offense, the attending circumstances, and the defendant’s
age, character, propensities, and chances of reform. State v. Hopkins, 860
N.W.2d 550, 555 (Iowa 2015). “The court is not permitted to arbitrarily
establish a fixed policy to govern every case, as that is the exact antithesis of
discretion.” State v. Hildebrand, 280 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Iowa 1979) (citation

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omitted). Not one single factor, “including the nature of the offense, will be
[s]olely determinative.” Id. (citation omitted).

Here, the record shows that the district court did not rely on Griffin’s
criminal history in isolation. During the sentencing proceeding, the court
specifically referenced Griffin’s age, family situation, employment, successes
on probation, the nature of the offense, and criminal history. The
consideration of these multiple factors indicates that the district court was
not employing a fixed sentencing policy. See State v. Oxendine, No. 24-1445,
2025 WL 2237328, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 6, 2025).

While the district court may have afforded more weight to Griffin’s
criminal history and the nature of the offense, it is “[t]he right of an
individual judge to balance the relevant factors in determining an appropriate
sentence inheres in the discretionary standard.” State v. Wright, 340 N.W.2d
590, 593 (Iowa 1983). Griffin has neither demonstrated an abuse of discretion
through application of an improper sentencing factor nor the utilization of a
fixed sentencing scheme by the district court. Accordingly, we affirm the
sentence imposed by the district court.
AFFIRMED.

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