State of Iowa v. Mackenzie Marie Herron

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-2012
Filed November 13, 2025

STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

MACKENZIE MARIE HERRON,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Guthrie County, Michael Jacobsen,

Judge.

A defendant appeals the sentence following her guilty plea to child

endangerment resulting in bodily injury. AFFIRMED.

Sonia Elossais of Carr Law Firm, P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Nicholas Siefert, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered without oral argument by Schumacher, P.J., and Badding and

Langholz, JJ.
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BADDING, Judge.

While operating an in-home daycare, Mackenzie Herron flipped a four-

month-old infant onto her back during “tummy time,” slamming her onto a wooden

floor with enough force to fracture the infant’s skull. Herron pled guilty to a reduced

charge of child endangerment resulting in bodily injury under an open-sentencing

plea agreement with the State. At the sentencing hearing, the State advocated for

a term of imprisonment, while Herron requested a suspended sentence and

probation—consistent with the recommendation in the presentence investigation

report. The district court sentenced Herron to an indeterminate term of

incarceration not to exceed five years.

On appeal, Herron claims the district court abused its discretion by imposing

a term of imprisonment.1 She argues the court: (1) failed to provide specific

reasons for not granting her a deferred judgment; (2) placed undue emphasis on

the nature of the offense; and (3) improperly considered uncharged conduct

mentioned in a victim impact statement.

Sentencing decisions that fall within statutory limits, as this one does, are

“cloaked with a strong presumption in their favor.” State v. McCalley, 972

N.W.2d 672, 676 (Iowa 2022) (cleaned up). “We will not reverse a sentence unless

there is ‘an abuse of discretion or some defect in the sentencing procedure.’” State

v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 103 (Iowa 2020) (citation omitted). “A district court

1 Although Herron pled guilty, she challenges the sentence imposed by the district

court—one to which she did not agree. Accordingly, she has established good
cause for this court to consider her appeal under Iowa Code section 814.6(1)(a)(3)
(2024). See State v. Hightower, 8 N.W.3d 527, 534 (Iowa 2024) (finding good
cause when a defendant challenges a sentence that was neither mandatory nor
agreed upon).
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abuses its discretion when it exercises its discretion on grounds clearly untenable

or to an extent clearly unreasonable.” State v. Duffield, 16 N.W.3d 298, 302 (Iowa

2025) (citation omitted). We find no abuse of discretion here.

To start, we question the premise of Herron’s first argument—that the

district court “did not give specific reasons for denying a deferred judgment.” Even

though Herron’s written sentencing memorandum requested either a deferred

judgment or a suspended sentence, defense counsel only advocated for the latter

option at the sentencing hearing. In any event, while Iowa Rule of Criminal

Procedure 2.23(3)(g) requires the court to “state on the record the basis for the

sentence imposed,” the court is not required “to give its reasons for rejecting

particular sentencing options.” State v. Russian, 441 N.W.2d 374, 375

(Iowa 1989); accord State v. Wilbourn, 974 N.W.2d 58, 67 (Iowa 2022).

The district court complied with its obligation to state the basis for its

sentencing decision and did not, as Herron complains, simply recite a “boilerplate

list of factors and evidence.” Cf. State v. Thacker, 862 N.W.2d 402, 408

(Iowa 2015) (rejecting “a boilerplate-language approach that does not show why a

particular sentence was imposed in a particular case” but noting “a terse and

succinct statement may be sufficient” (cleaned up)). Instead, the court crafted an

individualized sentence, explaining to Herron:

I must consider . . . what the appropriate sentence might be,
depending upon the defendant’s age, her lack of prior criminal
record, her employment circumstances, her family circumstances,
and any steps that she’s taken since the time that she entered her
plea of guilty in this case. The court is also required to consider
recommendations contained in this presentence and plea agreement
in this case. The plea agreement, in this case, does not contemplate
a specific sentence. It was a reduction in charge. The presentence
investigation, for the record, recommends probation for the
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defendant. It also notes that she would be eligible for a deferred
judgment, which the Court is not considering.
Finally, the Court must consider what sentence to impose
considering in the light of the protection of the community from further
offenses by the defendant and deter her and other persons in her
position from committing a similar offense in the future. . . . [T]he
Court must also consider what sentence will provide maximum
opportunity for rehabilitation, including—including her need for
treatment.
The Court has listened to the victim impact statements today
and has also listened to the testimony presented by Ms. Herron and
also her statement that she made. The Court has reviewed the
presentence investigation, including . . . the victim impact
statement[s]. The medical records that were also included.

The medical records included the infant’s follow-up care for her skull fracture, along

with Herron’s mental-health treatment for anxiety and depression.

After setting out those considerations, the court gave these reasons for

selecting a term of imprisonment:

Ms. Herron, your mental health doesn’t excuse anything you
did. This was an obvious intentional act by you, resulting in quite
serious injuries to a child, a very young child. . . .
....
. . . The Court has considered probation in this case. The
presentence investigation recommends probation. You’ve
requested probation. The State has not. This is a very serious crime,
and it was intentional on your part to a very young child. Because of
the seriousness of this offense, the Court is not going to suspend the
sentence.

Herron takes issue with the district court’s failure to “elaborate further upon

any aggravating or mitigating factors contained therein,” noting among other things

that she “has no criminal history,” “was raised in a tight knit family,” “is in a stable

marriage with a supportive spouse,” and has young children at home. But the court

did address some of those factors—even though it was not required to—noting

Herron’s “lack of prior criminal history” and “her family circumstances.” See State

v. Boltz, 542 N.W.2d 9, 11 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995) (stating that while a sentencing
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court “has a duty to consider all the circumstances of a particular case,” it is not

“required to specifically acknowledge each claim of mitigation urged by a

defendant”). As for Herron’s complaint that the court was “hyper focused on the

nature of the offense,” deciding what weight to give individual sentencing factors

is an inherent part of the district court’s discretion. See State v. Wright, 340

N.W.2d 590, 593 (Iowa 1983) (finding no abuse of discretion where the sentencing

court gave greater weight to the seriousness of the offense than other relevant

factors).

Lastly, Herron contends the district court improperly considered “uncharged

and unproven conduct” in a victim impact statement from the child’s mother. To

overcome the strong presumption in favor of the sentencing decision, “there must

be an affirmative showing the court relied on improper evidence.” State v. Sailer,

587 N.W.2d 756, 762 (Iowa 1998) (cleaned up). “This is a heavy burden.” State

v. Schooley, 13 N.W.3d 608, 619 (Iowa 2024). It is not enough that a victim impact

statement merely references uncharged or unproven conduct. See State v.

Phillips, 561 N.W.2d 355, 359 (Iowa 1997) (upholding a sentence where the victim

impact statements referenced unproven offenses, but there was no showing the

court relied on those statements). And that is all that is present here.

In her victim impact statement, the child’s mother stated: “We should have

seen some red flags prior to this incident, such as bruising we asked about.” Other

than noting that it had “listened to the victim impact statements,” the district court

did not mention this statement from the mother. “We generally rely on district

courts to know what they can and cannot consider from a victim-impact statement.”

Schooley, 13 N.W.3d at 619. And we trust that the courts, as they allow victims to
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fully convey the impact a crime has had on them, “will filter out improper or

irrelevant evidence.” Id. (quoting Sailer, 587 N.W.2d at 764). Without an

affirmative showing otherwise, we decline to infer that the court relied on

uncharged conduct in selecting the sentence here.

Having found no abuse of the district court’s discretion, we affirm Herron’s

sentence.

AFFIRMED.