Terry Lynn Ladawn Reynolds v. State of Iowa

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-0904
Filed November 13, 2025

TERRY LYNN LADAWN REYNOLDS,
Applicant-Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Jeanie Vaudt, Judge.

An applicant appeals the denial of postconviction relief following two

convictions for lascivious acts with a child. AFFIRMED.

Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Josh Irwin, Assistant

Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Genevieve Reinkoester, Assistant

Attorney General, for appellee.

Considered without oral argument by Tabor, C.J., and Greer and Buller, JJ.
2

TABOR, Chief Judge.

The State originally charged Terry Reynolds with two counts of sexual

abuse for conduct against eleven- and thirteen-year-old sisters in 2020. After

bargaining with the State, Reynolds entered Alford pleas1 to two counts of

lascivious acts with a child. A year later, Reynolds applied for postconviction relief

(PCR), which the district court denied. Reynolds appeals that denial, advancing

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and actual innocence. Because

Reynolds did not preserve error on his ineffective-assistance claims and did not

meet the demanding standard to show he was actually innocent, we affirm the

district court.

I. Prior Proceedings

Reynolds signed a written guilty plea, admitting there was “strong evidence”

that he was guilty of two counts of lascivious acts with a child, class “C” felonies,

in violation of Iowa Code section 709.8(1)(a) (2020). The district court sentenced

him to indeterminate ten-year terms to run consecutively. Beyond prison, he

received a “special sentence” of lifetime supervision under Iowa Code

section 903B.1. The court also advised him that his convictions qualified as

“sexually predatory offenses” under Iowa Code section 901A.1. Reynolds did not

challenge his convictions or sentence on direct appeal.

But in 2022, Reynolds—representing himself—applied for PCR, alleging

three grounds for relief. First, he asserted his plea attorney failed to “properly

represent” him or “investigate the case.” Second, he claimed actual innocence.

1 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970) (“[A]n express admission of

guilt . . . is not a constitutional requisite to the imposition of [a] criminal penalty.”).
3

Third, he contested the consecutive nature of his sentencing. Reynolds also asked

to proceed as a pro se litigant, which the court allowed.

In moving for summary judgment, Reynolds fleshed out his claim of

ineffective assistance, alleging that “counsel provided no investigation or

preparation for trial and forced [Reynolds] to take a plea agreement.” And he also

alleged that the State “had no evidence other than hearsay statements that were

absurd to charge [him] of the underlying crimes in this case.” The State also moved

for summary dismissal. After a hearing in October 2022, the district court

dismissed Reynolds’s claims concerning the sufficiency of the State’s proof and

the consecutive sentences. The court also granted Reynolds’s motion for counsel.

Represented by counsel, in March 2024, Reynolds appeared for a hearing

on the merits of his ineffective assistance and actual innocence claims. He was

the only live witness. The State presented a transcript of trial counsel’s testimony

from the summary-judgment hearing. After the hearing, both sides filed proposed

findings of fact and conclusions of law. In its order, the district court rejected

Reynolds’s request for relief. On the ineffective-assistance claim, the court found

no breach of duty or prejudice because counsel presented the State’s offer to

Reynolds and he decided to accept that proposed plea deal. The court did not

address Reynolds’s argument that counsel failed to investigate the case. As for

his actual-innocence claim, the district court found that Reynolds presented no

newly discovered evidence. And, regardless, there was not clear and convincing

evidence in the record that no reasonable factfinder could convict Reynolds of the

offenses.

Reynolds now challenges the denial of PCR.
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II. Analysis

That challenge is two-fold. First, Reynolds argues he received ineffective

assistance of counsel because his trial attorney failed “to conduct any

investigation” and failed to “adequately explain the special sentence.” Reynolds

insists these errors, individually and cumulatively, were prejudicial. Second,

Reynolds contends the district court erred in rejecting his claim of actual

innocence. We will address these claims in turn.2

A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Reynolds airs two grievances about counsel’s performance. But as the

State argues, he preserved neither claim for our review. True, Reynolds alleged

that his trial counsel failed to investigate the case in his PCR application and in his

motion for summary judgment. But the district court did not decide that ground or

even reference that argument in its PCR ruling. If “a court fails to rule on a matter,

a party must request a ruling” to preserve error. State v. Krogmann, 804

N.W.2d 518, 524 (Iowa 2011). Relying on Lamasters v. State, Reynolds argues

the district court “necessarily ruled” on this issue in finding that the guilty plea was

knowing and voluntary. 821 N.W.2d 856, 864 (Iowa 2012). We disagree. Unlike

Lamasters, in this case the court failed to mention the disputed issue. Thus, error

was not preserved.

Moving to the second grievance, Reynolds did not assert that his counsel

was ineffective for failing to advise him of the consequences of the guilty plea until

he submitted his proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. At the summary

2 We review both claims de novo. Dewberry v. State, 941 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Iowa 2019).
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judgment hearing, Reynolds asserted that he was “ambushed” by the plea deal

and forced to accept it. He did not argue that counsel failed to explain the special

sentence of lifetime supervision. At the PCR hearing on the merits, Reynolds did

testify that when he signed the plea, trial counsel did not explain the special

sentence. But that testimony was not connected to a legal argument until

Reynolds’s proposed findings of fact and legal conclusions. See Est. of Grossman

v. McCreary, 373 N.W.2d 113, 114 (Iowa 1985) (proposed findings submitted to

the court did not obviate the post-trial requirement to file a motion to reconsider,

enlarge or amend to preserve error). Even if the testimony and proposed findings

sufficiently raised the issue, the district court did not rule on that ground. See

Krogmann, 804 N.W.2d at 524. We find Reynolds failed to preserve this issue for

our review.

B. Actual Innocence

Reynolds next argues that the district court erred in rejecting his actual-

innocence claim. The State again contests error preservation, maintaining that

Reynolds abandoned this argument in his proposed findings of fact and

conclusions of law. In that filing by his PCR counsel, Reynolds proposed this legal

conclusion:

The Court finds that while the Applicant has provided evidence of his
innocence in the form of his testimony and the affidavits of two
witnesses, the evidence presented in the record is not of a clear and
convincing nature as required to prevail on a claim of actual
innocence. Schmidt v. State, 909 N.W.2d 778, 797 (Iowa 2018).

Yet on appeal, Reynolds resurrects his claim of actual innocence. He

contends that the proposed order—“functionally a closing argument”—does not

bind him because the district court “considered the matter and issued a ruling on
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the merits. We assume without deciding that Reynolds preserved error and

proceed to the merits.

On the merits, Reynolds must show by clear and convincing evidence that,

despite proof supporting his convictions, no reasonable fact finder could convict

him considering all the evidence. See Schmidt, 909 N.W.2d at 797. Under this

“demanding standard,” Reynolds must show that he is “factually and actually

innocent.” See Dewberry, 941 N.W.2d at 5 (emphasis omitted).

In the PCR proceedings, Reynolds presented affidavits from his wife and

his brother to support his claim that it was impossible for him to have sexually

abused the victims, S.W. and M.W., at the time and place they alleged. 3 Minutes

of testimony show S.W. and M.W. planned to testify that Reynolds sexually

assaulted them “around the time of a barbecue at [Reynolds]’s house.” S.W.

detailed that Reynolds came into the bathroom, took her to the garage, and “was

sticking his penis in her private part.” M.W. planned to testify that Reynolds

whispered things into her ear, followed her into a bedroom when she tried to get

away, “put his private part in her private part,” and “stopped when his wife started

calling his name.”

Reynolds contends that his own account, as well as the two affidavits,

amount to clear and convincing evidence of his innocence. Key to his contention

is that S.W. recalled the acts occurred in the garage during a family barbecue. But,

according to Reynolds, the garage door was open and barbecue guests were just

outside, so he could not have committed the crime without anyone seeing or

3 S.W. and M.W. refer to Reynolds and his wife as their grandparents or
godparents.
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hearing. Also, his wife claims S.W. and M.W. had behavioral issues and that

Reynolds was never alone with them during the barbeque.

In our de novo review, we find Reynolds fails to meet the “demanding”

standard to prove actual innocence. See Dewberry, 941 N.W.2d at 5. He does

not present clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable fact finder could

convict him of lascivious acts. The affidavits from his wife and brother are

conclusory and focus on the barbecue event. But, according to the minutes, M.W.

and S.W. allege the acts occurred “around the time of a barbecue,” not necessarily

during the barbecue. Reynolds also disparages the girls’ proposed testimony as

“confusing” and uncorroborated. But inconsistencies in the testimony of children

subjected to sexual conduct are common and would not “compel a jury to conclude

that the victim is not credible or that there is insufficient evidence to support a guilty

verdict.” State v. Donahue, 957 N.W.2d 1, 11 (Iowa 2021). As Reynolds admitted

in his Alford plea, a factfinder could have made an independent determination that

there was “strong evidence of [his] actual guilt.”

III. Conclusion

Because Reynolds failed to preserve error on his ineffective-assistance-of-

counsel claims and failed to prove actual innocence, we affirm the district court’s

denial of relief.

AFFIRMED.