State of Iowa v. James Kerkula Horace Jr.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-0343
Filed October 29, 2025

STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

JAMES KERKULA HORACE JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Melissa

Anderson-Seeber, Judge.

James Horace Jr. appeals his conviction for second-degree sexual abuse,

challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. AFFIRMED.

Austin Jungblut of Parrish Kruidenier, L.L.P., Des Moines, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Aaron Rogers, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered without oral argument by Ahlers, P.J., Buller, J., and

Potterfield, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206

(2025).
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POTTERFIELD, Senior Judge.

James Horace Jr. appeals his conviction for second-degree sexual abuse.

He challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, arguing that the State failed to show

venue and that the testimony of the victim was too conflicted to prove the alleged

abuse. We disagree. Horace waived any challenge to venue by declining to raise

it in a pretrial motion. As for the elements of Horace’s offense, we find substantial

evidence supports the district court’s verdict. We therefore affirm Horace’s

conviction.

I. Background

At the center of this case is a child—we will call her Sara1—who was born

in 2015. When Sara was two years old, she began making regular visits to

Horace’s home in Waterloo, Iowa. Horace’s wife looked after Sara while her

mother worked second shift at a processing plant. That was the routine for six

evenings a week until approximately October 2022, when Sara started to resist

going to Horace’s house. Sara’s mother found her behavior unusual, as Sara had

always enjoyed playing with Horace’s children. Eventually, Sara disclosed to her

mother that Horace had “put his hand down [her] pants” and touched her genitals.

Sara’s mother confronted Horace, and a criminal investigation ensued.

During a recorded interview in January 2023, Sara told a child protective worker

that something “wrong” had happened while she was at Horace’s house. When

asked what she meant, Sara explained that somebody had used their hand to

touch her genitals under her clothes. Horace was also interviewed by police. He

1 To protect the child’s identity, we adopt the randomly generated pseudonym used

by the State in its appellate brief.
3

initially alleged that he was unable to recall some of his interactions with Sara

because he often drank alcohol in the evenings. But he eventually told a detective

that he may have put his hand down Sara’s pants. As Horace put it, “if she says

so, it did happen.”

The State charged Horace with one count of sexual abuse in the second

degree. At a bench trial in October 2023, Sara—then seven years old—initially

denied any recollection of Horace or his house. With further questioning, she

divulged that she recognized Horace from “before when I had a babysitter,” and

that Horace “would always follow me and put his hands in my pants.” Sara testified

that Horace touched her “front” or “coochie,” although she equivocated when

asked whether he touched her inside or outside her underwear. She also gave

conflicting answers as to the frequency of the abuse. At one point, Sara testified

that Horace touched her “every time” she went to his house. Later, she said it was

“about eleven times.”

Horace took the stand at trial, denying any sexual contact with Sara and

renouncing the earlier statements he made to police. In a carefully reasoned

ruling, the district court rejected Horace’s version of the facts and found him guilty

as charged. Horace now appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. He

argues the record fails to support the district court’s finding that the abuse took

place—if at all—in Black Hawk County. He also challenges the court’s decision to

credit Sara’s version of events, contending her testimony was too conflicted to

prove the alleged abuse.
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II. Standard of Review

We review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence for correction of

errors at law. State v. Mathis, 971 N.W.2d 514, 516 (Iowa 2022). We must affirm

the conviction if it is supported by substantial evidence, which is evidence

“sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact the defendant is guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Id. at 516–17 (citation omitted). The substantial evidence

standards we use when reviewing jury verdicts apply equally in cases tried to the

court. State v. Ledezma, 549 N.W.2d 307, 310 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996).

III. Discussion

a. Location of the Offense

Horace asserts that the State failed to prove any of the alleged sexual abuse

occurred in Black Hawk County, which is the venue where he was tried. Horace

concedes the record shows that he moved to Waterloo in 2017 and that any abuse

would have occurred inside his home, but he contends “it was never established

the residence was located in Black Hawk County.” The State argues that Horace

waived any venue challenge by failing to raise it in a pretrial motion.

Generally speaking, a criminal action must “be tried in the county in which

the crime is committed.” Iowa Code § 803.2(1) (2022). This requirement stems

from the common law notion that “the situs of the alleged crime is usually the home

of the defendant” and the place where “witnesses are accessible for the purpose

of trial.” State v. Dorsey, 16 N.W.3d 32, 42 (Iowa 2025) (citation omitted). Of

course, those interests sometimes must yield to due process rights. See id. Our

procedural rules permit either party to seek a change of venue when necessary to

ensure a fair trial. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.11(4)(f), (11). However, a venue
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objection must be raised prior to trial; otherwise, it is waived. Iowa Code

§ 803.2(3). Horace never moved for a change of venue. We therefore agree with

the State that any objection to the place of his trial is waived on appeal. Id.

“Venue is not an essential element” of a charged offense. State v. Allen,

293 N.W.2d 16, 20 (Iowa 1980). But even if it were, there is substantial evidence

supporting the district court’s finding that the crime occurred in Black Hawk County.

Horace testified that he relocated to Iowa in 2016 and later moved to a home on

Western Avenue in Waterloo. He conceded that Sara visited his house, which is

where Sara testified that Horace abused her. Nothing in the record suggests that

Horace ever encountered Sara outside of his Waterloo home. The district court—

as finder of fact—was entitled to rely on its common geographical knowledge when

deciding whether venue was correct. See State v. Stevens, 719 N.W.2d 547, 552

(Iowa 2006) (explaining jurors may “rely on their common knowledge to support a

conviction”).

Horace waived any objection to venue, and he does not appear to dispute

that the charged conduct took place in Waterloo. We therefore reject Horace’s first

claim of error.

b. Whether a Sex Act Occurred

Horace also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on one of the

substantive elements of his offense. In order to convict Horace for second-degree

sexual abuse, the State was required to prove that he committed a “sex act”

against Sara. State v. Constable, 505 N.W.2d 473, 475 (Iowa 1993); see also

Iowa Code § 709.1. To this end, Sara testified that Horace reached under her
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clothing2 and touched her genitals on more than one occasion. Horace does not

dispute that these contacts would satisfy the sex-act element of his offense. See

Iowa Code § 702.17(3) (Supp. 2022) (defining a “sex act” to include “[c]ontact

between the finger, hand, or other body part of one person and the genitalia . . . of

another person”). However, he argues the trial record was too conflicted to prove

he ever touched Sara inappropriately.

Horace relies primarily on State v. Smith, where a panel of our court

reversed a jury’s finding of sexual abuse because the pivotal testimony of two

child-victims was “self-contradictory” and “devoid of . . . experiential detail.” 508

N.W.2d 101, 104 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993). However, Smith has long been criticized

as an “outlier case” that misapplied the deferential standard required for review of

a jury verdict. State v. Trane, 984 N.W.2d 429, 436 (Iowa 2023) (quoting Mathis,

971 N.W.2d at 518). Although frequently invoked, it has never been applied to

reverse a conviction on a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. See Mathis,

971 N.W.2d at 518 (noting Smith has “not been followed in any sexual abuse case

in Iowa since”); State v. Showers, No. 23-0390, 2024 WL 2317709, at *4–5 & n.4

(Iowa Ct. App. May 22, 2024) (collecting cases declining to apply Smith). Indeed,

after the parties submitted their appellate briefs in this case, our court filed an en

banc decision overruling Smith and disavowing its reasoning. State v. Lang,

2 Horace’s appellate brief highlights Sara’s inconsistent testimony as to whether

he touched Sara inside or outside her underwear. But our supreme court has
made clear that “skin-to-skin contact is not required in order to establish a ‘sex act’
under section 702.17.” State v. Pearson, 514 N.W.2d 452, 455 (Iowa 1994).
“[P]rohibited contact may occur even though the specified body parts or substitutes
are covered.” Id. Because a layer of cloth cannot insulate Horace from criminal
liability, it was unnecessary for the district court to wrestle with this aspect of the
record. Nor do we address the issue further.
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No. 24-0406, 2025 WL _______, at *_ (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2025) (explaining

that, among other flaws, “Smith cannot be reconciled with the[] fundamental

principles of appellate review”).

To avoid repeating the errors of Smith, we must approach Horace’s

sufficiency challenge with proper deference toward the verdict. The question

before us is not whether the district court reached the only conclusion that might

be drawn from a conflicted record, but whether the evidence “supports the finding

actually made.” State v. Lacey, 968 N.W.2d 792, 800–01 (Iowa 2021). We view

the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, granting all legitimate

inferences that might reasonably be drawn from the record facts. Mathis, 971

N.W.2d at 516. In doing so, we may not weigh the evidence, pass on the credibility

of witnesses, or resolve conflicts in the testimony—those decisions are for the

finder of fact.3 Id. at 519.

Under these standards, we find substantial evidence supports the verdict in

this case. We need not look farther than Sara’s testimony. See State v. Donahue,

957 N.W.2d 1, 10–11 (Iowa 2021) (“A sexual abuse victim’s testimony alone may

be sufficient evidence for conviction.”); State v. Hildreth, 582 N.W.2d 167, 170

(Iowa 1998) (finding a victim’s testimony was “by itself sufficient to constitute

3 One reason we do not second-guess credibility findings is that we lack the first-

person perspective of a factfinder at trial. Here, for example, the district court
adeptly observed how Sara’s body language lent credence to her testimony:
In response to a question by the prosecutor of whether she knew
where the private areas on body we[re], [Sara] said, “do I have to say
them?” After the prosecutor told her yes, the Court saw [Sara] draw
in a deep breath, slowly let it out, and begin answering questions
more fluidly. Her body language was consistent with someone who
did not want to have to recount events but physically and mentally
gathered the strength to do it anyway.
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substantial evidence” of sexual abuse). Although she was unable to elaborate the

precise manner and frequency of Horace’s assaults, “[w]e do not require victims

of child sex abuse to recall every detail with perfect clarity.” State v. Hagenow,

No. 22-1958, 2024 WL 2042137, at *6 (Iowa Ct. App. May 8, 2024). Nor do

occasional inconsistencies defeat a child’s testimony. See Donahue, 957 N.W.2d

at 11 (“Inconsistencies and lack of detail are common in sexual abuse cases and

do not compel a jury to conclude that the victim is not credible . . . .”). The district

court found that Sara’s “basic story has not waivered.” It was entitled to rely on

her account.

Although our analysis could start and end with Sara’s testimony, see id.

at 10–11, we note that other witnesses corroborated her story. For instance, her

mother testified regarding Sara’s sudden change in attitude toward visiting the

babysitter. She explained Sara’s resistance was so severe that she sometimes

“had to skip work because [Sara] did not want to go.” These facts support a

reasonable inference that Sara wanted to avoid something—or someone—at

Horace’s home. See Hildreth, 582 N.W.2d at 170 (noting a child’s testimony of

abuse was “corroborated by the evidence of the child’s aversion to returning to the

[defendant’s] home”). In addition, testimony from Horace’s wife confirmed that

Horace would often be home while she was babysitting Sara, and that she would

sometimes leave the child alone while tending to other tasks. On at least one

occasion, she witnessed Sara sitting on Horace’s lap.

Furthermore, the district court was permitted to hold Horace’s prior

statements against him. See State v. Meyers, 799 N.W.2d 132, 139 (Iowa 2011)

(explaining informal admissions can be substantial evidence of sexual abuse when
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supported by corroborating evidence). When Sara’s mother first confronted

Horace with her daughter’s allegations, Horace apologized. He later told

investigators that it was possible something happened with Sara, and that he was

unable to recall some of his interactions with her due to his drinking. When

confronted with more details, Horace said he would “go with” the accusations.

Eventually, he admitted to putting his hand down Sara’s pants, stating that “if she

says so, it did happen.” Horace attempted to backpedal these incriminating

remarks at trial, but the district court found his shifting account unworthy of belief.

See Liggins, 524 N.W.2d at 188 (noting a factfinder may consider a defendant’s

inconsistent statements as probative of guilt).

When we view the record in the light most favorable to the State—and honor

the credibility findings made by the district court—we believe a rational factfinder

could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Horace touched Sara’s genitals

beneath her clothing during at least one of her visits to his home. Horace does not

dispute that such contact is a sex act upon a child. We therefore find substantial

evidence supports his conviction for second-degree sexual abuse.

AFFIRMED.