State of Iowa v. Darion Shawn Hermes

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-0973
Filed September 17, 2025

STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

DARION SHAWN HERMES,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Celene Gogerty, Judge.

A defendant challenges the mandatory minimum sentence the district court

imposed following his conviction for first-degree robbery. AFFIRMED.

Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Nan Jennisch, Assistant

Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Olivia D. Brooks, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered without oral argument by Tabor, C.J., and Ahlers and

Langholz, JJ.
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AHLERS, Judge.

Law enforcement identified Darion Hermes as one of the perpetrators of a

robbery that resulted in a fatal shooting. As a result, the State charged Hermes

with first-degree murder, first-degree robbery, and felon in possession of a firearm.

The parties reached a plea agreement. Pursuant to that agreement,

Hermes pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter and first-degree robbery. At the

sentencing hearing, the parties jointly recommended Hermes be sentenced to

consecutive sentences in accordance with the terms of the plea agreement. But

each argued for a different mandatory minimum on the robbery charge—the

prosecutor advocated for a seventy percent mandatory minimum while Hermes

sought a fifty percent mandatory minimum. The district court imposed consecutive

sentences and a seventy percent mandatory minimum on the robbery charge.

Hermes appeals, challenging only the court’s decision to impose a seventy

percent mandatory minimum for the robbery conviction. Because he challenges a

discretionary sentence that was not agreed to in the plea agreement, Hermes has

good cause to appeal despite his guilty plea. See State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d

98, 105 (Iowa 2020). As the sentence imposed is within statutory limits, we review

for an abuse of discretion. State v. Majors, 940 N.W.2d 372, 385 (Iowa 2020).

Hermes is statutorily required to serve “between one-half and seven-tenths”

of his twenty-five-year sentence on the first-degree robbery charge before he

becomes eligible for parole or work release. See Iowa Code §§ 711.2 (2022)

(categorizing first-degree robbery as a class “B” felony); 902.9(1)(b) (setting

twenty-five years as the maximum sentence for a class “B” felony); 902.12(3)

(requiring a person to serve fifty to seventy percent of the maximum sentence for
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first-degree robbery before becoming eligible for parole or work release). Hermes

contends the district court abused its discretion when it imposed a seventy percent

mandatory minimum and he should only be subject to a fifty percent mandatory

minimum.

In deciding on the minimum sentence for first-degree robbery, the court is

required to consider “all pertinent information including the person’s criminal

record, a validated risk assessment, and the negative impact the offense has had

on the victim or other persons.” Id. § 901.11(3). Hermes contends the court failed

to do this and relied solely on the nature of the crime when determining the

mandatory minimum. In support of this contention, he points to these observations

by the court:

With regard to count II, robbery in the first degree, there is a
minimum sentence this court must apply. The court has options
between. . . fifty percent up to seventy percent. You have asked for
fifty percent; the State has asked for seventy.
Considering all that has been given to you as far as trying to
rehabilitate you, and you—now your actions have led to the death of
[the victim], I find that the appropriate sentence is seventy percent
minimum. I think that will protect the community and hopefully lead
to your rehabilitation.

Hermes is correct that the court cannot rely on a single factor in reaching a

sentencing decision. See State v. Dvorsky, 322 N.W.2d 62, 67 (Iowa 1982)

(concluding the district court abused its discretion when it relied only on the nature

of the offense to reach a sentencing decision). But emphasizing a particular factor

is not an abuse of discretion if the court also considers other pertinent sentencing

factors. State v. Leckington, 713 N.W.2d 208, 216–17 (Iowa 2006).

We question whether the above passage relied upon by Hermes shows that

the court relied only on the nature of the offense. Regardless, that passage is only
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a snippet of the court’s statement of reasons for the sentence. Here is what the

court said in full:

Reading through the pre-sentence investigation report,
Mr. Hermes, it certainly is clear you had a difficult childhood, and the
court finds that a mitigating factor.
It’s also clear that you were given a significant quantity and
quality of juvenile services to get you on the right path. But even
after four years of services, you continued down the path of
destruction.
In 2019, your offenses became worse and worse. You were
convicted of interference with official acts, possession of controlled
substance, eluding, carrying weapons, and a possession of firearm
by a felon.
This court is particularly concerned that it appears your
offenses were escalating.
By the time you were sentenced on your carrying weapons
charge, the court put you on probation. Shortly thereafter, you were
convicted of possessing a firearm by a felon. You were held in
contempt, put back on probation; and then your probation was
revoked, and you were sent to prison.
You ended up discharging your sentence from prison on
June 22, 2022. [The victim] was killed July 31, 2022, a month later,
and that doesn’t even include the offenses you committed in
between—during those in-between times of theft, driving while
barred, and eluding again.
You are a young man, but you’ve been given so many
opportunities to set your life straight, and yet here we are. Not only
did your offenses escalate, your actions led to the killing of [the
victim], who was a human being. He’s obviously desperately missed
by his family. He mattered, just like everybody else. His life
mattered.
Your life matters, and I’m not sure why you have not taken
advantage or taken a deep dive into your own self of why you
continue down this path, why you do not—why you chose to go down
this path.
But here we are.
This court has to look at essentially two factors in crafting your
sentence: A maximum opportunity for your rehabilitation and to
protect the community from further offenses. Both are important.
You were given, it appears, a lot of services through the
juvenile court that had no impact. You were given probation services
that appeared to have very little impact. You went to prison, yet you
don’t have your high school diploma. You haven’t—you were
actively using drugs once you got out of prison. Nothing has
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changed. If anything, things got significantly worse, which has now
led to a tragic event, the loss of [the victim].
Your attorney said something which I think is true[.] You hold
the key to your future. Which is true, but you’ve always had the key
to your future. You’re going to have to make that decision of which
way you go.
Courts have given you every opportunity to change things,
and it hasn’t made any difference at this point. If anything, things are
worse.
I think you need the maximum time for rehabilitation, and I
think—I definitely think we need to protect the community from you,
because after all of these services that were provided to you, you
commit the offense of voluntary manslaughter and robbery in the first
degree, two of our most serious offenses.
So I am adjudging you guilty of the crime of voluntary
manslaughter and sentencing you to a period of incarceration not to
exceed ten years.
I’m adjudging you guilty of the crime of robbery in the first
degree and sentencing you to a period of incarceration not to exceed
twenty-five years. You will receive credit against those terms for any
time you’ve served.
With regard to count II, robbery in the first degree, there is a
minimum sentence this court must apply. The court has options
between. . . fifty percent up to seventy percent. You have asked for
fifty percent; the State has asked for seventy.
Considering all that has been given to you as far as trying to
rehabilitate you, and you—now your actions have led to the death of
[the victim], I find that the appropriate sentence is seventy percent
minimum. I think that will protect the community and hopefully lead
to your rehabilitation.

Viewed in its entirety, the court’s statement of reasons for selecting the seventy-

percent minimum makes it clear that it considered more than just the nature of the

offense. The court considered multiple factors and gave thoughtful consideration

before determining the sentence. We find no abuse of discretion in that

determination, so we affirm.

AFFIRMED.