CMT Highway, LLC v. Logan Contractors Supply, Inc.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-1158
Filed June 18, 2025

CMT HIGHWAY, LLC,
Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant,
Appellant/Cross-Appellee,

vs.

LOGAN CONTRACTORS SUPPLY, INC.,
Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff,
Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Cedar County, Jeffrey D. Bert,

Judge.

A construction-material manufacturer appeals from a ruling that it breached

its contracts with a construction-material supplier. The construction-material

supplier cross-appeals the rates of pre- and post-judgment interest on various

awards. AFFIRMED ON APPEAL; VACATED IN PART AND REMANDED WITH

INSTRUCTIONS ON CROSS-APPEAL.

Molly M. Parker (argued), Samuel E. Jones, Steven J. Pace, and Kate

Thorne of Shuttleworth & Ingersoll, Cedar Rapids, and Joseph C. Creen of Bush,

Motto, Creen, Koury & Halligan, PLC, Davenport, for appellants/cross-appellees.

Michael W. Thrall (argued) and Matthew A. McGuire of Nyemaster Goode,

P.C., Des Moines, and Roy Leaf of Nyemaster Goode, P.C., Cedar Rapids, for

appellee/cross-appellant.

Heard at oral argument by Tabor, C.J., and Ahlers and Langholz, JJ.
2

AHLERS, Judge.

Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) governs this case. The

case centers on the termination of a business relationship between a construction-

material supplier, Logan Contractors Supply, Inc. (Logan Contractors), and a

construction-material manufacturer, CMT Highway, LLC (CMT).

I. Background Facts

Governmental entities intending to build, modify, or repair a public road

create plans for the project and publicly post them, seeking bids from contractors.

As a part of developing a bid, prospective general contractors seek bids from

subcontracting suppliers for materials needed to complete the project. Logan

Contractors is such a supplier. For suppliers to provide a bid to the general

contractor, the suppliers seek quotes from material manufacturers, like CMT. The

supplier will notify the manufacturer if it uses the manufacturer’s quote when

submitting its bid to the general contractor. Likewise, the general contractor will

notify the supplier if it uses its quote for its bid to the governmental entity. If the

governmental entity selects the bid from the general contractor, then the general

contractor is bound by its bid and Logan Contractors is bound by its bid to the

general contractor. According to a Logan Contractors employee, the company has

used this bid process for his entire seventeen-year career with the company, and

it is consistent throughout the road-construction industry.

Logan Contractors started doing business with CMT in 2016, and the two

companies followed the above-described process. When Logan Contractors

sought to bid for a job with a general contractor doing a road project, Logan

Contractors sought quotes from CMT. CMT would supply a quote. If Logan
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Contractors accepted the quote, it would notify CMT that it was using CMT’s quote

in its bid. If the general contractor accepted the bid, Logan Contractors would

notify CMT, and CMT would manufacture and supply the materials at the prices

listed in the quote when it received a purchase order from Logan Contractors.

Often Logan Contractors would submit multiple purchase orders as a project

progressed through different phases of construction. The timing of those orders

and delivery dates were not necessarily strictly set because the timing or

progression of a project and materials needed at any given time was “fluid.”

By 2021, CMT had difficulty meeting its production schedule and delivery

dates for several projects. The price of steel, a raw material necessary for

producing CMT’s products, had increased, as had shipping costs. This made it

difficult for CMT to produce and deliver materials to projects for Logan Contractors

at the prices stated in their quotes. On October 27, the president of CMT sent the

following email to the president of Logan Contractors:

After studying the numbers and reviewing our notes from the
conversation this morning, I have come up with the following
proposals:

1. CMT will continue to quote Logan on jobs they are sent quotes
for and manufacture and deliver everything they currently
have orders for with the following increases:
1.5 material will be billed at $6.95 a foot delivered price
1.25 material will be billed at $5.25 a foot delivered price
1.00 material will be billed at $3.90 a foot delivered price
.75 material will be billed at $2.80 a foot delivered price
Basket Stakes will be at $.06 higher than current cost

These prices represent a cost that is well below current pricing
but allows us to pass on the impact of our higher material cost
and would pertain to all existing orders on the books as of
today. We would not pass on any shipping cost as CMT will
eat the cost of the freight.
4

All material currently on the backlog would be manufactured
and paid for by March 31, 2022. Any new work moving
forward would be billed at negotiated price at time of order.
Also, any additional orders will receive a $1,000 rebate per
order (minimum a truckload of material) until the difference on
original price and new price is made up.

2. Logan rejects proposal 1 as written, at which time CMT
Highway LLC and Logan decide to end their working
relationship and go their separate ways.

Also, if you decide to move on, I want to thank you for your business
over the years. I wish you continued success on the personal and
business side. The ball is in your court and I will need an answer by
EOB on Friday. Thanks!

When Logan Contractors sought clarification, CMT clarified that the proposed

increased pricing was its “break even numbers on materials” and would apply to

all outstanding purchase orders except for the “Offutt jobs.”

Counsel for Logan Contractors informed CMT that it believed CMT

breached its contracts by failing to deliver goods in a timely manner and attempting

to increase the agreed-upon price. Counsel further informed CMT that Logan

Contractors would find “alternative sources of supply in effort to minimize

damages” and it “intend[ed] to hold CMT responsible for payment” of all damages.

Logan Contractors then refused to pay for some of the materials CMT had already

delivered for various projects.

CMT initiated this action to recover payment for the materials it previously

delivered. Logan Contractors filed a counterclaim alleging CMT breached its

contractual obligations when it did not provide materials at the originally agreed

price and seeking damages for cover materials.

The matters were tried before the business specialty court, which

determined that CMT breached its contracts with Logan and was liable for cover
5

material costs. The court also determined that Logan Contractors could not

withhold payment for materials received from CMT. Both parties appeal.

II. Standard of Review

While we review the business court’s contract interpretation and

construction for correction of errors at law, Homeland Energy Sols., LLC v.

Retterath, 938 N.W.2d 664, 683 (Iowa 2020), the business “court’s factual findings

have the effect of a special verdict and are binding on us if supported by substantial

evidence.” Pitz v. U.S. Cellular Operating Sys., 989 N.W.2d 636, 640 (Iowa 2023)

(citation omitted). “Evidence is substantial if a reasonable person would accept it

as adequate to reach a conclusion.” Chrysler Fin. Co. v. Bergstrom, 703 N.W.2d

415, 418 (Iowa 2005). “Evidence is not insubstantial merely because we may draw

different conclusions from it; the ultimate question is whether it supports the finding

actually made, not whether the evidence would support a different finding.” Id.

(citation omitted). When completing our review, we view the evidence in the light

most favorable to the business court’s ruling. Id.

III. CMT’s Appeal

We begin by addressing CMT’s claims. First, it argues that Logan

Contractors failed to establish there were binding contracts between them or that

CMT breached any contracts. Second, CMT claims the court erred by awarding

Logan Contractors damages for cover material costs. Finally, CMT argues the

court miscalculated the damages award because it included damages for projects

other than the projects at issue.
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A. Existence of Contracts and Breach

1. Formation of contracts

CMT contends the business court’s determination that contracts were

created with Logan Contractors is not supported by substantial evidence. Both

parties agree that article 2 of the UCC, codified in Iowa Code chapter 554 (2022),

governs this action, as it involves the sale of goods. “A contract for sale of goods

may be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by

both parties which recognizes the existence of such a contract.” Iowa Code

§ 554.2204(1). And “[e]ven though one or more terms are left open[,] a contract

for sale does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a

contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy.”

Id. § 554.2204(3). That is in keeping with chapter 554’s requirement that it “must

be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and

policies . . . to simplify, clarify, and modernize the law governing commercial

transactions” and “to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices

through custom, usage, and agreement of the parties.” Id. § 554.1103(1)(a), (b).

With that in mind, we review whether there is substantial evidence in the record to

support the business court’s determination that CMT and Logan Contractors

entered contracts for the various projects at issue.

CMT contends that it could not enter into binding contracts with Logan

Contractors until both parties agreed on firm delivery dates, and as there were no

firm delivery dates set, contracts were not created. We disagree. The business

court’s determination that definitive delivery dates were not a necessary

component to the contracts because “all industry players understand that delivery
7

dates can be a ‘moving target’” is supported by substantial evidence. Logan

Contractors’ employee testified as such, as did an employee for a different

materials manufacturer.1 In fact, CMT’s contentions that it could not enter into a

contract with Logan Contractors without a set delivery date is contrary to the entire

practice of the public road construction industry. Logan Contractors needed to

know the cost of materials when putting together a bid for a general contractor

because it would be bound by its bid should it be selected by the contractor. It

could only know the cost of materials to create that bid if its acceptance of CMT’s

quote was a binding agreement that locked in the materials at a set price. And at

that time, there would be no way for Logan Contractors to be able to provide

definitive delivery dates. As a Logan Contractors employee noted, the timing and

progress of road construction is fluid because it depends on several factors like

weather and performance of other contractors..

We find substantial evidence supporting the business court’s conclusion

that “[t]he course of dealing between the parties demonstrates an understanding

that CMT’s obligation was binding to Logan Contractors upon notification that

CMT’s quote had been accepted,[2] and Logan Contractors had been awarded the

project by the general contractor.” This conclusion is supported not only by the

parties’ past practice, but also by the terms included within CMT’s quotes. It is

apparent that CMT knew it was proposing binding terms each time it provided

1 The business court found the employee from the third-party materials
manufacturer “to be reliable and credible on industry practices.” We defer to that
credibility determination.
2 CMT’s sales director acknowledged that Logan informed CMT that it accepted its

bids on all the projects.
8

Logan Contractors with a quote for a project. For example, a quote for one project

included the following section:

TERMS:
Purchasing
The prices shown are firm through December 31, 2021, except as
noted above [an above notation added predetermined cost variables
if materials were shipped with pallets or bags] and for the following
items. Add 4% starting January 1, 2022 and for every 6 months
thereafter.

Escalators can be avoided for 2022 & 2023 if we are able to produce
during November-January 2022 and submit payment of stock-piled
material for material that is to deliver in 2022 & 2023[.]

A verbal commitment, signed acknowledgment or purchase order is
required within 15 days of the letting date. After this 15 day time
period, we reserve the right to withdraw this quotation or re-quote at
our discretion[.]

Our pricing is not subject to deduction by an indexes, regulation or
agreements made by the contractor and the owner of the project.
Pricing does not include sales tax. Add any applicable state and local
taxes.

Any changes made after purchase orders are accepted must be
made in writing and agreed upon by the CMT Highway sales
department.

Delivery
These prices are based upon delivery of all materials on or before
December 31,2021, except as noted above. Deliveries occurring
after this date are subject to an additional charge to be determined.

Delivered prices are based on shipping In truckload quantities. Any
partial shipments are subject to additional freight charges.

Shipments delayed more than two (2) hours in unloading will Incur
an extra charge of $60.00 per hour in 1/4 hour increments[.]

Payments:
Net 30 Days from the date of the invoice. A 1.5% finance charge,
accrued monthly will be applied to outstanding balances thirty days
past due[.]
9

Once CMT submitted the quote offering to be bound by its terms—including

prices being “firm” through December 31, 2021—and Logan Contractors accepted

the quote including these key terms, the two formed a binding contract. And their

course of dealing since 2016 establishes that both companies understood

themselves to be bound by the terms of the quote.3

2. Breach

CMT argues that its attempts to renegotiate the price of goods for the

contracts did not amount to breach, noting that the president of Logan Contractors

admitted he had renegotiated the price of goods in past instances. But the

business court’s conclusion that the October 27 email amounted to breach of the

contracts is supported by the content of the email. It was not an attempt at

renegotiation as CMT now claims. It was notification that CMT would not produce

and deliver materials to Logan Contractors for outstanding purchase orders at the

prices that the parties had agreed were “firm” through the end of the year. In other

words, CMT notified Logan Contractors that it would not perform under a key, if not

the most important, term of their contracts—the previously agreed price. This

amounts to breach.

3. Successive performance contracts

CMT contends that we should view its contracts with Logan Contractors as

successive performance contracts that could be terminated through reasonable

notification. See id. § 554.2309(2) (“Where the contract provides for successive

3 Like the business court, we do not credit Logan Contractors’ “cancelling” of twenty

agreements as negating the course of dealing established by hundreds of other
agreements that were formed through the quote-and-acceptance format.
10

performances but is indefinite in duration it is valid for a reasonable time but unless

otherwise agreed may be terminated at any time by either party.”), (3) (“Termination

of a contract by one party except on the happening of an agreed event requires

that reasonable notification be received by the other party and an agreement

dispensing with notification is invalid if its operation would be unconscionable.”).

In CMT’s view, the October 27 email was simply notification that it was terminating

the contracts and could not amount to breach.

The business court aptly rejected this argument because the contracts are

not successive performance contracts. Although the exact timing of performance

could change under the contracts, the contracts were not “indefinite in duration.”

See id. § 232.2309(2). The business court explained:

The court rejects the argument that the contracts between
CMT and Logan Contractors were successive performance
contracts. The contracts related to public paving and road
construction projects were finite in scope. The quotes issued by CMT
contained fixed amounts. And the CMT quotes contained a
disclaimer that pricing was “firm” through a certain date, usually
December 31, 2021. The CMT quotes further indicated the prices
were based upon delivery by a certain date, usually December 31,
2021. None of these factors are indicative of a contract that is
indefinite in duration. In fact, the language used by CMT in their
quotes recognizes the possibility that CMT might be required to make
deliveries after December 31, 2021.

(Footnote omitted.) We adopt this rationale as our own.

B. Cost of Cover Goods

When a seller fails to make delivery or repudiates a contract, “the buyer may

‘cover’ by making in good faith and without unreasonable delay any reasonable

purchase of or contract to purchase goods in substitution for those due from the

seller.” Id. § 554.2712(1). After CMT breached, Logan Contractors got quotes
11

from other businesses for substitute materials and contracted with different

businesses to produce and deliver the materials to its projects that CMT was

supposed to produce and deliver. This resulted in Logan Contractors paying

$1,529,264.57 more for the materials than it had originally agreed to pay CMT.

The business court found Logan Contractors acted in good faith and without

unreasonable delay in covering in this manner. As a result, it awarded Logan

Contractors $1,529,264.57 in damages caused by CMT’s breach. See id.

§ 554.2712(2).

But CMT argues that Logan Contractors did not act reasonably in

purchasing cover goods because it did not accept the lowest alternative substitute.

Thus, CMT contends Logan Contractors failed to mitigate its damages. As the

breaching party, it is up to CMT to prove that Logan Contractors failed to

adequately mitigate damages. See UE Local 893/IUP v. State, 997 N.W.2d 1, 15

(Iowa 2023).

CMT argues it proved Logan Contractors failed to mitigate its damages

because the price increase proposed in its October 27 email only raised the cost

to Logan Contractors by $310,082.08. In contrast, using third party contractors to

cover CMT’s breach resulted in increased costs to Logan Contractors of

$1,529,264.57. CMT contends it was unreasonable and a failure to mitigate

damages for Logan Contractors to pay cover costs of $1,529,264.57 with third

parties when it would have only incurred cover costs of $310,082.08 had it

purchased the materials from CMT. In support of its position, CMT relies on a

comment to Restatement (Second) of Contracts that states that “[i]f the party in

breach offers to perform the contract for a different price, this may amount to a
12

suitable alternative” so long as it is not “condition[ed] on surrender by the injured

party of his claim for breach.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 350 cmt. e

(Am. L. Inst. 1981).

We are not persuaded by CMT’s cited authority or argument. While

principles of law and equity still apply in cases governed by the UCC, that is true

only when those principles are not “displaced by the particular provisions” of the

UCC. Iowa Code § 554.1103(2). Section 554.2712 is a “particular provision”

governing this situation, and it permits the buyer aggrieved by a seller’s breach to

“purchase goods in substitution for those due from the seller” and then recover

damages from the breaching seller. See id. § 554.2712(1), (2). The plain language

of section 554.2712(1) contemplates purchasing cover goods from someone other

than the breaching seller, and CMT provides no explanation how requiring Logan

Contractors to purchase the very same goods from CMT, just at a higher price than

the parties agreed to, constitutes “substitution for those due from the seller.” The

plain language of the statute defeats CMT’s argument.

But even if we were to ignore the plain language of section 554.2712(1) and

conclude that an aggrieved buyer could be required to cover by purchasing the

same goods from the breaching seller at a higher price, we are not persuaded

Logan Contractors was required to do so here. In addition to raising prices on

materials, the October 27 email stated that “any additional orders will receive a

$1,000 rebate per order (minimum a truckload of material) until the difference on

original price and new price is made up.” So in essence, the $1000 rebate

language would functionally “surrender” the cover claims of Logan Contractors by

providing an alternative resolution and force Logan Contractors into future
13

contracts to recoup the damages it sustained. But the very authority CMT relies

on—comment e to section 350 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts—

prohibits such surrender of an aggrieved buyer’s claim for damages when it

suggests it may be a “suitable alternative” to require an aggrieved buyer to

purchase from the breaching seller. Surrendering the claims for cover damages

negates any obligation Logan Contractors may have otherwise had to purchase

from CMT. As a result, having CMT produce and deliver the materials at the higher

price was not a suitable alternative as contemplated by the Restatement. See

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 350 cmt. e. Because having CMT produce

the materials at a higher price was not a suitable alternative, we conclude that

substantial evidence supports the business court’s conclusion that Logan

Contractors acted reasonably when it contracted with other manufacturers to

produce and deliver the cover materials despite the higher cost.

As to the specific amount of cover damages awarded to Logan Contractors,

CMT identifies three projects where it contends Logan Contractors did not accept

the lowest bid for alternative materials and argues it should not be required to pay

cover damages beyond the lowest bid as to those three projects. But Logan

Contractors points out that when CMT compared the bids for alternative materials,

it failed to factor in delivery cost. After factoring in delivery charges along with the

cost of the materials, Logan Contractors did in fact select the most cost-effective

alternative materials for each project.

C. Damages For Offutt Projects

Finally, CMT argues the business court should not have awarded Logan

Contractors cover damages for alternative materials for projects known as the
14

Offutt projects because it clarified that the Offutt projects were not subject to the

price increases demanded in the October 27 email. This argument may seem

logical on first consideration, but not after consideration of the surrounding

circumstances. CMT’s October 27 email made it clear that if Logan Contractors

would not agree to pay the increased prices on all other projects, then CMT would

simply terminate their business relationship. There was no carve-out for the two

companies to continue to work together on just the Offutt projects. So while the

Offutt projects were not subject to the price increases, CMT’s willingness to

perform under those contracts was still tied to Logan Contractors paying the higher

prices on the other projects. Once Logan Contractors refused to pay the increased

prices on the other projects, the October 27 email made it clear that CMT would

no longer work with Logan Contractors at all as the email stated if Logan

Contractors refused to pay the higher prices, then CMT would “end their working

relationship and go their separate ways.” This amounted to CMT’s repudiation of

contracts for all projects, including the Offutt projects. See Pavone v. Kirke, 807

N.W.2d 828, 833 (Iowa 2011) (“A repudiation is accomplished by words or acts

before the time of performance evidencing an intention to refuse to perform in the

future.”). That required Logan Contractors to look elsewhere to secure the

materials needed for all projects, including the Offutt projects. As such the

business court correctly awarded Logan Contractors cover damages for the Offutt

projects as well.

IV. Logan Contractors’ Cross-Appeal

We move to Logan Contractors cross-appeal. Both of Logan Contractors’

claims relate to interest on the judgments awarded to both parties.
15

A. Prejudgment Interest Awarded to CMT

The business court awarded prejudgment interest at the rate of 1.5% per

month on $539,158.00 of the $772,515.36 Logan Contractors owed CMT for

previously delivered materials. That interest amounted to $192,716.85. After

adding in the interest, the business court concluded CMT was entitled to

$965,232.21.

Logan Contractors does not contest the business court’s reasoning or

calculations of prejudgment interest. At issue is the business court’s later

conclusion that awarded CMT the $965,232.21 (which already included the

$192,716.85 in prejudgment interest) “plus interest from October 27, 2021, at the

contract rate of 18%, and recoverable costs.” Logan Contractors points out this

would award CMT double interest because all interest CMT is entitled to receive is

already included in the judgment amount of $965,232.21. And because the

business court set off the judgment against the award to Logan Contractors, no

further interest would accrue.

Logan Contractors asks that we remand to the business court to correct the

judgment entered in favor to CMT to read, “The court enters judgment in favor of

CMT and against Logan Contractors on count I of the petition filed March 1, 2022,

in the amount of $965,232.21 and recoverable costs.” In its reply brief, CMT “has

no resistance to Logan Contractor’s request.” Accordingly, we grant relief on this

aspect of Logan Contractors’ cross-appeal, and we remand to the business court

for entry of a corrected judgment in accordance with Logan Contractors’ request,

as conceded by CMT.
16

B. Post-judgment Interest Awarded to Logan Contractors

Finally, Logan Contractors argues that the business court did not correctly

set post-judgment interest on its counterclaim against CMT. The business court

awarded interest at the annual rate of 5% from March 1, 2024, the date the court

entered judgment. Logan Contractors contends this is the wrong interest rate and

the wrong start date. It asserts interest should have been set at the statutory rate

of 6.83%4 from the date it filed its counterclaim. See Iowa Code §§ 535.3(1)(a)

(“Interest shall be allowed on all money due on judgments and decrees of courts

at a rate calculated according to section 668.13.”), 668.13(1) (“Interest, except

interest awarded for future damages, shall accrue from the date of the

commencement of the action.”), (3) (“Interest shall be calculated as of the date of

judgment at a rate equal to the one-year treasury constant maturity published by

the federal reserve in the H15 report settled immediately prior to the date of the

judgment plus two percent.”).

CMT argues Logan Contractors failed to preserve error on this claim. Logan

Contractors contends it preserved error via its post-trial brief to the business court.

Logan Contractors’ post-trial brief does not support its error-preservation

claim. In that brief, Logan Contractors took the following position:

• Logan Contractors was entitled to interest from the date it incurred its
cover damages at the rate of 5%—which it referred to as the “statutory
interest rate.”
• Using a per diem amount calculated by using a 5% interest rate, Logan
Contractors provided an accumulated total of interest through the first
day of trial and asked for an award of that amount as well as interest after
the first day of trial at the same per diem rate (based on 5% interest).

4 There is no dispute that 6.83% is the applicable statutory rate, as the one-year

treasury bill rate as of the date of judgment was 4.83%.
17

• Logan Contractors supported its claims for interest by citing Iowa Code
section 535.2(1)(b).

While the business court rejected Logan Contractors’ claim for interest from the

date it incurred its cover damages due to lack of sufficient proof—a conclusion

Logan Contractors doesn’t challenge on appeal—the court largely followed the rest

of Logan Contractors’ request when it awarded Logan Contractors interest at the

requested rate of 5% from the date of judgment.

Given the position Logan Contractors took in its post-trial brief—a position

the business court generally followed—Logan Contractors likely invited the error

of which it now complains. See Jasper v. State, 477 N.W.2d 852, 856 (Iowa 1991)

(“[A party] cannot deliberately act so as to invite error and then object because the

court has accepted the invitation.”). But at the very least, Logan Contractors failed

to preserve error by taking a position on appeal that conflicts with the position it

took with the business court without having given the business court the chance to

consider the new position. See State v. Rutledge, 600 N.W.2d 324, 325 (Iowa

1999) (“Nothing is more basic in the law of appeal and error than the axiom that a

party cannot sing a song to us that was not first sung in trial court.”). Rather than

the 5% interest claim in its post-trial brief, Logan Contractors now claims interest

of 6.83%. Rather than focusing on the first day of trial as the start date for interest

as it did in its post-trial brief, it claims interest from the date of filing its counterclaim.

And rather than relying on section 535.2(1)(b)—the only Code section cited in

support of its claim for interest in its post-trial brief—it relies on sections 535.3(1)(a)

and 668.13(1), (3). Given what it had pitched to the business court in its post-trial

brief, if Logan Contractors felt the court misinterpreted its argument in setting
18

interest on the judgment, Logan Contractors had the obligation to file a motion

under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904(2) or in some other way call the claimed

error to the business court’s attention. By failing to do so, Logan Contractors failed

to preserve error on this issue. See Waterloo Sav. Bank v. Austin, 494 N.W.2d

715, 717–18 (Iowa 1993) (finding error preserved on interest rate and start date

only when the appealing party provided adequate information in its district court

filings “to alert the district court to the requested relief”); Cincinnati Ins. Co. v.

McKasson, No. 23-0974, 2024 WL 4615898, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 30, 2024)

(requiring the filing of a rule 1.904(2) motion to preserve error when an issue only

became apparent upon the filing of the challenged district court decision).

Because error is not preserved, we decline to address the merits of this issue and

leave the business court’s decision intact on this issue.

V. Conclusion and Instructions

As to CMT’s appeal, we affirm the ruling that CMT breached its contracts

with Logan Contactors and that Logan Contractors is entitled to damages for cover

materials. We do not disturb the amount of damages awarded.

As to Logan Contractors’ cross-appeal, we grant relief in part by vacating

that part of the decision that awarded interest to CMT twice. On remand, the

business court shall replace the first paragraph of its conclusion on page 36 of its

ruling and order with this language:

For the reasons set forth herein, the court enters judgment in
favor of CMT and against Logan Contractors on count I of the petition
filed March 1, 2022, in the amount of $965,232.21 plus recoverable
costs.
19

All other aspects of the court’s ruling are affirmed. Costs on appeal are

assessed to CMT.

AFFIRMED ON APPEAL; VACATED IN PART AND REMANDED WITH

INSTRUCTIONS ON CROSS-APPEAL.