Jerris Daquon Davis Sr. v. State of Iowa

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-1964
Filed May 21, 2025

JERRIS DAQUON DAVIS Sr.,
Applicant-Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Alan Heavens,

Judge.

An applicant appeals the denial of his application for postconviction relief.

AFFIRMED.

Shea M. Chapin of The Chapin Center, PLC, Dubuque, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Benjamin Parrott, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

Considered without oral argument by Schumacher, P.J., and Badding and

Chicchelly, JJ.
2

BADDING, Judge.

Jerris Davis Sr. was charged with domestic abuse assault causing bodily

injury, third or subsequent offense, after his girlfriend called the police and reported

that he had assaulted her. A mutual friend who was at the couple’s home

witnessed the assault. She testified at the criminal jury trial that Davis twisted his

girlfriend’s arm behind her back, shoved her outside, and put her in a chokehold

on the front steps. Although Davis’s girlfriend described the assault in the same

way to the police, she recanted those statements at trial, testifying: “I called the

police and said he twisted my arm, he did this, he did that. He did not.” The jury

found Davis guilty of the lesser-included offense of domestic abuse assault, and

he stipulated to the enhancing prior offenses.

After his direct appeal was dismissed, Davis applied for postconviction

relief. Among other claims, Davis alleged that (1) trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to move for a mistrial and to poll the jury because of a heated argument

between two jurors during deliberations; and (2) appellate counsel was ineffective

for failing “to raise issues other than ineffective assistance of counsel.” Following

a hearing on his application, the district court denied Davis’s claims. Davis

appeals, reprising those same claims.

We review postconviction-relief proceedings raising constitutional claims of

ineffective assistance of counsel de novo. Sothman v. State, 967 N.W.2d 512,

522 (Iowa 2021). To establish his ineffective-assistance claims for both trial and

appellate counsel, Davis was required to prove (1) counsel failed to perform an

essential duty and (2) prejudice resulted. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668, 687 (1984); Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 141 (Iowa 2001) (judging
3

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims “against the same two-pronged

test utilized for ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims”). We “may consider

either the prejudice prong or breach of duty first, and failure to find either one will

preclude relief.” State v. McNeal, 897 N.W.2d 697, 703 (Iowa 2017) (citation

omitted).

I. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

After the jury deliberated for about an hour, they sent a question to the court:

“What happens if we cannot come to a unanimous decision? How long do we

wait?” The parties agreed that the court should respond by directing the jury to

continue their deliberations and by referring them to the following jury instruction:

In order to return a verdict, each juror must agree to it. Your
verdict must be unanimous.
It is your duty as jurors to consult with one another and reach
an agreement, if you can do so without compromising your individual
judgment. Each of you must decide the case for yourself, but do so
only after an impartial consideration of the evidence with the other
jurors.
During the deliberations, do not hesitate to re-examine your
view and change your opinion if convinced it is wrong. But do not
change your opinion as to the weight or effect of the evidence just
because it is the opinion of the other jurors, or for the mere purpose
of returning a verdict.

Several hours later, the trial judge overheard an argument between two

jurors. As he informed the parties on the record:

I will let you both know, as I was entering into this courtroom through
the judge’s hallway rounding the corner here behind me, so the
length of the courtroom—of this courtroom to go yet before we reach
the next courtroom where the jury is currently deliberating, there was
a heated exchange to the point I was concerned someone was going
to get physical. It was clear by a female’s voice that she was scared.
She was asking for a break. She was pleading for a break. Let’s
take a break, let’s take a break, she said at least three or four times
while a male voice became more and more loud and more and more
aggressive.
4

I immediately grabbed my court attendant and told her to
intervene and insist upon a break, separate them, get them outside,
fresh air. That was probably hour and a half ago to an hour ago.
After they took a break, they did apparently go back to work and then
we ended up with question number 2 here.

That second question asked, “We are split (10 yes to 2 no) on #1 of

instruction 17. This is not going to change. What do we do now???” 1 The court

proposed releasing the jury for the day with a verdict-urging instruction, also known

as an Allen charge.2 The court’s instruction ended with the charge: “Please go

home and return tomorrow in the spirit of deliberation, fairness, and candor, and

try to arrive at a verdict.” The next day, after about an hour of deliberating, the jury

returned a verdict of guilty for the lesser-included offense of domestic abuse

assault. Defense counsel chose not to poll the jury.

Davis argues on appeal that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance for

failing “to move for a mistrial in light of aggressive behavior by a male juror against

a female juror” and “to have the jury polled.”3 Trouble is, trial counsel testified at

the postconviction-relief hearing that Davis did not want him to move for a mistrial:

1 Instruction 17 was the marshaling instruction for the offense. Paragraph 1 of that
instruction required the State to prove:
On or about the 1st day of February, 2021, the defendant did
an act which was intended to cause pain or injury, result in physical
contact which was insulting or offensive to [the victim], or was
intended to place [the victim] in fear of immediate physical contact
which would have been painful, injurious, insulting or offensive to [the
victim].
2 “An ‘Allen charge’ is a common name for a verdict-urging instruction” from Allen

v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 500–02. State v. Davis, 975 N.W.2d 1, 17 n.10
(Iowa 2022). Davis does not challenge the verdict-urging instruction given here.
3 Davis also argues that trial counsel “failed to voir dire the jurors after their heated

argument to determine if the incident influenced the female juror requesting the
break” or otherwise unduly influenced the jury. And he suggests that trial counsel
should have secured his presence when the court was addressing questions from
the jury. But these issues were neither raised in nor decided by the district court.
5

I discussed that with Mr. Davis. He did not want me—he specifically
advised me not to request a mistrial because, of course, the remedy
for a mistrial isn’t that the case goes away. It’s that the case has to
be retried again at a later date.
And as we already know, he wanted a speedy trial. He
wanted a resolution to his case, and so he indicated to me he did not
want me to ask for a mistrial. He wanted to go ahead. I
assume . . . he felt that the fact that there was no agreement might
ultimately result in a not guilty verdict. And I think that’s a rational
conclusion to make.

In denying Davis’s application for postconviction relief, the district court

found that trial counsel “was an extraordinarily credible witness.” “Even on de novo

review, we defer to the postconviction court’s credibility finding.” Smith v. State, 7

N.W.3d 723, 732 (Iowa 2024). Upon doing so, we find that counsel was following

Davis’s directive by not moving for a mistrial. And generally, a defendant “will not

be permitted to allege an error in which he himself acquiesced, or which was

committed or invited by him, or was the natural consequence of his own actions.”

State v. Sage, 162 N.W.2d 502, 504 (Iowa 1986) (cleaned up); see also Moyer v.

State, No. 06-1454, 2007 WL 2963982, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 12, 2007) (finding

counsel’s performance was not deficient when defendant approved of replacing a

juror rather than seeking a mistrial). Because counsel was following Davis’s

instruction to refrain from seeking a mistrial, which was a rational roll-the-dice

strategy, we find no breach of duty on the mistrial issue. See, e.g., Belken v. State,

No. 05-0326, 2006 WL 1278730, at *5–6 (Iowa Ct. App. May 10, 2006) (finding

So they are not preserved for appellate review. See Ruiz v. State, 18 N.W.3d 453,
457 (Iowa 2025) (“It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review that issues must
ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court before we will decide
them on appeal.” (citation omitted)).
6

attorney’s failure to move for a mistrial based on suspected juror misconduct “was

trial strategy and not ineffective assistance”).

We also reject Davis’s claim about trial counsel’s decision not to poll the

jury. Counsel testified that decision was a judgment call based on more than thirty

years of experience in criminal defense: “I just had never had anything come from

it, knew that it made some jurors uncomfortable, so I stopped doing it.” Davis does

not cite any authority suggesting that a failure to poll a jury is a per se breach of

essential duty. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.903(2)(a)(8)(3). And “[m]iscalculated trial

strategies and mere mistakes in judgment normally do not rise to the level of

ineffective assistance of counsel.” Ledezma, 626 N.W.2d at 143.

In any event, assuming that counsel performed deficiently by not polling the

jury, the remedy when a juror “expresses disagreement on such poll or inquiry” is

further deliberation. Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.22(5) (2021). Davis made no effort to

demonstrate that further deliberation would have resulted in a different outcome.

See Ledezma, 626 N.W.2d at 143. He relies on the “heated exchange” overheard

by the trial judge and the jury’s disclosure of their division the day before the guilty

verdict was returned in suggesting there was undue influence. But our supreme

court has recognized that “all jurors do not embrace a verdict with the same degree

of enthusiasm,” with some “reach[ing] their decision reluctantly after considerable

discussion and persuasion.” State v. Morelock, 164 N.W.2d 819, 823 (Iowa 1969).

We accordingly conclude that Davis did not meet his burden to prove this ground

of ineffective assistance.
7

II. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel

On direct appeal from his conviction, the only claim raised by Davis’s

appellate attorney was that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek a mistrial.

The State moved to dismiss the appeal under Iowa Code section 814.7 (2021),

which prohibits such claims from being “decided on direct appeal from the criminal

proceedings.” Although appellate counsel at first responded by requesting more

time to file an amended brief, he later filed a voluntary dismissal of the appeal.

Davis challenged that decision on postconviction relief, arguing that appellate

counsel should have raised “issues such as insufficiency of the evidence and juror

misconduct.”

At the hearing on Davis’s postconviction-relief application, appellate

counsel testified that he considered but rejected raising those issues on direct

appeal. Counsel explained that a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence was

unlikely to succeed because “there was an independent witness that observed the

domestic assault.” And he felt the juror misconduct issue was better resolved

through an ineffective-assistance claim because “there really wasn’t enough on

the record.” Indeed, that issue had to wait for postconviction-relief because it was

not preserved. See State v. Wells, 629 N.W.2d 346, 356 (Iowa 2001) (finding a

claim of juror misconduct was not preserved when the defendant “waited for a

verdict, and when it was unfavorable, he then complained”). Counsel testified that

he discussed these issues with Davis and advised him that “he was better off not

waiting” months for the direct appeal to be resolved when he could immediately

proceed to postconviction relief.
8

This is not a case where counsel abdicated rather than exercised

professional judgment, as Davis seems to suggest with the structural-error

argument that he raises for the first time on appeal.4 See Lado v. State, 804

N.W.2d 248, 251 (Iowa 2011) (“Clearly, there is a greater tendency for courts to

find ineffective assistance when there has been an abdication—not exercise—of

professional responsibility.” (cleaned up)). “Selecting assignments to assert as

grounds for reversal is a professional judgment call we are reluctant to second-

guess.” Osborn v. State, 573 N.W.2d 917, 922 (Iowa 1998); see also McGee v.

State, No. 22-1993, 2024 WL 4760534, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2024) (“We

give significant deference to appellate counsel’s choice of issues on appeal.”).

Davis has made no argument that either of these issues would have been

successful on appeal. See Stonerook v. State, No. 09-696, 2010 WL 786045, at

*4 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 10, 2010) (finding an appellate attorney “was not ineffective

in failing to raise meritless issues on direct appeal”). And we agree with the district

court that counsel’s “opinion about a postconviction case being a better path to a

new trial than a direct appeal was reasonable.” We accordingly find that Davis

failed to prove appellate counsel performed deficiently.

AFFIRMED.

4 Although we need not reach Davis’s structural-error or prejudice arguments
because we are resolving the claim on the duty prong, we observe the newly-
raised structural error argument was not preserved for our review in any event.
See Riddle v. State, No. 20-0536, 2021 WL 2708937, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. June 30,
2021) (finding an applicant’s structural error claim was not preserved for review
where it was never raised before appeal).