Kooiker v. State

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-0753
Filed May 7, 2025

KATHLEEN JOAN KOOIKER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.

THE STATE OF IOWA, HELEN MILLER, individually and in her official
capacity as Iowa Board of Parole chair, AND GOVERNOR KIM REYNOLDS,
individually and in her official capacity,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, David Porter, Judge.

A plaintiff appeals the dismissal of her claims of wrongful discharge and

intentional interference with prospective business advantage under Iowa’s

whistleblower statute. AFFIRMED.

Kathleen J. Kooiker, Osceola, self-represented appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Patrick C. Valencia, Deputy Solicitor

General, and Alexa S. Den Herder, Assistant Solicitor General, for appellees.

Considered without oral argument by Tabor, C.J., and Schumacher and

Chicchelly, JJ. Langholz, J., takes no part.
2

SCHUMACHER, Judge.

Former Iowa Board of Parole member Kathleen Kooiker appeals the

dismissal of her claims of wrongful discharge and intentional interference with

prospective business advantage under Iowa Code chapter 70A (2023). We affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

In 2018, Governor Kim Reynolds appointed Kooiker to serve as a member

of the Iowa Board of Parole. The board consists of five members, including one

chairperson, who serve staggered four-year terms. Helen Miller was appointed as

the board chairperson in 2019. During Kooiker’s tenure, she raised concerns

about Miller’s participation in parole decisions and how the board “was being run.”

Kooiker was not reappointed to her position as a board member, and her term

ended on April 30, 2021.

In 2023, Kooiker sued the State of Iowa, the Governor, and Miller

(collectively, the defendants). Kooiker’s second amended petition contained four

counts: wrongful discharge in violation of Iowa Code chapter 70A; wrongful

discharge in violation of public policy; intentional interference with prospective

business advantage in violation of Iowa Code chapter 70A (against Miller only);

and intentional interference with prospective business advantage (against Miller

only). The defendants filed a motion to dismiss all claims against them based on

lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief can

be granted. Among other claims, the defendants argued Kooiker’s whistleblower

claims failed because such claims are “reserved for employees” and Kooiker failed

to exhaust her common law tort claims.
3

Following a hearing,1 the district court entered an order granting the

defendants’ motion. Kooiker’s appeal is limited to the dismissal of her claims

raised under chapter 70A, counts I and III of her second amended petition.

II. Scope and Standard of Review

We review a district court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss for
the correction of errors at law. In our review, we accept as true the
petition’s well-pleaded factual allegations, but not its legal
conclusions. We will affirm a district court ruling that granted a
motion to dismiss when the petition’s allegations, taken as true, fail
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Miller v. State, 18 N.W.3d 498, 501 (Iowa 2025) (cleaned up).

III. Analysis

Kooiker appeals the dismissal of her claims of wrongful discharge and

intentional interference with prospective business advantage under Iowa Code

chapter 70A. The district court determined Kooiker’s status as an officer—rather

than an employee—is dispositive to whether Kooiker can assert her claims. Iowa’s

“whistleblower-protection statute”2 provides:

A person shall not discharge an employee from or take or fail
to take action regarding an employee’s appointment or proposed
appointment to, promotion or proposed promotion to, or any
advantage in, a position in a state employment system administered
by, or subject to approval of, a state agency as a reprisal for a failure
by that employee to inform the person that the employee made a
disclosure of information permitted by this section, or for a disclosure
of any information by that employee to a member or employee of the
general assembly, a disclosure of information to the office of
ombudsman, a disclosure of information to a person providing
human resource management for the state, or a disclosure of
information to any other public official or law enforcement agency if
the employee, in good faith, reasonably believes the information
evidences a violation of law or rule, mismanagement, a gross abuse

1 A transcript of the hearing, if the hearing was transcribed, was not made a part

of our record on appeal.
2 See Chandler v. Iowa Dep’t of Corr., 17 N.W.3d 645, 650 (Iowa 2025).
4

of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger
to public health or safety.

Iowa Code § 70A.28(2).

As a backdrop for Kooiker’s claims, we look to the provisions relating to the

board of parole and its members. At the time relevant to this case,3 the following

provisions of Iowa Code chapter 904A stated:

The board of parole is created to consist of five members.
Each member, except the chairperson and the vice chairperson,
shall be compensated on a day-to-day basis. Each member shall
serve a term of four years beginning and ending as provided by
section 69.19,[4] except for members appointed to fill vacancies who
shall serve for the balance of the unexpired term. The terms shall be
staggered.

Id. § 904A.1. “The governor shall appoint the chairperson and other members of

the board of parole, including alternate members, subject to confirmation by the

senate.” Id. § 904A.3. Section 904A.4 sets forth the “duties of the board of parole,”

including but not limited to, interviewing and considering inmates for parole and

work release. Id. § 904A.4(1); see, e.g., Bomgaars v. State, 967 N.W.2d 41, 44

(Iowa 2021) (“The Iowa Board of Parole . . . completes about 13,000 parole

reviews per year.”). And section 904A.6 provides for “salaries and expenses” for

board members, stating:

Each member, except the chairperson and the vice
chairperson, of the board shall be paid per diem as determined by
the general assembly. The chairperson and vice chairperson of the
board shall be paid a salary as determined by the general assembly.

3 Many provisions of chapter 904A were revised effective July 2023. The
substance of the cited sections remains mainly the same.
4 Iowa Code section 69.19 states:

All terms of office of positions which are appointed by the governor,
have a fixed term, and are subject to confirmation by the senate shall
begin at 12:01 a.m. on May 1 in the year of appointment and expire
at 12:00 midnight on April 30 in the year of expiration . . . .
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Each member of the board and all employees are entitled to receive,
in addition to their per diem or salary, their necessary maintenance
and travel expenses while engaged in official business.

The supreme court has reiterated “five essential elements” to consider in

determining whether a position is a public office:

(1) The position must be created by the Constitution or legislature or
through authority conferred by the legislature. (2) A portion of the
sovereign power of government must be delegated to that position.
(3) The duties and powers must be defined, directly or impliedly, by
the legislature or through legislative authority. (4) The duties must
be performed independently and without control of a superior power
other than the law. (5) The position must have some permanency
and continuity, and not be only temporary and occasional.

State v. Pinckney, 276 N.W.2d 433, 435–36 (Iowa 1979) (quoting State v. Taylor,

144 N.W.2d 289, 292 (Iowa 1967)). The necessary elements to constitute Kooiker

as a public officer are sufficiently shown by the statutory language quoted above

and as alleged in Kooiker’s petition. See, e.g., State v. Zarate, 908 N.W.2d 831,

848 (Iowa 2018) (“[T]he Governor and legislature have the power to appoint and

confirm the parole board members under Iowa Code section 904A.3. However,

parole board members must meet certain qualifications and are appointed for fixed

terms. Parole decisions are subject to legal standards.” (internal citations

omitted)). As the district court found, “[v]irtually all five of those factor[s] support

[the finding] that [Kooiker] was a public officer.” We agree.

The district court further found:

The lynchpin in all of Plaintiff’s claims is whether she was
“employee” or an “officer” during her term of service with the Board.
The distinction is a question of law. . . .
....
Iowa Code Section 904A.6 does not expressly detail how an
“employee” is different from an “officer.” However, when looking at
the individual words used by the drafters and interpreting their
meaning within the statute, the usage of members and employees
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separately indicates there is indeed some distinction between the
two categories of individuals serving on the board. Additionally,
Chapter 904A goes on to describe the requirements for the board
members, ranging from the number of members and their
compensation, as well as the traits, qualifications and characteristics
that must be considered when the governor selects a member to
serve. The statute uses the term member when describing these
requirements, analogous to the terms and requirements of officers,
not employees.
Canons of statutory interpretation require that every word and
every provision in a statute is to be given effect, if possible, and not
deemed mere surplusage. No word should be ignored, and no
provision should needlessly be given an interpretation that causes it
to duplicate another provision or to have no consequence.
Throughout her service with the Board, Plaintiff enjoyed all the
trappings of “member/officer” status. To classify her now as an
“employee” would be to render one of the two terms meaningless.
That would be inconsistent with the basic canons of statutory
interpretation.
Moreover, and as Defendants correctly note, no reasonable
argument can be made that Plaintiff was an “employee” under the
five-factor test set forth in State v. Pinckney. . . .
....
As it relates to Counts I and III, Plaintiff’s claims are
fundamentally flawed because in virtually every scenario or any
conceivable state of facts she would be classified as public official,
as opposed to an employee. The employment protections granted
to employees, by virtue of the master/servant relationship they enter
with employers, far surpass the employment protections public
officials enjoy. Given that reality, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as
it relates to Counts I and III must be granted.

(Footnotes omitted.)

We find no error in the district court’s conclusion that Kooiker’s status as an

officer rather than an employee preempted her from asserting claims under

section 70A.28. See, e.g., Shumate v. Drake Univ., 846 N.W.2d 503, 516 (Iowa

2014) (holding the district court correctly granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss

for failure to state a claim where there was “no implied private right of action under
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[the relied-upon statute]”). Accordingly, we affirm the court’s order granting the

defendants’ motion to dismiss Kooiker’s petition.

AFFIRMED.