In re the Marriage of Wood

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-0929
Filed April 9, 2025

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF NICHOLAS JAMES WOOD
AND BRITTA NICOLE WOOD

Upon the Petition of
NICHOLAS JAMES WOOD,
Petitioner-Appellee,

And Concerning
BRITTA NICOLE WOOD,
Respondent-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Ian K. Thornhill,

Judge.

A respondent appeals from the physical-care provision of a marriage

dissolution decree. AFFIRMED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.

Thomas J. Viner, Cedar Rapids, for appellant.

Tara L. Hofbauer, Andrew Howie, and Meredith Ludens of Shindler,

Anderson, Goplerud & Weese, P.C., West Des Moines, for appellee.

Considered without oral argument by Greer, P.J., and Langholz and

Sandy, JJ.
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LANGHOLZ, Judge.

Britta and Nick Wood are both capable parents who love their five-year-old

son. But their marriage is now dissolved. They live three hours apart. And they

agree that their temporary joint-physical-care arrangement cannot continue. So

the district court faced the difficult duty of choosing which parent would best serve

their son’s interests. Finding the choice closely balanced, the court ultimately

placed their son in Nick’s physical care because it found that he would be the most

likely of the two to support their son’s relationship with the other parent.

Britta appeals, arguing that we should make the contrary choice and place

their son in her physical care. She contends that the court overlooked evidence

weighing against Nick’s ability to provide care, lacked any reliable basis to find that

she would not support their son’s relationship with Nick, and failed to explain its

decision with sufficient detail and credibility findings to warrant any deference.

On our de novo review, giving the district court’s well-reasoned and factually

supported decision due deference, we agree that placing their son in Nick’s

physical care will best serve the son’s interests. While we have considered the

entire record and all the required factors in weighing this choice, like the district

court we find that most factors leave the parents at a relative draw except for one.

We agree with the court’s assessment that their son’s critical interest in having a

relationship with both parents will be best served in Nick’s physical care, especially

given Britta’s conduct showing an effort to alienate their son from Nick and his

family while the dissolution was pending. We thus affirm the decree. And given

the parties’ abilities to pay and the merits of the appeal, we grant Nick’s request

for appellate attorney fees and remand for determination of a reasonable amount.
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I. Background Facts and Proceedings

Nick and Britta met in 2012 in their hometown of Rockford, Illinois, while

they were both on the coaching staff of a local high school football team. They

moved to Iowa City in 2016 for Nick to take a potential student assistant coaching

position with the University of Iowa football team that ultimately did not pan out.

And in July 2017, they got married. Britta was then working as a nurse at the

university, and Nick was pursuing a degree while working part-time.

Eventually, Nick returned to coaching—first back in Rockford coaching high

school football and then in Dubuque for a college team. Britta continued as a nurse

in Iowa City. So they often only saw each other a few days a week.

In February 2020, Nick and Britta’s son was born. Nick continued

commuting to Dubuque but soon began working from home because of the

pandemic. Nick’s mother often came to Iowa City to help care for the son. Britta

also often took their son back to Rockford to visit her family. On the whole, Britta

provided more of their son’s care when he was a baby than Nick did.

The marriage soon broke down. We do not dwell on the specifics, but both

parties presented evidence that each was verbally abusive to the other and the

conflict occasionally rose to physical abuse. In May 2021, Nick petitioned to

dissolve their marriage. And later in October, the district court1 issued a temporary

order placing their son in Britta’s physical care with visitation for Nick on alternating

weekends. The order did not restrict the location of either parties’ residence.

1 This case was not assigned to the same district judge throughout the district court

proceedings. So neither this order nor the other pretrial orders were issued by the
judge who ultimately heard the case at trial and issued the decree now on appeal.
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Shortly after the temporary order, Britta moved with their son about three

hours away to Rockford for a new job as a nurse practitioner. Like the district court,

we find that the move “was not done out of spite or for the purpose of isolating the

child” from Nick but rather to take “a professionally and financially beneficial

opportunity” that was “closer to her hometown and family.” Still—as the court

insightfully observed—the move, the temporary order, and Britta’s “penchant for

wanting all things related to [their son] done her way[] created circumstances that

led to her increasing alienation of [Nick] from [their son].”

Britta’s conduct related to daycare for their son shows this alienation. To

start, Britta enrolled their son in daycare in Rockford without involving Nick. She

refused to tell him which daycare she selected. So he had to call around to many

daycares to uncover the enrollment on his own. Britta also repeatedly refused to

let Nick or his parents drop off or pick up their son from daycare. And for some

time, Nick was not even allowed to visit the daycare to spend time with his son—

despite its open-door policy for parents—because of the information Britta had

provided the daycare. Nick’s efforts to sort out why the daycare was preventing

his contact resulted in what the daycare director described as “one of the most

difficult phone calls [she] had with a parent” and an uncomfortable in-person

meeting. And the daycare raised concerns it may have to remove their son if the

conflict continued.

Britta eventually sought a temporary injunction prohibiting Nick from

entering the daycare because she claimed he had “been behaving inappropriately”

at the daycare. She also amended her answer to the petition to include a request

for sole legal custody rather than joint legal custody as she had originally proposed.
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The court denied the injunction without a hearing. The court found that she had

failed to present sufficient evidence showing that Nick had acted inappropriately.

It reasoned that there would be nothing inappropriate about Nick “[a]sking for

information about the daycare and about his child’s involvement with the daycare,”

“[c]hallenging the daycare staff if he is told he has no right to such information,” or

“[q]uestioning why he needs a letter from a lawyer to access information.” The

court also observed that the evidence “suggests” that Britta “attempted to restrict

[Nick’s] ability to obtain information about/from the daycare and to restrict whether

[Nick] or others who are transporting for him can pick the child up from the daycare

if that is where the child is located at the start of [Nick’s] periods of visitation.”

Soon after, Nick asked for the appointment of a custody evaluator because

of the “extremely contentious custodial issues” in the case, including Britta’s

amended answer seeking sole legal custody. Nick agreed to be responsible for all

fees for the evaluation. And over Britta’s objection, the court granted the request,

ordering Nick’s proposed evaluator “to conduct a family forensic evaluation for the

purpose of determining custody and child care arrangements that are in the best

interests of the child.”

The evaluator found no evidence that Nick interfered with their son’s

education and caregiving and noted that Nick “recognizes the importance of

[Britta’s] role as [their son’s] mother and wishes to coparent on an equal basis.”

The evaluator also found that Britta had acted to restrict Nick and his family’s

access to the son and that Britta had a “tendency to minimize Nick[’s] role and

input into decision-making processes.” And aside from these concerns, he found

neither parent “was superior to the other” and both “demonstrated adequate
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parenting knowledge and skills” and “are committed to providing [their son] with a

happy and healthy childhood and family life.” Recognizing that neither parent was

open to moving closer so that they could “share equally” in care as would be ideal,

the evaluator thus recommended placing their son in Nick’s physical care.2

A week before the scheduled trial in March 2023, it was “cancelled due to

lack of judicial resources to try the case on those dates.” And when it was

rescheduled, the next available trial date was over a year later—and nearly three

years from the filing of the dissolution proceeding.3 So Nick applied to modify the

temporary order, arguing that given the recommendation of the custody evaluator,

it was in their son’s best interest to place the son in his physical care or

“significantly expand his parenting time.” After a hearing, the court modified the

temporary order to award joint physical care with the parties alternating care

weekly beginning in mid-July.

By the rescheduled April 2024 trial, Britta—then thirty-six-years old—was

still working as a nurse practitioner in Rockford. Nick was thirty and working for a

business in North Liberty. And the parties were still alternating physical care of

their son weekly. Over three days, the court heard testimony from more than a

2 The evaluator also noted that “the Iowa City area ranks significantly higher than

Rockford” on “various quality of life indicators and rankings,” and that Nick’s
extended family lived or was planning to move to Iowa City “before Britta relocated
to Rockford.”
3 We appreciate the district court’s transparency in its orders indicating that a “lack

of judicial resources”—rather than any choices of the parties—caused the
cancellation of trial. Unfortunately, the concerning trial delay here is not an isolated
occurrence in this county. Nor is it consistent with our statewide trial scheduling
time standards, which require a dissolution matter to be scheduled for trial within
nine months unless a party shows good cause for exceeding them. See Iowa Ct.
R. 23.2(1), (2). This case highlights the practical consequences to parties whose
lives are left in limbo awaiting their day in court.
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dozen witnesses—the parties, their family and friends, staff from the daycares

attended by their son, the court-appointed custody evaluator, and an expert hired

by Britta to critique the custody evaluation. The court also received more than two

thousand pages of exhibits and more than fifty video or audio recordings.

In a thorough and well-reasoned decree, the district court placed the parties’

son in Nick’s physical care.4 First, the court reasoned that “[b]oth parties love this

child and can provide a healthy, safe, and loving home.” It acknowledged that

Britta had provided “the majority of physical care” to their son in “the early months

of his life” and that Nick “received assistance from his mother” during “[m]any times

when” he had care. But it focused on the ten months before trial when the parties

had joint physical care and found “[b]oth parents have provided adequate care for

the child” and that “neither has accomplished this without the assistance of others.”

Indeed, the court reiterated that both are “able physical and emotional caretakers

of the child, and both have strong extended families willing and able to assist them

in executing their duties as single parents.”

Despite this balance, the court found “the scale ultimately tips in [Nick’s]

favor on the serious issue of which parent will better support the child’s relationship

with the other parent.” The court based this conclusion on its findings that Nick

“will sincerely and effectively undertake this responsibility” and that Britta’s

“conduct since the issuance of the original Temporary Order in October 2021

evinces an effort on her part to alienate [their son] from [Nick] and [Nick’s] extended

4 The court also resolved disputes about visitation, child support, and the
assessment of the cost of the court-ordered evaluator and other court costs and
approved the parties’ stipulations on other financial provisions of the decree. None
of these issues are before us on appeal.
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family.” Specifically, the court highlighted her conduct limiting Nick’s “ability to

have contact with and [be] informed regarding [their son] vis-a-vie the daycare.”

And while acknowledging some issues with the “methodology and initial

assumptions” of the court-ordered custody evaluation, the court agreed “in

general” with the evaluator’s “conclusions that in the year and a half that [Britta]

exercised temporary primary care of [their son], she interfered with, rather than

promoted, [Nick’s] relationship with the child” and the evaluator’s observation that

“if [Britta] is given power and authority over [their son] greater than that of [Nick],

she exercises that power in a way that negatively impacts the relationship between

[their son] and [Nick] and his extended family.” Britta now appeals.

II. Physical Care

We review the district court’s decision on physical-care placement de novo.

See In re Marriage of Fennelly, 737 N.W.2d 97, 100 (Iowa 2007). But a district

court is “greatly helped in making a wise decision about the parties by listening to

them and watching them in person,” while we are limited to the cold, printed record

before us and thus “denied the impression created by the demeanor of each and

every witness.” In re Marriage of Vrban, 359 N.W.2d 420, 423 (Iowa 1984)

(cleaned up). So we give weight to a district court’s fact findings—especially those

based on credibility determinations—even though they are not binding on us. See

id.; Iowa R. App. P. 6.904(3)(g).

“When considering the issue of physical care, the child’s best interest is the

overriding consideration.” Fennelly, 737 N.W.2d at 101. The factors in Iowa Code

section 598.41(3) (2021) and those articulated by the supreme court In re Marriage

of Winter, 223 N.W.2d 165, 166–67 (Iowa 1974), guide us. See id. Our goal “is to
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place the child[] in the environment most likely to bring them to health, both

physically and mentally, and to social maturity.” In re Marriage of Hansen, 733

N.W.2d 683, 695 (Iowa 2007). And “[p]hysical care issues are not to be resolved

based upon perceived fairness to the spouses, but primarily upon what is best for

the child.” Id.

Weighing these factors, we agree with the district court that placing the

parties’ son in Nick’s care is in their son’s best interest. The ten months of their

son’s growth and development while in their joint physical care shows that either

parent is capable of providing a positive home environment. And like the district

court, we find that the choice between the two parents is closely balanced except

for one factor—Britta’s conduct while this proceeding has been pending shows that

she is less likely to support their son’s relationship with Nick if he is placed in her

physical care. See Iowa Code § 598.41(3)(e) (requiring consideration of “[w]hether

each parent can support the other parent’s relationship with the child”).

Britta highlights conduct and statements by Nick that she contends show he

is a less fit parent. She also points out his more limited experience caring for their

son before the temporary order was modified to joint physical care. And she

argues that the district court did not consider this evidence when it focused on what

it found to be the critical dispositive factor. We disagree.

The district court provided a well-reasoned, factually supported, and

concise explanation of the reasons for its physical-care decision. That the court

chose not to itemize every piece of evidence considered does not mean that the

court failed to consider it—especially given the voluminous record here after a

three-day trial with more than a dozen witnesses, thousands of pages of exhibits,
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and gigabytes of videos. All the more so here, where the court found that the

parties’ suitability as caregivers was not really at issue as both are “able physical

and emotional caretakers of the child” and had shown that most clearly during the

ten months of joint physical care. What’s more, the court did expressly recognize

that Britta had provided a majority of the care during the early months of their son’s

life and that Nick often had help from his mother (as did Britta). It just weighed the

more recent period of alternating weekly joint physical care more heavily than

earlier periods or the other potential concerns raised by Britta. So do we.

Britta also argues the court should not have rested its decision on a finding

that she had alienated Nick from their son and would be less likely to support their

son’s relationship with Nick. But this aspect of the court’s decision is also well

supported. Selecting a placement that will best foster the son’s relationships with

both parents is a critical factor. See Iowa Code § 598.41(3)(e). So too is one

parent’s effort to alienate the other. See id. § 598.41(1)(c) (“The court shall

consider the denial by one parent of the child’s opportunity for maximum continuing

contact with the other parent, without just cause, a significant factor in determining

the proper custody arrangement.”); In re Marriage of Quirk-Edwards, 509 N.W.2d

476, 480 (Iowa 1993) (holding that a parent’s limiting of a child’s contact with the

other parent is a compelling reason to place the child with the other parent that

may even override countervailing interests).

We, like the district court, do not hold Britta’s move to Rockford against her.

But there is ample evidence that her actions beyond the mere move improperly

limited Nick’s contact with their son, especially relating to daycare. While this

finding is in line with the conclusions of the court-appointed custody evaluation, we
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too reach it based on the other testimonial and documentary evidence presented

at trial rather than merely accepting the evaluator’s opinion.

The court’s finding that Nick will more likely support Britta’s relationship with

their son than vice versa is also supported by the parties’ positions in this case.

Although by the time of trial Britta agreed that the parties should have joint legal

custody, for a time she was seeking sole legal custody and expressed concern to

the evaluator that Nick would otherwise interfere with their son’s routines and

placements. In contrast, Nick has consistently acknowledged the important role of

Britta in their son’s life, explaining at trial that he thought seeking sole legal custody

was “not in [their son’s] best interest” because “[r]egardless of the pain and the

struggles [and] lack of time, [his] love for [their son] will always come above that.”

Indeed, he even requested joint physical care if the parties would ever move within

twenty miles of each other. And we are mindful that the court’s assessment of the

parties’ sincerity on this point was aided by its “front-row seat” to three days of trial.

Hora v. Hora, 5 N.W.3d 635, 645 (Iowa 2024).

We thus affirm the district court’s physical-care decision. We do so because

the placement is in the best interest of the parties’ son—not as a reward or

punishment for either party’s conduct. And we echo the district court’s comments

at the end of trial that the parties and their families need to remember that they are

“forever connected through this child” and while they “don’t have to like each

other,” they “have to make an effort to be civil and do what’s in the best interest of

[their] child.” Their son needs strong relationships with both parents despite the

geographic and emotional distance between each parent. And it will take a

concerted effort from both parents to make that a reality.
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III. Appellate Attorney Fees

Nick asks for an award of appellate attorney fees. We have discretion

whether to award appellate attorney fees in an appeal of a dissolution decree. See

In re Marriage of McDermott, 827 N.W.2d 671, 687 (Iowa 2013). In exercising that

discretion, “we consider the needs of the party seeking the award, the ability of the

other party to pay, and the relative merits of the appeal.” Id. (cleaned up). Here,

Britta makes nearly three times as much as Nick, who was forced to defend against

her unsuccessful appeal. We thus grant Nick’s request for appellate fees.

Although Nick requested appellate fees in his brief and said he would “file

an attorney fee affidavit upon submission of this case,” he unfortunately did not do

so. Indeed, “we prefer that parties requesting appellate fees do so in their briefs

and submit an attorney-fee affidavit immediately after oral argument or after the

case is submitted without oral argument” so that we can decide the amount of the

award. In re Marriage of Samuels da Fonseca Silva, 15 N.W.3d 801, 808 (Iowa

Ct. App. 2024). But since we do not have an attorney-fee affidavit, we remand to

the district court with directions to decide the reasonable amount of appellate

attorney fees to award. See id.

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.