State of Iowa v. Billy D. Williams Dotson

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-0180
Filed April 9, 2025

STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

BILLY D. WILLIAMS DOTSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County,

Michael J. Shubatt, Judge.

A criminal defendant appeals his convictions for sexual abuse in the third

degree, attempted burglary in the second degree, and assault with intent to commit

sex abuse. AFFIRMED.

Shea M. Chapin of The Chapin Center, PLC, Dubuque, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Timothy M. Hau, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered without oral argument by Ahlers, P.J., and Badding and

Buller, JJ.
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BULLER, Judge.

Billy Dotson appeals three convictions relating to the rape of a young

woman outside a Dubuque County apartment, asserting the evidence at trial was

insufficient to support the jury’s verdict. Because the victim’s testimony standing

alone was sufficient to support conviction, and beyond that it was supported by

corroborating evidence, we affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

In March 2023, then-eighteen-year-old A.L. ended a casual romantic

relationship with thirty-four-year-old Dotson. By May, A.L. thought things were

“cool” between them as just friends, and she bought marijuana from Dotson one

day at a gas station. That night, A.L. went back to her apartment around 11:30 or

11:40 p.m. About five minutes later, she heard an unexpected knock at the back

door of the apartment—Dotson.

A.L. opened the door, stepped outside, and closed it behind her.1 Dotson

asked A.L. about a young man he had seen her with and then told A.L. he loved

and was “crazy” about her. A.L. tried to end the interaction and go back inside,

but—in her words—Dotson “tried to follow me” and “tried to step in,” but she “told

him you can’t come in here” and “shoved him back outside the door.” Dotson’s

foot crossed the entryway during this scuffle, but A.L. kept him from fully entering

her home, pushing him back out and closing the door.

1 A.L. told police and testified at trial that Dotson had a gun.
The jury acquitted on
some counts, suggesting they could not find proof beyond a reasonable doubt that
Dotson had a dangerous weapon. So we do not dwell on facts relating to the gun.
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Dotson then forced A.L. to turn around, pulled down her pants, pinned her

with his body, and inserted his penis into her vagina. During the rape, A.L. heard

something like part of a metal grill get knocked to the ground and make a loud

noise. Dotson paused, pulled out, and started pulling his pants up; but once he

realized he had not been discovered, he dragged A.L. by the hair and her shirt to

a flat surface (she thought maybe an outdoor table or air conditioning unit) and

resumed penetrating her until he ejaculated in her vagina. Then he kissed her and

left.

A.L. cried throughout the assault. She testified that, after the initial physical

resistance at the door, she did not try to fight Dotson or flee because she “didn’t

really want to do nothing to risk [her] life.” She “just wanted to be safe” and make

it back inside alive, so she could tell someone what Dotson had done. As soon as

she could, A.L. went inside and told her roommate Dotson “came out there and he

raped me.”

A.L.’s roommate called the police, and officers responded to the apartment.

Police spotted some hair on the ground near where A.L. reported being attacked

and found a partial palm or handprint on an air conditioning unit consistent with

where A.L. said Dotson put her on a flat surface. Officers also found disturbances

in the dew on a nearby door consistent with “someone [being] shoved up against

there.” And they found a metal grill on the ground.

A.L. went to the hospital, where a sexual assault examination was

performed and a rape kit was collected. The emergency-room physician observed

that A.L. was anxious and tearful and noticed “palpable raised marks on [A.L.’s]

right lateral neck” which weren’t “just a simple scratch or abrasion. It was raised a
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little bit.” A criminalist with the DNA section at the State Crime Lab determined

that Dotson’s sperm was found on a swab of A.L.’s vagina, with the match to a

probability of 1 out of 180 octillion.

The day after the rape, Dotson and A.L. exchanged text messages in which

A.L. accused Dotson of raping her and Dotson called her a liar. A.L. maintained

that she was not lying. Eventually Dotson texted her: “if I raped y u did not try to

fight.”

As pertinent to this appeal, the jury found Dotson guilty of sexual abuse in

the third degree, a class “C” felony in violation of Iowa Code section 709.4(1)(a)

(2023); attempted burglary in the second degree, a class “D” felony in violation of

sections 713.2 and 713.6(1)(b); and assault with intent to commit sex abuse, an

aggravated misdemeanor in violation of section 709.11(3). The district court, at a

combined sentencing hearing with another case number, sentenced Dotson to

consecutive terms of incarceration totaling twenty-two years—including seventeen

years for convictions at issue in this case number.2 Dotson appeals, challenging

the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions.

II. Standard of Review

We review sufficiency claims for correction of errors at law. State v. Jones,

967 N.W.2d 336, 339 (Iowa 2021). “In determining whether the jury’s verdict is

supported by substantial evidence, we view the evidence in the light most

favorable to the State, including all ‘legitimate inferences and presumptions that

2 We also affirm the sentence imposed for an unrelated crime in the other case

today, in State v. Dotson, No. 24-0181, 2025 WL _____ (Iowa Ct. App.
Apr. 9, 2025).
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may fairly and reasonably be deduced from the record evidence.’” Id. (citation

omitted).

III. Discussion

We consider Dotson’s challenges to each of his convictions in turn.

A. Sexual Abuse in the Third Degree

Dotson first challenges his conviction for sexual abuse in the third degree,

which required the State to prove he performed a sex act on A.L. by force or

against her will. See Iowa Code § 709.4(1)(a). Dotson admits there was sufficient

evidence he performed a sex act on A.L. But he challenges whether there was

proof he performed the sex act by force or against A.L.’s will.

“The overall purpose of Iowa’s sexual abuse statute is to protect the

freedom of choice to engage in sex acts.” State v. Meyers, 799 N.W.2d 132, 143

(Iowa 2011). “[M]eaningful consent is the important inquiry . . . .” Id. at 146. In

assessing meaningful consent, we consider “all the surrounding facts and

circumstances.” Id.; see also Iowa Code § 709.5 (“[T]he circumstances

surrounding the commission of the act may be considered in determining whether

or not the act was done by force or against the will of the other.”). “This critical

element does not inquire into the mind of the defendant to create a specific-intent

crime, but turns on the intentions and mental state of the victim.” State v. Kelso-

Christy, 911 N.W.2d 663, 666 (Iowa 2018).

We have little trouble finding sufficient evidence in the record to establish

A.L. did not meaningfully consent to Dotson repeatedly penetrating her vagina with

his penis that night. As a threshold matter, A.L.’s testimony standing alone was

sufficient to support the verdict. See, e.g., State v. Knox, 536 N.W.2d 735, 742
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(Iowa 1995) (en banc) (“The only direct evidence is the complainant’s testimony.

But under today’s law that is sufficient to convict. The law has abandoned any

notion that a rape victim’s accusation must be corroborated.”). But here the jury

had more than A.L.’s word—her sworn testimony was corroborated by the injuries

to her neck, her prompt report to her roommate and police, and the palm- or

handprint and suspected pubic hair where she reported Dotson laid her and

continued raping her. We also recognize that, although not directly probative on

consent, the DNA results conclusively establish Dotson penetrated A.L.’s vagina

with his penis and ejaculated inside her, which was consistent with A.L.’s report.

And, independent of this, the jury was permitted to consider Dotson’s own

statements to A.L. via text message—including “if I raped y u did not try to fight”—

as evidence reflecting consciousness of guilt. See State v. Cox, 500 N.W.2d 23,

25 (Iowa 1993) (discussing admissions as evidence of “consciousness of guilt”).

Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, there was sufficient evidence for

the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt A.L. did not meaningfully consent to sex

and that instead Dotson raped her.

We briefly note Dotson’s appellate complaints that A.L. may have been able

to flee or scream for help. The law required A.L. to do neither. See Iowa Code

§ 709.5 (“Under the provisions of this chapter it shall not be necessary to establish

physical resistance by a person in order to establish that an act of sexual abuse

was committed by force or against the will of the person.”). And we agree with the

State’s observation that “[t]hese victim blaming propositions are immaterial and do

not support disturbing the jury’s verdict.”
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B. Attempted Burglary in the Second Degree

Dotson next challenges the evidence supporting the attempted second-

degree burglary conviction. For this charge, the State was required to prove six

elements:

1. On or about May 10, 2023, the defendant attempted to
enter an apartment at [the address where A.L. was residing].
2. The apartment was an occupied structure as defined in
[another instruction].
3. The defendant did not have permission or authority to enter
the apartment.
4. The apartment was not open to the public.
5. The defendant did so with the specific intent to commit an
assault.
6. The attempted entry occurred while one or more persons
were present in the apartment.

See Iowa Code §§ 713.2, .6(1)(b). As we understand Dotson’s appellate brief, he

challenges the first, third, and fifth elements—whether he attempted to enter the

apartment, whether he had permission or authority to do so, and whether he

intended to commit an assault.

On our review, we find the evidence supports the jury verdict on all three

challenged elements. First, A.L.’s testimony established Dotson attempted to

enter the apartment because she described him doing exactly that. Her specific

description of how Dotson “tried to follow [her] and come back in,” “tried to step in,”

and got his foot across the threshold all support this element. Second, she testified

she told Dotson “no, he couldn’t come in,” which is sufficient to establish he did not

have permission or authority to enter. And third, there is circumstantial evidence

Dotson intended to assault A.L., including most obviously that he did so as soon

as he was able. See State v. Olson, 373 N.W.2d 135, 136 (Iowa 1985) (“[T]he

element of intent in burglary is seldom susceptible to proof by direct evidence.”).
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The jury also could have reasonably inferred that Dotson’s inquiries about the man

he saw with A.L. were caused by jealousy due to Dotson and A.L.’s past

relationship, which provided a motive fueling his intent to assault her. See State

v. Putman, 848 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Iowa 2014) (“Motive is the impetus that supplies the

reason for a person to commit a criminal act.” (citation omitted)). The attempted-

second-degree burglary conviction was supported by substantial evidence.

C. Assault with Intent to Commit Sex Abuse

Dotson last challenges his conviction for assault with intent to commit sex

abuse. For this charge, the State was required to prove that Dotson assaulted A.L.

and that he did so with specific intent to commit a sex act by force or against the

will. See Iowa Code § 709.11(3). Dotson appears to challenge both elements,

focusing on how the jury seemingly concluded the State failed to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt Dotson used a dangerous weapon when he raped A.L. based

on the jury’s verdict on other offenses.

We conclude that the use or absence of a dangerous weapon does not

control our analysis of the evidence supporting this conviction. The jury could have

reasonably found that Dotson committed multiple assaults as defined in

section 708.1(2)(a) without a weapon—he tried to push past A.L. into the

apartment, he laid hands on her and forced her to turn around, he pulled down her

pants, he pinned his body against hers, he inserted his penis into her vagina

repeatedly, and he pulled or dragged her from one location to another. And his

intent to commit sex abuse was plain from the fact he committed sex abuse during

and after the assaultive conduct. See also State v. Casady, 491 N.W.2d 782, 787

(Iowa 1992) (en banc) (recognizing that unwelcome sexual touching and removing
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clothing can reflect intent to commit a sex abuse). There was substantial evidence

to support the guilty verdict on this charge.

IV. Disposition

Having concluded the jury’s verdicts were supported by substantial record

evidence, we affirm Dotson’s convictions for sexual abuse in the third degree,

attempted burglary in the second degree, and assault with intent to commit sex

abuse.

AFFIRMED.