Tran Lee Walker v. State of Iowa

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-1515
Filed February 19, 2025

TRAN LEE WALKER,
Applicant-Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, James N. Daane,

Judge.

A postconviction-relief applicant appeals the district court’s order dismissing

his application. AFFIRMED.

Jessica Donels of Parrish Kruidenier L.L.P., Des Moines, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Sheryl Soich, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

Considered by Greer, P.J., and Ahlers and Badding, JJ.
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AHLERS, Judge.

Following a bench trial, Tran Walker was convicted of two counts of first-

degree murder for the 2018 stabbing deaths of his ex-girlfriend and friend. On

direct appeal from his convictions, our court described the slayings and events

leading to them as follows:

Tran Walker stabbed Paiten Sullivan forty-three times and
Felipe Negron Jr. seventeen times. Both victims bled out and died
as a result of their multiple stab wounds. Walker was charged with
two counts of first-degree murder. . . .
In the months before the murders, eighteen-year-old Walker
dated seventeen-year-old Sullivan. They were involved in an on-
again/off-again relationship. They broke up in January 2018. Walker
was hurt. He took the breakup badly and wanted closure. In late
January, seventeen-year-old Negron, a friend of Walker’s, told
Walker [that] Sullivan wanted to meet so they could talk. Negron and
Sullivan picked Walker up. Negron drove while Walker and Sullivan
sat in the back. The three drove to a local Wal-Mart and parked in
the parking lot. Walker and Sullivan discussed their relationship, and
at some point, Sullivan told Walker she did not love him anymore.
Walker later told detectives “Like, I wasn’t angry. I didn’t feel
anything about it, I was just like, okay.” The three left the parking lot
to take Sullivan home, and they continued to engage in a casual
conversation.
Once the trio neared a bar . . . , Walker took out his knife and
started stabbing both Sullivan and Negron. Walker claimed he could
not remember whom he stabbed first. Negron stopped the car and
tried to intervene, but Walker stabbed him. Walker stabbed Sullivan
at least forty-three times and stabbed Negron seventeen times.

State v. Walker, No. 19-1620, 2021 WL 210732, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 21,

2021).

Walker filed an application for postconviction relief (PCR) alleging several

ways his trial counsel was ineffective. About nine months into the case, the State

filed a motion to dismiss. After Walker’s counsel clarified that he intended to

pursue only the grounds for relief stated in his application, the State withdrew its

motion. About three months later, the State filed a motion seeking summary
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disposition pursuant to Iowa Code section 822.6 (2022), which was supported by

an affidavit from Walker’s criminal trial counsel and a forensic psychologist’s

report. Walker resisted the motion. The resistance was supported by an affidavit

from Walker. Without a hearing, the district court granted the motion and

dismissed Walker’s application.

Walker appeals. Although other issues were addressed in the district

court’s ruling, Walker’s challenges on appeal are limited to arguing: (1) he was

entitled to a hearing; (2) he generated a material factual dispute on his claim that

his criminal trial counsel was ineffective for failing to assert insanity and

diminished-responsibility defenses; and (3) he generated a material factual dispute

on his claim that his criminal trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present

evidence that he was not the one who arranged the meeting with the victims.

I. Standard of Review

When the district court summarily disposes of a PCR case under

section 822.6, we apply summary judgment standards on appeal. Moon v. State,

911 N.W.2d 137, 142 (Iowa 2018). Those standards recognize that summary

disposition is appropriate

if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show . . . there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Id. (quoting Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(3)). As the moving party, the State bears the

burden to show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See id. We are

required to view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and

draw all legitimate inferences from the record in the nonmoving party’s favor. Id.
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II. Lack of a Hearing

As to Walker’s claim that the district court erred in not granting him a

hearing, it is not clear from his briefs whether he is referring to a hearing on the

State’s motion for summary disposition or a hearing on the merits of his PCR

application. Either way, his claim fails.

As to a hearing on the State’s motion, once a PCR applicant has been given

proper notice and opportunity to resist, the district court may grant a motion for

summary disposition after a hearing or nonoral submission. See Poole v. State,

No. 21-0386, 2021 WL 5919044, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 15, 2021) (citing

applicable rules of civil procedure on summary judgment). Here, there is no

question Walker had notice and the opportunity to resist the State’s motion, and

he did so. As such, nothing prevented the district court from reviewing the State’s

motion and Walker’s resistance and then ruling on the motion without a hearing—

no error occurred by the district court doing so. See id.

As to Walker being entitled to a hearing on the merits of his PCR application,

the purpose of section 822.6 is to permit summary disposition of PCR actions

without a trial on the merits when appropriate. So, if the district court appropriately

granted the State’s motion for summary dismissal of Walker’s PCR application—a

question we resolve in the forthcoming sections of this opinion—Walker was not

entitled to a trial on the merits of the application and no error occurred in not holding

a PCR trial.

We reject Walker’s claim of error based on the failure to grant him a hearing

and proceed to the merits of the district court’s summary-disposition ruling.
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III. Ineffective-Assistance of Counsel Standards

We start with the standards governing Walker’s claims. Walker’s PCR

application is based on claims of ineffective assistance of his criminal trial counsel.

The United States and Iowa Constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant the right

to effective assistance of counsel. State v. Kuhse, 937 N.W.2d 622, 628 (Iowa

2020). To prevail on his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, Walker must

prove (1) by a preponderance of the evidence that his counsel failed to perform an

essential duty, and (2) prejudice resulted. See State v. Boothby, 951 N.W.2d 859,

863 (Iowa 2020).

To prove the first prong, Walker must show his counsel “made errors so

serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant

by the Sixth Amendment.” Kuhse, 937 N.W.2d at 628 (quoting Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). Counsel is presumed competent, and

Walker must successfully rebut that presumption by showing his counsel’s

performance was not reasonable under prevailing professional norms. See

Boothby, 951 N.W.2d at 863.

To prove the second prong, Walker must establish a reasonable probability

that, but for his attorney’s unprofessional errors, the result of his trial would have

been different. See id. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome.” Kuhse, 937 N.W.2d at 628 (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). And Walker’s obligation to establish a different result

means he must show the fact finder would have had reasonable doubt as to his

guilt absent counsel’s errors. See Boothby, 951 N.W.2d at 863.
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As the moving party, the State bears the burden of establishing there is no

genuine issue of material fact. See Moon, 911 N.W.2d at 142. In the context of a

PCR case, this means the State must establish that no rational fact finder could

conclude that Walker has met his burden of proving an ineffective-assistance-of-

counsel claim after both sides have had the opportunity to fully develop their

claims. See Linn v. State, 929 N.W.2d 717, 730 (Iowa 2019).

IV. Failure to Assert Insanity and Diminished-Responsibility Defenses

Walker contends his criminal trial counsel failed to (1) introduce evidence

of his mental-health treatment, medication, or diagnosis, and (2) obtain

professional opinions or mental-health files concerning his conditions. He

contends this failure constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, as it precluded

him from asserting insanity and diminished-responsibility defenses.

Both of Walker’s claims are directly contradicted by the record. Walker’s

criminal trial counsel was a seasoned public defender who had tried numerous

felony cases, including murders. Her affidavit reveals that, upon meeting with

Walker shortly after being appointed to represent him, she became aware that

Walker suffered from mental illness. She also knew insanity and diminished-

responsibility defenses could be raised on Walker’s charges. So, she had Walker

evaluated by a “well-established forensic psychologist.” Following “a

comprehensive forensic psychological evaluation” of Walker, the board-certified

psychologist submitted a report to Walker’s counsel summarizing the evaluation,

which included these details:

Consistent with the standard of practice in the field of forensic
psychological assessment, I relied on multiple sources of information
in performing this evaluation. I interviewed Mr. Walker at the
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Woodbury County Jail on three separate days. I saw him for a total
of approximately twelve hours.
During that time, I obtained a detailed history from him,
information about his relationship with both victims, and I discussed
his recollections regarding the crimes with which he has been
charged. I administered a range of psychological tests to him,
instruments commonly used in the field of forensic psychology.
These instruments focused on his intellectual and cognitive
functioning, issues related to possible neurological damage, his
personality functioning, and any attempts on his part to exaggerate
or malinger.
I was provided with records related to his prior psychiatric
hospitalization and treatment (both in and out-patient), Minutes of
proposed testimony of others if they were to testify, police reports, a
DVD of his interrogation, and extensive printouts from his Facebook
account. I also interviewed Mr. Walker’s mother and older brother
as part of this evaluation.
Initially, based on his report of events leading up to and
including the instant offenses and his prior mental health records, it
appeared that an insanity defense or a defense addressing
diminished capacity might be possible. However, as we discussed,
during my last interview with him and based on my recent review of
his communications on Facebook, I have ruled out a defense based
on his mental state at the time of the crime.

The forensic psychologist went on to explain why he ruled out those defenses.

Based on the forensic psychologist’s report, Walker’s counsel determined she

should not raise a psychological defense because it had no merit.

Walker countered this information from the State with his own affidavit in

support of his resistance to the State’s motion for summary disposition. In that

affidavit, Walker tries to undermine the forensic psychologist’s report by arguing

(1) the psychologist’s method of evaluating him was not sufficient because his

state of mind “comes and goes in waves” and the psychologist did not spend

enough time with him; (2) the psychologist highlighted details out of context; (3) the

psychologist repeatedly interrupted him and did not allow him to fully talk; and

(4) the psychologist included unnecessary information in his report. Walker
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contends these details in his affidavit generate a genuine issue of material fact as

to whether his trial counsel was ineffective in relying on the forensic psychologist’s

report as a basis for not asserting insanity or diminished-responsibility defenses.

At the outset, we question whether the facts asserted in Walker’s affidavit

generate a genuine issue of material fact on the question of whether his trial

counsel failed to perform an essential duty by relying on the psychologist’s report.

Further, Walker’s affidavit does not allege he told his trial counsel of the

deficiencies claimed in his affidavit at the time trial counsel had to make a decision

on asserting psychological defenses. But even if we assume Walker

communicated the deficiencies and a competent defense counsel would have

refused to rely on the psychologist’s report as a result, there is still a fatal flaw in

Walker’s claim. Walker presented no evidence by affidavit or otherwise in

resistance to the State’s motion for summary disposition that some other

competent expert would give the opinion that Walker met the legal standards

supporting an insanity or diminished-responsibility defense. Without that

evidence, Walker is in the exact same position now that he was in when his criminal

trial occurred. That is, he had no expert that would give the opinion that he was

legally insane or had diminished responsibility at the time he killed the two victims.1

1 We note that Walker makes no claim that he was not given sufficient time to

locate an expert to opine on his mental state at the time of the killings. As such,
Walker had the obligation to present some evidence to generate a fact question
that would defeat the State’s motion for summary disposition. See Slaughter v.
Des Moines Univ. Coll. of Osteopathic Med., 925 N.W.2d 793, 808 (Iowa 2019)
(requiring a party resisting summary judgment to present the evidence needed to
generate a fact dispute as summary judgment is the “put up or shut up moment in
a lawsuit” (citation omitted)). This he failed to do.
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As such, had the PCR case proceeded to a trial on the merits, there is no

factual dispute that would permit the district court to conclude that Walker’s

criminal trial counsel breached any duty by failing to assert insanity or diminished-

responsibility defenses with no expert or that Walker was prejudiced as a result.

See Lamaster v. State, 821 N.W.2d 856, 867 (Iowa 2012) (rejecting claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to present insanity or diminished-

responsibility defenses when “[t]o this day, [the PCR applicant] has no expert

opinion that he was legally insane at the time of the killing”); Anfinson v. State, 758

N.W.2d 496, 502 (Iowa 2008) (rejecting claim of ineffective assistance of counsel

for failing to present insanity or diminished-responsibility defenses when “[e]ven

the mental health expert retained by [the PCR applicant] in connection with this

postconviction action did not opine [the PCR applicant] was insane at the time of

the child’s death”).

We conclude the district court correctly determined that Walker failed to

present a question of material fact regarding his ineffective-assistance claim based

on counsel’s failure to pursue insanity or diminished-responsibility defenses.

V. Evidence of Who Scheduled the Meeting

For his final claim, Walker contends his criminal trial counsel provided

ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to “put on the exculpatory evidence that

the meeting on [the day of the killings] was set up by Negron, rather than Walker.”

He contends this evidence would have negated the finding of premeditation.

We find Walker has failed to generate a genuine issue of material fact on

this issue on both the breach-of-duty and prejudice prongs of his claim. As a

starting point, the evidence Walker contends was not presented was, in fact,
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presented. At trial, the State introduced into evidence text messages between

Negron and Walker. That text conversation starts with Negron telling Walker that

Sullivan wanted to meet. Walker responded that he was willing to meet, and the

meeting was then scheduled. Given this evidence establishing that Walker was

not the one who initiated the meeting, we fail to see what additional evidence

Walker expected his trial counsel to present on this topic, and Walker doesn’t

present any. This evidence alone establishes that Walker has failed to generate

a genuine issue of material fact on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

But even if we assumed Walker’s counsel should have put on additional or

other evidence of Walker not being the one to set up the meeting, Walker cannot

show prejudice. Evidence of planning activity directed toward the killing is just one

form of circumstantial evidence of deliberation and premeditation. State v. Blair,

347 N.W.2d 416, 421 (Iowa 1984). Others include motive (that can be inferred

from the relationship between the defendant and victim) and evidence regarding

the nature of the killing. Id. There is an overwhelming amount of these other forms

of circumstantial evidence here. That evidence includes that Walker took the

break-up with Sullivan hard, pictured himself killing anyone she began dating,

wanted her to feel pain, wanted to disfigure her face, pictured himself stabbing her,

and expressed interest in using knives to inflict the injuries he discussed. After

Walker agreed to the meet up, Walker armed himself with several knives and then

brutally stabbed both Sullivan and Negron an excessive number of times, including

multiple stab wounds to Sullivan’s face, causing their deaths.

Under these circumstances, it makes no difference who set up the meeting.

Even if Walker’s counsel had put on more evidence that he was not the one that
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set up the meeting, there is no reasonable probability of a different outcome at trial.

As such, we reject Walker’s claim for PCR based on ineffective assistance of

counsel in failing to present more evidence that Walker was not the one who set

up the meeting.

VI. Conclusion

The district court had no obligation to hold a hearing on the State’s motion

for summary disposition. The court correctly concluded that Walker failed to

generate a genuine issue of material fact on his claims of ineffective assistance of

counsel. As a result, the court correctly granted the State’s motion dismissing

Walker’s application for PCR, which negated any right Walker had to an evidentiary

hearing on his application.

AFFIRMED.