In re the Marriage of Faust

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-1484
Filed January 23, 2025

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF ABBEY M. FAUST
AND DOUG J. FAUST

Upon the Petition of
ABBEY M. FAUST,
Petitioner-Appellee,

And Concerning
DOUG J. FAUST,
Respondent-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Jones County, David Cox, Judge.

A former spouse appeals the spousal-support award of a decree dissolving

the parties’ marriage. AFFIRMED.

Alexander S. Momany of Howes Law Firm, P.C., Cedar Rapids, for

appellant.

Lea M. Kieffer of Iowa Legal Aid, Dubuque, for appellee.

Considered by Schumacher, P.J., and Ahlers and Langholz, JJ.
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LANGHOLZ, Judge.

In the decree dissolving their fifteen-year marriage, Doug Faust is ordered

to pay Abbey Faust monthly spousal support for ten years. For about the first year,

while Doug also has a child-support obligation, the monthly amount is $1915, and

then the amount increases to $2800. Doug appeals, arguing that the award is

inequitable and should be denied or substantially reduced in duration or amount.

He contends mainly that Abbey failed to prove that she was unable to work

because of a disability and thus cannot show an award of traditional spousal

support is appropriate since their marriage was shorter than the typical twenty-year

durational threshold for that support.

On our de novo review, mindful of the superior position of the district court

to assess Abbey’s credibility about her disability and the supreme court’s

admonition to refrain from undue tinkering with spousal-support awards on appeal,

we agree with the district court that the award is equitable. We thus affirm.

I.

Doug and Abbey were married for about fifteen years. They are both in

their mid-forties. And they have one daughter who was about to start her senior

year of high school at the time of trial.1

At the start of their relationship, Abbey worked full-time outside the home.

But the parties then decided that she would stay home to save on daycare

expenses. After trying “that for a little bit” and realizing “it did not work,” Abbey

decided she “need[ed] to work at least half time.” She first worked as a certified

1 Abbey also testified about another adult daughter, but the record lacks any
relevant details about this other daughter.
3

nursing assistant but injured her wrist while working and could no longer perform

required duties, like “lift[ing] a full-sized person.”

Abbey then worked as a special education para-educator for about six

years. In September 2019, she was injured at work by one of her students who

“latched onto [her] arm and tore a couple of things in [her] shoulder after getting

scared.” She tried to continue at that job after the injury, working “off and on” as

much as her arm could handle it. She last worked at the school in May 2022, after

which she was let go “because they said that [her] shoulder was not safe to work

with children in the job.” By the end of her employment, she was making about

$14 per hour—or roughly $11,000 per year given her part-time, school-year hours.

Abbey has not returned to work since then. But she hopes to return to work

eventually and planned to get an evaluation about what work she can perform with

her injured shoulder. To make ends meet, Abbey has used credit cards, some of

her workers’ compensation settlement from her shoulder injury, and sold some of

her jewelry and five of the family’s eight horses.

Doug works for an agricultural and energy cooperative. He is paid on

commission, so his income varies. In 2022, he earned $115,449. Based on his

earning in the first half of 2023, he was on track to make $142,950 in that year.

And at the time of trial, his take-home pay after taxes was about $6000 per month.

In August 2023, after a half-day trial—during which Abbey represented

herself—the district court dissolved the parties’ marriage. As relevant here, the

court ordered Doug to pay Abbey traditional spousal support for up to ten years

starting on September 1—$1915 per month until his child-support obligation ends
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and then $2800 per month.2 The court also equitably divided the marital property.

That division did not award Abbey many immediately liquid assets—though on the

sale of the marital home, she would receive an equal portion of any net proceeds.

Doug now appeals, challenging only the spousal-support award. Abbey

initially cross-appealed but later voluntarily dismissed her cross-appeal.

II.

We review a district court’s spousal-support award de novo. In re Marriage

of Sokol, 985 N.W.2d 177, 182 (Iowa 2023). But we defer to the court’s “important,

but often conjectural, judgment calls” and must not engage in “undue tinkering”

with the award on appeal. Id. at 182–83 (cleaned up). And so, we will “disturb the

district court’s determination of spousal support only when there has been a failure

to do equity.” Id. at 182 (cleaned up).

“Spousal support is not an absolute right; rather, its allowance is determined

based on the particular circumstances presented in each case.” In re Marriage of

Mills, 983 N.W.2d 61, 67 (Iowa 2022). And to decide what award—if any—is

equitable, we must consider the statutory factors under Iowa Code section

598.21A(1) (2022). See id.

The district court awarded Abbey only one of the four forms of spousal

support recognized by our supreme court: traditional spousal support. Such

support “is equitable in marriages of long duration to allow the recipient spouse to

2 Doug’s child-support obligation was ordered to continue until their daughter turns

eighteen, dies, or marries unless she is still in high school after turning eighteen
and expects to graduate before turning nineteen, in which case it would continue
until she graduates. Assuming she completed her senior year of high school as
expected, the support would thus continue for about a year until she turned
eighteen in June 2024.
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maintain the lifestyle to which he or she became accustomed. Generally, only

marriages lasting twenty or more years commonly cross the durational threshold

and merit serious consideration for traditional spousal support.” Sokol, 985

N.W.2d at 185 (cleaned up). But a “spouse’s disability suffered during the parties’

marriage” may justify an award of traditional spousal support even in shorter

marriages if the disability “substantially reduce[s] a spouse’s earning capacity and

feasibility of self-support.” Mills, 983 N.W.2d at 71. Our supreme court has thus

affirmed an award of traditional spousal support until the death or remarriage of

either party in a fourteen-year marriage based mainly on the recipient’s “permanent

disability and lack of earning capacity” that was caused by the birth of the parties’

only child. Id. at 71–72.

Doug mainly argues that Abbey failed to show that she suffered a disability

that substantially reduces her earning capacity and feasibility of self-support

enough to justify an award of traditional spousal support after only fifteen years of

marriage. But on our de novo review of the evidence, we agree with the district

court’s finding that Abbey “has a substantial injury to her shoulder that prevents

her from working at a level similar that which she enjoyed during the marriage.”

This finding is supported by ample testimony by Abbey—which the district court

credited from its “front-row seat” to both the testimony and parties throughout the

trial. Hora v. Hora, 5 N.W.3d 635, 645 (Iowa 2024). And we give weight to this

assessment since “our review is limited to reading black words on a white page of

a sterile transcript.”

Abbey testified that she injured her shoulder while working as a para-

educator and that, after trying to continue to work, she lost her job when the school
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decided she could no longer safely perform her duties. She detailed her two

surgeries on the shoulder—with a third still to come after the second surgery

showed the should “has arthritis starting in it.” And she described her current

limitations—“every time [she] work[s], [her] arm swells” and “goes numb.” Even at

home, she “can’t do repetitive motion right now because that causes swelling,” she

“drop[s] a lot of things” and sometimes has to “wait a day or two to do dishes.”

Further supporting that she suffered a workplace injury, she has already received

a partial workers’ compensation settlement of about $21,000.

True, as Doug critiques, Abbey did not present expert opinion or

documentary evidence backing up her testimony—medical records, the workers’

compensation settlement agreement, and the like. But Abbey’s credible testimony

alone is enough for us to agree with the district court’s finding, particularly given

the level of detail she shared. And this is not a case where her claimed disability

rests entirely on her self-assessment—she pointed to the decision of her employer,

the surgeries, and her workers’ compensation settlements, which could have been

independently verified if Doug believed the testimony was false. But while Doug

contested Abbey’s ultimate assertion she could not work, he did not present any

contrary evidence on these underlying facts. Rather, he relied on Abbey’s receipt

of the settlement and the manner of her spending it as evidence that weighed in

his favor and he agreed to pay her medical debt from some of her treatment.3

3 In noting the testimony that Doug left uncontested, we are not—nor do we read

the district court’s decree to be—placing the burden of proof on Doug. But we
consider that in deciding whether to believe Abbey’s testimony and whether she
has met her burden to show the spousal-support award is equitable.
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Doug also argues that Abbey’s initial return to work after the injury, her

continued caring for three family horses, and a multi-week trip to Florida with their

daughter weigh against her claim that she is unable to work. Yet Abbey’s attempt

to return to work weighs in favor—not against—her claim, suggesting that she

would be working if she could. After all, it was her employer that decided it was

unsafe for her to continue. And the record lacks evidence as to the physical

demands on Abbey to continue the horse’s care or to travel to Florida, and we do

not find it self-evident that a person with a disabling shoulder injury could not

engage in either activity. So we do not find those points particularly persuasive.

Beyond Abbey’s disability, the other factors also support some award of

traditional spousal support. Doug earns significantly more than Abbey—even

when she was working part-time during the marriage she made roughly one-tenth

of his earnings. See in re Marriage of Geil, 509 N.W.2d 738, 742 (Iowa 1993)

(noting appellate courts have affirmed traditional spousal support awards

“especially where the disparity in earning capacity has been great”). And it is

difficult to see how she could maintain anything near their marital lifestyle without

spousal support. Doug also has the ability to pay. His salary is substantial. And

he candidly made a modest assessment of his own financial needs at about

$2900—less than half of his roughly $6000 in monthly take-home pay.

Still, Doug argues that if we do not deny the spousal-support award entirely,

then it should be reduced from its $2800 amount or its ten-year duration. But

again, we agree that the district court’s award is equitable. When deciding an

equitable amount of traditional spousal support, the court must consider the

earning capacity of each spouse, their current standards of living, and the spouse’s
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ability to pay weighed against the relative needs of the other spouse. See In re

Marriage of Hitchcock, 309 N.W.2d 432, 436–37 (Iowa 1981).

Considering these factors, and refraining from undue tinkering, we do not

quibble with the amount of the award. Where, as here, “there is a substantial

disparity” in earning capacity, “we do not employ a mathematical formula to

determine the amount of spousal support.” In re Marriage of Gust, 858 N.W.2d

402, 411–12 (Iowa 2015). Abbey estimated her need as $3000. Doug estimated

he has a little more than $3000 available from his take-home pay after accounting

for his expenses. And the district court reduced Abbey’s request slightly to $2800.

Considering the property division as well, which gives few immediately liquid

assets, we cannot say this amount is inequitable.

Nor do we see any reason to reduce the ten-year duration of the award.

Traditional spousal support “is ordinarily of unlimited or indefinite duration.” Id. at

408. The district court reasoned that it would not order the typical indefinite support

“[w]ithout additional information” about her medical condition, her eventual ability

to work, and any eligibility for disability payments. It matters not whether we agree

with that logic for refraining from an indefinite award because Abbey does not

cross-appeal. So we cannot grant her any more relief than what she was granted

by the district court. See Midwest Hatchery & Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Doorenbos

Poultry, Inc., 783 N.W.2d 56, 64 n.7 (Iowa Ct. App. 2010). Given that the award

is already an atypical reduced duration, equity does not require an even shorter

duration for this traditional spousal-support award.

AFFIRMED.

Schumacher, P.J., concurs; Ahlers, J., dissents.
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AHLERS, Judge (dissenting).

Even accepting the district court’s determinations that Abbey Faust has no

income and no income should be imputed to her—determinations of which I am

skeptical on this record—the spousal support set by the district court is inequitably

high. As a result, I cannot join the majority’s decision to affirm.

A review of the parties’ finances shows a fair amount of operating debt,

suggesting the parties were in the fairly common situation of struggling to some

degree to meet their living expenses when they had one household to maintain.

Now that they have two households to maintain, there is not enough money for

both parties to maintain their same standards of living. See In re Marriage of

Stenzel, 908 N.W.2d 524, 534 (Iowa Ct. App. 2018) (“Often in marriage

dissolutions, incomes that were adequate to support married couples and their

children are stretched precariously thin in order to cover the expense of

maintaining two separate households.” (citation omitted)). While I agree that some

amount of spousal support is warranted with the goal of helping Abbey achieve

some semblance of the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage, it should

not be done at the expense of Doug being able to maintain his. See id. (“[I]f the

same standard of living cannot be maintained, support should not be fixed at the

cost of the standard of living of the payor.”).

The district court’s spousal-support decision does not strike this balance

and is inequitable. We should not dodge our obligation to correct the inequity by

wrapping ourselves in the cloak of the directive not to unduly tinker with the district

court’s decision. See In re Marriage of Sokol, 985 N.W.2d 177, 182–83 (Iowa

2023) (directing that spousal-support awards should only be disturbed when they
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fail to do equity, and appellate courts should avoid “undue tinkering” with them).

Tinkering isn’t warranted here. A wholesale change is. I would modify the district

court’s order to provide for ten years of spousal support at $1600 per month. As

such, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to affirm.