In the Interest of J.C., K.C., and K.C., Minor Children

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-1010
Filed December 18, 2024

IN THE INTEREST OF J.C., K.C., and K.C.,
Minor Children,

D.C., Father,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Susan Cox, Judge.

The father appeals the termination of his parental rights to three children.

AFFIRMED.

Lisa K. Pendroy, Des Moines, for appellant father.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Mackenzie Moran, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

Erin E. Romar of Youth Law Center, Des Moines, attorney and guardian ad

litem for minor children.

Considered by Greer, P.J., and Buller and Langholz, JJ.
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GREER, Presiding Judge.

The juvenile court terminated the father’s parental rights to his children J.C.,

K.C., and K.C., who were then eight, seven, and six years old respectively, under

Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f) (2024).1 The father appeals, arguing (1) the State

did not prove the statutory ground for termination, in part because providing visits

that included more than just his biological children constituted a failure to make

reasonable efforts to reunify; (2) the parent-child relationships should be preserved

because termination would be detrimental to the children; and (3) the court should

have granted him six additional months to work toward reunification. Alternatively,

the father argues that establishing a guardianship in the maternal grandfather in

lieu of terminating his parental rights is in the children’s best interests.

Following our de novo review, in which “we review both the facts and law,

and adjudicate . . . anew” those issues properly preserved and presented, In re

T.A.L., 505 N.W.2d 480, 482 (Iowa 1993), we conclude there was clear and

convincing evidence to support the termination of the father’s parental rights and

the best interests of the children require stability. We affirm the juvenile court’s

decision.

Statutory Ground and Reasonable Efforts. After a three-day hearing, the

juvenile court terminated the father’s parental rights to each of the three children

under section 232.116(1)(f), which requires the following elements to be proved by

clear and convincing evidence:

(1) The child is four years of age or older.

1 The mother’s rights to these children and two other children that have different

fathers were also terminated. She is not involved in this appeal.
3

(2) The child has been adjudicated a child in need of
assistance pursuant to section 232.96.
(3) The child has been removed from the physical custody of
the child’s parents for at least twelve of the last eighteen months, or
for the last twelve consecutive months and any trial period at home
has been less than thirty days.
(4) There is clear and convincing evidence that at the present
time the child cannot be returned to the custody of the child’s parents
as provided in section 232.102.

The father only challenges the fourth element. In somewhat of a concession, the

father notes that the children could have been returned to him at the time of hearing

or “within a reasonable time frame.” But, reference to “at the present time” in the

statute means at the time of termination hearing, so we limit our review to that

question. See In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 111 (Iowa 2014). And, as part of this

challenge, the father argues the State failed to make reasonable efforts to return

the children to his custody. See In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 493 (Iowa 2000)

(“[T]he reasonable efforts requirement is not viewed as a strict substantive

requirement of termination. . . . [Instead, t]he State must show reasonable efforts

as a part of its ultimate proof the child cannot be safely returned to the care of a

parent.”).

First, we consider whether the father preserved his reasonable-efforts

complaint. The father asserts the Iowa Department of Health and Human Services

(the department) failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify him with his children

because, in spite of his requests to the contrary, his supervised visits included his

three biological children and their two half-siblings. During his testimony at the

second day of the termination hearing, the father claimed he asked the department

to have visits with only his three children “a few times.” Even assuming the father’s
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testimony is reliable,2 alerting the department about an issue does not preserve

error. See In re C.H., 652 N.W.2d 144, 148 (Iowa 2002) (“[V]oicing complaints

regarding the adequacy of services to a social worker is not sufficient. A parent

must inform the juvenile court of such challenge.”). And the father did not complain

about his visits including the other children to the juvenile court until the second

day of the three-day hearing, when he made a formal motion for the visits to

change. This is too late to preserve error. See In re T.S., 868 N.W.2d 425, 442

(Iowa Ct. App. 2015) (“Complaints regarding services are properly raised ‘at

removal, when the case permanency plan is entered, or at later review

hearings.’ . . . [W]e will not review a reasonable efforts claim unless it is raised

prior to the termination hearing.” (citations omitted)); In re G.C., No. 21-1781, 2022

WL 246270, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2022) (“[T]he parent has a responsibility

to object when appropriate changes can [still] be made.”). So we do not consider

the father’s reasonable-efforts challenge.

Still, we consider whether the State proved the children could not be

returned to the father’s custody at the time of the termination hearing. While this

family became involved in child-in-need-of-assistance proceedings in

2 On the first day of the three-day termination hearing, the department case
manager testified the father was asked on more than one occasion if he was okay
with the visits including all five children and the father indicated he was. At the
second day of the hearing, the case manager testified the father raised the issue
about having visits with just his three biological children after the first day of the
termination hearing. The father provided contradictory testimony, stating he asked
the department for the visits with only his children “a few times.” The juvenile court
found the father was not credible in his testimony at the termination hearing, ruling,
“The Court previously found [the father’s] testimony was not credible. The Court
continues to make that finding. This is based upon his demeanor and inconsistent
statements. Also, [the father] repeatedly became escalated in his testimony. He
indicated an inability/unwillingness to comply with basic court directives.”
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September 2022 and the children were formally removed from parental custody

that October,3 the father did not start participating in services until July 2023 and

visits a couple months later. While the father initially avoided completing any drug

tests, when he began providing them in September 2023 they were positive for

methamphetamine. Additionally, he admitted during his testimony at the

termination hearing that he continued to use methamphetamine until

December 31, 2023. A drug patch worn by the father from January 11–18, 2024,

was positive for methamphetamine—there was contradictory testimony over what

period that patch would test. While the father participated in and completed

substance-use treatment from January to March 2024, and had results from a drug

test completed in March that tested negative for all substances, the father’s few

months of sobriety is not enough to establish the children could be safely returned

to his custody. See In re J.B., No. 18-0696, 2018 WL 4361058, at *4 (Iowa Ct.

App. Sept. 12, 2018) (“Short-term improvement on the eve of termination is not

enough for the child to safely return.”); C.B., 611 N.W.2d at 495 (“[T]he changes in

the two or three months before the termination hearing, in light of the preceding

eighteen months, are insufficient.”); In re E.M., No. 16-1641, 2016 WL 6903519,

at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 23, 2016) (finding a three-month period of sobriety not

enough time to demonstrate a consistent effort). And, while we hope the father

internalizes the lessons he learned in his domestic-violence classes and mental-

3 The department became involved with the family in December 2021 based on

concerns regarding parental substance use and the father perpetrating domestic
violence against the mother. Originally, the parents were offered services on a
voluntary basis and the children began staying with the maternal grandparents as
part of a safety plan.
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health therapy, his inability to regulate his emotions while testifying, speaking with

the case manager, and dealing with others he finds bothersome suggests there

are still other issues preventing the father from providing the children a safe, stable

home. So, the children could not be returned to the father’s custody, and the State

proved the statutory ground for termination.

Exception to Termination. The father argues termination of his rights

would be detrimental to the children due to the closeness of the parent-child bond.

See Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(c). While it is undisputed the father loves and wishes

to preserve his relationship with the children, a parent’s love for the child is not

enough to prevent termination. See In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 709 (Iowa 2010).

Neither is the mere existence of a bond. In re A.B., 956 N.W.2d 162, 169

(Iowa 2021). Rather, to prevent termination, the father has to establish that the

children would be disadvantaged by termination such that it overcomes his inability

to meet the children’s needs. See In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 476 (Iowa 2018)

(“[T]he parent resisting termination bears the burden to establish an exception to

termination.”); see also D.W., 791 N.W.2d at 709 (“Although it is clear that [the

mother] loves her son, our consideration must center on whether the child will be

disadvantaged by termination, and whether the disadvantage overcomes [the

mother’s] inability to provide for [the child’s] developing needs.”). The father has

not done so.

Additional Time. Next, the father argues he should receive six more

months to work toward reunification with the children. “[T]he juvenile court may

deny termination and give the parent an additional six-months for reunification only

if the need for removal ‘will no longer exist at the end of the additional six-month
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period.’” In re W.T., 967 N.W.2d 315, 323 (Iowa 2021) (emphasis added) (quoting

Iowa Code § 232.104(2)(b)). To give the father additional time, he must “show the

impediments to placing [the children] with him will not exist in six months, [and] we

must also consider whether the further delay is in [the children’s] best interests.”

Id.

The department and juvenile court had been formally part of these children’s

lives for about eighteen months at the time of the termination hearing. During that

time, the father went about a year without seeing the children and, during that

same time period, did not take steps to address his mental-health, substance

abuse, or domestic-violence issues. While the father took a lot of positive steps in

the last few months before the termination hearing, many of those changes were

still too new to know if the father could maintain them. The father argues that

giving him additional time would allow him to prove that he can, but we conclude

further delay is not in these children’s best interests. See In re N.F., 579 N.W.2d

338, 341 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998) (“We have repeatedly followed the principle that the

statutory time line must be followed and children should not be forced to wait for

their parent . . . .”).

Guardianship. In the alternative, the father asks us to establish a

guardianship in the maternal grandfather in lieu of terminating his parental rights.

See Iowa Code § 232.117(5) (allowing the court, after a termination trial, to not

order the termination of parental rights but instead enter an order pursuant to

section 232.104); see also id. § 232.104(2)(d)(2) (allowing the court to transfer

guardianship of the child to an adult relative).
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To establish a guardianship instead of terminating the father’s parental

rights, we must conclude that termination of the father’s rights is not in the

children’s best interests. See id. § 232.104(4)(a). We cannot do that here. The

maternal grandfather was completing the process to become eligible to adopt not

just the father’s children but also the other two half-siblings. Termination of the

father’s parental rights would likely allow all five siblings to be adopted by their

family member, who has cared for them for more than two years and can provide

them a safe forever home. This is in these children’s best interests. See In re

J.E., 723 N.W.2d 793, 801 (Iowa 2006) (Cady, J. concurring specially) (“A child’s

safety and the need for a permanent home are now the primary concerns when

determining a child’s best interests.”); In re L.W., No 23-0326, 2023 WL 3861986,

at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. June 7, 2023) (“Our legislature recognized that sibling

relationships should be considered when making a determination of each child’s

best interests.” (citing Iowa Code § 232.108)).

We affirm the termination of the father’s parental rights.

AFFIRMED.