In re Marriage of Williams

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-1544
Filed October 16, 2024

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF BEVERLY BEHARY WILLIAMS
AND RONALD CHRISTOPHER WILLIAMS

Upon the Petition of
BEVERLY BEHARY WILLIAMS,
Petitioner-Appellee,

And Concerning
RONALD CHRISTOPHER WILLIAMS,
Respondent-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Story County, James C. Ellefson,

Judge.

Ronald Christopher Williams appeals the economic provisions of the decree

dissolving his marriage to Beverly Behary Williams. AFFIRMED AND

REMANDED.

Andrew B. Howie, Shindler, Anderson, Goplerud & Weese, P.C., West Des

Moines, for appellant.

Brian J. Humke and Logan J. Eliasen of Nyemaster Goode, P.C., Ames, for

appellee.

Considered by Ahlers, P.J., and Chicchelly and Buller, JJ.
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CHICCHELLY, Judge.

Ronald Christopher Williams (Chris) appeals the economic provisions of the

decree dissolving his marriage to Beverly Behary Williams (Beverly). He contends

the property distribution and spousal support are inequitable. Upon our review, we

find the trial court’s order is equitable in regard to both provisions.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

Chris and Beverly were married on May 3, 1997. They share two children:

J.W., born in 2005; and G.W., born in 2007. In late 2021, Beverly petitioned for

dissolution. While the parties stipulated to most of their dissolution provisions, they

could not agree on property distribution or spousal support.

Throughout most of their marriage, the couple largely focused on Chris’s

career. Chris moved states multiple times for job opportunities, and Beverly

followed him. Chris eventually got a professorship at Iowa State University, and

the couple settled in Ames, Iowa, where they remained until the end of the

marriage. Beverly testified that as a result of the relocations, there were times she

took extended breaks from the workforce because her pharmacy license was

state-specific. When she did work, it was often part-time because she provided

most of the childcare. But in early 2020, Beverly started working full-time at the

Iowa State University Lloyd Veterinary Hospital. She testified that she loves her

job and plans to stay there until her retirement at sixty-five.

After considering the circumstances of their marriage, the court awarded

Beverly $2500 per month in traditional spousal support to “allow her to live at

approximately the standard of living the parties enjoyed before the dissolution.” It
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based its determination primarily on the parties’ disparate incomes, their respective

contributions to the marriage, and the twenty-six years they were married.

But the property distribution was more complicated. The most substantial

dispute at trial was the valuation of Chris’s interest in SoyLei. SoyLei is a start-up

created in June 2020 that licenses technology patented by Iowa State University.

Chris, as one of six people who established the company, owns a sixteen percent

interest, which is held in a limited-liability company, Polybit Unlimited LLC. After

its creation, SoyLei entered into an exclusive licensing agreement with

ColorBiotics. This contract “ha[d] not panned out” as expected, and by trial in

August 2023, SoyLei had made no sales that year. But nonetheless, 2023 was

still a formative year for the company. The ColorBiotics contract ended that

September, with no plans to renew. SoyLei also began product development on

a new asphalt technology, and it received a United States Department of

Agriculture grant for $4,974,327. Half of the grant funding was slated for the two

supporting universities, Iowa State University and Auburn University, while the rest

was for SoyLei personnel, materials, and equipment. SoyLei also secured

financing from Availa Bank for $1,500,000 and from First National Bank

for $400,000.

Because the parties could not agree on the approximate value of Chris’s

interest in SoyLei, they each retained their own experts to complete an estimate.

Chris retained Zach Eubank, an expert in business appraisals, who valued a 1/6th

interest in the company at approximately $12,000 rounded. Eubank testified that

this figure was based primarily on historic revenues since the company’s inception.

Chris then testified, disagreeing with his own expert and valuing his interest at
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$64,773.1 Beverly’s business-appraisal expert, Brian Crotty, valued Chris’s SoyLei

interest at $1,171,464. Crotty further criticized Eubank’s valuation, explaining that

analyzing SoyLei’s past revenues was “a waste of time.” Because the figures were

based on the ColorBiotics contract, which “is not likely to continue or be renewed,”

the valuation was already outdated. Instead, Crotty focused on the recent changes

within the company, including SoyLei’s current product development, the relatively

low royalty fees taken by Iowa State University compared to the industry market,

its substantial financial backing, and especially its receipt of the USDA grant. The

court found Crotty more credible, valued Chris’s interest in SoyLei at $900,000,2

and included it as part of the marital property distributions.

Chris appeals, challenging both the property-distribution and

spousal-support provisions.

II. Review.

Because dissolutions of marriage are equitable proceedings, our review is

de novo. In re Marriage of Mauer, 874 N.W.2d 103, 106 (Iowa 2016). While not

binding, “we give weight to the findings of the district court, especially to the extent

credibility determinations are involved.” Hansen, 733 N.W.2d at 690. We will only

disturb such findings if they fail “to do equity.” Mauer, 874 N.W.2d at 106.

1 While Chris does not maintain that he is an appraisal expert, a property owner is

considered “a competent witness” to testify to its market value. See In re Marriage
of Hansen, 733 N.W.2d 683, 703 (Iowa 2007).
2 The court discounted Crotty’s initial valuation by twenty-four percent “to account

for the uncertainty of [financial] forecasts.”
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III. Discussion.

Chris contends the court’s property-distribution and spousal-support

provisions are inequitable. “There are no hard and fast rules governing the

economic provisions in a dissolution action; each decision depends upon the

unique circumstances and facts relevant to each issue.” In re Marriage of Gaer,

476 N.W.2d 324, 326 (Iowa 1991). Therefore, we consider each argument in turn,

bearing in mind the specifics of the case.

A. Distribution of Property.

While Chris generally appeals the property distribution, he does not dispute

the distribution itself or that Beverly is entitled to certain marital assets. Instead,

he only challenges the court’s valuation of his interest in SoyLei and his ability to

pay the equalization payment. “Valuation is difficult and trial courts are given

considerable leeway in resolving disputes as to valuations.” In re Marriage of

Shanks, 805 N.W.2d 175, 177 (Iowa Ct. App. 2011). We therefore will not disturb

a court’s valuation “when it is within the range of permissible evidence” and

supported by “credibility findings or corroborating evidence.” Hansen, 733 N.W.2d

at 703. At trial, the parties presented contradictory evidence regarding SoyLei’s

value, and the court found Beverly’s expert more credible. In making this

determination, the court explained that Eubank’s focus was misplaced. Eubank

relied primarily on the expiring contract and “fail[ed] to consider the significance”

of the USDA’s willingness to back SoyLei’s new product. The court found the

receipt of such a prestigious grant was “an affirmation of the value of the new

product” and thus justified the higher valuation. But it also noted “the uncertainty

of [future] forecasts” and discounted Chris’s interest in SoyLei to $900,000 to
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account for any discrepancies in predictions. This figure was within the range of

evidence presented at trial, and we readily defer to the court’s credibility

determination in battles of experts. In re Marriage of Marasco, No. 22-0847,

2023 WL 3862591, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. June 7, 2023).

As for Chris’s claims that the court “failed to consider the tax consequences”

and “the trial record shows Chris cannot pay” the amount ordered, we disagree.

While we have previously considered the tax consequences of an equalization

payment requiring liquidation of assets, see In re Marriage of Bertrand,

No. 06-1937, 2007 WL 3376894, at *6 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2007), this is just

one of many factors considered by the court, see Iowa Code § 598.21(5)(j) (2021).

The trial court expressly noted the tax consequences in its order as one of many

considerations. But it also weighed this against the substantial assets available to

Chris. As part of the property distribution, Chris received over $3,000,000 in value,

including the interest in SoyLei, two real estate properties, and a seven-figure

retirement account. Despite Chris testifying “I have no money,” the trial court found

Chris was not credible regarding his finances. Chris holds sizable assets and “has

a history of earning an excellent income,” with an average annual salary of

$198,071. For these reasons, the trial court found that Chris had the ability to pay

Beverly the $659,793.25 equalization payment, especially over the prescribed

five-year period, and we agree.

B. Spousal Support.

Chris also argues that the court’s award of $2500 per month in traditional

spousal support is inequitable because Beverly’s already high income and her

relatively low expenses do not justify such an award. We begin by noting that the
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court has “considerable latitude” in fashioning or denying an award of spousal

support. In re Marriage of Mann, 943 N.W.2d 15, 20 (Iowa 2020) (citation omitted).

Based on the high level of discretion afforded to the trial court, “precedent may be

of little value in deciding each case.” In re Marriage of Gust, 858 N.W.2d 402, 408

(Iowa 2015). While the type of spousal support is of little consequence to our

analysis, we have recognized four categories of spousal support: traditional,

rehabilitative, reimbursement, and transitional. See id.; In re Marriage of Pazhoor,

971 N.W.2d 530, 543 (Iowa 2022). But the ultimate goal is the same: “to balance

the parties’ needs” and “do equity.” Gust, 858 N.W.2d at 416. To achieve this

goal, we consider several statutorily-guided factors when determining an equitable

spousal-support award. See Iowa Code § 598.21A(1).3

3 These factors include:

a. The length of the marriage.
b. The age and physical and emotional health of the parties.
c. The distribution of property made pursuant to section 598.21.
d. The educational level of each party at the time of the marriage
and at the time the action is commenced.
e. The earning capacity of the party seeking maintenance, including
educational background, training, employment skills, work
experience, length of absence from the job market,
responsibilities for children under either an award of custody or
physical care, and the time and expense necessary to acquire
sufficient education or training to enable the party to find
appropriate employment.
f. The feasibility of the party seeking maintenance becoming
self-supporting at a standard of living reasonably comparable to
that enjoyed during the marriage, and the length of time
necessary to achieve this goal.
g. The tax consequences to each party.
h. Any mutual agreement made by the parties concerning financial
or service contributions by one party with the expectation of future
reciprocation or compensation by the other party.
i. The provisions of an antenuptial agreement.
j. Other factors the court may determine to be relevant in an
individual case.
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After our own review of the requisite factors, we find the award is equitable.

Chris first claims the tax consequences do not justify a spousal-support award.

We do acknowledge recent changes in tax law require Chris to pay tax on any

award, which may support denying or reducing the amount. See In re Marriage of

Meints, No. 21-0172, 2022 WL 244433, at *7 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2022)

(acknowledging “changes in federal income tax laws” that alter the tax obligations

for spousal-support payments). But all the other factors do not weigh in his favor.

First, “[t]he length of the marriage is comfortably within our caselaw where a

spouse may be considered for indefinite spousal support.” Gust, 858 N.W.2d

at 415 (finding a twenty-six-year marriage supports a finding of traditional spousal

support). In determining that traditional spousal support was supported by the

record, the court focused on the duration of the marriage and Beverly’s

non-monetary contributions to the marriage. In lieu of traditional support, Chris

proposes a $1250 per month transitional-spousal-support award. But “transitional

spousal support is focused on solving a short-term liquidity issue,” which is not at

issue here. See In re Marriage of Sokol, 985 N.W.2d 177, 187 (Iowa 2023).

Instead, we agree with the court’s finding that a traditional award is appropriate.

As for the parties themselves, they are reasonably similar: both are in their fifties,

in good health, and hold advanced degrees, which does not support or cut against

an award. Both parties also received substantial assets during property

distribution, although Chris’s share was nearly double the value of Beverly’s.

Beverly’s share is also delayed because Chris has five years to disperse the full

amount. But most importantly, where the parties differ reflects our two priority

concerns: “need and ability.” Id. at 411. To determine the parties’ needs and
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abilities, “we focus on the earning capability of the spouses” instead of doing a

basic income calculation. Id. The court found that while Beverly made a healthy

six-figure income, she was already “earning at her full capacity,” with little hope of

future sizeable raises. The court partially attributed this to the couple’s many

relocations, which required Beverly “to start over in her pharmacy career,” and her

working part-time to provide the bulk of childcare. Conversely, between 2017

through June 2023, the court found Chris averaged $198,071 in earnings annually.

At the time of trial, Chris was “on pace to earn $226,934 for the year.” This is

before calculating any additional income not derived from Iowa State University.

When comparing Chris’s earnings with Beverly’s, which is $103,370 annually, the

court found a significant disparity. While Chris testified that his income would

actually decrease over time, the trial court found his testimony not credible. Chris

may disagree with such findings, but the court was in the best position to personally

observe and assess the parties’ testimonies and make such a credibility

determination. See Mann, 943 N.W.2d at 20.

Chris further challenges Beverly’s “inflated” expenses, attempting to parse

out certain items he finds “unjustified.”4 But we do not audit Beverly’s budget

line-by-line to appease the parties; instead, our only real consideration is whether

her expenses are comparable to what was enjoyed by the parties during the

marriage. See Gust, 858 N.W.2d at 415 (noting the goal of spousal support is “to

4 Chris claims that because the court denied Beverly trial attorney fees, Beverly

should not have been permitted to include $750 towards “Attorney Fees” in her
monthly expenses list. But other than a passing reference, he provides no
authority justifying his position; we therefore do not consider its merits. See Iowa
App. P. 6.903(2)(8)(3) (“Failure to cite authority in support of an issue may be
deemed waiver of that issue.”).
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live in a fashion that approaches the lifestyle to which she was accustomed in the

marriage”); Pazhoor, 971 N.W.2d at 543 (“Ideally, the support should be fixed so

the continuation of both parties’ standard of living can continue, if possible.”

(citation omitted)). We find that Beverly’s expenses are comparable to what she

enjoyed during the marriage. The items Chris disputes, such as modest monthly

savings and charitable contributions, are part of such analysis. See In re Marriage

of Stenzel, 908 N.W.2d 524, 536 (Iowa Ct. App. 2018) (finding “charitable

donations and retirement savings in a reasonable sum may be a part of the needs

analysis in fixing spousal support”). But more significantly, Beverly testified that

her lifestyle has necessarily changed since becoming a single-income household,

stating she has had “to cut back on some clothing and some of the necessities.”

While they did not live lavishly during their marriage, Chris and Beverly were

always comfortable and easily able to meet any unexpected expenses. The two

frequently vacationed, and Beverly and the children would often follow Chris to his

many conferences, making a holiday out it. Since the separation, Beverly testified

that she can no longer afford vacations or even an emergency fund. The trial court

therefore found that Beverly had the “need” and Chris the “ability [to pay].” Gust,

858 N.W.2d at 411. We agree. Based on the factors listed in section 598.21A(1),

we find that the spousal-support award is equitable.

C. Appellate Attorney Fees.

Finally, Beverly asks us to also award her appellate attorney fees. An award

of appellate attorney fees is not a matter of right but rests in this court's discretion.

See In re Marriage of Towne, 966 N.W.2d 668, 680 (Iowa Ct. App. 2021). Our

“controlling consideration” is the parties’ financial positions, but we also consider
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“whether a party has been obliged to defend the trial court’s decision on appeal.”

In re Marriage of Michael, 839 N.W.2d 630, 639 (Iowa 2013). While both Chris

and Beverly have some financial resources to pay their respective attorney fees,

Chris makes nearly double what Beverly does annually. Beverly is also the

prevailing party and was forced to defend this action. See id. Under these

circumstances, it is appropriate to award Beverly appellate attorney fees. But

because she has not provided an affidavit of attorney fees with documentation to

support her request, we remand to the district court to determine Beverly’s

reasonable appellate attorney fees and enter judgment against Chris for that

amount. See Towne, 966 N.W.2d at 680 (remanding for the district court to

calculate “reasonable and necessary fees” incurred on appeal).

IV. Disposition.

Because the court’s property-distribution and spousal-support provisions

are equitable, we affirm. We also award Beverly appellate attorney fees, but

because we lack an attorney-fees affidavit, we remand to the district court to

determine the appropriate amount.

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.

Buller, J., concurs; Ahlers, P.J., partially dissents.
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AHLERS, Presiding Judge (concurring in part and dissenting in part).

I agree with and join the majority’s decision rejecting the husband’s

challenge to the property division. I also agree that in this case the husband should

pay traditional spousal support—as opposed to the transitional spousal support

suggested by the husband. But, because I find the amount of that support to be

excessive, I part ways with the majority’s decision to affirm on that issue.

Back when spousal support was tax deductible to the payor and taxable to

the payee, ordering spousal support of $2500 per month may have been warranted

on these facts. Even then, I would find it to be on the high end of a reasonable

range, but I would affirm the award, following our supreme court’s directive not to

unduly tinker with such awards. See In re Marriage of Sokol, 985 N.W.2d 177, 182

(Iowa 2023) (“The institutional deference afforded the district court in determining

spousal support counsels against undue tinkering with spousal support awards.”).

But spousal support is no longer tax deductible to the payor and taxable to

the payee. In re Marriage of Mann, 943 N.W.2d 15, 21 (Iowa 2020). And tax

consequences to the parties is one of the factors to consider in determining

spousal support. Iowa Code § 598.21A(1)(g) (2021). The record suggests the

district court did not adequately consider the nontaxable nature of the spousal

support awarded. In setting the spousal support at $2500 per month ($30,000 per

year), the district court included a calculation stating the resulting gross annual

income to the parties after payment of the spousal support, presumably to show a

continuing disparity in the husband’s favor. But the resulting gross income figures

is a largely irrelevant calculation, as the $30,000 per year of spousal support is

paid with after-tax money. Given the nontaxable nature of spousal support, the
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relevant calculation is the after-tax income figures. The failure to consider that

relevant calculation suggests a flaw in the logic in setting spousal support.

So let’s look at the statutory factors. Id. § 598.21A(1) (listing relevant factors

to consider when determining a spousal-support award). Given the length of the

marriage, the fact that the wife’s career took a back seat when the family moved

for the husband’s career, and she took on the primary parenting responsibilities,

the award of some amount of traditional support is warranted. See id. §

598.21A(1)(a), (e); In re Marriage of Gust, 858 N.W.2d 402, 410–11 (Iowa 2015)

(“Generally speaking, marriages lasting twenty or more years commonly cross the

durational threshold and merit serious consideration for traditional spousal

support.”).

But certain factors cut against the amount awarded. Both parties are about

the same age and are in good health. See Iowa Code § 598.21A(1)(b). Both have

advanced degrees. See id. § 598.21A(1)(d). Both have substantial incomes that

would allow each to be self-supporting without support from the other, though both

will encounter the unavoidable decrease in standard of living that comes from

transitioning from a single household supported by two incomes to two households

each supported by one income. See id. § 598.21A(1)(f); see also In re Marriage

of Stenzel, 908 N.W.2d 524, 534 (Iowa Ct. App. 2018) (noting the problem of

stretching the same income into two households rather than one). In addition, both

parties are receiving substantial property—nearly $2.5 million each—decreasing

the need for any spousal support, especially considering the cash-flow crunch to

the husband and benefit to the wife stemming from the nearly $660,000

equalization payment that will be paid with interest. See Iowa Code
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§ 598.21A(1)(c). And finally, there are the tax consequences I have already

discussed. See id. § 598.21A(1)(g).

Balancing all these factors, a traditional spousal support of $2500 per month

fails to do equity. A monthly support amount of $1250 ($15,000 per year) would

be more in line with the equities of this case. I would modify the district court’s

order to reduce the husband’s monthly spousal support to that amount. Based on

this disposition and consideration of the other relevant factors, I would also deny

the wife’s claim for appellate attorney fees.

In conclusion, I concur with the majority’s decision to affirm the property

division and award of traditional spousal support. I respectfully dissent from the

decision to affirm the amount of the spousal support award and award the wife

appellate attorney fees.