State of Iowa v. Michael Jon Radtke, Jr.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-2103
Filed August 21, 2024

STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

MICHAEL JON RADTKE Jr.,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County, Mark T. Hostager,

Judge.

Michael Radtke appeals his sentence for operating while intoxicated,

second offense. AFFIRMED.

Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Theresa R. Wilson,

Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered by Ahlers, P.J., and Chicchelly and Buller, JJ.
2

AHLERS, Presiding Judge.

While committing his fifth lifetime offense of operating a motor vehicle while

intoxicated (OWI), Michael Radtke Jr. backed his vehicle into a marked law

enforcement patrol car. Radtke was charged with and pleaded guilty to OWI,

second offense. The district court sentenced Radtke to prison. He appeals. 1 He

contends the district court abused its discretion in sending him to prison instead of

imposing a jail sentence with a suspended term of incarceration with probation.

Radtke does not dispute that the sentence imposed is within statutory limits;

as such, the sentence is presumptively valid and can only be vacated for an abuse

of discretion or consideration of inappropriate matters. See Wilbourn, 974 N.W.2d

at 65 (“A sentencing court’s decision to impose a specific sentence that falls within

the statutory limits ‘is cloaked with a strong presumption in its favor, and will only

be overturned for an abuse of discretion or the consideration of inappropriate

matters.’” (quoting State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 105–06 (Iowa 2020))).

Instead, he contends the district court abused its discretion by focusing solely on

his criminal history without considering mitigating factors.

In deciding upon a sentence, the district “court must consider ‘the nature of

the offense, the attending circumstances, the age, character and propensity of the

offender, and the chances of reform.’” State v. Gordon, 998 N.W.2d 859, 862

1 Iowa Code section 814.6(1)(a)(3) (2023) prohibits a defendant from appealing

following a guilty plea to an offense other than a class “A” felony unless the
“defendant establishes good cause.” Because Radtke appeals his sentence rather
than the guilty plea itself, he has established good cause, and we have jurisdiction
to hear his appeal. See State v. Wilbourn, 974 N.W.2d 58, 66 (Iowa 2022).
3

(Iowa 2023) (quoting State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 725 (Iowa 2002)). The

district court did so here, giving this explanation for the sentence:

Mr. Radtke, I’ve looked at a number of factors here. Obviously the
first one is that you pled guilty to the charge; that you did have an
open-ended plea agreement with the prosecutor’s office. I’ve looked
at the presentence investigation. I’ve looked at the nature of the
offense—that does include an accident—as well as the evidence of
intoxication. That included a number of open alcohol containers in
the vehicle, your impairment, your test result. I’ve looked at, as I
said, the presentence investigation report, which details a number of
prior substance-abuse treatments, substance-abuse education
classes, including an OWI victim impact class or classes. I’ve taken
into account your family situation. And I’ve also taken into account
your criminal history, which is atrocious, all right, when you’re being
sentenced for operating while intoxicated second offense and it’s
actually your fifth conviction—
....
—for operating while intoxicated.
You’ve been to jail. You’ve been on probation, both formal
and informal. You’ve been in the OWI offender program. And here
you are back again. It’s extremely disappointing to see you back
here like this on the same type of offense. [Your attorney] referred
to it as—as a relapse. All right? And whatever it is, whether you call
it a relapse or something else, it’s—it’s the fifth time you’ve been
convicted of doing this same—what I consider extremely dangerous
behavior. Dangerous to you, dangerous to property, dangerous to
other vehicles on the road, and in this case the East Dubuque police
officer with a squad car.
When I weigh all of that out, I find that this isn’t—you’re not at
the point where—at least in my view, you’re not at a point where
we’re looking at some sort of minimal jail sentence, that we’re looking
at probation and informal probation. It doesn’t appear to me that you
really do get it. You’re back again. Your last one wasn’t that long
ago. I understand your first ones were quite awhile ago. But, you
know, you tell me you’ve learned your lesson and your record is
showing that you haven’t learned your lesson these past times.
....
So you lose some credibility. All right?
....
I have no doubt that you intend to stay out of trouble. But the
fact is that you haven’t, and you’ve been engaging in this dangerous
behavior serially—
....
—over a long period of time.
4

So the Code says I should look at all of my alternatives when
I sentence someone and consider a sentence within those
alternatives that maximizes the rehabilitation of the defendant and
attempts to maximize the protection of the community. And I look
back on all of the things that have been tried in the past with
treatment and classes and probation and the OWI offender program.
Those resources have already been tried and used.

To the extent Radtke claims the district court should have weighed the

relevant factors differently, we reject the claim. Deciding how much weight to give

individual sentencing factors is inherent in the discretionary nature of sentencing,

and we do not interfere with the sentencing decision in the absence of abuse of

that discretion. State v. Hightower, 8 N.W.3d 527, 543 (Iowa 2024). It is not our

place to second guess the district court’s decision or to substitute our judgment for

that of the district court. Id. We find no abuse of the court’s discretion in the way

it weighed the relevant sentencing factors.

To the extent Radtke contends the district court relied only on his criminal

history and failed to consider other factors, we reject his contention. As quoted

above, while the district court understandably emphasized the many OWIs in

Radtke’s criminal history, it also noted Radtke’s family situation, treatment history,

and the presentence investigation report, which discussed his employment and

treatment. The court “was not required to specifically acknowledge each mitigating

factor” and “failing to acknowledge a particular factor does not mean it was not

considered.” State v. Phillips, 996 N.W.2d 419, 422 (Iowa Ct. App. 2023). The

court considered multiple appropriate factors and did not improperly rely only on

Radtke’s criminal history.

Radtke suggests the court’s recitation of the mitigating factors was simply

boilerplate language and not an actual analysis of how they should affect his
5

sentence. But the reasoning the court provided adequately explained why the

court arrived at the sentence imposed. Again, the court was not required to go into

detail on every sentencing factor. See id. And the district court’s explanation can

be terse and succinct, so long as it does not prevent appellate review of the

sentencing discretion. State v. Wilson, 5 N.W.3d 628, 634 (Iowa 2024). Here, the

district court gave enough information to allow us to assess its exercise of

discretion, and we find no abuse of that discretion.

Radtke also argues the district court abused its discretion by not giving

Radtke more credit for the twenty-year gap between his third and fourth OWI

convictions. But the record clearly shows the court did not ignore the gap when it

stated, “[y]our last one wasn’t that long ago. I understand your first ones were

quite awhile ago. But, you know, you tell me you’ve learned your lesson and your

record is showing that you haven’t learned your lesson these past times.” The

district court had discretion to decide how much weight to place on the fact that

this was Radtke’s fifth OWI, committed only seven days after he finished probation

for his fourth OWI, in comparison to how much weight to place on the fact that his

first three OWIs occurred twenty or more years prior. We do not second-guess

that decision and find no abuse of discretion in the way the court chose to balance

those competing facts. See Formaro, 638 N.W.2d at 725.

Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Radtke

to prison instead of suspending a term of incarceration and putting him on

probation, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.