State v. Rump/Rump v. District Court

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 25-1108
Filed October 21, 2026
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State of Iowa,
Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
Josie Rhea Rump,
Defendant–Appellant.
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Josie Rhea Rump,
Plaintiff,
v.
Iowa District Court for Wapello County,
Defendant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Wapello County,
The Honorable Susan Cole, Judge.
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AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED
WITH INSTRUCTIONS
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Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Ella M. Newell, Assistant
Appellate Defender, attorneys for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant Attorney
General, attorneys for appellee.

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Considered without oral argument
by Greer, P.J., Sandy, J., and Bower, S.J.
Opinion by Bower, S.J.

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BOWER, Senior Judge.
Josie Rump appeals from her convictions and sentences for malicious
prosecution, a serious misdemeanor, in violation of Iowa Code section 720.6
(2023), and false reporting of an indictable criminal offense, a serious
misdemeanor, in violation of section 718.6(5). Rump challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting her convictions and claims the district
court erred by finding she had the reasonable ability to pay category “B”
restitution without a hearing. We affirm Rump’s convictions, vacate the
order that found Rump able to reasonably pay the full amount of
category “B” restitution, and remand with instructions to hold a hearing
pursuant to Iowa Code section 910.2A(2).
BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Rump engaged in sexual intercourse with her employer, D.W., on two
occasions in September 2023. Rump thereafter contacted law enforcement
and reported D.W. sexually assaulted her during their encounters. Ottumwa
Police Officer Jeremy Tosh investigated the report and found multiple
discrepancies between Rump’s statements and other evidence he obtained.
Officer Tosh determined “consensual sex occurred” between Rump and
D.W. which Rump “later regretted.”
The State filed a trial information charging Rump with malicious
prosecution and false reports of a criminal act, sexual abuse. Rump pleaded
not guilty, and the case proceeded to a jury trial. The jury found Rump guilty
on both counts. For each count, the district court sentenced Rump to a term
of incarceration for 365 days, with all but 30 days suspended, and imposed a
$430 fine. The court found Rump “is presumed able to pay all category
‘B’ restitution.” The court ran Rump’s sentences concurrently and placed
her on probation for one year.

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Rump appeals.1 Additional facts relevant to her claims on appeal will
be set forth below.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
“We review [Rump’s] challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence for
correction of errors at law.” State v. Brown, 32 N.W.3d 774, 778 (Iowa 2026).
A jury verdict binds this court if supported by substantial evidence—that is,
“evidence sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact the defendant is guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (citation omitted). Evidence is viewed in the
light most favorable to the verdict, including reasonable inferences fairly
drawn from the evidence. Id.
The jury was instructed the State had to prove the following elements
of malicious prosecution:
1. On or about October 30, 2023, in Wapello County, Iowa, the
Defendant caused or attempted to cause another to be indicted or
prosecuted for any public offense; and
2. The Defendant had no reasonable grounds for believing that the
person committed the offense.
See Iowa Code § 720.6.
The jury was instructed the State had to prove the following elements
of false reports:
1. On or about October 30, 2023, in Wapello County, Iowa, the
Defendant reported or caused to be reported false information to a law
enforcement authority, or the Defendant reported the alleged occurrence
of a criminal act; and
1 Rump’s appellate counsel petitioned for a writ of certiorari to invoke appellate
jurisdiction to address her claim regarding category “B” restitution, which the supreme
court granted.

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2. The Defendant knew the information was false, or the
Defendant knew the act did not occur; and
3. The Defendant reported a crime of sexual assault, which is an
aggravated misdemeanor or felony offense.
See id. § 718.6(5).
Rump challenges the element of each offense requiring proof she knew
her report was false and D.W. had not committed any offense. According to
Rump, “[t]here were reasonable grounds for Rump to believe [D.W.]
committed a criminal offense.” She further states, “Because both Rump and
[D.W.] testified two sexual acts occurred, the question in this case centers
around what acts were consented to and how consent was obtained.” And she
claims, “There was not substantial evidence to find Rump had a conscious
awareness the information she provided to law enforcement was false.” We
address these claims together, and for the following reasons, we find them to
be unpersuasive.
Here, the evidence in the record belies Rump’s claim the sexual
contact was not consensual. Both sexual encounters took place at Rump’s
apartment, after Rump invited D.W. in. On the evening of the first encounter,
video evidence shows Rump embracing and cuddling with D.W. outside a bar.
After they left the bar together, the video shows D.W. walking Rump to her
apartment; the pair are touching and walking close together. Another video
shows Rump requesting and receiving a backrub from D.W. at their
workplace. Specifically related to the second sexual encounter, Rump told
Officer Tosh she “agreed” to have D.W. over because he told her it would be
“rude” for her to not invite him over because her dog was not there and D.W.
was allergic to her dog. Rump told Officer Tosh she “put up two condoms on
the dresser as an implication of the fact that [D.W.] needed to use a condom.”
Rump also reported D.W. came to her apartment a third time to help her with

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a presentation. D.W. tried to rub Rump’s back, but it was clear to him Rump
was “stressed from her project she was working on.” D.W. eventually left
without any sexual contact occurring.
Rump told Officer Tosh her coworker, A.G., had confided with her that
D.W. “propositioned [A.G.] for sex with money.” Officer Tosh then spoke to
A.G., who denied Rump’s statement and further reported D.W. had never
made her feel uncomfortable. A.G. further stated she “thought [Rump’s and
D.W.’s interactions were] consensual sex that was kind of getting awkward
because of the workplace.” Similarly, another coworker, S.H., told Officer
Tosh she had never been made to feel uncomfortable by D.W. at work, and
“actually [Rump] made people feel uncomfortable because of her side
business” selling women’s sex toys.
Officer Tosh also spoke with R.K., the office manager. R.K. was
already “aware of what was going and [had been] documenting everything.”
R.K. reported Rump “did not at one point make it seem like it was not
consensual,” and rather, “[s]he had just made it seem like it was consensual
sex between the two of them that was just getting awkward because of the
workplace . . . , and because of the fact that he was her boss.” R.K. testified
Rump prior to contacting law enforcement “demanded to be paid out a year’s
salary” and “wanted a nondisclosure agreement signed by [D.W.] to protect
her [side] business interest.” R.K. declined her request for a payout, and
Rump was upset. Rump told R.K. she would request a pregnancy or a
sexually-transmitted-disease test believing she “could have a better chance of
wage payout if there was a ding on [her] medical record.”
Officer Tosh reviewed Facebook messages and audio clips between
Rump and a friend during the period of sexual encounters, in which Rump

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discussed her relationship with D.W. These messages are part of our record
on review. The morning after the second encounter, Rump told her friend:
I’d been very in my head about, okay, I understand its limerence, but was
[the first sexual encounter] that good, or was I that drunk, or was it
limerence-y. So . . . I was feeling some sort of ways, and [my dog] stayed at
my mom’s house and [D.W.]’s allergic to dogs, so I was like fuck it, this
will happen one more time. Told him where to park. I was like now or
never. We did it. It was not the best I’ve ever had, but it was not bad. It was
okay.
Rump then told her friend she felt like she had “scratched that itch and
got it out of [her] system.” Rump admitted, “I’m doing something wrong,”
because D.W. was married and they could “get caught.” She then described
the “dilemma” she was having because although she was “not in love” with
D.W., he was “charming” and “silly,” and they were “very similar.” Rump
also stated, “I feel like I have the upper hand in this situation because I don’t
want it as much as he does, but I also feel like that could end up being a
problem especially if I go back to scribing full-time, so I don’t know we’ll just
see how it goes.” Rump continued, “I have a dark side to me that I’ve tucked
away that knows how to manipulate, that knows how to be the victim, that
knows how to place blame, that knows how to be a narcissist . . . .” Rump sent
her friend a picture of a mirror in her apartment on which she had written, “I
am too over qualified to be anyone’s mistress.” Officer Tosh determined the
messages contradicted Rump’s reports and led him to conclude “[Rump] had
consensually had sex with [D.W.] two times.”
The jury also heard Rump’s testimony that on the evening of the first
encounter, D.W. “insisted on walking [her] home” from the bar, where he
forced himself inside. Rump testified she allowed D.W. to “lick” her, but then
she “woke up to him” “inside” her. Then she took him back to his car. As for

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the second encounter, Rump testified she felt obligated to invite D.W. over
because her “employment was on the line.”
“While [Rump] has an alternative explanation for the evidence, the
jury was not required to accept [her] version of the events.” State v. Jones,
967 N.W.2d 336, 343 (Iowa 2021) (cleaned up). “The function of the jury is
to weigh the evidence and place credibility where it belongs.” State v.
Shanahan, 712 N.W.2d 121, 135 (Iowa 2006) (cleaned up). In doing so, the
jury was free to accept or reject any of Rump’s testimony. Id. Here, the jury
weighed the evidence and determined Rump knew her report was false and
D.W. had not committed a sexual assault. Substantial evidence supports the
jury’s findings. We affirm on this issue.
RESTITUTION
Rump also claims the district court erred by finding she had the
reasonable ability to pay category “B” restitution without a hearing following
her request for determination. See Iowa Code § 910.2A(2) (providing “[i]f
an offender requests that the court determine the amount of category ‘B’
restitution payments the offender is reasonably able to make toward paying
the full amount of such restitution, the court shall hold a hearing and make
such a determination”). The State concedes error on this issue. Accordingly,
we affirm Rump’s convictions, vacate the order which found Rump able to
reasonably pay the full amount of category “B” restitution, and remand with
instructions to hold a hearing pursuant to Iowa Code section 910.2A(2).
AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED
WITH INSTRUCTIONS.