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FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
Electronically Filed
Intermediate Court of Appeals
CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
27-MAY-2026
08:02 AM
Dkt. 82 OP

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

OF THE STATE OF HAWAI I

---o0o---

GORDON KNOWLES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.
HAWAII PACIFIC UNIVERSITY, Defendant-Appellee, and
JOHN DOES 1-5; JANE DOES 1-5; DOE CORPORATIONS 1-5;
DOE PARTNERSHIPS 1-5; DOE NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 1-5; and
DOE GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES 1-5, Defendants

NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
(CIVIL NO. 1CC181001241)

MAY 27, 2026

NAKASONE, CHIEF JUDGE, LEONARD AND GUIDRY, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY LEONARD, J.

This appeal stems from the award of attorneys' fees to

the defendant after a trial on a two-count complaint seeking

relief for an alleged breach of an employment contract and an

alleged violation of the Hawai i Whistleblower Protection Act

(HWPA). We hold, inter alia, that it is an abuse of discretion
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to award the employer-defendant attorneys' fees in excess of the

amount allowable on the claim in the nature of assumpsit, even

where an apportionment of fees is impracticable, in light of the

express language, purpose, and remedial nature of the HWPA.

Plaintiff-Appellant Gordon Knowles (Knowles) appeals

from the June 18, 2024 Final Judgment Re: Attorneys' Fees and

Taxable Costs Awarded to Defendant[-Appellee] Hawai i Pacific

University [(HPU)] (Judgment on Fees) entered against him by the

Circuit Court of the First Circuit (Circuit Court).1 The

Judgment on Fees is vacated and this case is remanded for a

recalculation of the amount of attorneys' fees.

I. BACKGROUND

Knowles was a full-time professor at HPU. In January

of 2014, Knowles's supervisor, Dr. Carlos Suarez (Dr. Suarez),

learned that Knowles was also teaching at the University of

Hawai i and Honolulu Community College, in violation of HPU's

Conflict of Interest Policy. Dr. Suarez discussed this violation

with Knowles. Knowles replied that he was being unfairly

"targeted" and that HPU learned of Knowles's outside employment

because someone was "stalking" him. Knowles was informed that

HPU learned of his outside employment because HPU looked at

course offerings from other schools, not because of stalking.

1
The Honorable Karin L. Holma presided.

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In June of 2014, HPU offered Knowles a Regular Faculty

position for a five-year period from August 16, 2014, to

August 15, 2019. On October 30, 2014, Knowles sought a Temporary

Restraining Order (TRO) against several HPU faculty, alleging

stalking. The TRO was denied. In November of 2014, HPU received

reports from Knowles about stalking and initiated an internal

investigation. The investigator concluded that Knowles's

stalking claims were unfounded. Knowles failed to attend three

meetings scheduled with a faculty member to address Knowles's

allegations of stalking and noncompliance with HPU policy.

Thereafter, Knowles was placed on unpaid administrative leave.

On March 20, 2015, HPU informed Knowles that they would seek his

dismissal. On March 23, 2015, Knowles again sought a TRO against

HPU officials. This request was also denied.

On June 19, 2015, HPU terminated Knowles's employment,

citing Knowles's violation of HPU's Conflict of Interest Policy

and his failure to attend mandatory meetings. In December of

2016, after exhausting his administrative remedies, Knowles filed

a Complaint in the United States District Court for the District

of Hawai i (USDC), alleging Retaliation under the Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3, violation of

the HWPA, Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 378-62 (2015), and

breach of contract. In response to an HPU discovery request

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concerning the amount of damages Knowles sought in the USDC suit,

Knowles stated, inter alia:

I had worked at [HPU] for seventeen years. During
that time, my 401K had reached $200,000. Based upon my plan
to work at [HPU] until 62, it would have reached a projected
$600,000 (age 47 to 62= 15 years of additional employment).
Additionally, my annual salary at HPU was $62,000. Based
upon working at HPU until age 62, with an annual income of
$62,000 for the next 15 years would be $930,000.

I had to "cash out" $114,619.16 of my 401K to afford
health insurance for my cancer treatments and psychiatric
care[.]

On July 10, 2018, the USDC suit concluded after the

federal court granted summary judgment in favor of HPU on the

Civil Rights Act claim and dismissed the remaining claims without

prejudice.

On August 8, 2018, Knowles filed a two-count complaint

against HPU in the Circuit Court, alleging breach of his

employment contract and violation of the HWPA (Complaint). The

Complaint did not pray for a specific amount of damages. A bench

trial was held on October 30 and 31, 2023. 2 In Knowles's

proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Knowles

asserted that his damages from HPU's breach of his employment

contract were $213,099. Thereafter, the Circuit Court ruled

against Knowles and entered judgment in favor of HPU on all

claims.

2
The Honorable Jeffrey P. Crabtree presided.

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On February 28, 2024, HPU filed a Motion for Attorneys'

Fees and Taxable Costs, requesting $258,818.22 in fees pursuant

to, inter alia, HRS § 607-14 (2016). HPU argued that this amount

was less than 25% of the amount Knowles identified in his USDC

interrogatory response, i.e., $930,000, plus $114,619.16.

Knowles opposed HPU's motion, arguing, inter alia, that an award

of attorneys' fees should be reduced by the $87,116.72 in fees

attributable to the USDC suit. In addition, Knowles argued that

an award of fees should be limited to 25% of $213,099, the amount

Knowles sought on the breach of contract claim. In reply, HPU

argued that the fees accrued for assumpsit and non-assumpsit

claims were inextricably intertwined and could not be apportioned

because, as evidenced by the billing records, attorney time was

generally devoted to the litigation as a whole.

On May 24, 2024, the Circuit Court entered an Order

Granting in Part and Denying in Part [HPU's] Motion for

Attorneys' Fees and Taxable Costs (Order re Attorneys' Fees).

The Circuit Court found that the case was in the nature of

assumpsit and the claims were so inextricably intertwined that it

was impracticable to apportion them between the assumpsit and

non-assumpsit claims. Based on HRS § 607-14 (only), the Circuit

Court awarded attorneys' fees to HPU in the amount of

$180,583.50. Knowles timely filed a notice of appeal.

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II. POINT OF ERROR

Knowles raises a single point of error on appeal,

arguing that the Circuit Court erred when it awarded HPU's

attorneys' fees in the amount of $180,583.50.

III. APPLICABLE STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the Circuit Court's grant or denial of

attorneys' fees for an abuse of discretion. Kahala Royal Corp.

v. Goodsill Anderson Quinn & Stifel, 113 Hawai i 251, 266, 151

P.3d 732, 747 (2007). "A court abuses its discretion if it

clearly exceeded the bounds of reason or disregarded rules or

principles of law or practice[.]" State v. Enos, 147 Hawai i

150, 163, 465 P.3d 597, 610 (2020).

IV. DISCUSSION

It is well-established that under the American Rule,

each party is generally responsible for his or her own attorneys'

fees. Cowan v. Exclusive Resorts PBL1, LLC, 156 Hawai i 268,

273, 574 P.3d 288, 293 (2025). Attorneys' fees are shifted to

the losing party only when authorized by statute, court rule,

agreement, or case law. Id. HRS § 607-14 provides, in relevant

part:
In all the courts, in all actions in the nature of
assumpsit and in all actions on a promissory note or other
contract in writing that provides for an attorney's fee,
there shall be taxed as attorneys' fees, to be paid by the
losing party and to be included in the sum for which
execution may issue, a fee that the court determines to be
reasonable[.] The court shall then tax attorneys' fees,
which the court determines to be reasonable, to be paid by
the losing party; provided that this amount shall not exceed
twenty-five per cent of the judgment . . . and upon the
amount sued for if the defendant obtains judgment.

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Assumpsit is "a common law form of action which allows

for the recovery of damages for non-performance of a contract,

either express or implied, written or verbal, as well as quasi

contractual obligations." TSA Int'l Ltd. v. Shimizu Corp., 92

Hawai i 243, 264, 990 P.2d 713, 734 (1999) (quoting Schulz v.

Honsador, 67 Haw. 433, 435, 690 P.2d 279, 281 (1984)). In

determining whether to award fees under HRS § 607-14 in a suit

that includes both assumpsit and non-assumpsit claims, a court

must determine whether the nature of the suit sounds in

assumpsit. Id. "Furthermore, in awarding attorneys' fees in a

case involving both assumpsit and non-assumpsit claims, a court

must base its award of fees, if practicable, on an apportionment

of the fees claimed between assumpsit and non-assumpsit claims."

Id.

To determine whether an action is in assumpsit, Hawai i

courts look to "the essential character of the underlying action

in the trial court." Leslie v. Est. of Tavares, 93 Hawai i 1, 5,

994 P.2d 1047, 1051 (2000). "The character of the action should

be determined from the facts and issues raised in the complaint,

the nature of the entire grievance, and the relief sought."

Blair v. Ing, 96 Hawai i 327, 332, 31 P.3d 184, 189 (2001)

(citation omitted).

Suits that seek damages for the failure to perform a

contract are generally in the nature of assumpsit. See Hong v.

Kong, 5 Haw. App. 174, 182–83, 683 P.2d 833, 841 (1984)

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(rescission and restitution are in the nature of assumpsit). On

the other hand, common law actions that sound in tort are not

actions in the nature of assumpsit. Blair, 96 Hawai i at 332, 31

P.3d at 189. Statutory causes of action that do not provide for

damages based on an underlying contract are not actions in

assumpsit. 808 Dev., LLC v. Murakami, 111 Hawai i 349, 366, 141

P.3d 996, 1013 (2006); TSA Int'l Ltd., 92 Hawai i at 264, 990

P.2d at 734.

For example, the Hawai i Supreme Court has held that a

suit brought under the mechanic's lien statute is not in the

nature of assumpsit. Murakami, 111 Hawai i at 366, 141 P.3d at

1013. The supreme court reasoned that the mechanic's lien

statute was not a common law claim and the statute's remedy, lien

attachment, was not akin to contract damages. Id.

It is undisputed that Knowles's breach of employment

contract claim is in the nature of assumpsit. However, Knowles's

HWPA claim is statutory in nature, based on the following:

§ 378-62 Discharge of, threats to, or discrimination
against employee for reporting violations of law. An
employer shall not discharge, threaten, or otherwise
discriminate against an employee regarding the employee's
compensation, terms, conditions, location, or privileges of
employment because:

(1) The employee, or a person acting on behalf of
the employee reports or is about to report to a
public body, verbally or in writing, a violation
or a suspected violation of:

(A) A law, rule, ordinance, or regulation,
adopted pursuant to law of this State, a
political subdivision of this State, or
the United States[.]

HRS § 378-62 (2015).

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The HWPA provides for statutory remedies as follows:

§ 378-64 Remedies ordered by court. A court, in
rendering a judgment in an action brought pursuant to this
part, shall order, as the court considers appropriate,
reinstatement of the employee or public employee, payment of
back wages, full reinstatement of fringe benefits and
seniority rights, actual damages, or any combination of
these remedies. A court may also award the complainant all
or a portion of the costs of litigation, including
reasonable attorney's fees and witness fees, if the court
determines that the award is appropriate.

HRS § 378-64 (2015).

A claim under HWPA does not sound in assumpsit. Akin

to the mechanic's lien claim discussed in Murakami, an HWPA claim

does not arise from a common law cause of action or a contractual

promise. Instead, the statute imposes an independent legal duty

on employers: an employer may not "discharge, threaten, or

otherwise discriminate against an employee" because the employee

reports a violation of "a law, rule, ordinance, or regulation[.]"

HRS § 378-62(1)(A). And, it provides unique remedies tailored to

its remedial purpose, such as reinstatement to position,

seniority, and fringe benefits. See HRS § 378-64. Notably, if

appropriate, HRS § 378-64 allows for an award of litigation

costs, including attorneys' fees, to an HWPA complainant –

without any reciprocal provision allowing an award of such costs

to an HWPA defendant.

Accordingly, Knowles brought both assumpsit and non-

assumpsit claims. "[I]n awarding attorneys' fees in a case

involving both assumpsit and non-assumpsit claims, a court must

base its award of fees, if practicable, on an apportionment of

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the fees claimed between assumpsit and non-assumpsit claims."

Blair, 96 Hawai i at 332, 31 P.3d at 189. Apportionment may not

be practicable, however, where the claims are "inextricably

linked." Id. at 333, 31 P.3d at 190.

This court has acknowledged that "there is no

prescribed method of determining when claims are too closely

related to segregate them[.]" Porter v. Hu, 116 Hawai i 42, 67,

169 P.3d 994, 1019 (App. 2007). However, the general inquiry

revolves around whether the prosecution or defense of a claim was

devoted "to the litigation as a whole," making it difficult to

allocate the hours on a claim by claim basis. Id. at 68, 169

P.3d at 1020 (citation omitted). Hawai i courts look to the

incident(s) giving rise to litigation, whether the claims arise

from the same common core of facts, and whether "counsels' time

was devoted largely to the litigation as a whole and not

divisible into discrete slivers neatly matching each claim

advanced." Id. at 69, P.3d at 1021. In cases where attorneys'

fees are recoverable on one cause of action but not another,

apportionment may not be required where "nearly every fact in

[the] case relate[s] in some way" to the other claims. Id.

Here, the gravamen of Knowles's claims is that HPU

violated his employment contract and the HWPA by terminating his

employment due to his allegations that he was being unfairly

targeted, subjected to workplace violence, and stalked. HPU

argued that it terminated Knowles because Knowles breached their

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contract by engaging in outside employment and insubordination.

The same factual allegations underlie both of Knowles's claims

and the defense to both claims. A review of the HPU's attorney

time sheets shows that the claims were not defended independently

of one another. Thus, it appears that this is not a case that we

can divide "into discrete slivers neatly matching each claim

advanced." See Porter, 116 Hawai i at 69, 169 P.3d at 1021.

Nonetheless, legislative intent and equitable

principles compel some limitation on the total amount of

attorneys' fees in this case. Looking to the legislative history

of HRS § 607-14's predecessor statute, the supreme court has

stated that "in enacting HRS § 607–17 (and in amending HRS

§ 607–14 to incorporate the provisions of HRS § 607–17), the

legislature's purpose was to place some limit on the amount of

attorney's fees that a prevailing party could reasonably

recover." Piedvache v. Knabusch, 88 Hawai i 115, 119, 962 P.2d

374, 378 (1998). The supreme court noted:
The legislative history of HRS § 607–17 indicates
clearly . . . that the statute was intended to prohibit the
collection of excessive attorney's fees[.]
HRS § 607–17 had its genesis in Act 194, § 1, 1955
Haw. Sess. Laws 171, which imposed a thirty-three and
one-third percent cap, not to exceed $250, on the amount of
attorney's fees awardable in lawsuits instituted in the
district courts on written contracts. In 1959, the
legislature extensively revised the statute to, among other
things, reduce the amount of attorney's fees which could be
awarded, prohibit the collection of such fees unless
collection was provided for by a written instrument,
prohibit the practice of pyramiding fees, and apply the cap
on attorney's fees to lawsuits brought in both the district
and the circuit courts. Act 218, § 1, 1959 Haw. Sess. Laws
146. In recommending passage of the bill which was
ultimately enacted as Act 218, the House Judiciary Committee
stated in pertinent part as follows: ["]Your Committee

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finds . . . that an attorney's fee . . . of thirty-three and
one-third per cent is a heavy burden to place on a
debtor[."] Hse. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 103, in 1959 House
Journal at 617.

Id. at 119-20, 962 P.2d at 378-79 (citation omitted).

The supreme court recognized that the "legislative

goal" of HRS § 607-14, and its predecessor statute, was to

"circumscrib[e] attorney's fees awards where the amount of the

potential judgment is ascertainable." Id. at 120, 962 P.2d at

379. The supreme court concluded:
Just as it would be "inequitable" to deny a prevailing
defendant any award of attorney's fees merely because no
monetary amount has been sued for in his opponent's
pleadings, it would be equally inequitable to award a
prevailing defendant attorney's fees in an amount nearly
twice that which the plaintiff could have recovered had he
or she prevailed. Where, as here, the maximum possible
judgment is capable of determination, it should serve as a
limit on the amount of the defendant's attorney's fees
pursuant to HRS § 607–14.

Id. (emphasis added).

Here, notwithstanding that Knowles's assumpsit and non-

assumpsit claims are inextricably intertwined, there is a

determinable maximum that should limit the amount of attorneys'

fees recoverable under HRS § 607-14. "The measure of recovery by

a wrongfully discharged employee is the amount of compensation

agreed upon for the remaining period of service, less the amount

which the employer affirmatively proves the employee has earned

or with reasonable effort might have earned from other

employment." Vieira v. Robert's Hawai i Tours, Inc., 2 Haw. App.

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237, 239, 630 P.2d 120, 122 (1981). 3 Knowles's contract ran from

August 16, 2014, to August 15, 2019. Thus, for his claim

sounding in assumpsit, Knowles was only potentially entitled to

"future pay" on his employment contract from the date of his

termination on June 19, 2015, until the employment contract

expired on August 15, 2019. Therefore, we conclude that the

maximum possible damages Knowles could have received based on the

breach of contract claim is determinable.

In addition, we are cognizant of the well-established

public policy behind remedial, fee-shifting statutes. "[F]ee-

shifting statutes are generally enacted to 'strengthen the

enforcement of selected . . . laws by ensuring that private

persons seeking to enforce those laws [can] retain competent

counsel.'" Schefke v. Reliable Collection Agency, Ltd., 96

Hawai i 408, 449 n.89, 32 P.3d 52, 93 n.89 (2001) (citation

omitted); see also Wiginton v. Pac. Credit Corp., 2 Haw. App.

435, 446, 634 P.2d 111, 120 (1981)("Although one purpose of

granting attorney's fees is to make the plaintiff whole, another

purpose is to encourage private enforcement of certain

statutes."). For example, in the context of Hawaii's Sunshine

Law, the supreme court noted:
The main purpose behind HRS § 92–12(c) was to
encourage citizens to pursue claims of violations of the
sunshine law, and an award of attorneys' fees against a
citizen who challenged a sunshine law violation and lost

3
We also note that there is no provision that allows a plaintiff to
recover future pay under the HWPA. See HRS § 378-64.

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would have a "'chilling effect' and deter citizens from
filing HRS § 92–12(c) suits in the future."

Kahana Sunset Owners Ass'n v. Maui Cnty. Council, 86 Hawai i 132,

136 n.4, 948 P.2d 122, 126 n.4 (1997).

The HWPA is a remedial statute that should be construed

liberally to "accomplish the purpose for which it was enacted."

Crosby v. State Dep't of Budget & Fin., 76 Hawai i 332, 342, 876

P.2d 1300, 1310 (1994). The legislative history confirms that,

like other statutes that allow for one-sided fee shifting, the

HWPA was enacted to encourage enforcement of the law:
The purpose of this bill is to provide protection to
employees in the private and public sectors who report
suspected violations of law from any form of retaliation by
their employers.

Your Committee on Judiciary heard testimony from the
State Ethics Commission strongly supporting this bill. Your
Committee agrees that providing protection to government
employees and citizens who are willing to "blow the whistle"
when they are aware of ethical or other violations of law
will help the State maintain high standards of ethical
conduct.

Sen. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 1127, in 1987 Senate Journal at 1392.

Defendants are entitled to only limited fees under HRS

§ 607-14 and they are not entitled to any fees under the HWPA.

It would therefore be inequitable to allow a defendant to recover

fees beyond HRS § 607-14's 25% limit merely because a plaintiff

also asserted an HWPA claim. As noted above, the HWPA allows

plaintiffs, and plaintiffs alone, to recover attorneys' fees in

order to encourage employees to 'blow the whistle' on illegal

conduct. Id. Allowing defendants to recover fees for the

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defense of an HWPA claim would have a "chilling effect" like the

one the supreme court sought to avoid in Kahana Sunset, and

undermine the legislative intent to "provide protection to

employees." Sen. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 1127, in 1987 Senate

Journal at 1392. Thus, we hold that the Circuit Court abused its

discretion in failing to limit HPU's attorneys' fees award to an

amount based on the maximum possible judgment on Knowles's breach

of contract claim.

Finally, we note that, to the extent that it did so,

the Circuit Court clearly erred in determining the amount sued

for in this case – and in turn determining the allowable amount

of attorneys' fees – based on Knowles's interrogatory response in

the USDC suit, rather than, for example, Knowles's requested

damages in his proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

in this case. Upon remand, the proper inquiry involves the

amount of damages sought in this case based on Knowles's breach

of contract claim against HPU, without regard to any additional

relief that might have provided under the HWPA.

V. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Circuit Court's June 18,

2024 Judgment on Fees and May 24, 2024 Order re Attorneys' Fees

are vacated and this case is remanded to the Circuit Court for a

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recalculation of the award of attorneys' fees consistent with

this Opinion.

DATED: Honolulu, Hawai i, May 27, 2026.

On the briefs: /s/ Karen T. Nakasone
Chief Judge
Charles H. Brower,
Michael P. Healy, /s/ Katherine G. Leonard
for Plaintiff-Appellant Associate Judge

Anna Elento-Sneed, /s/ Kimberly T. Guidry
Samantha M.P. Sneed, Associate Judge
(ES&A, Inc.),
For Defendant-Appellee