State v. Jones

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

Electronically Filed
Intermediate Court of Appeals
CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
06-AUG-2025
08:03 AM
Dkt. 57 SO

NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX

IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

OF THE STATE OF HAWAIʻI

STATE OF HAWAIʻI, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
AARON JONES, Defendant-Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT
(CASE NO. 2CPC-XX-XXXXXXX(1))

SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
(By: Nakasone, Chief Judge, Hiraoka and McCullen, JJ.)

Defendant-Appellant Aaron Jones was charged in

District Court of the Second Circuit with operating a vehicle

after person's license has been revoked or suspended for

operating a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant, in

violation of Hawaiʻi Revised Statute (HRS) § 291E-62 (2020 &

Supp. 2021). Jones demanded a jury trial. He appeals from the

Circuit Court of the Second Circuit's March 10, 2023 order
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denying his motion to dismiss. 1 In this interlocutory appeal,

Jones contends the circuit court (1) lacked jurisdiction and

(2) erred in determining the complaint need not include whether

he was represented by counsel or waived his right to counsel in

proceedings related to his prior convictions.

Upon careful review of the record and the briefs

submitted by the parties and having given due consideration to

the issues raised and the arguments advanced, we resolve the

points of error as discussed below, and affirm.

(1) Jones contends the circuit court lacked

jurisdiction over this case because Plaintiff-Appellee State of

Hawai‘i (State) failed to file another complaint in circuit court

after he demanded a jury trial in district court.

The Hawai‘i Supreme Court addressed this issue in State

v. Bautista, holding "[n]o rule requires the State to file a

second complaint in circuit court" and "[t]here is no basis in

Hawai‘i law to conclude that the circuit court lacked subject

matter jurisdiction." State v. Bautista, 153 Hawai‘i 284, 290,

535 P.3d 1029, 1035 (2023). Based on the supreme court's

holding in Bautista, Jones' jurisdictional challenge lacks

support. See 153 Hawai‘i at 290, 535 P.3d at 1035.

1 The Honorable Kirstin M. Hamman presided.

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(2) Jones also contends the circuit court erred in

determining the complaint sufficiently alleged the charged

offense. Jones argues the complaint was defective because

"[t]he failure to plead essential facts about whether [he] was

represented by counsel at the time of his prior conviction is a

failure to plead an element" of HRS § 291E-62.

HRS § 291E-62 prohibits operating a vehicle after a

person's license has been revoked or suspended for operating a

vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant. As relevant to

this appeal, HRS § 291E-62(c)(3) provides for certain penalties

if there are two or more convictions under this section within

five years of the current offense:

(c) Any person convicted of violating this section shall be
sentenced as follows without possibility of probation or
suspension of sentence:

. . . .

(3) For an offense that occurs within five years of
two or more prior convictions for offenses under this
section . . . :

(A) One year imprisonment;

(B) A $2,000 fine, to be deposited into the
state drug and alcohol toxicology testing
laboratory special fund;

(C) Permanent revocation of the person's
license and privilege to operate a vehicle; and

(D) Loss of the privilege to operate a vehicle
equipped with an ignition interlock device, if
applicable.

HRS § 291E-62(c)(3) (formatting altered and emphasis added).

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The two or more prior convictions "are attendant

circumstances and an essential offense element that must be

alleged in the charging instrument in order to impose the

enhanced penalties for repeat offenders under HRS § 291E-62."

State v. Bryan, 124 Hawai‘i 404, 414, 245 P.3d 477, 487

(App. 2010).

The charging instrument in this case included the

language of two or more prior convictions as required:

That on or about the 29th day of April, 2022, in the
Division of Wailuku, County of Maui, State of Hawaii, AARON
JONES, having been convicted two or more times within a
five-year period of the instant offense for Operating a
Vehicle After License and Privilege Have Been Suspended or
Revoked For Operating a Vehicle Under the Influence of an
Intoxicant (Hawaii Revised Statute Section 291E-62), whose
license and privilege to operate a vehicle had been
revoked, suspended or otherwise restricted pursuant to
Section 291E-62 or Part III of Chapter 291E or Section
291E-61 or 291E-61.5 or Part VII or XIV of Chapter 286 or
Section 200-81, 291-4, 291-4.4, 291-4.5 or 291-7 of the
Hawaii Revised Statutes, did intentionally, knowingly or
recklessly operate and/or assume actual physical control of
a vehicle on a public way, street, road or highway, while
his license or privilege to operate a vehicle remains
suspended or revoked, thereby committing the offense of
Operating a Vehicle After License and Privilege Have Been
Suspended or Revoked For Operating a Vehicle Under the
Influence of an Intoxicant in violation of Section 291E-
62(a)(2) and subject to Section 291E-62(c)(3) of the Hawaii
Revised Statutes.

Jones asserts the State was also required to allege in

the charging instrument that he was represented by counsel or

waived his right to counsel when he was previously convicted.

Jones relies in part on State v. Kamae, 56 Haw. 628, 638, 548

P.2d 632, 639 (1976).

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In Kamae, the supreme court examined whether a

presentence report was admissible evidence to prove Kamae's

prior convictions. 56 Haw. at 636, 638, 548 P.2d at 637, 639.

The supreme court determined even if the presentence report was

admissible evidence, the record was "glaringly deficient as it

does not show that appellant was represented by counsel during

any of the alleged prior offenses of which he was convicted, or

that he intelligently and voluntarily waived his constitutional

right to counsel." Id. at 638, 548 P.2d at 639. The supreme

court, however, did not hold that representation by counsel must

be alleged in the charging instrument. See id.

"[T]he sufficiency of the charging instrument is

measured, inter alia, by whether it contains the elements of the

offense intended to be charged, and sufficiently apprises the

defendant of what he or she must be prepared to meet." State v.

Wheeler, 121 Hawai‘i 383, 391, 219 P.3d 1170, 1178 (2009)

(brackets, internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The

essential elements of an offense are "(1) conduct, (2) attendant

circumstances, (3) results of the conduct, as: (a) Are specified

by the definition of the offense, and (b) Negative a defense[.]"

HRS § 702-205 (2014) (formatting altered).

Additionally, Hawai‘i Rules of Penal Procedure

Rule 7(d) provides that "[t]he charge shall be a plain, concise

and definite statement of the essential facts constituting the

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offense charged." And relatedly, HRS § 701-114 (2014)

delineates facts that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt:

(1) Except as otherwise provided in section 701-115, no
person may be convicted of an offense unless the following
are proved beyond a reasonable doubt:
(a) Each element of the offense;

(b) The state of mind required to establish each
element of the offense;

(c) Facts establishing jurisdiction;

(d) Facts establishing venue; and

(e) Facts establishing that the offense was committed
within the time period specified in section 701-
108.
(2) In the absence of the proof required by subsection
(1), the innocence of the defendant is presumed.

HRS § 701-114 (formatting altered). 2

For determining the sufficiency of the complaint here,

whether Jones was represented by counsel or waived his right to

counsel as related to his prior convictions is not an enumerated

element of HRS § 291E-62, is not a state of mind, and is not a

fact establishing jurisdiction, venue, or timeliness. See

generally HRS §§ 291E-62, 701-114, 702-205. Thus, the circuit

court did not err in determining the complaint need not include

whether Jones was represented by counsel or waived his right to

counsel as related to his prior convictions.

2 HRS § 701-108 (2014, Supp. 2021) relates to time limitations, while
HRS § 701-115 (2014) relates to defenses.

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Based on the foregoing, we affirm the circuit court's

March 10, 2023 order denying Jones' motion to dismiss and remand

this case to the circuit court for further proceedings.

DATED: Honolulu, Hawaiʻi, August 6, 2025.
On the briefs: /s/ Karen T. Nakasone
Chief Judge
Benjamin E. Lowenthal,
for Defendant-Appellant. /s/ Keith K. Hiraoka
Associate Judge
Chad Kumagai,
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, /s/ Sonja M.P. McCullen
County of Maui, Associate Judge
for Plaintiff-Appellee.

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