Sweeney v. Shepherd University Police Corporation et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
MARTINSBURG DIVISION
WILLIAM ROBERT SWEENEY,
Plaintiff,
v. 	Civil Action No. 3:25-cv-161
SHEPHERD UNIVERSITY POLICE
CORPORATION, et al.,
Defendants.
PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
Pending before the Court are: Defendants Shepherdstown Police Department, Patrolman
John A. Jeffries, Patrolman Austin Simms and Chief of Police Michael King’s Motion to
Dismiss and supporting Memorandum of Law (ECF Nos. 6, 7) filed on November 12, 2025;
Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum of Law in Support by Defendants Magistrate Arthena
Roper and Magistrate Vicki D’Angelo (ECF No. 8) filed on November 18, 2025; Motion to
Dismiss and Memorandum of Law in Support by Shepherd University and Robert James (ECF
No. 9) filed on November 18, 2025; and Defendants Matthew L. Harvey, Morgan E. Nick, and
the Jefferson County Office of the Prosecuting Attorney’s Motion to Dismiss and supporting
Memorandum of Law (ECF Nos. 11, 12) filed on November 24, 2025. By Administrative Order
entered on January 5, 2026, this matter was referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate
Judge for the submission of proposed findings of fact and a recommendation for disposition
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). (ECF No. 14) Having examined the Complaint and
additional pleadings of record and after consideration of the pertinent legal authority, the
undersigned has concluded that the Motions to Dismiss should be GRANTED for the reasons
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stated infra:
Plaintiff’s Factual Allegations
The Plaintiff alleges that on October 24, 2023, he was stopped by Defendant James for
“longer than permitted by law”, and then approximately ten minutes later, Defendant Jeffries
arrived, and then Defendant Simms arrived on the scene. (ECF No. 1 at 2) The Plaintiff next alleges
that Defendant James threatened to “bust the window and extricate me out of my property”; the
Plaintiff complains the stop lasted forty-five minutes, and when he exited his vehicle, he was
“attacked” by Defendants James, Jeffries, and Simms. (Id.) The Plaintiff alleges that he was
choked and a taser was used on him, placed in handcuffs, and put in the back of a police cruiser.
(Id. at 2-3) The Plaintiff states that he was later taken to the Eastern Regional Jail “at which time
these officers perjured themselves and the magistrates conspired in a false prosecution against
me[.]” (Id. at 3)
For relief, the Plaintiff “seeks conviction, overturn, record, cleaned $700 in property
damage $50 tow service $25,000 from each individual personally and official capacity $1 million
from each corporation $1 million for personal injury and emotional distress 1 million for false and
imprisonment and punitive damages[.]” (Id. at 4)
Procedural History
On October 23, 2025, the Plaintiff, acting pro se1, filed his Complaint ostensibly for relief
pursuant to Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1) On November 12, 2025, the Defendants
Shepherdstown Police Department Corporation2, Patrolman John A. Jeffries, Patrolman Austin
1 Because the Plaintiff is acting pro se, the documents which the Plaintiff has filed in this case are held to a less
stringent standard than if they were prepared by a lawyer and therefore, they are construed liberally. See Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972).
2 This Defendant states that the “Corporation of Shepherdstown is improperly named as the ‘Shepherdstown Police
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Simms and Chief of Police Michael King filed their Motion to Dismiss and supporting
Memorandum of Law (ECF Nos. 6, 7). On November 18, 2025, the Defendants Magistrate Arthena
Roper and Magistrate Vicki D’Angelo filed their Motion to Dismiss along with their incorporated
supporting Memorandum of Law (ECF No. 8), and the Defendants Shepherd University and
Robert James filed their own Motion to Dismiss along with their incorporated supporting
Memorandum of Law (ECF No. 9). Finally, on November 24, 2025, the Defendants Matthew L.
Harvey, Morgan E. Nick, and the Jefferson County Office of the Prosecuting Attorney filed their
Motion to Dismiss and supporting Memorandum of Law (ECF Nos. 11, 12).
Following the reassignment of this matter to District Judge Thomas E. Johnston (ECF No.
10), the matter was referred to the undersigned on January 5, 2026 for the submission of proposed
findings of fact and a recommendation for disposition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (ECF
No. 14). Noting that the aforementioned pleadings had been served upon the Plaintiff via U.S.
Mail, absent any indication that the Plaintiff did not receive same, and further noting that the
Plaintiff had not filed any response to these pleadings, on January 5, 2026, the undersigned entered
an Order pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1975) directing the Plaintiff to
show cause in writing on or before January 16, 2026 as to why this matter should not be dismissed
for failure to prosecute (ECF No. 15).
In accordance with the Roseboro notice, the Plaintiff filed his response to the show cause
order on January 16, 2026, indicating that he intended to pursue this action (ECF No. 21).3
Department Corporation,’ as there is no legal entity known as Shepherdstown Police Department Corporation.” (ECF
No. 7 at 1, fn1) For the sake of convenience and clarity, the undersigned will adopt this Defendant’s moniker and refer
to this Defendant simply as “Shepherdstown” herein.
3 Because the Plaintiff filed materials that contained sensitive information, the undersigned had the Clerk file to the
public docket a redacted version of the Plaintiff’s pleading. It is not clear that the Plaintiff’s responsive pleading to
the undersigned’s show cause order was also sent to counsel of record, as there is no certificate of service attached to
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Accordingly, on January 20, 2026, the undersigned entered another Roseboro notice, notifying the
Plaintiff of his right to file his response to the aforementioned Motions to Dismiss, and to file same
on or before February 6, 2026 (ECF No. 19). In keeping with the Clerk’s practice, this Order was
sent to the Plaintiff via certified mail, return receipt requested (ECF No. 22), however, the Plaintiff
did not file any response to the pending motions by the designated deadline, causing the
undersigned to issue another show cause order, directing the Plaintiff to file his response to same
no later than February 20, 2026 (ECF No. 23). Ostensibly in accordance with the undersigned’s
show cause order, on February 20, 2026, the Plaintiff filed an “Affidavit”4 (ECF No. 25) which
the undersigned construes as the Plaintiff’s response to the pending motions.
Thereafter, on February 26, 2026, the Defendants Shepherd University and Robert James,
and Defendants Magistrate Arthena Roper and Magistrate Vicki D’Angelo filed their respective
replies to the Plaintiff’s response to their Motions to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 26, 27). On February 27,
2026, the Defendants Shepherdstown, Patrolman John A. Jeffries, Patrolman Austin Simms, and
Chief of Police Michael King, as well as the Defendants Matthew L. Harvey, Morgan E. Nick, and
the Jefferson County Office of the Prosecuting Attorney filed their respective replies to the
Plaintiff’s response to their Motions to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 28, 29).
same. Additionally, along with his responsive pleading, the Plaintiff hand-delivered two thumb drives containing what
appears to be the body cam recordings of the incident subject to the Plaintiff complaint from the Defendant law
enforcement officers who arrived at the scene on October 24, 2023 (there appeared to be four separate body cam
recordings from different perspectives). Although the Plaintiff asserts that “the video doesn’t match the complaint the
signatures under penalty of perjury would be false” (see ECF No. 18 at 1), the undersigned is unclear as to which
segments of the two hours’ worth of the aggregate video recordings “doesn’t match” the complaint”. Nevertheless, in
the undersigned’s view, the body cam footage submitted by the Plaintiff substantially corroborates the statements
contained in the criminal complaint filed against the Plaintiff in the Magistrate Court of Jefferson County, West
Virginia (see ECF No. 21 at 2-6).
4 While the “Affidavit” was signed by the Plaintiff and dated, it did not contain a notary seal or indicate that it was
notarized.
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Consequently, this matter is fully briefed and ready for resolution.
Shepherdstown’s and Patrolmen John A. Jeffries’s and Austin Simms’s,
and Chief of Police Michael King’s Argument for Dismissal
These Defendants argue that the Plaintiff fails to allege facts allowing for a reasonable
inference as to how these Defendants are liable to the Plaintiff; also, the Plaintiff merely provides
naked assertions that fall below pleading standards. In short, the Plaintiff fails to state a plausible
claim upon which relief may be granted. Additionally, Jeffries, Simms and King enjoy qualified
immunity. The Plaintiff asserts no violations or actions against King, who was not involved in the
traffic stop at issue here. Jeffries and Simms argue that the Plaintiff does not assert any violation
of a clearly established constitutional right at the time of the incident, the Plaintiff only makes
conclusory statements. The Plaintiff also fails to allege a Monell5 claim against Shepherdstown,
as there is no alleged express policy or training at issue, and further, such an entity may not be
held vicariously liable for the actions of its employees.
Magistrate Arthena Roper’s and Magistrate Vicki D’Angelo’s Argument for Dismissal
Both Defendants note the Plaintiff’s allegation against them is sparse and conclusory, and
contend that this Court lacks jurisdiction over any claims the Plaintiff has asserted against them
due to lack of diversity of citizenship, and no clear indication of federal question jurisdiction.
Further, these Defendants assert absolute judicial immunity arising out of their duties as
magistrates.
Shepherd University’s and Robert James’s Argument for Dismissal
Both Defendants note the Plaintiff’s allegation against them is sparse and conclusory, and
contend that this Court lacks jurisdiction over any claims the Plaintiff has asserted against them
5 Pursuant to Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1976).
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due to lack of diversity of citizenship, and no clear indication of federal question jurisdiction. Both
Defendants assert Eleventh Amendment immunity from this action: Shepherd University is an arm
of the State, and is immune from suit; any officer of Shepherd University acting in their official
capacity is not a “person” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and also not subject to suit. Further, neither
Defendant consented to being sued in federal court. The Plaintiff’s claims against James in his
official capacity fail as a matter of law, because they are claims against the State; the Plaintiff’s
claims against James in his personal capacity also fail as he enjoys qualified immunity. James
argues that the Plaintiff does not assert any violation of a clearly established constitutional right at
the time of the incident, therefore, he has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
To the extent the Plaintiff has alleged James committed perjury, this Defendant argues that the
criminal statutes do not give rise to civil liability, therefore, again, the Plaintiff fails to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.
Matthew L. Harvey’s, Morgan E. Nick’s and the Jefferson County Office of the
Prosecuting Attorney’s Argument for Dismissal
These Defendants observe that the Plaintiff makes no factual allegations against them, and
only conclusory alleges a conspiracy to engage in false prosecution among the three law
enforcement officers and the two magistrates. Additionally, these Defendants note that even if the
Plaintiff were permitted to amend his sparse claims against them, it would be fruitless, as they
enjoy absolute prosecutorial immunity from the Plaintiff’s claims, given that they were involved
in the prosecution of the Plaintiff. Moreover, the Jefferson County Office of the Prosecuting
Attorney is not a proper party to this suit under State law. Finally, these Defendants contend that
this Court lacks jurisdiction over the Plaintiff’s complaint as it fails to meet criteria under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1331, 1332.
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Plaintiff’s Response6
The Plaintiff seemingly realleges the series of events occurring on October 24, 2023,
specifying that “Officer James of the Shepherd University police” stopped him on a public road
and issued citations. The Plaintiff alleges that he was advised he was free to go, but not with his
“property”; the Plaintiff then alleges that Shepherdstown Police officer Jeffries arrived and “I ask
him to advise James on my rights that they have taken an oath to protect he did not do as requested
they at which point I was talking with Candie Sweeney on phone and requested her to come and
pick up property because they were not letting me leave[.]” The Plaintiff alleges that “officer
Simms” arrived next and the officers surrounded the Plaintiff’s property and about fifteen minutes
later,
RC towing showed up and began positioning his truck in front of property while I
was still inside I moved in to a space behind University Police vehicle 10 minutes
later Candie arrived to take possession of her property I exited the vehicle and
tossed key across street to Candie then I was grab by the throat and choke by James
and grabbed by Jeffries and Simms my arms were held pulls straight out by Simms
on the right side and James on left side James was still holding my neck Officer
Jeffries Tased me so they could handcuff me at this time my property was damaged
on front fender from attack[.]
6 The Plaintiff’s allegations as set forth in his self-titled “Affidavit” are difficult to follow, as they tend to be rambling
and somewhat incoherent. Nevertheless, to the extent that the Plaintiff is attempting to expand upon the allegations
contained in his Complaint, the undersigned notes that any such attempts to supplement the Complaint is generally
disallowed and will not be considered. See Wong v. Guilford County Sheriff Department, 2024 WL 85548, at *9
(M.D.N.C. Jan. 8, 2024), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 5372414 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 30, 2024) ((“[a
plaintiff] is bound by the allegations contained in [hi]s complaint and cannot, through the use of motion briefs, amend
the complaint,” Zachair, Ltd. v. Driggs, 965 F. Supp. 741, 748 n.4 (D. Md. 1997), aff’d, 141 F.3d 1162 (4 th Cir.
1998). See, e.g., Morgan Distrib. Co., Inc. v. Unidynamic Corp., 868 F.2d 992, 995 (8 th Cir. 1989) (“[I]t is axiomatic
that a complaint may not be amended by the briefs in opposition to a motion to dismiss. To hold otherwise would
mean that a party could unilaterally amend a complaint at will, even without filing an amendment, and simply by
raising a point in a brief.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Days v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n,
2019 WL 8619628, at *2 (W.D.N.C. Jun. 4, 2019) (“In order to amend their complaint, [the p]laintiffs may not simply
add allegations to their already existing complaint as they have done here. Rather, they must submit a proposed
amended complaint that contains all claims they intend to bring in this action against all [the d]efendants they intend
to sue. That is, [the p]laintiffs may not amend their complaint in piecemeal fashion.” (emphasis omitted))). However,
given the liberal construction afforded to pro se litigants pursuant to Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) and
its progeny, and because the supplemental allegations contained in the Plaintiff’s “Affidavit” do not substantially
modify or alter the claims alleged in his Complaint, or affect the undersigned’s analysis herein, the supplemental
allegations were considered herein.
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The Plaintiff alleges he was placed in backseat of a patrol car to wait for medical to remove
the probes from his body. The Plaintiff appears to allege that Candie was unable to get her property
back unless she paid for the tow service with cash. After the probes were removed from the
Plaintiff, he “was transported to ERJ I waited unknown amount of time in holding cell until
Magistrate Angelo [sic] I was taken to a hearing room for conference call I was placed at a desk
with complaint form with a bond set amount on it then magistrate told me I have a bond before
any discussion of charges which I demanded PR which she did not hesitated [sic] to grant request
for PR[.]” The Plaintiff indicates that “no officer” appeared at the pretrial hearing. The Plaintiff
states that he requested all discovery later received it in the mail. At that time, the Plaintiff “noticed
officer James filled out a complaint form” and signed it, but the judge’s signature line was blank.
The Plaintiff appears to suggest that a second form of the complaint contained a judge’s signature,
but it was not signed in the Plaintiff’s presence, indicating that it “was false before trial [sic][.]”
The Plaintiff states he tried to contact the prosecuting attorney, Matthew Harvey, and asked that
he review the videos. The Plaintiff indicates that Matthew Harvey agreed to review the videos and
told the Plaintiff that he intended to prosecute the Plaintiff on all charges unless the Plaintiff took
a plea to obstruction. The Plaintiff suggests that the complaints did not match: “officer James stated
upon my exiting the vehicle I came after him and James and [sic] he said he had to deploy his taser
to bring me into compliance.” The Plaintiff alleges that the “Jefferson County magistrates have
continued to violate my rights” and that Magistrate Roper “has a duty to protect those rights which
an oath [sic] to do she could clearly see the documents she denied dismissal and continuance and
advised me if we would’ve went to trial I would’ve been found guilty on all charges.” The Plaintiff
alleges that Magistrate Roper “has continued to Levied [sic] excessive fines against me and court
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cost for challenging the authority of the officers in court.”
Shepherd University’s and Robert James’s Reply
In addition to reasserting their arguments in support of dismissal, these Defendants point
out that the Plaintiff’s “Affidavit” does not comply with W. Va. Code § 57-5-9, and is nothing
more than a run-on narrative that expands upon the events alleged in his complaint. Further, the
Plaintiff made no effort to address any of the legal arguments these Defendants asserted in their
motion to dismiss.
Magistrate Arthena Roper’s and Magistrate Vicki D’Angelo’s Reply
These Defendants reassert their arguments in support of dismissal and also point out that
the Plaintiff’s “Affidavit” fails to comport with State law, and also observe that the Plaintiff failed
to address their legal arguments.
Shepherdstown’s, Patrolmen John A. Jeffries’s, Austin Simms’s, and
Chief of Police Michael King’s Reply
These Defendants point out the deficiencies of the Plaintiff’s “Affidavit” and also note the
Plaintiff did not address their legal arguments supporting dismissal.
Matthew L. Harvey, Morgan E. Nick, and the Jefferson County Office of the Prosecuting
Attorney’s Reply
Notwithstanding the additional allegations asserted by the Plaintiff in his “Affidavit”, these
Defendants again note the Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
and reasserts their previous legal arguments supporting dismissal.
The Standard
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
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662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corporation v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 554, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Although factual allegations must be accepted
as true for purposes of a motion to dismiss, this principle does not apply to legal conclusions. Id.
“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,
do not suffice.” Id. The “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level on the assumption that all of the complaint’s allegations are true.” Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. at 1959.
This Court is required to liberally construe pro se documents, holding them to a less
stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct.
285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976); Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291, 1295 (1978). Liberal construction,
however, “does not require courts to construct arguments or theories for a pro se plaintiff because
this would place a court in the improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest arguments
and most successful strategies for a party.” Miller v. Jack, 2007 WL 2050409, at * 3 (N.D.W. Va.
2007) (citing Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978)). Further, liberal construction
does not require the “courts to conjure up questions never squarely presented to them.” Beaudett
v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4 th Cir. 1985). In other words, a court may not construct
legal argument for a plaintiff. Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411 (7th Cir.1993). Finally, the
requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the
pleadings to allege facts which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court.
Weller v. Department of Social Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990)). Where a pro se Complaint
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can be remedied by an amendment, however, the District Court may not dismiss the Complaint
with prejudice, but must permit the amendment. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 34, 112 S.Ct.
1728, 1734, 118 L.Ed.2d 340 (1992); also see Goode v. Central Va. Legal Aide Society, Inc., 807
F.3d 619 (4 th Cir. 2015).
Discussion
As an initial matter, as observed by each of the Defendants herein, the Plaintiff does not
dispute or even respond to their legal arguments concerning the pleading standards endorsed under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and long-standing jurisprudence; the Plaintiff neither
responds nor addresses the Defendants’ asserted immunities that bars their liabilities from this
action and/or precludes them from being sued; the Plaintiff neither responds nor addresses the
Defendants’ arguments that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the Plaintiff’s claims.
Instead, the Plaintiff merely rehashed his threadbare claims from his Complaint, including his
conclusory statements of some wrong(s) committed against him. To that extent, the undersigned
finds that the Plaintiff’s silence on these issues can be construed as a concession to the Defendants’
arguments. Intercarrier Communications, LLC v. Kik Interactive, Inc., 2013 WL 4061259, at *3
(E.D. Va. Aug. 9, 2013) (citing Cureton v. U.S. Marshal Serv., 322 F. Supp. 2d 23, 27 (D.D.C.
2004) (“When a plaintiff files a response to a motion to dismiss but fails to address certain
arguments made by the defendant, the court may treat those arguments as conceded, even when
the result is dismissal of the case.”); see Chamblee v. Old Dominion Sec. Co., L.L.C., 2014 WL
1415095, at *8 (E.D. Va. Apr. 10, 2014) (“[Plaintiff] did not respond to the arguments made by
any of the defendants with regards to Counts IX and X. As a result, [Plaintiff] abandoned these
claims.”); see also, Victoria v. Kimbrell, 2025 WL 2022704, at *3 (D.S.C. Jun. 17, 2025) (pro se
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plaintiff failed to respond to defendants’ arguments for granting summary judgment in their favor
found to concede summary judgment appropriate), report and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL
2021776 (D.S.C. Jul. 18, 2025).
The undersigned also finds that the Plaintiff’s filings are largely incoherent, rambling, and
difficult to comprehend. It is difficult to decipher the Plaintiff’s exact claims. As noted supra,
although this Court must liberally construe pro se filings, the Court is not required to make
arguments on behalf of the Plaintiff. Nevertheless, to the extent the Plaintiff seeks relief under
Section 1983, it is noted that Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a remedy for violations of all “rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws [of the United States].” Thus,
Section 1983 provides a “broad remedy for violations of federally protected civil rights.” Monell
v. Dep’t of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 685 (1978). Generally speaking to state and prevail upon
a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must prove that (1) a person acting under color of State
law (2) committed an act which deprived him of an alleged right, privilege or immunity protected
by the Constitution or laws of the United States.
1. 	Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction:
The Plaintiff sues numerous officials and entities ostensibly for a garden variety of torts,
including property damage, personal injury, and emotional distress that stem from his arrest and
eventual prosecution of traffic and presumably other offenses arising out of an incident in October
2023 on the campus of Shepherd University (See ECF No. 1 at 4). Assuming that the Plaintiff is
alleging common torts as the basis for this lawsuit, this Court cannot consider these claims under
its supplemental jurisdiction because the Plaintiff has failed to state any other claim for which
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relief can be granted over which the Court has original jurisdiction for the reasons set forth, infra.7
To that extent, the undersigned notes that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction
that are empowered to consider cases authorized by Article III of the United States Constitution
and statutes enacted by Congress. Bender v. Williamsport Area School District, 475 U.S. 534, 541,
106 S.Ct. 1326, 1331, 89 L.Ed.2d 501 (1986). Title 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332 provide that the
Federal Courts have jurisdiction over cases involving federal questions and diversity of citizenship.
Title 28 U.S.C. §1331 provides that “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Title 28 U.S.C. §1332
provides that the District Courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter
in controversy (1) exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interests or costs, and (2) is
between citizens of different states. 28 U.S.C. §1332(a)(1).
As observed by the Defendants herein, there simply is no evidence that the claims raised
in the Plaintiff’s complaint fulfill the requirements for diversity jurisdiction: the Plaintiff explicitly
alleges that all the Defendants reside or are situated in West Virginia, as does he. (ECF No. 1 at 3-
4) Section 1332 requires complete diversity of citizenship between the adverse parties. See Owen
Equip., & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373, 98 S.Ct. 2396, 57 L.Ed.2d 274(1978).
“[D]iversity jurisdiction does not exist unless each defendant is a citizen of a different State from
each plaintiff.” Id.; see also, Wisconsin Dept. Of Corrections v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 388, 118
S.Ct. 2047, 2052, 141 L.Ed.2d 364 (1998) (“A case falls within the federal district court’s
7 The District Court has supplemental jurisdiction over State law claims “that are so related to claims in the action
within [the District Court’s] original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III
of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). “[T]he federal claim must have sufficient substance to confer
subject matter jurisdiction on the court. The state and federal claims must derive from a common nucleus of operative
facts.” United Mineworkers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 718, 725, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1138, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966)
(citation omitted).
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‘original’ diversity ‘jurisdiction’ only if diversity of citizenship among the parties is complete, i.e.,
only if there is no plaintiff and no defendant who are citizens of the same State.”). “The statute
establishing diversity jurisdiction is to be strictly construed and all doubts are to be resolved against
federal jurisdiction.” Frontier Energy Corp. v. Broda, 882 F. Supp. 82, 85 (N.D.W. Va. 1995). For
purposes of diversity jurisdiction, an individual’s citizenship has been equated to the place of
domicile. See Linville v. Price, 572 F. Supp. 345 (S.D.W. Va. 1983). Accordingly, this Court
cannot exercise diversity jurisdiction over this matter.
To the extent the Plaintiff is alleging this Court has jurisdiction under Section 1331, the
undersigned notes that the Plaintiff does not specify what federal question is being raised here, let
alone what constitutional rights the Plaintiff alleges had been violated by the Defendants. However
unartfully plead, the Court can only presume that the Plaintiff is complaining about civil rights
violations under Section 1983. (See ECF No. 1 at 2-3)
2. 	Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
The Plaintiff is required to comply with the general rules of pleading as set forth in Rule
8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. That Rule provides as follows:
(a) Claim for Relief. A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain:
(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the Court’s jurisdiction, unless the
court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no jurisdictional support;
(2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief;
and
(3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or
different types of relief.
In this case, the Plaintiff’s claims do not comply with Rule 8(a) for failing to allege sufficient facts
and circumstances showing entitlement to relief. After having liberally reviewed the Plaintiff’s
allegations, it is clear that he is suing numerous defendants ostensibly involved in the Plaintiff’s
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arrest and eventual prosecution in the Magistrate Court of Jefferson County, West Virginia for
traffic violation(s). 8 Regardless, the Plaintiff only provides “naked assertion[s]” which are
verboten pursuant to the jurisprudence espoused under Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Although a complaint need not assert “detailed factual allegations,” it must contain “more
than labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, the
complaint must raise a right to relief that is more than speculative. Id. In other words, the complaint
must contain allegations that are “plausible” on their face, rather than merely “conceivable.” Id. at
555, 570. A “claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
at 556; see also, Dunbar Corp. v. Lindsey, 905 F.2d 754, 764 (4th Cir. 1990) (“a ‘heightened
pleading standard’ is highly appropriate in actions against government officials.”); Hall v. Griffith,
No. 2:14-cv-00091, 2015 WL 13735466, at *4 (N.D.W. Va. Sep. 22, 2015) (applying heightened
pleading to a pro se plaintiff’s complaint alleging claims against officers and finding dismissal
appropriate), report and recommendation adopted, 2015 WL 6454851 (N.D.W. Va. Oct. 26,
2015).
Notably, the Plaintiff fails to allege any factual support for any misconduct by the Chief of
Police Michael King, Shepherd University, Shepherdstown, Matthew L. Harvey, Morgan E. Nick,
8 There is no indication that these proceedings have concluded on the merits, thus to that extent, this Court should
abstain from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over these claims based upon the Younger-abstention doctrine. See
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). “Under the Younger-abstention doctrine, interest of comity and federalism
counsel federal courts to abstain from jurisdiction whenever federal claims have been or could be presented in ongoing
state judicial proceedings that concern important state interests.” Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229,
237-238 (1984).
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or the Jefferson County Office of the Prosecuting Attorney; further, the Plaintiff fails to allege any
factual support that these particular Defendants violated the Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, any
other rights, or committed some tort against the Plaintiff – to sustain Section 1983, or any other
form – of liability. To that extent, the Plaintiff’s complaint against these particular Defendants
warrants dismissal outright.
Similarly, but no less problematic under the pleading standards set forth above, the Plaintiff
relies entirely on conclusory statements as they relate to the remaining Defendants herein:
regarding the Magistrates, the Plaintiff merely states that they “conspired in a false prosecution
against [him]” (ECF No. 1 at 3); and the Plaintiff only alleges that the Defendant “officers” (it is
not known exactly who the Plaintiff is referring to, though it can be assumed the Plaintiff intended
to allege all three officers who were on the scene per the Plaintiff’s Complaint) also “conspired”
with the Magistrates and that they “perjured themselves” (Id.). Due to the lack of any factual
allegations to substantiate any claims of wrongdoing or misconduct, the Plaintiff’s claims here fail
to comply with pleading standards and should be dismissed.
To the extent the Plaintiff is alleging an excessive force claim9, the only references to this
claim is that the Plaintiff “was attacked by officer, James, Officer Jeff[]ries and Officer Simms at
which time they used a taser and I was choked suffered [sic] injury” (ECF No. 1 at 2-3). This is
the type of “naked assertion[s]” the aforementioned jurisprudence warns a litigant from using in a
9 When evaluating an excessive force claim, the Court should determine whether the force applied was “objectively
reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting [the officers]” at the time. See Smith v. Ray, 781 F.3d
95, 101 (4 th Cir. 2015) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989)). The objective reasonableness standard
requires the Court to consider “the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision
of hindsight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1968)). “[O]fficers are often forced
to make split-second judgments – in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving – about the amount
of force that is necessary in a particular situation.” Id. at 397. Factors to consider include “the severity of the crime at
issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively
resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id.
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complaint. Further, this conclusory statement conveniently leaves out the series of events leading
up to the Plaintiff’s confrontation with law enforcement officers, which is described in the criminal
complaint and corroborated in the very video evidence the Plaintiff himself submitted to the Court
for review: that the Plaintiff was traveling around a traffic gate; that the Plaintiff was traveling
south bound on a north bound one way street; that the Plaintiff admitted to having no driver’s
license and the Plaintiff advised that he did not need one; that the Plaintiff was given a citation;
that the Plaintiff was argumentative with law enforcement officers; that the Plaintiff refused to
cooperate with law enforcement officers’ instructions, specifically, the Plaintiff refused to exit his
vehicle when requested multiple times; that the Plaintiff began playing music in his vehicle loudly
while law enforcement officers waited on a tow truck to tow the Plaintiff’s vehicle; that the
Plaintiff put his vehicle in drive and lunged towards a patrol unit (cruiser)10; that once the Plaintiff
exited his vehicle, he approached law enforcement officers in an aggressive manner; that when
told to place his hands behind his back, the Plaintiff failed to comply; that the Plaintiff and law
enforcement officers engaged in a brief struggle; that a taser was deployed on the Plaintiff; that
the Plaintiff then became compliant; and then the Plaintiff was placed in handcuffs.
The foregoing does nothing to advance the notion that the Defendant law enforcement
officers used excessive force against this Plaintiff, or that they “attacked” the Plaintiff for no
reason. Clearly, a simple traffic stop escalated to a physical struggle with the Plaintiff, who nearly
from 	the 	onset 	of 	the 	initial 	encounter 	with 	law 	enforcement, 	presented 	as 	combative,
argumentative, uncooperative, and aggressive towards the officers on the scene, to the point where
10 It is noted that the Plaintiff admits moving his vehicle towards the patrol unit/cruiser in his “Affidavit” (see ECF
No. 25 at 2; “. . . while I was still inside [vehicle] I moved in to a space behind University Police vehicle . . .”).
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the Plaintiff was resisting arrest, resulting in the use of a taser in order to subdue him. Once the
Plaintiff became cooperative, no additional force was used against him. Additionally, the
Plaintiff’s allegations, coupled with the video evidence from the body cam recordings, do not
overcome the Defendant law enforcement officers’ qualified immunity defense. 11 Under the
circumstances presented herein, the Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants James, Jeffries, and Simms
deployed excessive force fails.
3. 	Improper Parties:
The Plaintiff does not address the argument that the Plaintiff’s claims against the Jefferson
County Office of the Prosecuting Attorney fail as a matter of law because this is an entity not
capable of being sued. See, Launi v. Hampshire County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office, 480
F.Supp.3d 724 (N.D.W. Va. Aug. 20, 2020) (plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against prosecuting
attorney’s office fail as a matter of law because it is not the proper entity to be named in a lawsuit).
The Plaintiff has not responded to or otherwise addressed Defendant “Shepherd University Police
Corporation”12, or Shepherd University’s argument that the police department is not a separate
independent legal entity apart from the University, or that it is not a suable entity separate from
the State of West Virginia pursuant to W. Va. Code § 18B-2A-6(c).
4. 	Immunities from Suit:
The Plaintiff also does not address the arguments that Shepherd University is an agency of
the State, and to the extent that the Plaintiff’s claims against its employee, James, are for actions
within his official capacity, that both these Defendants enjoy immunity from suit under the
11 Addressed further, infra.
12 There appears to be no such Defendant, only Shepherd University.
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Eleventh Amendment. Thus, the Plaintiff’s claims against Shepherd University and James also fail
in this respect and should be dismissed.13
The Plaintiff fails to respond to the arguments set forth by Jeffries, Simms, King, and James
that they would be entitled to qualified immunity. The Plaintiff has not alleged a violation of
clearly established law at the time of the October 24, 2023 incident, and the Plaintiff does not
establish facts showing a constitutional violation – instead, the Plaintiff makes only conclusory
statements. Due to the lack of any factual allegations presented here, these Defendant law
enforcement officers are entitled to qualified immunity.14 This Court has explained, “[u]nless the
plaintiff’s allegations state a claim of violation of clearly established law, a defendant pleading
qualified immunity is entitled to dismissal before the commencement of discovery.” Conklin v.
Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 205 F.Supp.3d 797, 805 (N.D.W. Va. 2016) (citing Cloaninger v.
McDevitt, 555 F.3d 324, 331 (4th Cir. 2009)). The undersigned finds that the Plaintiff has failed to
allege a claim of violation of clearly established law, let alone that such law was clearly established
when the alleged misconduct occurred during the encounter with Defendant law enforcement
officers on October 24, 2023. Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s claims against Jeffries, Simms, King,
and James should be dismissed.
With regard to the Plaintiff’s claims against the two Magistrates, once again, the Plaintiff
does not respond to their assertions of absolute judicial immunity. “Few doctrines were more
13 See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,
436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978); see Smith v. W. Va. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., No. 3:23-cv-0746, 2024 WL 4544135,
at *3 (S.D.W. Va. Oct. 22, 2024) (Chambers, J.).
14 When a government official is sued in their individual capacity, they are protected by qualified immunity ‘insofar
as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known.” King v. Riley, 76 F.4th 259, 264-265 (4 th Cir. 2023) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 818 (1982)).
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solidly established at common law than the immunity of judges from liability for damages for acts
committed within their judicial jurisdiction, as this Court recognized when it adopted the doctrine
in Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, __ S.Ct. ___, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1872).” Imbler v. Patchman, 424
U.S. 409, 419 (1976). Judicial immunity does not attach when a judicial officer acts in the clear
absence of all jurisdiction. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978); Pressly v. Gregory, 831 F.2d
514, 517 (4 th Cir. 1987). The doctrine of judicial immunity, however, “attaches even if the act in
question was in excess of [the judge’s] authority.” Jackson v. Houck, 181 Fed.Appx. 372, 372 (4 th
Cir. 2006) (quoting Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 12-13, (1991)). “This immunity applies even
when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly, and it ‘is not for the protection or
benefit of a malicious or corrupt judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is that
the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions with independence and without fear of
consequences.” Id. (adopting doctrine of absolute judicial immunity in Section 1983 actions)
(internal citation omitted). There are no allegations that either Magistrate named in this action
acted outside of their jurisdiction, save for the conclusory and poorly supported allegations set
forth in the Plaintiff’s Complaint. Accordingly, under the circumstances presented herein, the
undersigned finds that the Plaintiff’s claims against Magistrate Arthena Roper and Magistrate
Vicki D’Angelo are barred.
Regarding the Plaintiff’s claims against Matthew L. Harvey and Morgan E. Nick, the
Plaintiff does not respond to these Defendants’ defense of absolute prosecutorial immunity. It is
noted that prosecutors have absolute immunity for activities performed as “an officer of the court”
if the conduct at issue is closely associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process. Van de
Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 341-343, (2009); Further, absolute immunity extends to “actions
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preliminary to the initiation of a prosecution and actions apart from the courtroom.” Buckley v.
Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 272, (1993) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. at 431).
Furthermore, a prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity even if he or she “acted with an
improper state of mind or improper motive.” Shmueli v. City of New York, 424 F.3d 231, 237 (2 nd
Cir. 2005); also see Smith v. McCarthy, 349 Fed.Appx. 851, 859 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 562
U.S. 829, 131 S.Ct. 81, 178 L.Ed.2d 26 (2010); Brown v. Daniel, 230 F.3d 1351 (4th Cir. 2000)
(“[T]o the extent [plaintiff] alleges that the prosecutors engaged in misconduct during the
prosecution of this case . . ., the prosecutors are absolutely immune.”). There is absolutely no
allegation that these particular Defendants were acting outside of their roles involving the criminal
prosecution of the Plaintiff. Accordingly, the undersigned also finds that the Plaintiff’s claims
against these Defendants are barred.
5. 	Not Cognizable and Improper Claims:
The Plaintiff also fails to address Shepherdstown’s and Shepherd University’s argument
that the Plaintiff’s claims against them fail as a matter of law under Monell, and they cannot be
sued under Section 1983. To reiterate, Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides, in relevant part, as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
Id. Local government units are “persons” under Section 1983 and are subject to suit. Monell v.
Dep’t of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). Liability of a local government, however,
must be direct. Id. (“[A] municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employes a tortfeasor
– or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior
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theory.”) (emphasis in original); also see Board of County Commissioners of Bryan County v.
Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997) (finding that a local government is liable under Section 1983
only when “through its deliberate conduct, the [local government] was the ‘moving force’ behind
the injured alleged.”) Thus, a respondeat superior theory of liability is insufficient. Id.; also see
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677 (“In a § 1983 suit or a Bivens action – where masters do not answer for the
torts of their servants—the term ‘supervisory liability’ is a misnomer. Absent vicarious liability,
each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own
misconduct.”) A local government cannot be sued under Section 1983 for injuries caused by its
employees or agents unless it is the “execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made
by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy”
that cause the injury. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; also see Semple v. City of Moundsville, 195 F.3d
708, 712 (4th Cir. 1999) (“[P]laintiffs seeking to impose liability on a municipality must, therefore,
adequately plead and prove the existence of an official policy or custom that is fairly attributable
to the municipality and that proximately caused the deprivation of their rights.”) A local
government establishes a “policy or custom” in four ways:
(1) through an express policy, such as a written ordinance or regulation; (2) through
the decisions of a person with final policymaking authority; (3) through an
omission, such as a failure to properly train officers, that “manifest[s] deliberate
indifference to the rights of citizens”; or (4) through a practice that is so “persistent
and widespread” as to constitute a “custom or usage with the force of law.”
Lytle v. Doyle, 326 F.3d 463, 471 (4 th Cir. 2003) (quoting Carter v. Morris, 164 F.3d 215, 218 (4th
Cir. 1999). The Plaintiff’s Complaint, and other pleadings, are utterly devoid of any allegations to
impose Monell liability against Shepherd University, its police department, or Shepherdstown.
“[T]he Supreme Court has rejected the notation that ‘a § 1983 plaintiff [can] . . . establish municipal
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liability without submitting proof of a single action taken by a municipal policymaker.’” Doe v.
Broderick, 225 F.3d 440, at 456 (4th Cir. 2000) (citing City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S.
808, 821 (1985)). Therefore, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff only alleges conclusory
allegations of municipal liability without alleging any factual support concerning any policy or
custom, any acts of final policymaking authority, or specify what failure to train occurred.
Accordingly, the Plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim against Shepherd University (its
police department) or Shepherdstown.
To the extent that the Plaintiff intends to initiate criminal proceedings against the
Defendants, specifically the “officers” and “the magistrates”, 15 the undersigned finds this is
impermissible. See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619, 93 S.Ct. 1146, 35 L.Ed.2d 536
(1973) (“a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution
of another.”); see also, Hester v. West Virginia, 2008 WL 4298471, at *6 (S.D.W.Va. Sept. 18,
2008) (“no private right of action can be inferred from 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242”) (Johnston, J.); see
also, Young v. Herald, 2005 WL 1048117, * 8 (E.D. Ky. May 3, 2005) (the authority to initiate
criminal complaints rests exclusively with state and federal prosecutors); United States v.
Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 124, 99 S.Ct. 2198, 2204, 60 L.Ed.2d 755 (1979) (the decision whether
to prosecute and what charges to file rest in the prosecutor’s discretion); Inmates of Attica
Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 447 F.2d 375 (2nd Cir. 1973) (finding that the authority to
investigate and initiate criminal complaints rest exclusively with the United States Attorney).
Thus, to the extent the Plaintiff requests that the Court “convict” Defendants or otherwise initiate
15 As noted supra, the Plaintiff alleged that “these officers perjured themselves and the magistrates conspired in a
false prosecution against me[.]” (ECF No. 1 at 3)
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criminal proceedings, such relief is unavailable in a civil action. The authority to initiate criminal
prosecutions rests exclusively with the executive branch, and private citizens have no judicially
cognizable interest in the criminal prosecution of another. Accordingly, any request for criminal
charges must be dismissed.
PROPOSAL AND RECOMMENDATION
The undersigned therefore respectfully PROPOSES that the District Court confirm and
accept the foregoing findings and RECOMMENDS that the District Court GRANT the
Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 6, 8, 9, 11), DISMISS the Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF
No. 1) with prejudice, and remove this matter from the Court’s docket.
The Plaintiff is hereby notified that this “Proposed Findings and Recommendation” is
hereby FILED, and a copy will be submitted to the Honorable United States District Judge Thomas
E. Johnston. Pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1)(B), and
Rule 6(d) and 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days
(filing of objections) and three (3) days (if received by mail) from the date of filing of this Findings
and Recommendation within which to file with the Clerk of this Court specific written objections
identifying the portions of the Findings and Recommendation to which objection is made and the
basis of such objection. Extension of this time period may be granted for good cause.
Failure to file written objections as set forth above shall constitute a waiver of de novo
review by the District Court and a waiver of appellate review by the Circuit Court of Appeals.
Snyder v. Ridenour, 889 F.2d 1363, 1366 (4th Cir. 1989); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 155
(1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 846 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d
91, 94 (4 th Cir. 1984). Copies of such objections shall be served on any opposing parties, District
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Judge Johnston and this Magistrate Judge.
The Clerk is requested to send a copy of this Proposed Findings and Recommendation to
the pro se Plaintiff and to counsel of record.
ENTERED: March 5, 2026.
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