Dye v. Santander Consumer USA Inc. d/b/a Chrysler Capital

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
CASEY DYE, on behalf of herself and
all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff,
v. 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:23-CV-045
(KLEEH)
SANTANDER CONSUMER USA INC.
d/b/a CHRYSLER CAPITAL,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO CERTIFY
QUESTION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA AND
STAY RULING ON PENDING MOTIONS
Pending 	is 	the 	motion 	of 	the 	plaintiff, 	Casey 	Dye
(“Plaintiff”), to certify a legal question to the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia (“WVSCA”) [ECF No. 104]. For the reasons
that 	follow, 	the 	Court 	GRANTS 	the 	Plaintiff’s 	motion 	and 	intends
to certify the following question:
Question 1: 	Can a “debt collector” be liable for engaging,
“directly 	or 	indirectly,” 	in 	“unfair 	or
unconscionable means” of debt collection under
W. Va. Code § 46A-2-128 based on its use of a
third-party 	vendor, 	absent 	an 	agency
relationship 	or 	other 	basis 	for 	vicarious
liability 	between 	the 	debt 	collector 	and 	the
vendor?
Pending 	before 	the 	Court 	is 	also 	Plaintiff’s 	motion 	for 	the
Court 	to 	stay 	ruling 	on 	the 	pending 	cross-motions 	for 	summary
judgment, 	motion 	for 	class 	certification, 	and 	renewed 	motion 	to
compel 	arbitration 	pending 	the 	Supreme 	Court 	of 	Appeals’
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QUESTION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
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resolution of the certified question. In the interests of judicial
economy, 	the 	Court 	STAYS 	ruling 	on 	the 	pending 	motions 	in 	this
matter pending an answer from the WVSCA to its certified question.
I. 	BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
Plaintiff 	Casey 	Dye 	entered 	into 	an 	auto 	loan 	agreement 	in
July 2022. ECF No. 3, Compl. ¶ 16. Chrysler Capital undertook the
servicing rights of Plaintiff’s auto installment retail contract.
Id. 	at 	¶ 	17. 	Plaintiff’s 	agreement 	with 	Chrysler 	Capital 	is
governed by a Retail Installment Contract and Security Agreement.
ECF 	No. 	13. 	Chrysler 	Capital 	provided 	multiple 	methods 	for
Plaintiff 	to 	make 	her 	car 	payment. 	ECF 	No. 	13. 	One 	particular
method 	allowed 	for 	Plaintiff 	to 	use 	a 	third-party 	platform, 	ACI
Payments, Inc. (“ACI”), to pay her bill with a debit card. ECF No.
17. Plaintiff alleges that Chrysler Capital improperly charged her
$2.75 to pay her car payment with a debit card. ECF No. 3, Compl.
¶ 	18. 	Plaintiff 	further 	alleges 	that 	Chrysler 	Capital 	illegally
passes 	the 	cost 	of 	debt 	collection 	servicing 	to 	consumers 	and
upcharges for the service. Id. at ¶ 13.
Plaintiff 	claims 	that 	Defendant 	participated 	in 	an
arrangement 	wherein 	ACI 	paid 	Chrysler 	Capital 	in 	exchange 	for
Chrysler’s 	promotion 	of 	ACI’s 	services. 	Amendment 	5 	to 	MSA.
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Defendant argues that ACI is a separate entity and not an agent of
Chrysler Capital. ECF No. 30. Defendant also claims that Chrysler
Capital does not receive any part of the processing fee charged by
ACI. Tardugno Dep. at 69:15-22, 72:23-73:4, 78:11-15.
Plaintiff’s use of ACI’s platform was governed by ACI’s Terms
and 	Conditions. 	The 	Terms 	and 	Conditions 	state 	that 	ACI 	provides
a 	money 	transfer 	(or 	payment) 	on 	behalf 	of 	a 	sender 	– 	here,
Plaintiff. 	ECF 	No. 	13-1. 	The 	service 	is 	provided 	to 	the 	sender,
Plaintiff, and not the recipient, Chrysler Capital. Id. The Terms
and 	Conditions 	further 	state 	“ACI 	Payments, 	Inc. 	is 	not 	involved
in 	the 	administration 	or 	collection 	of 	Your 	account 	with 	the
Receiver, 	nor 	is 	ACI 	Payments, 	Inc. 	involved 	or 	associated 	with
the goods and/or services provided by Receiver.” Id. The Terms and
Conditions further provide:
“OTHER THAN OUR AGREEMENT WITH THE RECEIVER TO
PROVIDE YOU ACCSESS TO THE ACI PAYMENTS, INC.
SERVICE, 	ACI 	PAYMENT 	INC. 	IS 	NOT 	AFFILIATED
WITH 	THE 	RECEIVER 	. 	. 	. 	ACI 	PAYMENTS, 	INC.
SHALL HAVE NO RESPONSIBILITY OR LIABILITY FOR
RECEIVER’S OBLIGATIONS TO YOU. YOU AGREE THAT
ACI PAYMENTS, INC. SHALL HAVE NO LIABILITY FOR
THE WRONGFUL ACTS, NEGLIGENCE OR ERRORS OF THE
RECEIVER 	. 	. 	. 	ACI 	PAYMENTS, 	INC. 	IS 	NOT
INVOLVED IN THE COLLECTION OF YOUR DEBT.”
Id.
The 	Terms 	and 	Conditions 	reiterate 	that 	“Your 	[Plaintiff]
agreement 	with 	the 	Account 	Provider 	[Chrysler 	Capital] 	governs
Your use of an Account and sets forth Your rights and liabilities
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as 	Account 	Holder 	of 	an 	Account” 	and 	that 	“ACI 	Payments, 	Inc. 	is
not responsible for actions taken by the Account Provider.” Id.
B. Procedural History
Based 	on 	these 	allegations, 	the 	Plaintiff 	initiated 	this
lawsuit 	against 	Santander 	Consumer 	USA, 	Inc., 	d/b/a 	Chrysler
Capital (“Defendant”), asserting one cause of action: violation of
the 	West 	Virginia 	Consumer 	Credit 	and 	Protection 	Act
(“WVCCPA”)[ECF No. 1 at p. 6-7]. Defendant removed this case from
the Circuit Court of Monongalia County, Civil Action No. 23C82, on
May 	19, 	2023, 	asserting 	jurisdiction 	under 	the 	Class 	Action
Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(5)(B). ECF No. 1. On January 23,
2024, 	the 	Court 	denied 	Defendant’s 	Motion 	Pursuant 	to 	Federal
Arbitration 	Act 	[ECF 	No. 	12] 	and 	Supplement 	to 	Motion 	to 	Stay
Pursuant to Section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act [ECF No. 16].
ECF No. 30.
At the conclusion of discovery, Defendant filed a motion for
summary 	judgment 	[ECF 	No. 	56] 	and 	its 	Renewed 	Motion 	to 	Stay
Pursuant to Section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act [ECF No. 94].
Plaintiff filed her motion for class certification on October 14,
2025 	[ECF 	No. 	66] 	and 	a 	motion 	for 	partial 	summary 	judgment 	[ECF
No. 79]. These three motions are pending before the Court.
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C. Motion to Certify
In its pending motion, [ECF No. 104], Plaintiff asks the
Court to certify one question:
Can a “debt collector” be liable for engaging,
“directly 	or 	indirectly,” 	in 	“unfair 	or
unconscionable means” of debt collection under
W. Va. Code § 46A-2-128 based on its use of a
third-party 	vendor, 	absent 	an 	agency
relationship 	or 	other 	basis 	for 	vicarious
liability 	between 	the 	debt 	collector 	and 	the
vendor?
According to the Plaintiff, the West Virginia Consumer Credit and
Protection 	Act 	(“WVCCPA”) 	has 	not 	yet 	addressed 	whether 	a 	debt
collector’s own conduct in designing, promoting, and/or directing
consumers 	to 	a 	third-party 	processor 	gives 	rise 	to 	independent
liability or whether the plaintiff must additionally prove a formal
agency relationship between the debt collector and the third-party
processor. Plaintiff argues that answering the certified question
will be determinative of the pending motions, no controlling West
Virginia 	appellate 	authority 	exists, 	and 	the 	question 	presents 	a
matter of sufficient public importance to warrant the Supreme Court
of Appeals’ consideration.
The Defendant opposes certification [ECF No. 106]. Defendant
contests Plaintiff’s assertions that certification is necessary or
appropriate. 	First, 	Defendant 	argues 	that 	its 	renewed 	FAA 	motion
to 	compel 	arbitration 	should 	be 	decided 	first. 	Second, 	Defendant
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argues 	that 	answering 	the 	certified 	question 	will 	not 	be
dispositive in this matter because questions of fact remain. Third,
the 	Defendant 	argues 	that 	sufficient 	authority 	exists 	to 	resolve
the 	question 	without 	certification. 	Defendant 	points 	to 	the
language 	of 	the 	WVCCPA 	statute, 	federal 	Fair 	Debt 	Collection
Practices Act (“FDCPA”) precedent, and separate West Virginia Code
sections that address the duties and obligations of licensed money-
transmitters.
II. 	RELEVANT LAW
West 	Virginia 	has 	enacted 	the 	Uniform 	Certification 	of
Questions 	of 	Law 	Act, 	(“UCQLA”), 	W. 	Va. 	Code 	§ 	51-1A-1, 	et 	seq.,
which provides:
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
may 	answer 	a 	question 	of 	law 	certified 	to 	it
by any court of the United States . . . if the
answer 	may 	be 	determinative 	of 	an 	issue 	in 	a
pending 	case 	in 	the 	certifying 	court 	and 	if
there 	is 	no 	controlling 	appellate 	decision,
constitutional 	provision 	or 	statute 	of 	this
state.
W. Va. § 51-1A-3. The Supreme Court of Appeals has recognized that
the purpose of this statute is “to provide foreign courts with the
benefit 	of 	[its] 	determination 	of 	West 	Virginia 	law” 	and 	“to
resolve 	ambiguities 	or 	unanswered 	questions” 	in 	the 	same. 	Abrams
v. 	W. 	Va. 	Racing 	Comm’n, 	263 	S.E.2d 	103, 	106 	(W. 	Va. 	1980)
(internal 	quotations 	omitted); 	see 	also 	Morningstar 	v. 	Black 	and
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Decker Mtg. Co., 253 S.E.2d 666, 669 (W. Va. 1979). The provisions
of 	the 	UCQLA 	are 	discretionary 	for 	both 	the 	certifying 	court 	and
the Supreme Court of Appeals. Abrams, 263 S.E.2d at 105; see also
Lehman 	Bros. 	v. 	Schein, 	416 	U.S. 	386, 	391 	(1974)
(“[Certification’s] 	use 	in 	a 	given 	case 	rests 	in 	the 	sound
discretion of the federal court.”).
III. DISCUSSION
Certification 	of 	the 	question 	proposed 	by 	the 	Plaintiff 	is
appropriate 	because 	its 	resolution 	will 	resolve 	pending
dispositive motions, which depend upon whether the WVCCPA requires
proof 	of 	agency 	or 	vicarious 	liability 	to 	establish 	a 	debt
collector’s 	liability 	for 	alleged 	third-party 	violations 	of 	the
WVCCPA, and there is no controlling precedent under West Virginia
law.
A. Issue Determinative
The 	first 	prong 	of 	the 	UCQLA 	requires 	that 	a 	certified
question 	be 	issue 	determinative. 	W. 	Va. 	Code 	§ 	51-1A-3. 	The
certified 	question 	must 	“be 	pertinent 	and 	inevitable 	in 	the
disposition of the case below.” Hariston v. Gen. Pipeline Constr.,
Inc., 704 S.E.2d 663, 673 n.5 (W. Va. 2010). The Supreme Court of
Appeals 	“will 	not 	consider 	certified 	questions 	not 	necessary 	to
the decision a case.” Zelenka v. City of Weirton, 539 S.E.2d 750,
752 (W. Va. 2000) (citing Shell v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 380
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S.E.2d 183 (W. Va. 1989). To that end, “certification requires ‘a
sufficiently 	precise 	and 	undisputed 	factual 	record 	on 	which 	the
legal issues can be determined . . . [and that] such legal issues
. . . substantially control the case.’” Zelenka, 539 S.E.2d at 752
(alteration 	in 	original) 	(quoting 	Bass 	v. 	Coltelli, 	453 	S.E.2d
350, 356 (W. Va. 1994)).
Because 	the 	answer 	to 	the 	question 	to 	be 	certified 	will
determine 	whether 	the 	Defendant 	was 	potentially 	liable 	for 	their
direct 	or 	indirect 	conduct 	related 	to 	third-party 	violations 	of
the 	WVCCPA 	without 	establishing 	agency 	or 	vicarious 	liability
principles, it will determine the viability of the pending cross-
motions to for summary judgment. Hairston, 704 S.E.2d at 673 n.5.
The 	factual 	record 	is 	sufficiently 	developed 	for 	certification.
Plaintiff 	acknowledges 	that 	she 	was 	provided 	alternate 	payment
methods 	that 	did 	not 	incur 	an 	additional 	fee. 	Defendant 	does 	not
dispute 	that 	it 	had 	a 	separate 	agreement 	with 	ACI 	to 	promote 	and
market 	ACI’s 	payment-processing 	services. 	The 	questions 	to 	be
certified 	are 	purely 	legal 	questions 	involving 	West 	Virginia
consumer protection and commercial law.
B. No Controlling Appellate Authority
The second prong of the UCQLA is satisfied if it “appears to
the 	certifying 	court 	there 	is 	no 	controlling 	precedent 	in 	the
decisions 	of 	the 	[S]upreme 	[C]ourt 	of 	[West 	Virginia].”
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Morningstar, 253 S.E.2d 666, 669 (W. Va. 1979). Here, there appears
to 	be 	no 	controlling 	authority 	addressing 	whether 	a 	WVCCPA 	claim
under 	Sections 	127 	or 	128 	requires 	proof 	of 	agency 	where 	the
defendant 	debt 	collector 	acted 	through 	a 	third-party 	payment
processor.
The 	WVCCPA 	defines 	“debt 	collector” 	as 	“any 	person 	or
organization engaging directly or indirectly in debt collection.”
W. 	Va. 	Code 	§ 	46A-2-122(d)(emphasis 	added). 	No 	controlling
appellate authority has determined whether the phrase “directly or
indirectly” 	eliminates 	the 	need 	for 	agency 	proof 	when 	the 	debt
collector itself orchestrated the allegedly unlawful conduct of a
third party.
The 	Supreme 	Court 	of 	Appeals 	has 	recognized 	that 	the 	WVCCPA
was 	enacted 	for 	equitable 	purposes 	and 	“must 	be 	liberally
construed,” Harper v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc., 706 S.E.2d 63, 72 (W.
Va. 	2010). 	The 	Court 	has 	dealt 	with 	the 	WVCCPA, 	including 	its
identification 	of 	the 	FDCPA 	as 	the 	“federal 	equivalent 	to 	the
WVCCPA”; 	however, 	the 	Court 	has 	never 	specifically 	addressed 	the
agency 	question 	presented 	here. 	Vanderbilt 	Mortg. 	and 	Finance,
Inc. 	v. 	Cole, 	740 	S.E.2d 	562, 	568 	(W. 	Va. 	2013); 	Tedrick 	v.
LoanCare, LLC, 168 F.4th 154 (4th Cir. 2026)(holding Sections 127
and 	128 	are 	strict 	liability 	provisions); 	Casillas 	v. 	Tuscarora
Land Co., 412 S.E.2d 792, 794 (W. Va. 1991)(identifying situations
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in 	which 	“borrowers 	who 	suffered 	damages 	had 	no 	remedy” 	because
“companies passed financing responsibilities to third parties.”);
Barr v. NCB Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 711 S.E.2d 577, 583 (W. Va. 2011)
(acknowledging 	the 	Act 	provides 	relief 	for 	consumers 	who 	may
otherwise 	have 	difficulty 	proving 	their 	case 	under 	traditional
causes of action).
Most persuasively, the United States Circuit Court of Appeals
for 	the 	Fourth 	Circuit 	has 	recently 	heard 	oral 	argument 	in 	an
analogous 	case, 	Sheridan. 	Sheridan 	v. 	Ally 	Financial, 	Inc., 	2025
WL 	2055556 	at 	*3 	(S.D.W. 	VA. 	July 	22, 	2025). 	The 	Fourth 	Circuit
heard 	Ally 	Financial 	Inc.’s 	appeal 	from 	Judge 	Volk’s 	Memorandum
Opinion 	and 	Order 	granting 	plaintiff’s 	motion 	for 	class
certification. 	See 	Case 	No. 	5:23-cv-616, 	ECF 	No. 	131. 	The 	Fourth
Circuit 	panel 	expressly 	noted 	a 	lack 	of 	clarity 	in 	West 	Virginia
law 	about 	whether 	an 	agency 	relationship 	is 	required 	under 	the
WVCCPA. 	(4th 	Cir. 	Oral 	Arg. 	Recording 	at 	3:09–4:37 1 , 	Sheridan 	v.
Ally Fin., Inc., No. 25-2145 (4th Cir. Sept. 16, 2026) (Richardson,
J.)).
Therefore, 	the 	Court 	concludes 	that 	there 	is 	no 	controlling
decision, constitutional provision, or statute on the question to
1 The Sheridan v. Ally Financial, Inc., No. 25-2145, Fourth Circuit oral
argument 	recording 	is 	accessible 	here:
https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/OAarchive/mp3/25-2145-20260916.mp3.
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be 	certified 	and 	the 	second 	prong 	of 	the 	UCQLA 	is 	satisfied.
Morningstar, 	253 	S.E.2d 	at 	669. 	Given 	that 	the 	substantive 	law
governing 	this 	case 	is 	unclear, 	certification 	of 	these 	questions
will further the purpose of the UCQLA by providing this Court with
the 	benefit 	of 	West 	Virginia’s 	highest 	court’s 	definitive
resolution of the questions presented. Abrams, 263 S.E.2d at 106.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For 	the 	reasons 	discussed, 	the 	Court 	GRANTS 	the 	Plaintiff’s
motion to certify a legal question to the Supreme Court of Appeals
[ECF No. 104] based on:
1. The 	Plaintiff’s 	argument 	that 	this 	question 	presents 	a
matter 	of 	first 	impression 	under 	the 	WVCCPA 	that 	bears
directly on the pending cross motions for summary judgment
in this matter;
2. The Defendant’s counter argument that the WVCCPA does not
state 	or 	imply 	that 	a 	statutory 	debt 	collector 	can 	be
liable 	for 	“directly 	or 	indirectly” 	charging 	prohibited
fees;
3. The recognition by the Supreme Court of the United States
and 	courts 	within 	this 	District 	that 	the 	state
certification 	procedure 	is 	an 	efficient 	and 	useful
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mechanism for resolving unanswered questions of state law;
and
4. Defendant’s 	lack 	of 	a 	persuasive 	argument 	against
certification.
The 	Court 	STAYS 	ruling 	on 	pending 	motions 	in 	this 	matter
including cross-motions for summary judgment [ECF Nos. 56 and 79],
motion for class certification [ECF No. 66], and renewed motion to
compel 	arbitration 	[ECF 	No. 	94] 	pending 	the 	Supreme 	Court 	of
Appeals’ resolution of the certified question.
It is so ORDERED.
The Clerk SHALL transmit copies of this Memorandum Opinion to
counsel of record.
DATED: September 29, 2026
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