Horschak, William v. State of Wisconsin et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
WILLIAM HORSCHAK,
Plaintiff,
v.
STATE OF WISCONSIN, TREMPEALEAU COUNTY,
JOHN SACIA, LENI NILSESTUEN, SUSAN FISHER,
WAYNE DAHL, CAITLIN SOLSRUD, TODD
ROSESSLER, and AUBRA SMEIJA,
Defendants.
OPINION and ORDER
25-cv-429-jdp
Plaintiff William Horschak, proceeding without counsel, alleges that multiple officials
in the Trempealeau County District Attorney’s office and Sheriff’s office discriminated against
him because of his disability when he sought their help pursuing postconviction relief related
to an old criminal case. Horschak also alleges that defendants unlawfully searched for his name
in driver records and law enforcement databases, created a retaliatory internal file about him,
and implemented a blanket ban prohibiting the sheriff’s department from dispatching officers
to help him. The court has granted Horschak’s motion to proceed without prepaying the filing
fee. Dkt. 4.
The next step is to screen Horschak’s complaint and dismiss any portion that is legally
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or asks for money
damages from a defendant who by law cannot be sued for money damages. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2). When screening a complaint filed by a litigant proceeding without counsel, I
construe the complaint generously, holding it to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers. Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 751 (7th Cir. 2011). But even under this
lenient standard, Horschak must allege enough facts to show that he is plausibly entitled to
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relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007). I conclude that Horschak fails to
state a plausible claim for relief because he does not allege facts that would support an inference
that defendants violated his rights. But I will give him the opportunity to file an amended
complaint that fixes the problems identified in this order.
ALLEGATIONS OF FACT
Horschak has submitted three amended complaints since filing this action, each
containing new allegations about events that have occurred since he filed the previous
complaint. I will grant Horschak’s motion to submit a third amended complaint, Dkt. 9, and
treat that complaint, Dkt. 9-1, as the operative complaint. But the third amended complaint
omits some factual context that appeared in previous versions. I draw the following facts
primarily from the third amended complaint, but with additional details drawn from the
previous complaints and the accompanying exhibits. I presume these facts to be true for the
purposes of screening the complaint.
This case arises from an incident that occurred at the Trempealeau County courthouse
on May 16, 2025. Horschak came to the courthouse that day seeking postconviction relief
related to a 2003 case in which he pleaded guilty to a forgery charge. See Trempealeau County
case no. 2003CF0088.1 Earlier that morning, Horschak had emailed district attorney John
Sacia to request a meeting. Dkt. 1-2 (email chain with DA Sacia). After Sacia denied the
meeting 	request, 	Horschak 	followed 	up, 	stating 	that 	he 	was 	an 	“individual 	with
1 In the 2003 state court records, Horschak’s name is “William J. Bryhn.” Horschak explains
that he legally changed his last name in 2018.
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high-functioning autism” and was requesting the meeting as an ADA accommodation “to
ensure equal access in communicating with your office.” Id. at 2.
Sacia did not respond to Horschak’s second email requesting a meeting, so Horschak
went to the courthouse in person. He attempted to speak with Sacia through a glass window
in the lobby of the DA’s office, but Sacia again refused to meet with him. Sacia and other DA’s
office staff made mocking comments about Horschak. (Horschak doesn’t describe what these
comments were.) At one point, Sacia called Horschak “weird.”
After leaving the DA’s office, Horschak left a voicemail with the office of defendant
Susan Fisher, corporation counsel for Trempealeau County. 	Fisher emailed Sacia, who
explained what had occurred. Fisher told Sacia that she would “start a file” on Horschak
because “given his demonstrated persistence today, he may email or make additional attempts
to communicate.” Dkt. 1-8.
Horschak also called the county sheriff’s office to report harassment by Sacia and other
staff members in the DA’s office. He spoke with dispatcher Caitlin Solsrud, who was
“dismissive and unhelpful.” Dkt. 9-1, ¶ 22. While speaking with Horschak, Solsrud accessed
Horschak’s records in Wisconsin law-enforcement databases, including DMV records and the
TIME/NCIC database. She also created a computer-aided dispatch (CAD) entry, in which she
described Horschak as “very agitated.” Dkt. 5-2. Solsrud dispatched an officer, who took
Horschak’s statement about the alleged harassment.
After the May 16 incident, Horschak submitted several requests for records related to
the incident and he filed a civil lawsuit, Trempealeau County Case No. 2025-cv-90, alleging
violations of Wisconsin’s open records laws. On May 20, 2025, Trempealeau County officials
conducted two additional searches for records related to Horschak in the TIME/NCIC
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database. Horschak wrote to the Trempealeau County board detailing his concerns about the
May 16 incident, the failure of county officials to offer reasonable accommodations, and what
he characterized as retaliatory searches of his name in law enforcement databases. Trempealeau
County responded via counsel on June 26, 2025. (Horschak says that they “formally den[ied]
his ADA request” in this letter, but he did not attach a copy of the letter itself.)
On June 29, 2025, Horschak called the Sheriff’s office non-emergency line “to request
police assistance concerning ongoing safety and legal concerns.” Dkt. 9-1, ¶ 46. Dispatch
initially told him that it would send a deputy, but when Horschak followed up several hours
later, defendant Aubra Smeija, a dispatch officer, told Horschak that her office had “orders”
not to dispatch officers to him. Smeija told Horschak to contact the county attorney instead
and eventually transferred him to the voicemail box of defendant Wayne Dahl, the Chief
Deputy Sheriff. Sheriff’s office staff conducted another search of Horschak’s name in the
TIME/NCIC database.
In September 2025, Horschak filed a petition for postconviction relief in his 2003
criminal case. Horschak went to the DA’s office to inspect the prosecutorial file in the 2003
case. DA Sacia “abruptly exited his office shouting [Horschak’s] name in an aggressive tone.”
When Horschak asked him about the prosecutorial file, Sacia denied that any file existed and
told Horschak that he would have to “pay the State for discovery.” Dkt. 9-1, ¶ 65. Horschak
filed a motion in the 2003 case to disqualify Sacia, which a state judge denied. At the end of
December 2025, Horschak proposed a “global resolution” to his disputes with various
Trempealeau County officials, but defendants did not accept the settlement proposal.
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ANALYSIS
Horschak’s 	claims 	fall 	into 	five 	categories. 	First, 	he 	asserts 	that 	defendants
discriminated against him because of his disability. Second, he asserts that defendants searched
for his personal information in online databases, in violation of the Fourth Amendment and
Wisconsin privacy law. Third, he asserts that defendants targeted him for harassment due to
personal animus, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Fourth, he asserts that defendants retaliated against him for requesting accommodations and
for filing lawsuits against them. Fifth, he asserts that he was denied county services without
due process.
A. Disability claims
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) prohibits public entities from
discriminating against, excluding, or denying services to individuals on the basis of disability
status. 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act prohibits programs or
activities receiving federal funding from engaging in the same conduct. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). I
will analyze Horschak’s ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims together, because the analysis is
the same under either statute. See CTL ex rel. Trebatoski v. Ashland Sch. Dist., 743 F.3d 524, 528
(7th Cir. 2014) (noting that the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act are largely “coextensive”).
To state a claim for a violation of Title II of the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act,
Horschak must allege that (1) he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) he was denied
the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity or otherwise subjected to
discrimination by the entity; and (3) the denial or discrimination was by reason of his disability.
Wagoner v. Lemmon, 778 F.3d 586, 592 (7th Cir. 2015). Horschak alleged in his original
complaint that he has high-functioning autism. Dkt. 1, ¶ 5. In the third amended complaint,
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he says that he has disabilities that “affect his ability to process information and manage
complex, stressful interactions with government officials.” Dkt. 9-1, ¶ 15. I will assume that
Horschak is a qualified individual with a disability.
Nevertheless, I will not allow Horschak to proceed on claims under the ADA or
Rehabilitation Act because Horschak has not alleged facts sufficient to create a plausible
inference that defendants denied him services on the basis of his disability. Horschak relies on
both a failure-to-accommodate theory and an intentional discrimination theory. He says that
Sacia and the DA’s office failed to accommodate him because Sacia wouldn’t meet with him
to discuss his 2003 criminal case. But federal disability law requires public entities to offer
reasonable accommodations only if the plaintiff shows that, but for his disability, he would
have been able to access the services or benefits desired. Wisconsin Cmty. Servs., Inc. v. City of
Milwaukee, 465 F.3d 737 (7th Cir. 2006); King v. Hendricks Cnty. Comm’rs, 954 F.3d 981 (7th
Cir. 2020). Nothing in the complaint suggests that the DA’s office is required to meet with
anyone about their past criminal cases, regardless of disability status. So the DA’s office was
not required to offer that service to Horschak either.
As for the intentional discrimination theory, Horschak says that defendants mocked
him and called him “weird,” created an internal file on him, and implemented orders not to
dispatch officers to him. The first two actions are not related to whether Horschak was able to
access county services, so they don’t state a claim for a violation of the ADA or Rehabilitation
Act. Horschak alleges that certain individuals in the DA’s office and the Sheriff’s office were
dismissive and condescending, but he admits that they gave him information and offered him
the services that they were able to offer, including sending a law enforcement officer to take
his statement.
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Horschak’s allegation that employees in the sheriff’s department were ordered not to
dispatch officers to Horschak fails for a different reason: Horschak does not allege facts
plausibly suggesting that he was denied services because of his disability. Horschak says that
he requested police services for “ongoing safety and legal concerns,” and that instead of
receiving services, he was re-routed to the county attorney and the chief deputy sheriff.
Dkt. 9-1, ¶¶ 53. But Horschak doesn’t describe what these “ongoing safety and legal concerns”
were, so this allegation doesn’t allow for a plausible inference that Horschak would have
received police assistance if not for his disability. I will not allow Horschak to proceed on a
disability discrimination claim on this basis, but I will allow Horschak an opportunity to submit
an amended complaint to fix this pleading deficiency.
B. Fourth Amendment and Privacy Act
Horschak asserts that defendants violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment and
federal driver privacy laws by searching for his name in state driver records and in law
enforcement databases, including the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) database. I
will not allow Horschak to proceed on Fourth Amendment claims on the basis. The court of
appeals has held that accessing vehicle registration records or querying law enforcement
databases like NCIC are not “searches” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. United
States v. Miranda-Sotolongo, 827 F.3d 663, 667–68 (7th Cir. 2016); Willan v. Columbia Cnty.,
280 F.3d 1160, 1162 (7th Cir. 2002). An individual does not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in information that is already stored within government databases. See United States v.
Diaz-Castaneda, 494 F.3d 1146, 1151 (9th Cir. 2007)
Nor did the search of Horschak’s driver records violate the Driver’s Privacy Protection
Act (DPPA). The DPPA provides a private cause of action against “[a] person who knowingly
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obtains, discloses or uses personal information, from a motor vehicle record, for a purpose not
permitted under this chapter.” 18 U.S.C. § 2724(a). But the DPPA permits law enforcement
agencies 	to 	access 	driver 	records 	“for 	use . . . in 	carrying 	out 	[agency] 	functions.” 	Id.
§ 2721(b)(1). Horschak alleges that sheriff’s office dispatcher Caitlin Solsrud violated the
DPPA when she accessed Horschak’s Wisconsin driver records while responding to his dispatch
call requesting police services. But it is clear from Solsrud’s dispatch report and from the
transcript of the dispatch call that Solsrud accessed those records to verify Horschak’s personal
information, including his name, date of birth, address, and phone number, so that she could
input that information into the dispatch report. See Dkt. 5-2 (dispatch report); Dkt. 5-3
(dispatch call transcript). Horschak’s allegation that Solsrud lacked a permissible reason to
access his driver records is not plausible in light of the exhibits showing that she used the driver
records to fill out a dispatch report.
C. Equal protection
Horschak contends that defendants violated his rights under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by denying him access to law enforcement services. To
state a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim, a plaintiff must typically allege that the
defendant mistreated him because of membership in a protected class like race, sex, or national
origin. See Bennett v. Schmidt, 153 F.3d 516, 518 (7th Cir. 1998). Physical and mental
disabilities are not protected characteristics under the Equal Protection Clause. See Bd. of
Trustees 	of 	Univ. 	of 	Ala. 	v. 	Garrett, 	531 	U.S. 	356, 	367 	(2001); City 	of Cleburne, 	Tex.
v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985). Because disability is not a protected
characteristic, “the proper standard of review is rational basis.” See Srail v. Vill. of Lisle, Ill., 588
F.3d 940, 943 (7th Cir. 2009). Rational basis review requires Horschak to show that: (1) the
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state actor intentionally treated him differently from others similarly situated; (2) this different
treatment was caused by his disability; and (3) this different treatment was not rationally
related to a legitimate state interest. See id.
Additionally, in certain cases, a plaintiff can bring a “class of one” equal protection
claim by showing that “he was intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated
and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Geinosky v. City of Chicago,
675 F.3d 743, 747 (7th Cir. 2012). Allegations that a government official has targeted a
plaintiff for official harassment because of personal animus or malice may state a class of one
claim. See id. at 750–51 (plaintiff stated class-of-one claim where he “alleged a pattern of
deliberate and unconstitutional harassment, even though accomplished through the relatively
mild mechanism of bogus parking tickets”); Swanson v. City of Chetek, 719 F.3d 780, 785 (7th
Cir. 2013) (grant of summary judgment on class-of-one claim improper where the plaintiff
“identified his specific harasser, provided a plausible motive and detailed a series of alleged
actions by [the harasser] that appear[ed] illegitimate on their face”).
Horschak’s equal protection claims suffer from the same problem as his claims under
the federal disability laws. He says that defendants denied him law enforcement services
because of his disability or because of personal animus, but he doesn’t explain why he needed
law enforcement services other than for “ongoing safety and legal concerns.” I cannot infer that
similarly situated individuals would have received law enforcement services without knowing
why Horschak requested those services in the first place.
D. Retaliation
Horschak asserts retaliation claims under the ADA, Rehabilitation Act, and the First
Amendment. He alleges that defendants retaliated against him in various ways because he
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requested disability accommodations, filed open records requests, and filed lawsuits against
them. A retaliation claim has three elements: (1) the plaintiff engaged in protected conduct;
(2) the defendant took action that would dissuade the average person from engaging in
protected conduct; and (3) a causal connection exists between the plaintiff’s conduct and the
defendant’s action. Fuller v. McDonough, 84 F.4th 686 (7th Cir. 2023) (Rehabilitation Act
retaliation) Harnishfeger v. United States, 943 F.3d 1105, 1112–13 (7th Cir. 2019) (First
Amendment retaliation).
Horschak’s retaliation claims are based on much the same conduct as his other claims.
He says that defendants retaliated against him for his accommodation requests, open records
requests, and lawsuits in the following ways:
• 	They created an internal file on him.
• 	They searched for his name in driver records and law enforcement databases.
• 	They treated him with hostility when he visited the DA’s office in May 2025
and October 2025.
• 	They refused to send law enforcement services to help him.
The first three actions are simply too trivial to support retaliation claims: none of these
actions would dissuade the average person from engaging in protected conduct. The database
searches and the creation of a “file” on Horschak were simply internal actions that county
employees took to document their interactions with Horschak. These actions had no effect on
Horschak, and he did not even know that these things had happened until he filed open records
requests about his May 2025 visit to the county courthouse. As for the alleged hostility from
county officials, Horschak says that county employees were dismissive and unhelpful, that DA
Sacia called him “weird,” and that Sacia “shout[ed] [Horschak’s] name in an aggressive
manner” and referred to this litigation when Horschak came to the courthouse to review
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records from his 2003 criminal case. This is at most mild rudeness or incivility, which does not
support a retaliation claim. See Brown v. Advoc. S. Suburban Hosp., 700 F.3d 1101, 1107–08
(7th Cir. 2012) (“[W]e do not think that being called a trouble maker, a cry baby, or a spoiled
child would dissuade a reasonable person from complaining of discrimination.”).
That leaves Horschak’s allegation that defendants refused to dispatch law enforcement
officers to him. I will dismiss Horschak’s retaliation claim based on that action for the same
reason that I have dismissed Horschak’s other claims based on that action. Horschak did not
explain in his complaint why he needed law enforcement services, so it is not plausible that
defendants’ denial of services was retaliatory.
E. Due process
Finally, Horschak asserts a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause, contending that defendants denied him access to law enforcement services without
giving him an opportunity to contest the decision. To state a procedural due process claim, a
plaintiff must allege the deprivation of a cognizable liberty or property interest. See Cheli v.
Taylorville Comm. Sch. Dist., 986 F.3d 1035, 1038–39 (7th Cir. 2021). The Supreme Court has
held that individuals do not have a cognizable property interest in law enforcement services.
Town of Castle Rock, Colorado v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005) (holding that the plaintiff lacked
a property interest in police enforcement of a restraining order against her husband). So
Horschak has not alleged that he was deprived of any liberty or property interest that could
support a procedural due process claim.
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CONCLUSION
Most of Horschak’s allegations do not state a viable claim for relief, nor could they be
amended to do so. But I will allow Horschak to file an amended complaint to fix the problems
I have identified with his claims based on defendants’ denial of law enforcement services. In
drafting his amended complaint, Horschak must:
• 	Carefully consider whether he is naming proper defendants and omit defendants
who did not personally participate in, or otherwise cause, a violation of his rights.
Horschak must take care to allege what each defendant did, or failed to do, to
violate his rights.
• 	Avoid referring to several defendants together. For instance, if more than one
defendant has taken a particular action that Horschak believes supports a claim,
he should identify each defendant who took that action.
• 	Identify 	by 	full 	name 	all 	the 	individuals 	he 	wishes 	to 	sue 	in
the amended complaint’s caption.
• 	Omit legal arguments other than explaining what types of claims that he wishes
to bring.
Horschak has until April 1, 2026, to file an amended complaint. If he does not do so, I will
dismiss this case.
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that:
1. Plaintiff William Horschak’s third amended complaint, Dkt. 9-1, is DISMISSED
for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
2. Plaintiff may have until April 1, 2026, to submit an amended complaint that fixes
the problems with his claims based on defendants’ denial of law enforcement
services.
3. The amended complaint will act as a complete substitute for the complaint. This
case will proceed on only the allegations made and claims presented in
the amended complaint, and against only the defendants specifically named in
the amended complaint’s caption.
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4. 	If plaintiff fails to comply with this order, I may dismiss this case.
5. 	The clerk is directed to send plaintiff a copy of the court’s non-prisoner complaint
form.
Entered March 11, 2026.
BY THE COURT:
/s/
________________________________________
JAMES D. PETERSON
District Judge
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