Annamalai, Annamalai v. Emmerich, Eric

3:24-cv-00167Wiwd22 dic 2025

Testo completo

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
ANNAMALAI ANNAMALAI,
Petitioner,
v.
ERIC EMMERICH,
Respondent.
OPINION and ORDER
24-cv-167-jdp
Petitioner Annamalai Annamalai, who is incarcerated at FCI Oxford, has an extensive
history of abusive litigation in federal and state courts. Annamalai is seeking restoration of
good-conduct time based on allegations that BOP officials unlawfully disciplined him, and he
is proceeding without counsel. In response to the court’s screening order, Annamalai brings an
amended petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Respondent answered the amended petition, and
Annamalai submitted a reply. Dkt. 30 and Dkt. 50.
The evidence shows that Annamalai directed his son, Ashok Annamalai, to facilitate a
three-way call with the clerk’s office for the Indiana Supreme Court. That call led to an incident
report alleging that Annamalai violated BOP policy by circumventing staff’s ability to monitor
the frequency of his telephone use. Annamalai received ample notice of the disciplinary charge
and, with the help of his personal representative, had an opportunity to contest the charge at
a disciplinary hearing. The disciplinary record, which includes a transcript of the call,
conclusively shows that Annamalai received all the process he was due, and that his violation
of BOP policy, not retaliatory animus, led to the incident report. I will deny the petition. I will
also rule on Annamalai’s other pending motions.
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BACKGROUND
Annamalai was convicted in the Northern District of Georgia of several offenses,
including bank fraud, conspiracy to commit bank fraud, filing a false federal income tax return,
and making a false statement under oath in a bankruptcy proceeding. See Annamalai v.
Emmerich, No. 24-cv-678-jdp, 2024 WL 4625803, at *1 (W.D. Wis. Oct. 30, 2024)
(“Annamalai I”). Annamalai has a projected release date of October 12, 2028.
A. State-law breach-of-contract action
In April 2017, while in federal custody, Annamalai brought a breach-of-contract action
in Vigo County, Indiana against a sole private defendant, Vishal Kalyani. See docket sheet in
Vigo County (Ind.) Superior Court case no. 84D02-1704-MI-2768.1 Apparently, Annamalai
based his breach-of-contract claim on allegations that, “after he was convicted more than a
decade ago, at least 169 persons and entities looted and or sold, transferred, and absconded
with property that [Annamalai] alleges he owned.” Annamalai v. Montgomery Cnty. Treasurer
(“Annamalai II”), No. 24-cv-268, 2024 WL 4599935, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 29, 2024), report
and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 4881269 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 25, 2024).
In 	November 	2020, 	Annamalai 	obtained 	a 	purported 	“final 	order 	of 	specific
performance,” which “consists of [Annamalai’s own] handwritten orders” that were apparently
signed by a “special judge.” See id. at *4; see also Dkt. 18-10 at 4–5. From what I can gather, the
basis of the “final order of specific performance” is the alleged failure of numerous “account
debtors,” who Annamalai alleges stand “in privity” with Kalyani, to respond to Annamalai’s
non-party discovery requests. See Annamalai II, 2024 WL 4599935, at *4–5; Annamalai I, 2024
1 Available at https://public.courts.in.gov/mycase/#/vw/Search.
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WL 3694446, at *1; Dkt. 18-10 at 4; Dkt. 18-12. Annamalai alleges that the “account debtors”
include BOP officials. Annamalai I, 2024 WL 3694446, at *1; Dkt. 18-11 at 5–20. Even though
a special judge signed it, the “final order of specific performance” was described by courts as
“extraordinarily odd” and “nonsensical.” Annamalai II, 2024 WL 4599935, at *4. There’s no
clear 	indication that 	any “account debtor” 	received 	notice of 	the 	Vigo County case.
See Annamalai II, 2024 WL 4599935, at *5; see also Dkt. 18-12.
B. Incident reports at FCI Oxford and disciplinary hearing
On January 29, 2018, Annamalai received incident report 3083231, which was
prepared by S. Cope. Dkt. 18-1 at 2. Cope wrote that, on January 9, 2018, Annamalai
completed an unauthorized three-way call by having Ashok try to connect him with a federal
court of appeals. Id. It’s undisputed that the ’231 report was “dismissed and expunged,” and
that Annamalai didn’t lose good-conduct time based on this report. See id.; Dkt. 31-1;
Dkt. 31-2.
Also on January 29, Annamalai received incident report 3083232, which Cope
prepared. Dkt. 31-10 at 2. Cope wrote that, on January 22, 2018, Annamalai conducted an
unauthorized three-way call by having Ashok connect Annamalai to “Katherine,” a clerk’s
office employee in the Indiana Supreme Court. See id.; Dkt. 31-11 at 4–10. Cope also wrote
that the ’232 report was based on review of a transcript of the phone call, a part of which was
translated to English from Tamil. Dkt. 31-10 at 2.
The same day, the investigator, D. Fayad, delivered the ’232 report to Annamalai.
Id. at 2–3. Fayad noted that Annamalai told Fayad that “both numbers” (his son’s and the
Indiana Supreme Court’s) were on his approved list and that he needed more time to conduct
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legal work. Id. at 3. Fayad concluded that Annamalai had been properly charged, and he noted
that the matter was pending before the unit disciplinary committee for further disposition. Id.
On January 31, 2018, the unit disciplinary committee recommended that the ’232
report be expunged. Id. at 2. But despite that recommendation, due to the seriousness of the
charge, the committee also referred the ’232 report to the disciplinary hearing officer. Id.
That day, Annamalai’s counselor, D. Gladney, provided Annamalai with a copy of the
“Notice of Discipline Hearing Before the (DHO)” form. Id. at 5. Annamalai requested a
psychologist, Owings, to be his staff representative, and Annamalai asked to present Ashok and
another individual as witnesses to show “[t]hat is was not a third party call.” Id. Gladney also
provided Annamalai with an “Inmate Rights at Discipline Hearing” form. Id. at 4.
Annamalai’s disciplinary hearing was held on April 10, 2018. Dkt. 31-11 at 2. The
hearing officer, M. Puckett, noted that Annamalai and Owings appeared and “agreed that they
had met and were ready to proceed.” Id. at 1. Puckett also noted that Owings had reviewed the
paperwork and confirmed that Annamalai’s “due process rights [had] been afforded,” and that
Owings said that Annamalai had asked Owings “to review the materials and help him through
the process.” Id.
According to Puckett, Annamalai’s primary defense was that: (1) the unit disciplinary
committee recommended expunging the ’232 report; (2) both phone numbers were on his
approved list, and he was only calling the courts about his pending cases; and (3) his proposed
witnesses, Ashok and Parvathi Sivanadiyan, would testify that Annamalai did not make a
three-way call. Id. at 2–3, 11.
Puckett denied Annamalai’s request to present Ashok and Sivanadiyan as witnesses
because a certified third-party linguist prepared a transcript of the call. Id. at 3, 11. But Puckett
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accepted that Ashok and Sivanadiyan would testify that Annamalai didn’t make a three-way
call if they appeared. Id. at 3.
Puckett found that Annamalai committed the act as charged. Id. Puckett acknowledged
that both numbers were on Annamalai’s approved contact list, but he explained that Annamalai
had to call those numbers “directly from [his] phone account.” Id. at 11. Annamalai could not
“call one phone number of a family member and have them connect [him] to another phone
number,” which was a “three-way call [that] circumvent[ed] phone monitoring and frequency
of use.” Id. As a result, Puckett disallowed 27 days of good-conduct time. Id. at 11. B. Mathis
documented that Annamalai received a copy of Puckett’s decision. Id. at 12.
ANALYSIS
A. Preliminary matters
1. 	Challenge to ’231 report
In his amended petition, Annamalai alleges that he was denied due process regarding
both the ’231 and ’232 incident reports. Dkt. 16 at 6–7. Annamalai seeks restoration of 27
days of good-conduct time and “expung[e]ment” of the related disciplinary records. Id. at 8.
Annamalai’s challenge to the ’231 incident report is moot. “Under Article III of the
Constitution, federal courts may adjudicate only actual, ongoing cases or controversies.” Lewis
v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990). To satisfy this “case or controversy”
requirement, “parties must continue to have a personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit.”
Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998). A party has no stake in a case when the court cannot
grant any relief that would have a meaningful effect on a party. United States v. Shorter, 27 F.4th
572, 575 (7th Cir. 2022). If a party no longer has a personal stake in the outcome of the
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lawsuit, the lawsuit is moot and the court lacks jurisdiction to hear it. See Lewis, 494 U.S.
at 477; see also Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7.
It’s undisputed that the ’231 report was dismissed and expunged, and that Annamalai
didn’t lose any good-conduct time based on that report. Annamalai has already received all the
relief that he seeks based on his challenge to the ’231 report, so this challenge is moot.
2. 	Pending motions
Two motions are pending. In the first motion, Annamalai asks for: (1) an emergency
status hearing and oral argument; (2) a copy of the docket sheet; and (3) copies of orders
entered since October 2024. Dkt. 55 at 2. In his second motion, Annamalai acknowledges
receipt of a docket sheet from the clerk’s office and withdraws the second and third requests.
Dkt. 57.
That leaves Annamalai’s first request for a status hearing and oral argument, which I will
deny. The request for a status hearing is now moot. Oral argument is not appropriate because,
as explained below, the paper record conclusively shows that Annamalai’s amended petition
lacks merit.
3. 	Challenge to ’232 report
I take Annamalai to challenge the ’232 report on two primary grounds. The first ground
is that Annamalai was denied procedural due process during the disciplinary proceedings for
the ’232 report because: (1) his rights weren’t “pronounced” before the hearing; (2) he wasn’t
allowed to review a recording or transcript of the call; (3) Owings didn’t meet with Annamalai
before the hearing, review the transcript of the call, or contact Ashok and Sivanadiyan;
(4) Puckett didn’t allow Annamalai to present Ashok and Sivanadiyan as witnesses at the
hearing; and (5) the transcript of the call was “corrupted.” See Dkt. 16 at 7–8; Dkt. 17 at 2.
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Annamalai’s second ground is that Cope wrote the ’232 report to retaliate against Annamalai
because Annamalai had obtained the “final order of specific performance” against Cope and
other individuals in the Vigo County case. See Dkt. 16 at 8; Dkt. 17 at 2–3.
a. 	Procedural due process claim
As a general rule, due process requires prisoners in disciplinary hearings to receive:
“(1) advance (at least 24 hours before hearing) written notice of the claimed violation; (2) the
opportunity to be heard before an impartial decision maker; (3) the opportunity to call
witnesses and present documentary evidence . . . ; and (4) a written statement by the fact-finder
of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action.” Scruggs v. Jordan, 485 F.3d
934, 939 (7th Cir. 2007). “[S]ome evidence” must support Puckett’s decision. Walpole v. Hill,
472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985); Smith v. Bezy, 141 F. App’x 479, 481 (7th Cir. 2005).
Annamalai hasn’t developed any argument on the second requirement and, on the
fourth requirement, the evidence is that Annamalai received a copy of Puckett’s decision.
Dkt. 31-11 at 12. My analysis is limited to the first and third requirements, and to whether
some evidence supported Puckett’s decision.
On the first requirement, advanced notice, the evidence is that Fayad delivered the ’232
report to Annamalai on January 29, 2018. Dkt. 31-10 at 2–3. The evidence is also that, two
days later, Gladney provided Annamalai with both the notice of discipline and inmate rights
forms. Id. at 4–5. Annamalai signed the notice of discipline and inmate rights forms, which
refutes any suggestion that he didn’t receive them. Annamalai received ample notice of the
disciplinary hearing, which was held more than two months later. At the hearing, Puckett
documented that Annamalai and Owings “agreed that they had met and were ready to
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proceed.” Dkt. 31-11 at 1. The record conclusively shows that Annamalai received ample
advanced written notice of his disciplinary charge.
The next issue is whether, under the third requirement, Annamalai received an
opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence. I begin with witnesses. The
rule that a prisoner has a right to call witnesses at a prison disciplinary hearing is not absolute.
Prison officials have discretion to refuse to allow witnesses for “irrelevance” or “lack of
necessity.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974).
Puckett denied Annamalai’s request to call Ashok and Sivanadiyan for lack of necessity.
Puckett had a transcript of the call prepared by a certified third-party linguist. Dkt. 31-11 at 3,
11. The transcript shows that Annamalai gave Ashok the Indiana Supreme Court’s phone
number and directed Ashok to call that number so that Annamalai could speak with Katherine,
which Annamalai managed to do. Dkt. 31-11 at 4–10. The transcript of the call flatly
contradicted Ashok’s and Sivanadiyan’s proffered testimony. Annamalai’s bare statement that
the transcript is “corrupted” lacks factual support and doesn’t show that the transcript is
inaccurate or otherwise unreliable. Garlotte v. Fordice, 515 U.S. 39, 46 (1995) (“[T]he habeas
petitioner generally bears the burden of proof[.]”); McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856
(1994) (habeas petitions “must meet heightened pleading standards”). Puckett’s exclusion of
Ashok and Sivanadiyan as witnesses didn’t violate procedural due process.
That 	leaves, 	under 	the 	third 	requirement, 	the 	issue 	of 	documentary 	evidence.
Annamalai received an opportunity to present that evidence. The “due process clause does not
require later consideration of evidence that could have been but was not presented during a
prison disciplinary proceeding.” Jones v. McCaughtry, 6 F. App’x 371, 372–73 (7th Cir. 2001).
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Puckett noted that Annamalai “understood his rights and did not submit documentary
evidence.” Dkt. 31-11 at 3 (emphasis added). The inmate rights form advised Annamalai of
this right, Dkt. 31-10 at 4, so he knowingly forfeited it. Due process does not require
Annamalai to receive another opportunity to present documentary evidence when he could
have presented that evidence at the hearing. Also, even though Annamalai declined to present
documentary evidence at the hearing, Annamalai made an extensive statement in which he
referred to several documents in the disciplinary hearing record. See Dkt. 31-11 at 2. The
evidence shows that Annamalai received an adequate opportunity to present documentary
evidence to contest the disciplinary charge.
The next issue is whether “some evidence” supported Puckett’s decision. The “some
evidence” requirement is quite lenient; sanctions imposed in a prison disciplinary hearing are
subject to the “narrowest judicial review.” See United States v. Kizeart, 505 F.3d 672, 675 (7th
Cir. 2007). The issue is whether there is any evidence in the record, even just a “modicum,”
that could support the hearing officer’s decision. Hill, 472 U.S. at 455–56. “Ascertaining
whether this standard is satisfied does not require 	examination of the entire record,
independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence.” Id. at 455.
This lenient standard is easily satisfied based on the transcript showing that Annamalai
had Ashok arrange a three-way call with Katherine. Even though the Indiana Supreme Court’s
phone number was on Annamalai’s approved contact list, making a three-way call violated
prison policy by circumventing BOP staff’s ability “to monitor frequency of telephone use.”
28 C.F.R. § 541.3, Table 1, Prohibited Act Code 297; Dkt. 31-11 at 1, 11.
Annamalai also alleges that his personal representative, Owings, was ineffective because
she didn’t meet with Annamalai before the hearing, review the transcript of the call, or contact
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his witnesses. I will assume for purposes of this opinion that these rights enjoy due process
protection. But the disciplinary hearing record mostly contradicts Annamalai’s allegation.
Puckett documented that Annamalai and Owings “agreed that they had met and were ready to
proceed.” Dkt. 31-11 at 1. Even if Owings failed to contact Ashok and Sivanadiyan or review
the transcript, Annamalai hasn’t explained 	how these failures deprived him of a fair
opportunity to contest the disciplinary charge. The witnesses’ testimony was unnecessary and
the transcript conclusively showed Annamalai’s guilt.
I will deny the petition on Annamalai’s procedural due process claim.
b. 	Retaliation claim
Annamalai alleges that Cope wrote the ’232 report to retaliate against Annamalai
because Annamalai had obtained the “final order of specific performance” against Cope and
other BOP officials in the Vigo County case.
To establish a retaliation claim, Annamalai must show that: (1) he engaged in activity
protected by the First Amendment; (2) he suffered a deprivation that would likely deter future
First Amendment activity; and (3) the protected activity was at least a motivating factor in
defendants’ 	decision 	to 	take 	the 	retaliatory 	action. 	Bridges 	v. 	Gilbert, 	557 	F.3d 	541,
546 (7th Cir. 2009). I limit my analysis to the third element, causation.
To establish that Cope was motivated to retaliate based on Annamalai’s state-court
litigation, Annamalai must show that Cope had actual knowledge of that litigation. See Eaton
v. J. H. Findorff & Son, Inc., 1 F.4th 508, 512 (7th Cir. 2021); Healy v. City of Chicago, 450 F.3d
732, 740 (7th Cir. 2006).
It’s unlikely that Cope had actual knowledge of Annamalai’s state-court litigation when
Cope isn’t a party to the Vigo County case and there’s no clear indication that Cope received
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notice of any proper third-party discovery request in that case. But even if Cope knew about
the state case, the disciplinary record conclusively shows that Cope based the ’232 report on
Annamalai’s participation in a three-way call in violation of BOP policy. Also, regardless of
retaliatory motive, a prisoner can’t win a retaliation claim for a conduct report given for a
legitimate reason. See Brown v. Phillips, 801 F.3d 849, 855 (7th Cir. 2015). Again, the record
shows that Annamalai received the ’232 report for a legitimate reason, i.e., his participation in
a three-way call.
Annamalai says that Annamalai’s counselor, Gary Burgess, told Annamalai that Cope
wrote the ’232 incident report because the ’231 report was dismissed. Dkt. 17 at 2. The
disciplinary record also contradicts this bare statement, which in any case is inconsistent with
Annamalai’s claim that Cope wrote the ’232 report because of his state-court litigation. I will
deny the petition on Annamalai’s retaliation claim.
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that:
1. 	Petitioner Annamalai Annamalai’s amended petition, Dkt. 16, is DENIED.
2. 	Petitioner’s emergency motion for status hearing and oral argument with request for
docket sheet, Dkt. 55, is DENIED.
3. 	Petitioner’s verified motion to amend his emergency motion, Dkt. 57, is GRANTED
solely to amend the emergency motion but otherwise DENIED.
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4. 	The clerk of court is directed to enter judgment and close the case.
Entered December 22, 2025.
BY THE COURT:
/s/
________________________________________
JAMES D. PETERSON
District Judge
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