Nate A. Lindell v. Ashley Suprise

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
NATE A. LINDELL,
Plaintiff,
v.
LARRY FUCHS, et al.,
Defendants.
OPINION and ORDER
23-cv-805-amb
Plaintiff Nate A. Lindell, a state prisoner representing himself, alleges that a correctional
officer at Columbia Correctional Institution, Ashley Suprise, sexually assaulted him and issued
a false conduct report against him to discredit any complaint. 	He further alleges that the
remaining defendants, also Columbia Correctional staff, knew Suprise posed a risk of harm to
inmates yet turned a blind eye to her alleged conduct in this case and approved the conduct
report. 	Plaintiff is proceeding on Eighth Amendment claims against Suprise for the alleged
assault, and against the remaining defendants for failing to prevent further emotional or
psychological harm to plaintiff. Dkt. 9 at 8–9, 17.
Defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment on all of plaintiff’s claims on
the merits or, alternatively, under the doctrine of qualified immunity for all defendants except
Suprise. 	Dkt. 25. 	Plaintiff has renewed his motion to compel defendants to provide
supplemental responses to certain discovery requests. 	Dkt. 60. 	For the following reasons,
defendants’ motion is GRANTED as to all of plaintiff’s claims except for his Eighth
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Amendment claim against Suprise, which will proceed to trial.1 Plaintiff’s motion to compel is
DENIED, but the parties are ORDERED to meet and confer by the deadline indicated below
on any remaining discovery issues related to plaintiff’s claim against Suprise.
JURISDICTION
This case was originally assigned to a district court judge, who screened plaintiff’s
complaint. 	Dkt. 9. 	The parties have since consented to jurisdiction by a United States
Magistrate Judge. Dkt. 20. The court has original jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claims because
they arise under the Constitution of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
FINDINGS OF FACT2
A. The parties
Plaintiff, a state prisoner, was incarcerated at Columbia Correctional Institution at all
times relevant to this lawsuit.
The defendants all worked at that institution: 	defendant Larry Fuchs as Warden,
defendants Ryan Blount and Gwen Schultz as security directors, defendants Kevin Pitzen and
1 Plaintiff seeks leave to file a sur-reply in opposition to defendants’ motion for summary
judgment 	contesting 	defendants’ 	arguments 	regarding 	plaintiff’s 	claim 	against 	Suprise.
Dkt. 62. 	The motion is GRANTED and the court has considered plaintiff’s arguments,
although they did not affect the court’s reasoning, conclusions, or the ultimate result.
Plaintiff’s sur-reply raises points about Suprise that were already in the record and already
considered by the court, so defendants are not prejudiced by the court accepting it.
2 I find the following facts are material and undisputed, unless otherwise noted, based on the
parties’ briefing, their proposed factual findings, responses, replies, and objections, and
considering the evidence of record in the light most favorable to plaintiff as the non-moving
party. Miller v. Gonzalez, 761 F.3d 822, 827 (7th Cir. 2014).
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Jason Chatman as captains, defendant Kyle Zenk as an inmate complaint examiner, and
defendants Ashley Suprise and Bryan Gerry as correctional staff.
B. The alleged sexual assault
At approximately 6:30 p.m. on November 10, 2020, plaintiff was moved to Housing
Unit 2 following a Covid-19 quarantine. Suprise was working on the unit as a floor officer and
a nondefendant officer was working in the dayroom control “bubble,” an enclosed room where
staff can observe the housing unit’s hallways and dayroom. Suprise allowed plaintiff to clean
his new cell due to Covid-19 concerns before moving several large bins of his property one by
one from the nearby dayroom and down a hallway into the cell. 	The process took about an
hour.
Plaintiff alleges that while he was moving into his new cell, Suprise called him into the
unit’s meeting room, slid her hands down his pants, touched his genitals, and then bent over
and pressed herself against his genitals. 	Plaintiff alleges he warned Suprise that she was
violating the Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA), and Suprise threatened that plaintiff had
better not complain. So, plaintiff went back to moving and unpacking his property in the hope
that “the matter would blow over.” Dkt. 1-1, ¶ 32. But, as discussed in greater detail below,
Suprise later issued a conduct report against plaintiff for alleged disrespect, disruptive conduct,
loitering, and disobeying orders.
C. Video of plaintiff’s move-in process
Plaintiff’s move-in process was captured across two different videos—one of the
dayroom and one of the hallway. 	Neither video recorded audio. 	The dayroom video begins
with plaintiff setting two large bins on a dayroom table and approaching the control bubble
where he appears to speak to the officer inside as well as Suprise, who is standing nearby.
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Dkt. 29-4, 00:21–1:22. 	Plaintiff then retrieves a broom and dustpan, pauses again at the
control bubble, and proceeds down the hallway, followed about a minute later by Suprise
carrying what appear to be cleaning supplies. 	Id. at 1:37–3:41. 	The hallway video shows
plaintiff proceeding into his new cell with the broom and moving a chair out into the hallway,
where Suprise places cleaning supplies about a minute later. 	Dkt. 49, 00:22–1:45. 	Suprise
hands plaintiff several items and then leaves the hallway while plaintiff sweeps and cleans his
cell. Id., 1:44–3:21.
Over the next few minutes, the hallway and dayroom videos show plaintiff moving his
property into his cell bin by bin, at times with Suprise nearby. At that point, Suprise follows
plaintiff down the hallway as he is carrying a bin and waits outside his cell for him to emerge
carrying a mattress pad that he takes back through the dayroom with Suprise following. 	Id.,
8:24–9:04. 	Plaintiff and Suprise cross the dayroom and go through a door in the bottom
lefthand corner of the frame where they remain out of frame for approximately 12 seconds
before plaintiff reappears without the mattress followed by Suprise. Dkt. 29-4, 11:05–11:49.
Plaintiff resumes moving his property as Suprise walks away in the opposite direction.
About half an hour later, Suprise walks to plaintiff’s new cell, stacks his bins that are in
the hallway, and leans up against the wall outside his cell on one arm. Dkt. 49, 41:37–41:48.
Plaintiff is in his cell, off camera. Suprise stands there for around a minute and appears to be
speaking with plaintiff before she takes a bin from him and stacks it on top of the others. Id.,
41:48–42:45. She remains standing by the stack of bins in the hallway outside plaintiff’s cell
for two minutes before taking another bin from plaintiff that she stacks with the others and
pushing the stack down the hallway and out of frame. Id., 42:45–44:43. Suprise returns about
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10 minutes later to retrieve a spray bottle left in the hallway and the chair from outside
plaintiff’s cell and then leaves the hallway. Id., 55:38–56:32.
D. Plaintiff’s conversation with defendant Jason Chatman
Later that same evening, defendant Jason Chatman went to plaintiff’s cell to ask
whether he was still feeling “a little heated” after an alleged altercation between plaintiff and
Suprise during plaintiff’s move. 	Dkt. 48, 0:09–0:14. 	The conversation was captured on
Chatman’s body worn camera.
Chatman informed plaintiff that he was being moved to temporary lockup, a restrictive
housing status, due to his alleged disruptive conduct “in his cell” and “with the boxes” while
relocating to Housing Unit 2. Id., 0:36–0:55. Plaintiff explained that he still felt sick and had
become frustrated when Suprise had tried to rush him through his move, but he denied yelling.
He repeatedly asked how he had been disruptive, and Chapman responded that details would
follow in a formal conduct report. Plaintiff also expressed concern about his personal property
and wanted to pack it himself rather than risk its loss while in restrictive housing should officers
or inmates later pack it for him. 	Chatman allowed plaintiff a few minutes to organize his
belongings but declined plaintiff’s request to resolve the matter informally and escorted
plaintiff from his cell.
E. The conduct report
Suprise submitted a formal conduct report against plaintiff on November 12, 2020.
She alleged that she instructed plaintiff to empty and return the bins before it was time to
distribute medications at 7:00 p.m., and that plaintiff also received repeated instructions from
the control bubble officer to unpack his bins, but plaintiff “loitered on and off for the next
approximately 30 minutes speaking with other inmates in their cells.” Dkt. 29-1 at 15. Suprise
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further alleged that plaintiff became agitated, yelled profanity at her, and “grabbed the tote he
was unpacking aggressively as if he was going to throw it at” her when she advised him that he
could place some of his property on the empty top bunk. Id.
Suprise also reported that plaintiff then allegedly threw a bin on the top bunk to empty
it and did the same with the last bin while continuing to yell and swear. Suprise felt threatened
at that point, and placed her hand on her body alarm, but plaintiff then handed her the
remaining bins, and she was able to quickly shut and secure the cell door. Suprise quickly told
Chatman about the altercation, who then went to speak with plaintiff in his cell a few minutes
later as recorded on Chatman’s body worn camera.
The conduct report was signed by defendant Security Director Gwen Schultz, who
determined that the report should proceed to a hearing for a major offense.
1. The initial hearing
Plaintiff contested the conduct report, and a hearing was held on November 23, 2020,
in front of defendant Lieutenant Bryan Gerry. 	In preparation for the hearing, plaintiff
requested that the control bubble officer and an inmate testify, and that video from Chatman’s
body worn camera as well as the hallway and dayroom video footage be reviewed. 	On
November 	19, 	2020, 	defendant 	Security 	Director 	Ryan 	Blount 	approved 	the 	witness
attendance requests and the use of the body worn camera video but did not allow “overhead”
video because it “d[id] not exist.” Dkt. 29-1 at 21. This was incorrect. In fact, the video had
been preserved in relation to another inmate’s conduct report. Dkt. 27, ¶ 10.
Blount attests that he denied the request because he had not retained the footage
himself and mistakenly thought the hallway and dayroom video had been overwritten. He also
attests that Suprise’s “conduct report revolved around the interactions between [plaintiff] and
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Suprise,” and the requested footage “would not have shown what the interaction sounded like
or even the individuals’ actions looked like” because it was recorded from a “distant viewpoint
with no audio.” Id., ¶ 8. Plaintiff disputes Blount’s explanation, and states that Blount denied
his request to use the dayroom and hallway video because he knew that the contents would
exonerate plaintiff.
At the hearing, plaintiff denied screaming, swearing, or throwing bins, and stated that
he “neatly unpacked” his belongings while Suprise rushed him and yelled at him to give her his
bins. Dkt. 29-1 at 18. Plaintiff admitted that “there is an arguable claim that [he] loitered”
by talking to two other inmates but stated that neither Suprise nor the control bubble officer
told him to get back to his cell. Id. The control bubble officer testified that while there was
screaming and yelling, she “felt it was more about the situation than directed at” Suprise and
that she, the control bubble officer, had not said anything to plaintiff. Id. at 20. The inmate
witness was unavailable to attend the hearing due to Covid-19 restrictions, and Suprise did not
testify.
In addition to the testimony and the conduct report, Gerry reviewed Chatman’s body
worn camera video and noted that dayroom and hallway videos were not available. He found
that plaintiff had not disobeyed orders, but “more likely than not” had been disrespectful and
disruptive, and had loitered, and imposed 15 days’ cell confinement. Id. at 19.
Plaintiff objects to Gerry’s conclusions, stating that he did not give sufficient weight to
the exculpatory testimony.
2. Plaintiff’s appeal and inmate complaint
Plaintiff appealed Gerry’s determination to defendant Warden Fuchs. He argued that
Gerry should not have found Suprise’s conduct report credible in light of the testimony and
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that the dayroom and hallway video should have been considered. Upon review, Fuchs upheld
the cell confinement, but modified Gerry’s decision by finding plaintiff had not disobeyed
orders in light of the control bubble officer’s testimony that she had not said anything to
plaintiff. 	Fuchs also noted that while the dayroom and hallway video should have been
considered, that evidence ultimately would not have shed light on the remaining issues. Fuchs
attests that he reached this conclusion because the video at issue had no audio. Dkt. 26, ¶ 12.
Plaintiff objects to this statement as a “post-hoc explanation invented for litigation.” Dkt. 56,
¶ 19.
Plaintiff then filed an inmate complaint received by the institution on December 7,
2020, complaining that the dayroom and hallway video should have been admitted. He argued
that even without audio, the requested video would show what happened between him and
Suprise. 	He also noted that he had filed a complaint against Suprise under the Prison Rape
Elimination Act (PREA), which plaintiff believed Suprise sought to discredit by filing the
conduct report. 	And he argued that dayroom video would support that PREA complaint by
showing them entering the housing unit’s meeting/storage room together. Plaintiff wondered
how Gerry could find any of Suprise’s assertions about him credible in light of the control
bubble officer’s testimony.
Defendant Inmate Complaint Examiner Kyle Zenk recommended dismissing the inmate
complaint on procedural grounds. Zenk explained that Fuchs had already reviewed and taken
action on plaintiff’s allegations, and “[a] parallel investigation is not necessary nor allowed per
policy.” 	Dkt. 29-2 at 2. 	Fuchs adopted that recommendation and plaintiff appealed to a
corrections complaint examiner and the Secretary of the Wisconsin Department of Corrections
(DOC), who returned the complaint “for priority investigation.” 	Id. at 6. 	Zenk reviewed
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plaintiff’s complaint a second time, addressed the merits and again recommended dismissal,
noting that plaintiff mischaracterized a statement in the conduct report, and that the requested
“tier footage” had no evidentiary value because it did not show the inside of plaintiff’s cell or
include audio. 	Id. at 7. 	Fuchs, however, did not adopt that recommendation and ordered a
rehearing to include the dayroom and hallway video.
3. The rehearing
The rehearing was held before a nondefendant officer on February 5, 2021. 	Plaintiff
requested that Suprise testify, noting that he “might file a PREA on her; so she sought to
discredit me by accusing me of maniacal behavior in this [baseless conduct report].” Dkt. 29-
1 at 34. Suprise was not available to testify, but plaintiff also requested review of the dayroom
and hallway video, which was allowed.
Based on the additional video evidence, and the control bubble officer’s testimony at
the initial hearing, the conduct report was dismissed and removed from plaintiff’s record due
to “the inaccuracy of information provided by report writer,” namely, Suprise. Id. at 31.
F. 	Plaintiff’s PREA report
While contesting Suprise’s conduct report, plaintiff filed a PREA complaint against
Suprise.3 He was interviewed by a detective from the Columbia County Sheriff’s Office and
by defendant Kevin Pitzen on December 29, 2020. Plaintiff stated that Suprise had asked him
3 Plaintiff filed an inmate complaint on November 20, 2020 alleging that Suprise sexually
assaulted him in “the unit’s storage room.” 	Dkt. 42-2 at 54. 	A non-defendant inmate
complaint examiner reviewed the complaint and recommended dismissal and immediate
referral per policy to the PREA compliance manager. 	Id. at 46. 	Defendant Warden Fuchs
adopted that recommendation, and his decision was distributed to several individuals,
including defendant Blount, on November 24, 2020. 	Id. at 47. 	Plaintiff unsuccessfully
appealed.
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to bring a mattress to a storage room while he was moving into a new cell and “[s]omething
happened in there.” 	Dkt. 29-3 at 2. 	He did not want to say exactly what happened and
explained that he had to be “careful about what I say” because Suprise “lied on me.” 	Id.
Plaintiff was told that without “specifics,” the investigation would not proceed, and plaintiff
responded that he could not give “any specifics.” 	Id. 	Plaintiff told the investigators that he
would contact them if he wanted to speak further.
G. Suprise’s termination from the DOC
Plaintiff contends in his proposed findings of fact that, before and during her
employment with the DOC, Suprise “accumulated multiple criminal convictions” and was
previously incarcerated. Dkt. 57, ¶¶ 1, 4. He further contends that “DOC supervisors” were
required to conduct criminal history checks of correctional officers and were repeatedly warned
about Suprise’s workplace misconduct, but “failed to review or act upon Suprise’s criminal
history,” to adequately monitor “at-risk staff,” or take other remedial action. 	Id., ¶¶ 3, 6, 7,
11. Plaintiff maintains that defendants failed to properly investigate Suprise’s report against
him or his PREA report, or otherwise protect him from her. 	Defendants object to plaintiff’s
assertions 	as 	unsupported, 	based 	on 	unauthenticated 	documents, 	and 	improperly
argumentative.
In support of his position, plaintiff has submitted documents purportedly from a private
investigator or a nonparty assisting him with his evidentiary materials in this case.4 See Dkt. 39.
These documents include what plaintiff asserts are printouts of publicly available Wisconsin
4 This nonparty, Brianna Burton, has filed a motion to intervene and attend and record the
final first final pretrial conference to be held over Zoom. Dkt. 62. She has also filed a request
to access the video evidence in this case. 	Dkt. 63. 	The court will address these matters
separately.
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state court criminal case docket information concerning an “Ashley N. Johnson” and an “Ashley
Nicole Suprise,” and a copy of an internal investigation report about Suprise that led to her
termination as a correctional officer. 	See Dkt. 39 & Dkt. 42-3. 	The state court docket
information that predates the alleged assault in this case indicates that:
• 	Ashley N. Johnson pled guilty/no contest as a minor to theft as a party to a crime in
2003 and was sentenced to probation in Waupaca County Circuit Court.5 Dkt. 42-
3 at 1–8.
• 	Ashley Nicole Suprise pled no contest to failure to wear a seatbelt in 2019 in Dane
County Circuit Court. Id. at 9–12.
As for the purported internal investigation report, it indicates that Suprise was arrested
on February 27, 2021 for operating while intoxicated and possession of THC and taken to
Columbia County Jail. 	Id. at 48. 	Suprise admitted during the investigative interview to
smoking marijuana the day before, driving after drinking two beers and that there was a THC
edible in her car. 	Id. at 45. 	She also alluded to an issue with a supervisor. 	Id. at 46, 50.
Suprise was terminated on March 15, 2021 “for failure to meet probationary standards” as a
result of the investigation. Id. at 60.6
5 Whether this individual is Suprise is not confirmed in the record. 	Defendants state that
“[g]iven the tight turnaround” to reply in support of their motion, they cannot make any
“representation as to whether” Johnson and Suprise are the same person. 	Dkt. 58 at 2 n. 1.
For purposes of this motion, the court assumes they are.
6 Plaintiff has also submitted court records purporting to concern a 2024 charge against Suprise
for theft as a party to a crime that resulted in a deferred prosecution agreement. Dkt. 42-3 at
34.
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LEGAL STANDARDS
Defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment. 	Summary judgment is
appropriate when there are no genuine disputes of material fact, and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In determining whether there are genuine
factual disputes, the court examines the record in the light most favorable to the party opposing
judgment and construes all reasonable inferences from the evidence in their favor. See Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 	“[A] factual dispute is ‘genuine’ only if a
reasonable jury could find for either party.” SMS Demag Aktiengesellschaft v. Material Scis. Corp.,
565 F.3d 365, 368 (7th Cir. 2009). Mere conclusory allegations do not constitute evidence.
See Balderston v. Fairbanks Morse Engine Div. of Coltec Indus., 328 F.3d 309, 320 (7th Cir. 2003).
Further, disputed facts that are not outcome-determinative are not material and will not
preclude summary judgment. Smith ex rel. Smith v. Severn, 129 F.3d 419, 427 (7th Cir. 1997).
ANALYSIS
A. Threshold matters: requests for injunctive relief and discovery
1. Request for injunctive relief
Plaintiff requests injunctive relief in his response to defendants’ summary judgment
motion, which is relief plaintiff may seek when suing individuals in their official capacities.
Knowlton v. City of Wauwatosa, 119 F.4th 507, 519 (7th Cir. 2024). Specifically, he names the
Secretary of the Wisconsin Department of Corrections and requests “policies requiring
adequate supervision, training, and monitoring of correctional staff” in light of alleged “failures
documented 	in 	this 	case” 	to 	“prevent 	future 	assaults” 	and 	“ensure 	compliance 	with
constitutional standards.” Dkt. 53 at 23–24.
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The Secretary of the Wisconsin Department of Corrections is not a defendant in this
case, and plaintiff cannot add this defendant and pursue this claim for injunctive relief at this
late stage. Although he requested injunctive relief in his complaint, it was different in nature—
he sought to prevent defendants from placing him on a restricted housing status without first
verifying the allegations against him and to require correctional staff to use body cameras when
interacting with him and handling his property. Dkt. 1-1, ¶ 89. More to the point, plaintiff
was not granted leave to proceed on a claim for injunctive relief, see Dkt. 9 at 17 & 21, and
cannot amend his complaint now through a response brief. Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp. Retiree
Med. Benefits Tr. v. Walgreen Co., 631 F.3d 436, 448 (7th Cir. 2011) (it is “axiomatic” that “a
plaintiff may not amend his complaint in his response brief”).
2. Plaintiff’s discovery motions
Plaintiff claims he is unable to fully defend against defendants’ summary judgment
motion because the court denied his motion to compel discovery. 	Specifically, plaintiff
contends that he was denied files of any internal investigations and disciplinary actions
concerning Suprise, communications between Suprise and unspecified supervisors, information
and content from defendants’ personal social media accounts, and video footage. 	After
summary judgment briefing closed, plaintiff filed a renewed motion to compel defendants to
respond to certain discovery requests, Dkt. 60, that defendants oppose, Dkt. 65. 	The court
will not reconsider its previous rulings, and will deny his latest motion, but it will order the
parties to meet and confer in preparation for trial on plaintiff’s surviving claim against Suprise.
a. 	Plaintiff’s discovery issues
Plaintiff’s brief in opposition to defendants’ motion for summary judgment was initially
due October 2, 2025. 	He filed a request for a six-month extension on September 8, 2025,
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stating that institution staff were interfering with his access to the law library and harassing
him, and he was litigating multiple lawsuits. 	He also requested that the court compel
defendants to “supply the footage from the hallway and internal investigative records regarding
[Suprise’s] misconduct that resulted in her termination and/or is related to sexual misconduct
with prisoners.” Dkt. 33. The court granted plaintiff a 30-day extension, ordered the parties
to meet and confer with a week about plaintiff’s discovery concerns, and invited plaintiff to file
a motion to compel if his concerns were not resolved. Dkt. 35.
Plaintiff renewed his request for a six-month extension on October 6, 2025, contending
that staff were “persistently obstructing his use of the law library, while the defendants’ counsel
have persistently obstructed discovery.” Dkt. 36 at 1. Specifically with respect to discovery,
plaintiff said that he could not recall receiving complete responses to requests served ten
months earlier in January 2025, and that defense counsel was not providing evidence that the
previously assigned judge had ordered preserved. Dkt. 37, ¶¶ 13–15. The court acknowledged
that plaintiff had remaining discovery concerns, but noted that he had yet to file a motion to
compel and had been scheduled to review video evidence in time to complete a summary
judgment response. Dkt. 38. The court declined to extend plaintiff’s response deadline further.
On October 20, 2025, plaintiff filed a motion to compel. Dkt. 40. He took issue with
defendants’ February 2025 responses to his discovery requests, noted that he had since
obtained case docket information and an internal investigation report about Suprise on his
own, and underscored that he was seeking Chatman’s body worn camera video in addition to
other 	video 	evidence. 	The 	attached 	exhibits 	included 	a 	letter 	from 	defense 	counsel
memorializing the parties’ meet and confer. Dkt. 42-1 at 10–11. The letter indicated that the
parties had discussed plaintiff’s request for “overhead tier video” and Suprise’s employment
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files. Id. at 10. Defense counsel stated that Suprise’s employment files would not be produced
because such files are generally confidential and Suprise’s files “do not contain information or
an investigation into [plaintiff’s] allegation of sexual assault in this case.” Id. at 11. But defense
counsel would produce the recently discovered “tier” or dayroom video. Id. at 10.
The court denied plaintiff’s motion to compel because it did not appear that there were
any additional materials to produce. 	Dkt. 47. 	All existing video evidence had been made
available for plaintiff’s review, and for good measure the court ordered defendants to file the
remaining video evidence with the court for the parties’ use at summary judgment. The court
also declined to order duplicative production of internal investigative materials and state-court
docket information allegedly concerning Suprise that plaintiff already had. The court granted
plaintiff a final extension of his response deadline to November 21, 2025.
The court will not reconsider these rulings. The court attempted to assist plaintiff with
his discovery concerns by extending his response deadline and ordering the parties to meet and
confer, but plaintiff simply waited too long to start litigating discovery requests served in
January 2025. He received responses about seven months before summary judgment was filed
and did not raise any discovery concerns beforehand nor file a motion to compel for another
two months. As the court instructs in its preliminary pretrial conference order, “[i]f the parties
do not bring discovery problems to the court’s attention quickly, then they cannot complain
that they ran out of time to get information that they needed for summary judgment or for
trial.” Dkt. 23.
Regardless, plaintiff has not been prejudiced. He had access to all existing video footage
before his summary judgment response materials were due, and the videos were also filed with
the court. 	As far as his requests for Suprise’s personnel files and communications with
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supervisors and all of defendants’ social media account information and contents, parties may
obtain “nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional
to the needs of the case,” considering among other factors “whether the burden or expense of
the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The court has
considered in this order the criminal case docket information and investigative report he did
obtain, but these materials, as explained in greater detail below, do not suggest that Suprise
has a history of misconduct towards inmates that merits such broad additional discovery.
b. 	Plaintiff’s second motion to compel, Dkt. 60
After summary judgment briefing closed, and a day before discovery closed, plaintiff
filed a second motion to compel. Dkt. 60. He seeks to compel defendants to supplement their
November 2025 responses to his October 2025 discovery requests. 	Specifically, he seeks
“discovery addressing credibility, supervisory knowledge, hiring decisions, discipline processes,
and DOC handling of reports related to former Officer Ashley Surprise [sic]” as well as other
names she may have used, information about a deferred prosecution agreement she allegedly
entered into in 2024, and the meaning of her nickname. 	Id. at 1–2. 	To the extent plaintiff
sought any of this discovery for summary judgment, he mailed his requests too late, about two
and a half weeks before his response deadline, which was November 3, 2025 at the time.
Regardless, the court will deny the motion. 	Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(1)
requires a certification of a good faith attempt to meet and confer before seeking court
intervention in a discovery dispute. Plaintiff does not certify that he tried to meet and confer
about his latest discovery issues. Rather, he attached a November 25, 2025 email that a non-
attorney, nonparty sent defense counsel from a Gmail account on behalf of plaintiff, raising
concerns with defendants’ responses. 	See Dkt. 61, ¶ 12 (plaintiff attests that the email was
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sent by his “assistant” to defense counsel) & Dkt. 61-10 (email). 	This does not satisfy the
meet 	and 	confer 	requirement—defense 	counsel 	is 	under 	no 	obligation 	to 	respond 	to
communications sent by non-attorney, nonparties on behalf of litigants.
That said, plaintiff is proceeding to trial on his Eighth Amendment claim against
Suprise. So, the court will reopen discovery for a limited time and for the limited purpose of
allowing the parties to meet and confer concerning any remaining discovery related to this
claim that plaintiff may need for trial. In conferring, plaintiff must keep in mind the scope of
his surviving claim. If outstanding discovery issues remain after the parties meet and confer,
the parties may raise these issues in their pretrial filings due by the deadline indicated below.
B. Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims
Plaintiff is proceeding against all defendants on Eighth Amendment claims. 	Inmates
have the right to “humane conditions of confinement,” and “prison officials must ensure that
inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must ‘take reasonable
measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.’” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832, 114
(1994) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526–27 (1984)). The Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition 	of 	cruel 	and 	unusual 	punishment 	protects 	prisoners 	from 	conditions 	of
confinement that “involve the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain[.]” 	Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981). This prohibition includes acts that are “totally without
penological justification.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 737 (2002) (citation omitted).
A prison official’s conduct may violate the Eighth Amendment if “the official knows of
and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. “[T]he
official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial
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risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” 	Id. 	Courts refer to this
standard as requiring “deliberate indifference” to or “conscious disregard” of a risk of harm.
1. Ashley Suprise
Plaintiff alleges that Suprise sexually assaulted him in the housing unit’s meeting or
storage room while he was moving into a new cell, in violation of his Eighth Amendment right
to be free of cruel and unusual punishment, and then threatened him to ensure he did not
complain. A reasonable jury could conclude that Suprise’s conduct, if true, objectively imposed
a serious risk to plaintiff’s safety and that Suprise threatened plaintiff because she knew of that
risk. See J.K.J. v. Polk Cnty., 960 F.3d 367, 376 (7th Cir. 2020) (“To say that the sexual assaults
[a jail guard] committed against [two inmates] objectively imposed serious risk to their safety
would be an understatement.”).
Defendants did not address plaintiff’s claim against Suprise in their motion for
summary judgment beyond stating that his allegation of assault was “deficient” due to a “lack
of evidence.” Dkt. 30 at 8. Defendants further assert in reply that the video evidence disproves
plaintiff’s allegation because the hallway video does not show Suprise ever entering his cell.
Dkt. 58 at 4–5. Defendants presumably focus on this location—plaintiff’s cell—because that
is where plaintiff said the assault took place in his response brief. Dkt. 53 at 9. But that one
reference is an outlier. Plaintiff alleges in his verified complaint that Suprise sexually assaulted
him in “the unit two meeting room” off the dayroom, Dkt. 1-1, ¶¶ 29–30. This allegation is
substantially consistent with what he stated during his PREA interview, see Dkt. 29-3 at 2
(calling it a storage room), and in his inmate complaint, see Dkt. 42-2 at 54 (calling it the
“unit’s storage room”). 	The dayroom video supports this account, showing Suprise and
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plaintiff enter a room off the dayroom where they remain for 12 seconds off camera before
emerging and walking away in opposite directions.
Construed in plaintiff’s favor, this evidence is sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude
that plaintiff was sexually assaulted as he alleges. When a videotape “blatantly contradict[s]”
the non-movants version of facts in such a way that it is “so utterly discredited by the record
that no reasonable jury could have believed him,” there is no “genuine” dispute, and the court
should view the facts in light of the video. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380-81 (2007). That
is not the case here. Twelve seconds is not a long time, but defendants do not argue, nor can
the court conclude as a matter of law, that it is an impossibly insufficient amount of time for
Suprise to insert her hand down plaintiff’s pants, touch his genitals, and then back up into his
genitals as plaintiff alleges she did. 	There are inferences that can be made from the existing
video evidence that suggest no sexual assault occurred, but that evidence does not “utterly
discredit” plaintiff’s claim. Id.
At bottom, the evidence is too inconclusive to grant summary judgment in Suprise’s
favor. 	See Barrows v. Blackwell, Case No. 13-cv-1483, 2016 WL 1122838, at *5–7 (C.D. Ill.
March 22, 2016) (summary judgment is inappropriate where video evidence is inconclusive
regarding plaintiff’s sexual assault claim). 	And deciding whose version of events is most
credible is a task for a jury.7 See Omnicare, Inc. v. UnitedHealth Grp., Inc., 629 F.3d 697, 704–
05 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[D]istrict courts presiding over summary judgment proceedings may not
weigh conflicting evidence or make credibility determinations, both of which are the province
7 Suprise responded to plaintiff’s first set of interrogatories, Dkt. 42-1 at 21, but she did not
submit a declaration with defendants’ summary judgment materials. The court presumes that
she denies plaintiff’s allegations.
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of the jury.” (cleaned up)). 	Accordingly, defendants’ motion is DENIED with respect to
Suprise and plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim against her will proceed to trial.
2. The remaining defendants
As for the remaining staff defendants, plaintiff claims they failed to intervene in a
conscious disregard of his constitutional rights. Captain Chatman spoke with plaintiff at his
new cell about Suprise’s allegations and placed him on temporary lockup pending further
investigation. 	Security Director Gwen Schultz determined that Suprise’s conduct report
alleged a major offense and should proceed to a hearing. 	In anticipation of that hearing,
Security Director Blount approved plaintiff’s witness attendance requests and the use of
Chatman’s body worn camera video but indicated that requested “overhead” video did not
exist. 	Dkt. 29-1 at 21. 	Officer Gerry presided over the initial hearing. 	Inmate complaint
examiner Zenk and Warden Fuchs reviewed plaintiff’s complaint about the conduct report
process, and the warden, who also reviewed plaintiff’s direct appeal of Gerry’s determination,
ultimately ordered a rehearing that resulted in the report’s dismissal. Finally, Captain Pitzen
interviewed plaintiff regarding his PREA complaint after Fuchs referred plaintiff’s inmate
complaint alleging sexual assault.
Plaintiff contends that these “supervisory officials” “were deliberately indifferent in
failing to prevent the assault despite having knowledge of [Suprise’s] dangerous misconduct.”
Dkt. 53 at 4. He disavows pursuing any claim “relating to false conduct reports or unrelated
conditions of confinement.” 	Id. 	This disavowal appears to be a response to defendants’
opening brief, where they focus on their actions during the conduct report proceeding. 	The
court’s screening order also focuses on how the remaining defendants responded to the alleged
events, noting that plaintiff alleged these defendants turned a blind eye to Suprise’s alleged
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conduct by approving her conduct report, suggesting these defendants each had the authority
and reason to “intervene regarding the plaintiff’s claim of Suprise’s alleged sexual assault that
could have prevented him from suffering further emotional or psychological harm.” Dkt. 9 at
9 (emphasis added).
Whether the court construes these claims as screened or as plaintiff defines them now,
the remaining defendants are entitled to summary judgment in their favor. 	Prison officials
generally “may be held liable for a constitutional violation if [they] knew about it and had the
ability to intervene but failed to do so . . .with deliberate or reckless disregard for the plaintiff’s
constitutional rights.” 	Fillmore v. Page, 358 F.3d 496, 505–06 (7th Cir. 2004). 	Liability for
supervisors is “not vicarious” in this context—there needs to be personal involvement or “a
connection between the supervisor’s action or inaction and the violation at issue,” and “the
supervisor must have also had the necessary state of mind,” the high standard of deliberate
indifference in this case. Bostic v. Murray, No. 23-1665, 2025 WL 3248684, at *5–6 (7th Cir.
Nov. 21, 2025).
c. 	Notice of a substantial risk of serious harm
As a threshold issue, plaintiff refers to these remaining defendants collectively in his
response as “supervisory officials,” “without specific allegations tying the individual defendants
to the alleged unconstitutional conduct.” 	Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 778 (7th Cir.
2008). It is not clear whether all of the remaining defendants were in fact Suprise’s supervisors
or had supervisory authority, or what the scope of their authority would have been. 	Even if
they each had authority to change the course of events, prison officials, even supervisory
officials, can only be held liable for their own actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, so such “[v]ague
references to a group of ‘defendants’ . . . do not raise a genuine issue of material fact with
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respect to those defendants.” Id. (inmate plaintiff claimed “the defendants” failed to protect
him).
Regardless, a reasonable jury could not conclude that any of the remaining defendants
were on notice that Suprise posed a serious, escalating risk of harm to inmates before she
allegedly assaulted plaintiff on November 10, 2020. 	Prison officials are not “free to ignore
obvious dangers to inmates.” 	Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842. 	But even if plaintiff’s materials
purporting to concern Suprise’s criminal history are authentic and accurate, and even assuming
as plaintiff argues that the remaining defendants had an obligation to review her criminal
history, all any of them would have known upon review in 2020 was that Suprise had been
convicted of theft as a party to crime as a minor in 2003 and was cited for failure to wear a
seatbelt in 2019. This history does not suggest that Suprise posed a substantial risk of serious
harm to inmates.
Suprise was also arrested and detained for operating while intoxicated and possessing
THC, but that incident occurred on February 27, 2021, just over two weeks after the rehearing
on the conduct report and its dismissal. 	The submitted court records indicate that several
charges arising from this incident were dismissed, and that she ultimately pled guilty due to no
contest to a first offense of operating while intoxicated. This arrest and related charges could
not have informed the alleged events underlying this case. 	Even if they had, neither this
criminal history nor the internal investigative report reference any previous misconduct
involving inmates and otherwise do not speak to whether she posed a substantial risk of serious
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harm to inmates. Consequently, these materials do not support the position that the alleged
sexual assault was foreseeable.8
Plaintiff relies heavily on Collins v. Suprise, Case No. 21-cv-237 (W.D. Wis. 2021), a
case filed in this court in which the inmate plaintiff alleged that Suprise and another
correctional officer used excessive force on him on April 27, 2020, and that two captains,
including defendant Gwen Schultz, investigated the incident but did not hold either officer
accountable. 	Warden Fuchs was also named as a defendant, but the court dismissed him at
the outset in its leave to proceed order and he was never required to answer. Specifically, the
plaintiff alleged that Suprise sprayed him with a defense spray causing eye and nasal pain.
Dkt 1 in the ‘237 case, ¶ 7. For plaintiff, this lawsuit provided notice to defendants in advance
of the sexual assault alleged here that Suprise posed a serious risk of harm to inmates.
There are two problems with plaintiff’s reliance on this unrelated case. First, the court
dismissed the lawsuit for the plaintiff’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies, meaning
that the allegations were never tested or proven and that the plaintiff failed to give the
institution adequate notice of the issue and opportunity to correct it at the time it allegedly
occurred. 	See Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 650 (7th Cir. 2013) (inmates satisfy the
exhaustion requirement when the prison receives notice of, and an opportunity to correct a
problem).
8 Although the court is considering these materials for purposes of summary judgment, when
it must view the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, whether any of
these materials would be admissible at trial, as plaintiff appears to argue they are, is another
question for another day. 	As for the 2024 theft charge and deferred prosecution agreement,
the court cannot conceive of any possible relevance to this case, as it involves unrelated conduct
occurring years after Suprise was terminated from her employment with the DOC.
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Second, plaintiff does not explain why any of the remaining defendants would have
been aware of the April 2020 events alleged in this 2021 lawsuit before the alleged November
2020 sexual assault. See Lewis v. Richards, 107 F.3d 549, 553 (7th Cir. 1997) (“Without . . .
knowledge [of the alleged risk of sexual assault], defendants can hardly have been deliberately
indifferent to [plaintiff’s] safety.”). 	The only overlapping defendants are Fuchs and Schultz.
Fuchs was dismissed at the outset and never answered, was not the warden at the time of the
alleged use of excessive force, see Dkt. 26, ¶ 2, and does not appear to have ever seen any inmate
complaint or related correspondence about the incident, see Dkt. 23-2 in the ’237 case. Schultz
allegedly investigated the use-of-force incident at issue in Collins, but her involvement in the
alleged events underlying this case is too tangential to constitute a violation of plaintiff’s
constitutional rights, as discussed in greater detail below.
d. Defendants’ conduct after the alleged assault
The defendants’ conduct after the alleged assault does not create a genuine issue of
material fact either. 	“Public officials do not have a free-floating obligation to put things to
rights” and “cannot be hit with damages under § 1983 for not being ombudsmen.” 	Burks v.
Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 595 (7th Cir. 2009). 	As noted, Shultz was not involved beyond
verifying that the conduct report alleged a major offense and authorizing it to proceed to a
hearing. Plaintiff does not explain why Shultz would have had any reason to suspect the report
was false, or what steps she could have taken. To the extent plaintiff believes Shultz should
have viewed the conduct report skeptically because of the allegations against Suprise in Collins,
the conduct report did not involve any use of force and, as noted, the merits of the allegations
in Collins were never tested.
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Nor does plaintiff explain how Captain Pitzen evidenced a failure to intervene by
investigating plaintiff’s PREA complaint. 	The investigation could not move forward only
because plaintiff refused to provide any details, and plaintiff does not explain why Pitzen had
to press on with the investigation regardless.
As for Chatman, he spoke with plaintiff at his cell in response to Suprise’s verbal
complaint of an altercation. 	Although Chatman, to plaintiff’s frustration, did not provide
specific details regarding Suprise’s allegations, Chatman was responding to a verbal complaint
received minutes earlier from staff claiming to have felt threatened enough to consider using
her body alarm. He would not have had time to review any evidence, but he did explain the
basic situation to plaintiff, who admitted being frustrated with Suprise, and allowed plaintiff
the courtesy of organizing his property before being escorted to temporary lock up. 	To the
extent plaintiff believes Chatman should have done more, “the possibility that [a government
official] could have done more does not evince deliberate indifference.” Hunter v. Mueske, 73
F.4th 561, 567 (7th Cir. 2023). There is insufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude
that any of these defendants showed a reckless disregard for plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
Defendants Blount, Gerry, Zenk and Fuchs all played more direct roles in the conduct
report process. 	Plaintiff states that he is not pursuing any claim related to this process, but
reasons that these defendants disregarded exculpatory evidence to protect Suprise or ignored
her misconduct and thus created a culture that emboldened her. 	Specifically with respect to
Blount, plaintiff speculates that his statement that the hallway and dayroom video did not exist
was 	no 	mistake 	but 	rather 	Blount’s 	attempt 	to 	conceal 	exculpatory 	evidence. 	But
“[s]peculation cannot create a genuine issue of fact that defeats summary judgment.” Flowers
v. Kia Motors Fin., 105 F.4th 939, 946 (7th Cir. 2024).
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Plaintiff disagrees with how Gerry, Fuchs, and Zenk viewed and weighed the evidence
in the conduct report proceeding and believes they also should have done more. 	But Gerry
dismissed a charge against plaintiff after crediting exculpatory testimony from the control
bubble officer and did not have the benefit of hallway or dayroom video. Nor can it be said
that Fuchs showed a conscious disregard by dismissing an additional charge and ultimately
taking the step of ordering a rehearing on the conduct report to include all video evidence.9
As for Zenk’s recommendations to dismiss plaintiff’s inmate complaint, there is no
evidence to suggest he was deliberately indifferent towards plaintiff’s constitutional rights. An
inmate complaint examiner could show deliberate indifference by, for example, routinely
shredding inmate complaints without reading them or intervening “to prevent the medical unit
from delivering needed care.” Raemisch, 555 F.3d at 595. But an inmate complaint examiner
is not liable for “carr[ying] out [his] job exactly as [he] was supposed to do,” including by
rejecting procedurally deficient complaints or dismissing complaints on the merits upon review
and any necessary investigation. Id. Plaintiff may disagree with the examiner, and the conduct
report may have been later dismissed, but these points do not support the conclusion that Zenk
was deliberately indifferent.
9 Plaintiff’s inmate complaint about the sexual assault does not compel a different conclusion.
Blount received notice of Fuchs’ decision to refer the complaint to the PREA compliance
manager five days after he reviewed plaintiff’s witness and evidence requests in anticipation of
the conduct report hearing, so the inmate complaint could not have informed Blount’s review.
See Dkt. 42-2 at 47 (dated November 24, 2020). 	And Fuchs cannot reasonably be found to
have shown conscious disregard of plaintiff’s allegation by following policy, referring the inmate
complaint for further review under PREA, and relying on that process. See Burks, 555 F.3d at
595 (“Bureaucracies divide tasks; no prisoner is entitled to insist that one employee do
another’s job.”).
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A jury may view the hallway and dayroom video differently than Zenk and Fuchs did,
but their conclusions about that evidence were not so unreasonable as to constitute deliberate
indifference. 	They were viewing the video evidence through the lens of a conduct report
alleging a verbal altercation between plaintiff and Suprise at his cell. Their observations that
the video does not contain any audio and does not show what plaintiff is doing inside his cell
are accurate.
All in all, it will be for a jury to decide how to weigh the video and other admissible
evidence with respect to Suprise. 	But the remaining defendants are entitled to summary
judgment in their favor, so the court will not reach defendants’ alternative qualified immunity
argument.
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ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that:
1. 	Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a sur-reply, Dkt. 62, is GRANTED.
2. 	Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Dkt. 25, is DENIED with respect to
plaintiff’s claim against defendant Ashley Suprise and GRANTED in all other
respects.
3. 	Plaintiff’s motion to compel, Dkt. 60, is DENIED.
4. 	Discovery is reopened through January 9, 2026 for the limited purpose of allowing
the parties to meet and confer about any remaining discovery issues related to
plaintiff’s claim against Suprise. The parties are ORDERED to meet and confer by
that date. 	Any unresolved discovery issues may be raised as part of the parties’
pretrial submissions.
5. 	To allow the parties an opportunity to digest this ruling in preparation for trial, the
court makes the following adjustments to the case schedule:
a. 	Pretrial submissions and motions in limine shall be due January 15, 2026,
and responses shall be due January 29, 2026.
b. 	The court will hold its first final pretrial conference on February 10, 2026
at 11:00 a.m. via Zoom.
c. 	The second final pretrial conference remains in person on February 17,
2026 at 8:30 a.m. with jury selection and trial to begin at 9:00 a.m.
6. 	The parties must review the court’s trial preparation order attached to this order
in preparation for trial.
Entered December 23, 2025.
BY THE COURT:
/s/
________________________________________
ANITA MARIE BOOR
Magistrate Judge
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