Ducksworth, Brian v. Kinas, Austin

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
BRIAN A. DUCKSWORTH,
Plaintiff, 	OPINION AND ORDER
v.
23-cv-567-wmc
AUSTIN KINAS,
Defendant.
Plaintiff Brian A. Ducksworth, representing himself, filed a complaint under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that Correctional Officer Austin Kinas violated his civil rights.
(Dkt. #1.) The court granted plaintiff leave to proceed with a First Amendment retaliation
claim and Eighth Amendment claim against that defendant for allegedly confiscating and
breaking plaintiff’s property, as well as hitting him with a cell door after he learned plaintiff
had filed complaints against him. (Dkt. #11.) Defendant moved for summary judgment
on plaintiff’s claims. 	(Dkt. #26.) 	For the reasons explained below, the court will grant
defendant’s motion in part and deny defendant’s motion in part.
UNDISPUTED FACTS1
Plaintiff Brian A. Ducksworth was an inmate at Jackson Correctional Institution
(“JCI”) from June 1 to July 19, 2023. 	(Def.’s Reply to Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Proposed
Findings of Fact (“PFOF”) (dkt. #41) ¶ 1.) 	He was then transferred to Oshkosh
Correctional Institution (“Oshkosh”), where he remains today. 	(Id.) 	Defendant Austin
1 Unless otherwise noted, the court finds the following facts undisputed for the purposes of
summary judgment. The facts are drawn from the parties’ proposed findings of fact and responses,
as well as the underlying evidentiary record where appropriate.
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Kinas is a Corrections Officer at JCI and worked in the unit where Ducksworth was placed
while at JCI. (Id. at ¶ 2.)
A. Plaintiff’s First Inmate Complaint
Ducksworth filed an inmate complaint against Officer Kinas on June 8, 2023,
stating that Officer Kinas was “disrespectful and hostile toward him for no apparent
reason” during a previous interaction in the unit. 	(PFOF (dkt. #41) ¶ 8.) 	Inmate
Complaint Examiner (“ICE”) Jodi Dougherty notified Ducksworth that she received his
complaint on June 8, 2023. (Id. ¶ 9.) After completing her investigation of the incident,
she responded in writing to the complaint on June 16, 2023. (PFOF (dkt. #41) ¶ 12.)
ICE Dougherty found that Officer Kinas’s supervisor “received requests from
[inmate] Ducksworth and said she would talk with [Ducksworth,] . . . then follow up and
address his concerns with CO Kinas.” 	(Dkt. #29-4, at 2.) 	In her written disposition of
the complaint, ICE Dougherty stated that she only contacted Officer Kinas’s supervisor
and another sergeant that witnessed the interaction as part of her investigation. 	(Id.)
Officer Kinas declares under oath that: ICE Dougherty never contacted him directly as part
of her investigation into the June 8 complaint; and that he was only made aware of
Ducksworth’s June 8 inmate complaint against him by this lawsuit. 	(Kinas Decl. (dkt.
#30) ¶¶ 13-14.) On the other hand, Ducksworth maintains a jury could reasonably infer
Officer Kinas knew of the complaint given ICE Dougherty’s representation that Officer
Kinas’s supervisor would speak to him about the incident. (Ducksworth Decl. (dkt. #37)
¶ 16.) 	Regardless, ICE Dougherty ultimately recommended dismissal of the complaint,
which was affirmed after Ducksworth appealed, and no disciplinary action was taken
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against Officer Kinas. (PFOF (dkt. #41) ¶¶ 12-13.)
B. Search of Plaintiff’s Cell and Plaintiff’s Second Complaint
Two days after Ducksworth filed the June 8 complaint, on June 10, 2023, Officer
Kinas conducted a search of Ducksworth’s cell under JCI’s random monthly search policy.
(Id. ¶¶ 18-19.) 	Officer Kinas cannot recall whether another officer or he chose the three
cells that were randomly searched that day. 	(Kinas Decl. (dkt. #30) ¶ 20.) 	During the
search, Officer Kinas confiscated a few items from Ducksworth that he suspected were
contraband; then he issued Ducksworth a disciplinary conduct report for Unauthorized
Transfer of Property and Possession of Contraband. 	(PFOF (dkt. #41) ¶ 24; Dkt. #29-
11, at 1; Kinas Decl. (dkt #30) ¶ 35.) 	After a hearing in which Ducksworth was found
guilty of such conduct, JCI disciplinary records indicate that one item—a pair of workout
gloves—were returned to Ducksworth because he had a valid receipt for them, although
Ducksworth represents that he never received them. (Dkt. #29-11 at 3; Ducksworth Decl.
(dkt. #37) ¶¶ 5-6.) 	Ducksworth also declares that Officer Kinas broke a pair of his
headphones while searching his cell. (Ducksworth Decl. (dkt. #37) ¶ 11.)
Later that day, on June 10, 2023, Ducksworth filed a second inmate complaint
against Officer Kinas stating that “he broke [his] headphones during a cell search.” (Dkt.
#29-5, at 11.) He further claimed in the complaint that Officer Kinas “searched [his] cell
after [he] filed a complaint against him.” (Id. at 11-12.)
On June 16, 2023, the same day that she actually responded to Ducksworth’s first
complaint about Officer Kinas, ICE Dougherty also responded to this second complaint.
(Id. at 2.) 	ICE Dougherty also explained that she had not started her investigation into
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the June 8 complaint before the cell search occurred on June 10, so no prison official
outside of herself knew about the June 8 complaint before June 10. (Id.) Specifically, in
her written disposition, she stated: “prior to the . . . submission of this complaint [on June
10, 2023], [she] did not speak to [Kinas’s supervisor], CO Kinas or any other staff person
regarding his previous complaint . . . Therefore, unless [inmate] Ducksworth told CO Kinas
[that] he submitted the complaint, his claim of retaliation cannot be substantiated.” (Id.)
In general, inmate complaint examiners must keep a complaint confidential, except to the
degree necessary to investigate the complaint. Wis. Admin. Code §§ DOC 310.16(1)-(2).
Ducksworth does not represent on the record that he ever told Officer Kinas about his June
8 complaint any time before the cell search on June 10.
After June 10, ICE Dougherty did contact Officer Kinas directly to investigate the
second 	complaint 	relating 	to 	the 	allegation 	that 	Officer 	Kinas 	broke 	Ducksworth’s
headphones. 	(Dkt. #29-5, at 2.) 	Ultimately, ICE Doughtery recommended dismissal of
the second complaint due to insufficient evidence to support the allegations. 	(Id.) 	ICE
Dougherty’s recommendation of dismissal was followed at all levels of complaint appeal
and review, and no discipline was taken against Kinas. (Id. at 9.)
C. Door Incident and Plaintiff’s Subsequent Medical Treatment
A few weeks later, on the morning of July 1, 2023, Officer Kinas had been speaking
to Ducksworth’s cellmate, Jonathan Cole, about picking up his bedding from the laundry
after Cole returned from disciplinary segregation. 	(PFOF (dkt. #41) ¶¶ 43-44.) 	After
consulting the laundry department about the status of the bedding, Officer Kinas
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approached Cole and Ducksworth’s cell to let Cole know that the bedding was ready for
pickup. (Id. ¶ 44.) While Officer Kinas stated that he could see Cole through the window
of the cell as he approached, he declares that he could not see Ducksworth, who he says
was standing near the outlets and trashcan closest to the door, which is not an area visible
through the cell window. (Kinas Decl. (dkt. #30) ¶ 42.) In contrast, Ducksworth declares
that he was sitting at a desk visible through the cell window. 	(Ducksworth Decl. (dkt.
#37) ¶ 38.)
Officer Kinas then opened the wooden door to the cell, but did not need to push
hard to open it because it is light. (PFOF (dkt. #41) ¶ 51.) Even so, Officer Kinas admits
that he accidentally, gently hit Ducksworth’s shoulder as he opened the door and
immediately apologized to Ducksworth, explaining that he had not seen him as he
approached and he hit him by accident. 	(Kinas Decl. (dkt. #30) ¶ 44; PFOF (dkt. #41)
¶¶ 53-54.)
Again, in contrast, Ducksworth declares that Officer Kinas forcefully opened the
door and hit him in the head. (Ducksworth Decl. (dkt. #37) ¶ 1.) Cole also attests that
Officer Kinas hit Ducksworth in the head when he opened the door. 	(Cole Decl. (dkt.
#39) ¶ 1.) Ducksworth also attests that immediately after the incident, he was dizzy and
in pain. 	(Ducksworth Decl. (dkt. #37) ¶ 29.) 	Within about an hour of the incident,
Ducksworth went to the officer station and requested to go to the Health Services Unit.
(PFOF (dkt. #41) ¶¶ 65-66.) He saw the nurse later that day and reported pain after being
hit on the head by the door. (Id. ¶ 70.)
He declares that he also reported bruising and swelling on his head when he saw the
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nurse. (Ducksworth Decl. (dkt. #37) ¶ 29.) However, the nurse’s report states, “patient
does not have a bump, no bruising. Neuro check was done and no visual disturbance, no
dizziness. Patient does state that he has a headache.” (Dkt. #29-1, at 14.) Ducksworth’s
vital signs and neurological assessment were also normal and within normal limits; and the
report does not indicate that Ducksworth had lost consciousness at any time that day. (Id.,
at 12-14; Wheatley Decl. (dkt. #32) ¶ 9.) 	Instead, Ducksworth was diagnosed with
“altered comfort,” then given ice and acetaminophen. (Dkt. #29-1, at 14.)
A few days later, on July 4, 2023, Ducksworth returned to HSU, complaining of
headaches. (Dkt. #29-1, at 11.) The nurse’s notes state as follows: “He has had a headache
off and on since the incident[.] The swelling has gone down but he still has one area that
causes pain when touched. 	Discussed concussion s[ymptoms] and how to treat. . . . He
was given Tylenol to continue to use for the headache[.] He [h]as no neuro deficits noted.”
(Id.) 	At this same appointment, Ducksworth declares the nurse diagnosed “a mild
concussion.” 	(Ducksworth Decl. (dkt #37) ¶ 20.) 	The diagnosis in the nurse’s report,
however, was again “altered comfort,” as well as “potential altered neuro status.” 	(Dkt.
#29-1, at 11.) Otherwise, Ducksworth’s neurological assessment and vital signs were once
more reported as normal. (Id.; Wheatley Decl. (dkt. #32) ¶ 10.)
Shortly 	after, 	on 	July 	19, 	2023, 	Ducksworth 	was 	transferred 	to 	Oshkosh
Correctional Institution. (PFOF (dkt. #41) ¶ 76.) There, he continued to visit the HSU
periodically and complain of headaches, and he reports still having headaches. 	(PFOF
(dkt. #41) ¶¶ 77, 81, 86, 90; Ducksworth Decl. (dkt. #37) ¶ 42.) 	In each visit in the
record, 	Ducksworth 	was 	given 	ibuprofen 	and/or 	acetaminophen 	to 	treat, 	and 	his
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neurological assessments and vital signs remained normal. 	(PFOF (dkt. #41) ¶¶ 77, 81,
86, 90; Wheatley Decl. (dkt. #32) ¶¶ 12-15.)
OPINION
Summary judgment is appropriate if the moving party shows that “there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact[,] and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 	If the moving party meets this burden, then the
nonmoving party must provide evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the
nonmoving party to survive summary judgment. 	Trade Fin. Partners, LLC v. AAR Corp.,
573 F.3d 401, 406-07 (7th Cir. 2009). 	In reviewing the evidence, “the court must draw
all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility
determinations or weigh the evidence.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S.
133, 150 (2000).
I. 	First Amendment Retaliation Claim
To prevail on a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must establish
that someone deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United
States, and whoever deprived him of this right was acting under the color of state law. D.S.
v. E. Porter Cnty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015). Here, plaintiff alleges that
defendant violated his First Amendment rights by retaliating against him after he filed two
inmate complaints. To prevail on a First Amendment retaliation claim, plaintiff must show
that: “(1) he engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment; (2) he suffered a
deprivation that would likely deter First Amendment activity in the future; and (3) the
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First Amendment activity was ‘at least a motivating factor’ in the [defendant's] decision to
take the retaliatory action.” Gomez v. Randle, 680 F.3d 859, 866 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting
Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 546 (7th Cir. 2009)).
For the first element, plaintiff’s filing of a non-frivolous grievance about conditions
of confinement is an activity protected by the First Amendment. Holleman v. Zatecky, 951
F.3d 873, 878 (7th Cir. 2020). 	For the second element, plaintiff alleges that defendant
retaliated by subjecting him to a cell search, taking disciplinary action against him, and
hitting him with a door. This element is also satisfied because performing a cell search and
taking subsequent disciplinary actions against an inmate, as well as physically harming an
inmate could dissuade an inmate of ordinary firmness from exercising First Amendment
activity. Manuel v. Nalley, 966 F.3d 678, 680 (7th Cir. 2020); McKinley v. Schoenbeck, 731
F. App'x 511, 515 (7th Cir. 2018).
For the third element, plaintiff “must produce sufficient evidence to show that his
protected speech was at least a ‘motivating factor” in the defendant’s alleged retaliatory . . .
actions taken against him.” Kidwell v. Eisenhauer, 679 F.3d 957, 965 (7th Cir. 2012). Such
evidence must show “a causal link between the protected activity and the unlawful
retaliation.” Manuel, 966 F.3d at 680. Plaintiff may demonstrate a “causal link” through
“circumstantial evidence. . . includ[ing] suspicious timing, ambiguous oral or written
statements, or behavior.” 	Kidwell, 679 F.3d at 965 (citation omitted). However, the
protected activity could not have motivated the defendant to retaliate unless the defendant
knew about the protected activity beforehand. 	McGreal v. Vill. of Orland Park, 850 F.3d
308, 313 (7th Cir. 2017).
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A defendant’s knowledge of plaintiff’s grievance against him, without more, is
insufficient to demonstrate that defendant had a retaliatory motive or that his legitimate
motive is pretextual. Jones v. Van Lanen, 27 F.4th 1280, 1284 (7th Cir. 2022). Likewise,
the fact that disciplinary action takes place after the plaintiff files a grievance is insufficient
to establish a causal inference on its own, especially where significant time has elapsed
between the protected activity and the allegedly retaliatory conduct. 	See Sweet v. Town of
Bargersville, 18 F.4th 273, 279 (7th Cir. 2021) (“Though there is ‘no set legal rule[,] ... we
typically allow no more than a few days to elapse between the protected activity and the
adverse action’ . . . to support an inference of retaliatory motive”) (citing Kidwell, 679 F.3d
at 966); Kidwell, 679 F.3d at 969 (holding five weeks between protected activity and
purported retaliatory act too long to support inference of retaliatory motive.) Nonetheless,
the court must consider whether the evidence presented by plaintiff altogether allows a
reasonable jury to infer that his protected activity was a motivating factor for the retaliatory
act. See Greene v. Doruff, 660 F.3d 975, 980 (7th Cir. 2011).
Further, a defendant does not violate the First Amendment when he provides a
legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the allegedly retaliatory conduct, and the reason
shows that the same conduct would have occurred in the absence of the protected activity.
Winston v. Fuchs, 837 F. App'x 402, 404 (7th Cir. 2020). Moreover, significant deference
is owed to prison official’s non-retaliatory justifications for their conduct “when responding
to grievances and maintaining order in a volatile environment.” Holleman, 951 F.3d at 880.
Specifically, to rebut defendant’s legitimate reason for his conduct, plaintiff must then
provide “some evidence that places [defendant’s] rationale in dispute,” and indicates that
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the rationale was dishonest or pretextual. 	Perkins v. Koehler, No. 24-1508, 2024 WL
4835249, at *2 (7th Cir. Nov. 20, 2024).
A. Claim as to Defendant’s Conduct during the Cell Search
As to defendant’s conduct during the June 10 cell search, plaintiff’s claim fails at
the third element since there is insufficient evidence in the record for a reasonable jury to
find that plaintiff’s First Amendment activity was a motivating factor for defendant’s
allegedly retaliatory acts. 	Specifically, plaintiff presents no evidence in the record from
which a reasonable jury could infer that defendant knew about plaintiff’s June 8 inmate
complaint against him at the time of the search. To show that defendant knew about the
complaint before June 10, plaintiff points only to ICE Dougherty’s statement in the
resolution of the June 8 complaint that defendant’s supervisor would discuss the underlying
incident with him. 	However, the evidence also shows that: (1) ICE Dougherty did not
start her investigation into plaintiff’s complaint, or speak to defendant’s supervisor about
the complaint, on or before June 10, 2023; (2) plaintiff does not state he told defendant
about the complaint that he filed against him between June 8 and June 10; and (3) inmate
complaints are otherwise confidential as a matter of law under Wis. Admin. Code § DOC
310.16(1), such that defendant could not have found out about the complaint on his own.
In this way, no jury could reasonably infer under the undisputed facts that defendant knew
about plaintiff’s protected activity before he searched plaintiff’s cell on June 10. Therefore,
plaintiff’s 	protected activity could not 	have been 	a 	‘motivating factor’ 	for 	any of
defendant’s allegedly retaliatory conduct relating to the cell search, and defendant is
entitled to summary judgment on this aspect of plaintiff’s retaliation claim. McGreal, 850
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F.3d at 313.
B. Claim as to Defendant Hitting Plaintiff with Cell Door
As to defendant hitting plaintiff with the cell door, drawing all inferences from the
record in favor of the plaintiff, he presents sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury
could infer that his complaints were a ‘motivating factor’ for defendant’s retaliatory acts,
such that this aspect of this claim must proceed to trial.2 	First, a reasonable jury could
infer that defendant knew about the June 8 complaint by July 1, as the record showed his
supervisor planned to discuss the underlying incident with him. Second, the record plainly
shows that defendant knew about the June 10 complaint, since the complaint examiner
contacted him directly about that complaint during her investigation. 	Third, drawing
inferences most favorable to plaintiff from the record, only two weeks passed between the
end of the complaint investigation and the retaliatory conduct. 	Considering these
circumstances together, a reasonable jury could infer that plaintiff’s complaints were a
‘motivating factor’ for defendant to hit plaintiff with the door, such that there is a triable
issue of fact. 	Greene, 660 F.3d at 980. 	Finally, though defendant certainly provides a
legitimate justification for entering plaintiff’s cell, defendant’s conduct of hitting plaintiff
with the door hard enough to cause significant pain as he did so (accepting plaintiff’s
version of events at this stage without weighing credibility) has no legitimate penological
2 Defendant argues that plaintiff was not allowed to proceed on the claim that defendant hit him
with the cell door in retaliation for filing a grievance against him, and thus, it should not be
considered; however, the court’s screening order explicitly allowed plaintiff to proceed with this
claim. (Dkt. #11, at 2.)
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justification such that defendant could have met his burden to rebut plaintiff’s prima facie
case. 	See Winston, 837 F. App'x at 404. 	As such, defendant is not entitled to summary
judgment, and this aspect of plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim shall proceed to
trial.
II. Eighth Amendment Claim
Plaintiff also makes a § 1983 claim that defendant violated his Eighth Amendment
right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment by hitting him with a cell door. 	To
proceed with a claim that plaintiff suffered constitutional harm under § 1983, plaintiff
must put forth sufficient evidence in the record to show that he suffered a legally cognizable
injury. 	Lord v. Beahm, 952 F.3d 902, 905 (7th Cir. 2020) (holding that one instance of
minor cuts is not cognizable injury); Douglas v. Schwartz-Oscar, No. 20-3489, 2021 WL
6102971, at *2 (7th Cir. Dec. 22, 2021) (same); Steinke v. Krueger, No. 21-2049, 2021 WL
5399873, at *2 (7th Cir. Nov. 18, 2021) (one instance of “fleeting discomfort” not legally
cognizable injury.) Here, accepting plaintiff’s version of events as true, the injuries that he
alleges are legally cognizable—getting hit in the head hard enough to cause significant pain
exceeds the severity of a minor cut treatable by a bandage, and headaches that persist for
months also exceed one instance of fleeting discomfort.
Turning to the Eighth Amendment, its prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment
protects 	prisoners 	from 	conditions 	of 	confinement 	that 	“involve 	the 	wanton 	and
unnecessary infliction of pain” unconnected from any legitimate penological purpose.
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981). 	“In cases involving the claimed use of
excessive force, ‘the core judicial inquiry’ is ‘whether force was applied in a good-faith effort
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to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.’” Outlaw v.
Newkirk, 259 F.3d 833, 837 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7
(1992). Several factors are relevant to this inquiry, including “the need for an application
of force, the relationship between that need and the force applied, the threat reason ably
perceived by the responsible officers, the efforts made to temper the severity of the force
employed, and the extent of the injury suffered by the prisoner.” Id. (citations omitted).
“While significant injury is not required, a claim ordinarily cannot be predicated
upon a de minimis use of physical force. . . . [N]ot every push or shove by a prison guard
violates a prisoner's constitutional rights.” DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607, 620 (7th Cir.
2000) (shove by prison guard resulting only in bruising insufficient to show excessive use
of force); Fillmore v. Page, 358 F.3d 496, 505 (7th Cir. 2004) (incidental bumping resulting
in discomfort and sore wrists “not enough to meet the constitutional threshold for excessive
force”). Though it is not the only factor considered in an Eighth Amendment claim, “the
extent of injury is relevant to the Eighth Amendment inquiry because it provides some
indication of the amount of force applied.” McCottrell, 933 F.3d at 664.
Here, drawing all reasonable inferences from the record in the light most favorable
to plaintiff, he has alleged sufficient facts such that a reasonable jury could find for him on
his Eighth Amendment claim. Plaintiff declares that defendant hit him forcefully, resulting
in a bump and bruise on his head, dizziness, and pain, which resulted in prolonged
headaches. Given plaintiff’s proffered evidence that he was seated at the desk in his cell,
making him visible through the cell door, and defendant nonetheless opened the door and
hit plaintiff, resulting in the aforementioned injuries, a reasonable jury could infer that
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such force was not applied in “a good-faith effort to maintain” order in the prison, but
rather to cause harm to plaintiff. 	Outlaw, 259 F.3d at 237. Because the facts material to
plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim are genuinely disputed, defendant is not entitled to
summary judgment, and plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim will proceed to trial.
III. Qualified Immunity
Alternatively, defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity on
plaintiff’s claims. 	Qualified immunity protects a government official from civil liability
when a reasonable officer in his position would have known that his conduct does not
violate a clearly established constitutional right. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231
(2009); Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015). 	Constitutional rights are clearly
established when existing precedent places the right at issue beyond debate. See Ashcroft v.
al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011); Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002).
At the time of defendant’s alleged actions, it was clearly established in this circuit
that a plaintiff has a constitutional right not to be physically harmed due to his protected
First Amendment activity. 	McKinley, 731 F. App'x at 515. 	At the same time, the
constitutional 	prohibition 	on 	physically 	harming 	an 	inmate 	absent 	any 	legitimate
penological justification was clearly established. 	Outlaw, 259 F.3d at 237.
To determine whether a defendant’s actions violated clearly established law, the
court must again view the evidence at summary judgment in the light most favorable to
the nonmovant and may not weigh evidence or resolve disputed issues in favor of the
moving party. Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 657 (2014). Further, the court should deny
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a motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity when “the facts, taken in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff, create a genuine dispute about whether the
defendants’ actions violated a clearly established constitutional right.” 	Estate of Clark v.
Walker, 865 F.3d 544, 550 (7th Cir. 2017). In other words, “when the qualified immunity
inquiry cannot be disentangled from disputed facts, the issue cannot be resolved without
a trial.” Gonzalez v. City of Elgin, 578 F.3d 526, 540 (7th Cir. 2009).
Because the question of defendant’s qualified immunity is so entangled with
disputed material facts as to liability on both of plaintiff’s remaining claims, the court must
deny defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this question as well, at least until
better resolved at trial. 	Id. 	Indeed, the entire course of conduct underlying plaintiff’s
claims is disputed by the parties, particularly as to whether defendant knew about
plaintiff’s first grievance when he opened the cell door, what he saw before he opened the
cell door, the extent of force used to do so, and the extent of plaintiff’s actual injuries.
Accordingly, the court must also deny defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to
qualified immunity until material factual disputes are resolved at trial. Id.
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that:
1) Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (dkt. #26) is GRANTED in part on
plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim relating to defendant’s conduct
during the cell search.
2) Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (dkt. #26) is DENIED as to:
a) 	Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim relating to defendant’s
conduct opening plaintiff’s cell door.
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b) Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment excessive force claim.
3) Defendant’s motion for a stay pending summary judgment (dkt. #48) is
DENIED as moot.
4) The deadline for all Submissions for Final Pretrial Conference is EXTENDED
to January 30, 2026, and the responses shall be due on February 6. 2026.
5) Plaintiff is given LEAVE TO AMEND his pre-trial filings (Dkts. ##44-47) to
reflect that only the claims related to the cell door incident, and not the cell
search, shall proceed to trial.
Entered this 15th day of January, 2026.
BY THE COURT:
/s/
__________________________________
WILLIAM M. CONLEY
District Judge
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