Taylor, Alvin v. Van Rybroek, Gregory

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN
ALVIN TAYLOR,
Petitioner, OPINION AND ORDER
v.
21-cv-440-wmc
GREGORY VAN RYBROEK,
Respondent.
After being found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect on four counts of
first-degree murder, and now committed to the Wisconsin Department of Health Services
(“DHS”), petitioner Alvin Taylor has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28
U.S.C § 2254. Specifically, Taylor argues that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals misapplied
the standard of proof articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Foucha v.
Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992), in rejecting his arguments that the Wisconsin statute
governing petitions for conditional release, Wis. Stat. § 971.17(4)(d), is unconstitutional
facially and as applied to him. For the reasons explained below, the court will deny Taylor’s
petition.
BACKGROUND1
A. Taylor is Charged and Committed
Taylor killed four people over the course of several years in the 1980s. He
subsequently pleaded not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect (“NGI”) on four
1 Unless otherwise noted, the facts are drawn from the Wisconsin Court of Appeals’ decision. (Dkt.
#8-5.)
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counts of first-degree murder in violation of Wis. Stat. § 940.01 (1985-86) and “guilty/no
contest” to one count of attempted murder over the course of four, separate criminal
proceedings in Dunn, Eau Claire, and Washington counties.2 Absent his NGI plea, the
maximum penalty for first-degree murder would have been life imprisonment. Ultimately,
he was committed to the DHS for an indeterminate period based on a diagnosis of
“psychotic spectrum disorder.” (Dkt. #8-10, at 133.)
B. Taylor’s Petition for Conditional Release and Hearing
Under Wis. Stat. § 971.17(4)(d) (2017-18), a Wisconsin circuit court “shall grant
[a petition for conditional release] unless it finds by clear and convincing evidence that
[petitioner] would pose a significant risk of bodily harm to himself or herself or to others
or of serious property damage if conditionally released.” The statute further instructs that,
[i]n making this determination, the court may consider without limitation
because of enumeration, the nature and circumstances of the crime, the
person’s mental history and present mental condition, where the person will
live, how the person will support himself or herself, what arrangements are
available to ensure that the person has access to and will take necessary
medication, and what arrangements are possible for treatment beyond
medication.
Id.
Having unsuccessfully petitioned for his conditional release repeatedly since 2013,
Taylor filed another petition for conditional release in April 2017 in Washington County
Circuit Court, State v. Taylor, Case No. 1987CF000368A. The circuit court then ordered
psychological examinations by Drs. Deborah Collins and William Merrick to evaluate
2 See Case Nos. 1987CF000021; 1987CF000030 1987CF000467 (one count attempted murder
and one count first-degree murder); 1987CF000368A.
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whether it would be appropriate to release him conditionally. (Dkt. #8-2, at 31, 51.) In
their respective reports, Drs. Collins and Merrick agreed that Taylor had not displayed
signs or symptoms of a psychotic spectrum disorder for many years; and Dr. Collins noted
that he was no longer prescribed psychotropic medication. (Dkt. #8-2, at 45, 63.) Even
so, the doctors agreed that Taylor still had an unspecified personality disorder with
antisocial and narcissistic traits, along with alcohol and cannabis use disorders in remission
in a controlled environment. (Id. at 45, 60.)
Ultimately, Dr. Collins recommended against granting Taylor’s petition because he
continued to pose a significant risk of bodily harm to himself or others. In particular,
Collins noted: Taylor’s rule violations at Mendota Mental Health Institute (“MMHI”),
like self-publishing an autobiographical book; his “boundary issues” with MMHI staff; his
history of violence; and Taylor’s belief that any purported recovery from past psychotic
symptoms was the result of his personal will, which is inconsistent with the documented
course of his actual mental illness. (Id. at 44-45.) For his part, Dr. Merrick supported
Taylor’s conditional release, although he also recommended “round-the-clock” supervision
and support. (Id. at 64.) In concluding that release would be appropriate, Merrick
emphasized Taylor’s stable mental condition; lack of psychiatric symptoms; and his “very
low” risk of causing harm to himself, others, or property. (Id. at 62-63.) As for Taylor’s
book, Merrick opined that it “offers exactly what Dr. Collins noted was required to
understand with reasonable professional certainty the psychological ‘underpinnings’ of
those heinous murders he committed in the mid-1980s.” (Id. at 62.)
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Next, MMHI staffers, including Taylor’s psychiatrist, Dr. Odette Anderson, wrote
a letter recommending against Taylor’s release. (Id. at 46-50.) Specifically, these staffers
noted that Taylor: (1) ignored a staff directive that he could not speak with an IT person;
(2) walked into a small linen closet without permission to help a female staff member reach
something, while commenting, “I’m just so comfortable with you, I forget . . . See this is
why they should let me out”; and (3) published an autobiographical book despite staff
having denied him permission to do so. (Id. at 47-48.)
The circuit court then held a three-day hearing, at which Dr. Collins testified that
Taylor had a “personality disorder,” as “distinguish[ed] from a mental illness proper,”
explaining the former reflected “an individual’s characteristic way of seeing the world.”
(Dkt. #8-10, at 144.) Dr. Collins further testified that Taylor had not engaged in “overt
acts of violence” since 2010, but had felt compelled to kill another patient at MMHI and
had several rule and security violations. (Id. at 165-66.) Dr. Merrick added that most of
Taylor’s recent rule violations were relatively insignificant, and he had no major rule
violations for many years. (Id. at 225-26.) While disagreeing with Collins’ testimony that
a personality disorder was not a mental illness, testifying that “[i]t is a mental condition,”
Merrick further opined that Taylor’s delusional disorder had remitted over time, initially
with psychoactive medications, then through therapy and strong relationships with
treatment providers. (Id. at 243, 291-92.) Finally, as his treating psychiatrist, Dr.
Anderson testified that she still recommended against Taylor’s release because he posed a
significant risk to himself and others, noting in particular that Taylor broke rules and
pushed boundaries, even in his highly structured environment. (Id. at 26-32.)
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C. Circuit Court 2018 Denial of Taylor’s Petition
In a March 2018 oral decision, Washington County Circuit Judge Andrew Gonring
denied Taylor’s petition for release, explaining that the outcome “hinge[d] on … the nature
and circumstances of the crime and Mr. Taylor’s mental history and present mental
condition.” (Dkt. #8-11, at 32-33.) As for the former, Judge Gonring summarized that
Taylor “basically in cold blood executed four innocent individuals in three separate
counties.” (Id. at 34.) As for the latter, the judge acknowledged Taylor’s history of
treatment at MMHI since 1988, noting that the accuracy of his original diagnosis of
“psychotic spectrum disorder” was a “double-edged sword” because, if the diagnosis was
correct, it raised the question of whether it might return once Taylor was released from
confinement, but if he never had that mental illness, it left the court to speculate about
why he became a serial killer. (Id. at 34-35.) In any event, the court noted that Drs.
Collins and Merrick were “essentially in agreement” that Taylor currently had a
“personality disorder not otherwise specified with antisocial and narcissistic traits together
with cannabis and alcohol dependency in remission in a structured setting.” (Id. at 35-36.)
Ultimately, the court found that Taylor posed a significant risk of harm to others if
conditionally released based, in large part, on the letter from MMHI staff who know him
best and “clearly think Mr. Taylor cannot be safely released to the community.” (Id. at
42-43.) The court also noted that the opinions of the MMHI staff aligned with Dr.
Collins’s opinion that Taylor was not ready for release. (Id.) As for Dr. Merrick’s lone
support for Taylor’s release, Judge Gonring noted that even he found Taylor would need
24-hour supervision upon release. (Id. at 34.)
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D. Postconviction Motion and Direct Appeal
In 2019, pointing out the “State may also confine a mentally ill person if it shows
‘by clear and convincing evidence that the individual is mentally ill and dangerous,’”
Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80 (quoting Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 362 (1983)), Taylor
next filed a “postdisposition” motion, asserting that Wis. Stat. § 971.17(4)(d) is
unconstitutional facially and as applied to him. Taylor argued that there was no evidence
that he remained mentally ill, and under Foucha, it was unconstitutional to confine a non-
mentally ill person under an insanity commitment. The circuit court denied the
postdisposition motion in April 2019, determining that it was bound by State v. Randall,
192 Wis. 2d 800, 532 N.W.2d 94 (1995), which held “that it is not a denial of due process
to confine an insanity acquittee who has committed a criminal act to a state mental health
facility for as long as that individual is considered dangerous, provided that the
commitment does not exceed the maximum term of imprisonment which could have been
imposed for the offense charged.” (Dkt. #8-6, at 80-81.)
Taylor then appealed to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals. (Dkt. #8-2, at 2-26.) In
2020, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals summarily affirmed the circuit court’s denial of
Taylor’s petition for conditional release and postdisposition motion. First, concluding that
it, too, was bound by Randall, the court rejected Taylor’s facial challenge to Wis. Stat.
§ 971.17(4)(d). Second, the court rejected Taylor’s as-applied challenge, concluding that
“[n]ot much separates Taylor’s facial challenge from his as-applied challenge.” (Dkt. #8-5,
at 6.) As a result, again reasoning that it was bound by Randall, the court held that
“confinement of an acquittee can continue when he or she poses a danger and ‘so long as
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the state houses the acquittee in a facility appropriate to his or her condition and provides
the acquittee with care and treatment to overcome that which makes him or her
dangerous.’” (Id. at 6-7 (quoting Randall, 192 Wis. 2d at 833-34).) Since Taylor made
no argument suggesting that was not the case, the court of appeals affirmed. Id. Thereafter,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court denied Taylor’s petition for review. (Dkt. #8-8.)
OPINION
Before this court, petitioner argues that he is no longer mentally ill, and therefore,
his continued confinement is a violation of Foucha. More specifically, he asserts that
Wisconsin’s alleged failure to consider his current mental status in deciding whether to
conditionally release him from confinement under Wis. Stat. § 971.17(4)(d) is a violation
of his due process rights. As he did in state court, the court understands petitioner to be
asserting that § 971.17(4)(d) is unconstitutional both facially and as applied to him.
Federal courts may grant a state prisoner’s habeas petition only if the state court’s
denial of relief “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” or “was
based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented.”
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). The court does not understand petitioner to challenge the
state court’s factual findings, nor could he on this record, so the sole issue presented is
whether the Wisconsin Court of Appeals’ decision either: (1) reaches a conclusion on a
question of law opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court; or (2) decides a case
differently than the Supreme Court has on materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v.
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Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). For the application of law to be unreasonable, the
decision must be “so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and
comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.”
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011). It is petitioner’s burden to show an error
under § 2254(d). Westray v. Brookhart, 36 F.4th 737, 746 (7th Cir. 2022).
In Foucha, petitioner Terry Foucha was charged by Louisiana authorities with
aggravated burglary and illegal discharge of a firearm, and he was committed to a mental
health facility after the trial court found him not guilty by reason of insanity. 504 U.S. at
73-74. Louisiana’s statutory scheme provided that, “[w]hen a defendant in a criminal case
pending in Louisiana is found not guilty by reason of insanity, he is committed to a
psychiatric hospital unless he proves that he is not dangerous.” Id. at 73. After four years
of confinement, the superintendent of a Louisiana mental health facility recommended
that Foucha be discharged or released. Id. at 74. A two-doctor “sanity commission” further
reported that Foucha was “presently in remission from mental illness,” but explained that
they were unable to “certify that he would not constitute a menace to himself or others if
released.” Id. at 74-75. In particular, the doctors noted that while Foucha had “an
antisocial personality,” that condition was not a “mental disease” or “treatable.” Id. at 75.
Based on these findings, a state trial court determined that Foucha was dangerous to
himself and others and ordered him returned to the mental institution. Id. Louisiana’s
appellate courts affirmed the trial court, and the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Id.
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Because it was undisputed that he was not mentally ill at the time of the lower
court’s hearing, four Supreme Court justices determined that “the basis for holding Foucha
in a psychiatric facility as an insanity acquittee has disappeared, and the State is no longer
entitled to hold him on that basis.” Id. at 78. Those four also rejected Louisiana’s assertion
that it could continue to confine Foucha based solely on an antisocial personality that
made him dangerous to himself and others. Id. Even if Foucha’s continued confinement
were constitutionally permissible, the plurality further reasoned that based on a finding of
dangerousness alone, keeping him against his will in a mental institution was inappropriate
absent a determination in civil commitment proceedings that he was mentally ill with
“constitutionally adequate procedures to establish the grounds for his confinement.” Id.
at 78-79. Regardless, because Louisiana conceded that Foucha was not suffering from a
mental disease or illness, and due process “requires that the nature of commitment bear
some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed,” the
plurality held that Foucha could no longer be held as a mentally ill person and, because
Foucha was never convicted, Louisiana had no interest in punishing him. Id. at 79-80.
Justice O’Connor cast the fifth and deciding vote in a concurring opinion. Although
she agreed with the majority that Louisiana’s scheme violated the Due Process Clause, she
wrote separately to emphasize the limitations of the Court’s holding:
Louisiana asserts that it may indefinitely confine Terry Foucha in a mental
facility because, although not mentally ill, he might be dangerous to himself
or to others if released. For the reasons given in Part II of the Court’s opinion,
this contention should be rejected. I write separately, however, to emphasize
that the Court’s opinion addresses only the specific statutory scheme before
us, which broadly permits indefinite confinement of sane insanity acquittees
in psychiatric facilities. This case does not require us to pass judgment on
more narrowly drawn laws that provide for detention of insanity acquittees,
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or on statutes that provide for punishment of persons who commit crimes
while mentally ill.
I do not understand the Court to hold that Louisiana may never confine
dangerous insanity acquittees after they regain mental health.
Id. at 86-87 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
By way of further explanation, Justice O’Connor noted that an insanity defense only
became relevant under Louisiana law after the prosecution had already established that the
defendant committed criminal acts beyond a reasonable doubt, providing “concrete
evidence” of the defendant’s dangerousness. Id. at 87. By contrast, she noted that “the
only certain thing that can be said about the present state of knowledge and therapy
regarding mental disease is that science has not reached finality of judgment.” Id.
(alteration adopted and quotation marks omitted). Thus, in her view, it might be
permissible for Louisiana to confine an insanity acquittee who has regained sanity “if the
nature and duration of detention were tailored to reflect pressing public safety concerns
related to the acquittee’s continuing dangerousness.” Id. at 87-88. Still, Justice O’Connor
explained that to confine an acquittee solely as a mental patient, the State would require
“some medical justification for doing so.” Id. at 88.
Three years after Foucha, the Wisconsin Supreme Court issued its opinion in
Randall, reading Foucha “to permit the continued confinement of dangerous but sane
acquittees in a mental health facility, so long as they are treated in a manner consistent
with the purposes of their commitment, e.g., there must be a medical justification to
continue holding a sane but dangerous insanity acquittee in a mental health facility.” 192
Wis. 2d at 807. Relatedly, Randall concluded that “[t]o be constitutionally permissible,
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the continued confinement of a sane but dangerous insanity acquittee in a mental health
facility[ ] must have some therapeutic value.” Id. at 817. The Randall court also
distinguished Wis. Stat. § 971.17(4)(d) from Louisiana’s unconstitutional scheme because
Wisconsin law did not authorize “indefinite” detention; instead, it limited time in
detention to that justified by the sentence for the underlying criminal conduct, then placing
the burden of further justifying detention on the state, while the petitioner had the burden
in Louisiana. Id. at 808. With these rulings in mind, the court turns to petitioner’s facial
and as-applied challenges here.
I. Facial Challenge
Petitioner argues that Wis. Stat. § 971.17(4)(d) facially violates the U.S.
Constitution because it permits confinement of insanity acquittees who are no longer
mentally ill. However, the Seventh Circuit recently rejected that same argument in Stowe
v. Rybroek, 114 F.4th 630 (7th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1101, 220 L. Ed. 2d 407
(2025). As here, Stowe had argued that “Wis. Stat. § 971.17(4)(d) violates the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as understood in [Foucha], because it allows
the state to keep in custody someone who is a danger to self or others without finding that
this person also has a mental disease or defect.” Id. at 632. Because Justice O’Connor
provided the controlling vote, the Seventh Circuit held that her separate concurrence
limited the scope of the holding in Foucha, “stress[ing] features of Louisiana’s system that
§ 971.17 does not share.” Id. at 633. Thus, the Seventh Circuit emphasized that a
“decision that turns on elements specific to one state’s system does not ‘clearly establish’
the invalidity of another state’s system,” explaining that it did not “see a stark
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incompatibility between the Wisconsin Randall and Justice O’Connor’s views.” Id.
Accordingly, even if petitioner in this case is confined indefinitely, such confinement would
be consistent with Wisconsin’s life sentence for first-degree murder. Wis. Stat.
§ 939.50(3)(a). Regardless, the Seventh Circuit determined that even if Randall misread
Justice O’Connor’s concurrence, “the fact remains that § 971.17(4)(d) permits courts to
consider evidence of a detainee’s ‘present mental condition[,]’” which for many people,
would include proof of ongoing mental disease. Id. at 634. Thus, the court concluded that
“it assuredly cannot be confident that no set of circumstances exists under which [§
971.17(4)(d)] would be valid,” as is required for facial constitutional challenges arising
under amendments other than the First Amendment. Id. Based on this recent, binding
precedent alone, therefore, the court must reject petitioner’s facial challenge to Wis. Stat.
§ 971.17(4)(d).
II. As-Applied Challenge
The court understands petitioner is also asserting that Wis. Stat. § 971.17(4)(d) is
unconstitutional as applied to him in particular because he suffered from a psychotic
spectrum disorder at the time of his commitment and experts now agree that he no longer
suffers from that condition. Thus, he argues, there is no evidence that he has a “current,
qualifying mental condition.” (Pet. Br. (dkt. #9) 21.)
To begin, petitioner’s as-applied argument depends on the correctness of his
assertion that his current diagnosis of a “personality disorder with narcissistic and
antisocial traits along with his cannabis and alcohol use disorders” are not considered
“mental diseases or defects” under Wisconsin law. E.g., Wis. Stat. § 971.15(2) (“As used
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in this chapter, the terms ‘mental disease or defect’ do not include an abnormality
manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct.”) (emphasis added).
Even if petitioner’s conditions would not qualify as mental illnesses under Wisconsin law,
this would be a question of interpretation of state law, not necessarily one warranting
federal habeas relief, which requires an unreasonable application of clearly established
federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991) (“federal
habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law”) (quotation marks omitted).
In fairness to petitioner, he points to both Foucha and the United States Supreme
Court’s later decision in Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997), as support for the
argument that his current diagnosis does not qualify as mental illnesses under federal law.
However, neither case stands for that proposition. See Harris v. Cotton, 365 F.3d 552, 555
(7th Cir. 2004) (“A rule is clearly established only if it is compelled by existing Supreme
Court precedent.”) (quotation marks omitted). First, Foucha did not hold that an antisocial
personality disorder was not a mental illness; instead, a doctor at the state court trial
testified that antisocial personality was “untreatable,” and “not a mental disease,” a
position that Louisiana did not dispute. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 75, 80. In fact, the Supreme
Court later recognized that the term “mental illness” is “devoid of any talismanic
significance,” adding that “psychiatrists disagree widely and frequently on what constitutes
mental illness.” Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 359. Case in point, Drs. Collins and Merrick
disagreed about whether petitioner’s personality disorder was a “mental illness,” and
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Collins testified that MMHI staff saw “no reason” for petitioner to have medication
because they saw “no signs of a mental illness.” (Dkt. #8-10, at 161.)3
Second, under Hendricks, petitioner asserts that “[a] constitutional commitment
statute is one that ‘requires a finding of future dangerousness, and then links that finding
to the existence of a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes it difficult, if
not impossible, for the person to control his dangerous behavior.’” (Pet. Br. (dkt. #9) 23
(quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358).) Although underdeveloped, the court understands
petitioner to be asserting the Wisconsin Court of Appeals unreasonably applied Hendricks,
there being insufficient evidence that he had difficulty controlling his behavior. However,
the Supreme Court’s observation about control in Hendricks does not amount to “clearly
established Federal law.” To the contrary, in Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002),4 the
Supreme Court later clarified that Hendricks required something more than commitment
“without any lack-of-control determination,” but did not require “total or complete lack of
control.” Id. at 411-13 (emphases original). At minimum, “[w]here between these two
extremes a person’s difficulty in controlling his behavior must fall remains open to decision
one case at a time,” prompting the Seventh Circuit to find that the “serious difficulty”
3 Petitioner does not rely on the doctors’ disagreement about whether his personality disorder was
a mental illness or Dr. Collins’s suggestion that he required no medication as grounds for habeas
relief.
4 Hendricks and Crane addressed the constitutionality of Kansas’s “Sexually Violent Predator Act,”
which created “procedures for the civil commitment of persons who, due to a mental abnormality
or a personality disorder, are likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence.” Hendricks, 521
U.S. at 350 (quotation marks omitted).
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standard discussed in Hendricks and Crane is not a “clearly established rule that the state
judiciary could transgress.” Varner v. Monohan, 460 F.3d 861, 864 (7th Cir. 2006).
Even if the control standard discussed in Hendricks were deemed clearly established,
federal law, the record suggests that petitioner continues to have control issues, having
failed to follow boundaries with IT staff, published an autobiographical book against
MMHI staff directives, and walked into a small linen closet with a female MMHI staffer.
All of these events were sufficiently disturbing to be of concern to staff, and while there is
some evidence to the contrary (e.g., his return to maximum privileges at MMHI) (dkt. #8-
2, at 58), the possibility of disagreement is not enough to warrant habeas relief. Harrington,
562 U.S. at 103.
Finally, petitioner alludes to being denied constitutionally adequate procedures to
establish grounds for his continued confinement, but fails to explain why the current
procedures are inadequate. (Pet. Br. (dkt. #9) 23.) Thus, petitioner waived this argument
by not developing it further, and the court will not address it further. United States v.
McGhee, 98 F.4th 816, 824 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 456 (2024). Accordingly,
petitioner has also failed to establish that Wis. Stat. § 971.17(4)(d) is unconstitutional as
applied to him.
III. Certificate of Appealability
The final remaining question on habeas review is whether to grant petitioner a
certificate of appealability. Under Rule 11 of the United States District Courts Rules
Governing Section 2254 cases, the court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability
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when entering a final order adverse to a petitioner. To obtain a certificate of appealability,
the applicant must make a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.”
Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 282 (2004) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2)). A
substantial showing means that “reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that
matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that
the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller
El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003) (quotation marks omitted). While finding
petitioner’s facial challenge barred by Stowe, he is entitled to a certificate of appealability
as to whether Wis. Stat. § 971.17(4)(d) is unconstitutional as applied to him because
reasonable jurists could find the court’s assessment debatable.
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that:
1) Alvin Taylor’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C § 2254 (dkt.
#1) is DENIED.
2) A certificate of appealability under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) is GRANTED as set
forth above.
Entered this 2nd day of February, 2026.
BY THE COURT:
/s/
__________________________________
WILLIAM M. CONLEY
District Judge
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