Teece et al v. The United States Internal Revenue Service et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION
REBECCA SUE TEECE; and RICHARD
KIMBALL TEECE,
Plaintiffs,
v.
THE UNITED STATES INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE, et al.,
Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
TO DENY PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR
DEFAULT AND SUMMARY
JUDGMENT (DOC. NO. 31)
Case No. 2:25-cv-00322
District Judge Howard C. Nielson, Jr.
Magistrate Judge Daphne A. Oberg
This case stems in large part from Rebecca and Richard Teece’s assertion that
they were improperly prosecuted for tax evasion. Proceeding without an attorney, the
Teeces filed this action against several defendants, including the United States Internal
Revenue Service, the Department of the Treasury, and the Department of Justice (the
United States Defendants).1 The Teeces have moved “for default and summary
judgment” against these defendants for failing to respond to the complaint.2 But default
has not been entered against the United States Defendants. And the Teeces have not
1 (See Compl., Doc. No. 1.)
2 (Mot. for Default & Summ. J. (Mot.), Doc. No. 31.)
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moved for summary judgment consistent with the rules. Accordingly, the undersigned
recommends3 the district judge deny the motion.
BACKGROUND
The Teeces filed their complaint on April 25, 2025, asserting claims against the
United States Defendants arising out of the Teeces’ attempt to avoid federal income
tax.4 Three days after filing their complaint, the Teeces purportedly mailed copies to the
IRS, the Treasury Division, the DOJ, and the DOJ’s Civil Tort Claim Division.5 The
Teeces claim these copies were received on May 5, 2025.6 Without citing evidence,
3 This case is referred to the undersigned magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(B). (See Doc. No. 39.)
4 (Compl., Doc. No. 1 at 4–10 (alleging the Teeces submitted a “Revocation of Election”
with the IRS in 2010 that should have changed their statuses to “nontaxpayers,” which
the IRS did not do and subsequently imposed “liens and levies” on the Teeces,
presumably for not paying federal taxes).)
5 The Teeces filed documents purporting to be “proof of service,” indicating they mailed
copies of summonses to these defendants. (See Proof of Serv. for IRS, Doc. No. 14
(indicating summons mailed to the IRS at 1111 Constitution Ave N.W. in Washington,
D.C.); Proof of Serv. for DOJ Civil Div., Doc. No. 15 (indicating summons mailed to the
DOJ Civil Division Tort Branch to “Tort Branch Staff” at P.O. Box 888 Benjamin Franklin
Station in Washington, D.C.); Proof of Serv. for DOJ, Doc. No. 16 (indicating summons
mailed to the DOJ at 950 Pennsylvania Ave N.W. in Washington, D.C.); Proof of Serv.
for IRS Treasury Div., Doc. No. 17 (indicating summons mailed to the Treasury Division
of the IRS at 1500 Pennsylvania Ave N.W. in Washington, D.C.).)
6 (Mot., Doc. No. 31 at 1–2 (citing four exhibits—“J-1,” “J-2,” “J-3,” and “J-4”—that are
not attached to the motion).) Because the motion does not include page numbers, this
recommendation refers to the CM/ECF pagination.
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they also contend they mailed a “courtesy copy” to the United States Attorney for the
District of Utah.7
Now the Teeces move for “default and summary judgment” under Rules 55 and
56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.8 They argue default judgment and summary
judgment should be entered against the United States Defendants because they failed
to answer the complaint or “present any further evidence” within the “required 60 days.”9
LEGAL STANDARDS
Rule 55 outlines a two-step process for obtaining a default judgment.10 First,
when a party “has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by
affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the party’s default.”11 Then, after entry of
7 (Id. at 2.) The Teeces have not filed any proof of service for the United States
Attorney for the District of Utah.
8 (Id. at 1, 2.)
9 (Id. at 2.) The Teeces request a total judgment of $61,292,000 against the United
States Defendants. (Id. at 6–7.) The Teeces also ask the court to order the IRS to
“remove all liens and levies” against them, and to “provide a written declaration” stating
the Teeces and their children are tax exempt and any attempt to collect taxes from them
“will result in 100 Million USD or equivalent to the price of gold.” (Id. at 5.)
10 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a), (b); Rowley v. Morant, 276 F.R.D. 669, 670 (D.N.M. 2011)
(“Rule 55 mandates a two-step process for a party who seeks a default judgment in his
favor.” (quoting Williams v. Smithson, 57 F.3d 1081 (10th Cir.1995) (unpublished table
decision))); see also Guttman v. Silverberg, 167 F. App’x 1, 2 n.1 (10th Cir. 2005)
(unpublished) (“The entry of default and the entry of a judgment by default are two
separate procedures.” (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a)–(b))).
11 Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a).
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default, the party seeking default judgment must apply to the clerk or court. The clerk or
court may then enter default judgment, depending on the circumstances.12
Separately, Rule 56 permits a party to move for summary judgment. The court
will grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”13 Under
Rule 56(c), a party must support factual assertions made in (or in response to) motions
for summary judgment.14 And under Rule 56(e), courts may grant summary judgment
or take other actions if a party fails to properly address another party’s factual
assertions as required by Rule 56(c).15
Because the Teeces proceed without an attorney (pro se), their filings are
liberally construed and held “to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted
by lawyers.”16 Still, pro se plaintiffs must follow the same rules of procedure governing
other litigants.17 For instance, pro se plaintiffs still have “the burden of alleging sufficient
12 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(1) (“If the plaintiff’s claim is for a sum certain or a sum that
can be made certain by computation, the clerk—on the plaintiff’s request, with an
affidavit showing the amount due—must enter judgment for that amount and costs
against a defendant who has been defaulted for not appearing . . . .”); Fed. R. Civ. P.
55(b)(2) (“In all other cases, the party must apply to the court for a default judgment.”).
13 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
14 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1) (providing that “[a] party asserting that a fact cannot be or is
genuinely disputed must support the assertion” with evidence).
15 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
16 Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
17 Garrett v. Selby, Connor, Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005).
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facts on which a recognized legal claim could be based.”18 While courts make some
allowances for a pro se plaintiff’s “failure to cite proper legal authority, his confusion of
various legal theories, his poor syntax and sentence construction, or his unfamiliarity
with pleading requirements,”19 courts “will not supply additional factual allegations to
round out a plaintiff’s complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff’s behalf.”20
ANALYSIS
The Teeces’ motion should be denied because there is no entry of default
against the United States Defendants and the Teeces have not moved for summary
judgment consistent with Rule 56.
First, the motion for default judgment should be denied. Default must be entered
before a motion for default judgment can be granted.21 And the clerk cannot enter
default unless the Teeces prove the United States Defendants are actually in
default22—which requires proof of proper service. While it appears the Teeces mailed
18 Jenkins v. Currier, 514 F.3d 1030, 1032 (10th Cir. 2008) (citation modified).
19 Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110.
20 Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1096 (10th Cir. 2009) (citation modified).
21 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a) (“[T]he clerk must enter the party’s default.”); Rowley, 276
F.R.D. at 670 (“[T]he clear weight of authority holds that a party must seek entry of
default by the clerk before it can move the court for default judgment.”); see also
Johnson v. Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co., 140 F.3d 781, 783 (8th Cir. 1998) (“[E]ntry of default
under Rule 55(a) must precede grant of a default judgment under Rule 55(b).”); 10A
Wright & Miller’s Federal Practice & Procedure § 2682 (4th ed. 2025) (“Prior to obtaining
a default judgment under either Rule 55(b)(1) or Rule 55(b)(2), there must be an entry
of default as provided by Rule 55(a).”).
22 Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a) (requiring the party’s failure to plead or defend be “shown by
affidavit or otherwise”).
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copies to the IRS, DOJ, and Attorney General, the Teeces have not filed any proof of
service indicating copies of the summonses and complaint were delivered to the United
States Attorney for the District of Utah, as required by Rule 4.23 Where default
judgments are disfavored, it is critical to ensure Rule 55’s procedures are followed and
supported by sufficient evidence.24 Accordingly, the motion for default judgment should
be denied.
23 To serve a federal agency, a party must “serve the United States and also send a
copy of the summons and of the complaint by registered or certified mail to the agency.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(2). To serve the United States, a party must:
(A)(i) deliver a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the United
States attorney for the district where the action is brought—or to an
assistant United States attorney or clerical employee whom the United
States attorney designates in a writing filed with the court clerk—or (ii) send
a copy of each by registered or certified mail to the civil-process clerk at the
United States attorney’s office;
(B) send a copy of each by registered or certified mail to the Attorney
General of the United States at Washington, D.C.; and
(C) if the action challenges an order of a nonparty agency or officer of the
United States, send a copy of each by registered or certified mail to the
agency or officer.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(1).
24 See Harvey v. United States, 685 F3d 939, 946 (10th Cir. 2012) (“Default judgments
against the United States are especially disfavored.”); Katzson Bros., Inc. v. U.S.
E.P.A., 839 F.2d 1396, 1399 (10th Cir. 1988) (explaining “default judgments are not
favored by courts, and an entry of default may be set aside for good cause shown”); see
also Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(d) (“A default judgment may be entered against the United
States, its officers, or its agencies only if the claimant establishes a claim or right to
relief by evidence that satisfies the court.”); Garrett, 425 F.3d at 840 (explaining pro se
parties still must follow the same rules of procedure governing other litigants).
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Second, the motion for summary judgment should be denied because the
Teeces never moved for summary judgment consistent with Rule 56. The Teeces did
not show (or even argue) there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and they
are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.25 While the Teeces reference Rule 56(c)
and 56(e), the United States Defendants cannot be faulted for failing to properly
respond to factual assertions raised in a motion for summary judgment—because no
such assertions were made. Instead of meeting the requirements of Rule 56, the
Teeces argue only that judgment should be entered against the United States
Defendants for failing to respond to the complaint or “present any further evidence”
within the “required 60 days.”26 This is the deadline for the United States Defendants to
respond to the complaint after they are properly served.27 Even if the defendants were
to fail to meet that deadline, it would not result in summary judgment. Accordingly, the
motion for summary judgment should be denied.
RECOMMENDATION
Because the clerk has not entered default against the United States Defendants
and the Teeces have not moved for summary judgment consistent with Rule 56, the
undersigned recommends the district judge deny the motion for default and summary
25 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
26 (Mot., Doc. No. 31 at 2.)
27 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(2) (“The United States, a United States agency, or a United
States officer or employee sued only in an official capacity must serve an answer to a
complaint, counterclaim, or crossclaim within 60 days after service on the United States
attorney.”).
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judgment28 without prejudice. The Teeces have the right to object to this Report and
Recommendation within fourteen days, and failure to object may be considered a
waiver of objections.29
DATED this 27th day of January, 2026.
BY THE COURT:
_____________________________
Daphne A. Oberg
United States Magistrate Judge
28 (Doc. No. 31.)
29 See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed R. Civ. P. 72(b).
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