Gigena v. Dept of Workforce Services

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF UTAH
GABRIEL OMAR GIGENA,
Plaintiff,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE
SERVICES,
Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Case No. 2:25-cv-00130-JNP-JCB
Chief District Judge Jill N. Parrish
Magistrate Judge Jared C. Bennett
B ACKGROUND1
Pro se Plaintiff Gabriel Omar Gigena (“Mr. Gigena”) alleges that he applied for
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (“SNAP”) benefits through Defendant Utah
Department of Workforce Services (“DWS”) in September 2024.2 Mr. Gigena started a job the
day prior to submitting his application.3 Soon thereafter, DWS conducted a phone interview with
Mr. Gigena to determine his eligibility for SNAP benefits.4 Given that Mr. Gigena’s job had
started ten days prior to his phone interview, and he had received only one paycheck, DWS
determined that Mr. Gigena qualified for SNAP benefits for the month of September 2024.5
1 This case is referred to Magistrate Judge Jared C. Bennett under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). ECF
No. 11.
2 ECF No. 1 at 3 of 22.
3 ECF No. 9 at 2 of 6.
4 Id.
5 Id.
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Thereafter, Mr. Gigena received a total of four paychecks from his job in September and October
2024.6 Based on that income, DWS denied his SNAP benefits for October 2024.7
Mr. Gigena appealed the DWS decision in November 2024.8 The appeal request was
forwarded to the DWS Appeals Unit on December 11, 2024.9 The following day, DWS issued
notice to Mr. Gigena that his SNAP benefits for October 2024 were denied because his income
for that month exceeded the income limit for such benefits.10 Mr. Gigena filed a Request for Fair
Hearing one week later.11 DWS subsequently scheduled a hearing before an Administrative Law
Judge (“ALJ”) for January 22, 2025.12 After holding that hearing, the ALJ issued a decision on
January 29, 2025, concluding that the DWS determination of Mr. Gigena’s income was correct
and affirming the denial of SNAP benefits.13 The ALJ’s decision notified Mr. Gigena that it
would become final unless Mr. Gigena filed a written appeal within 30 days with either the
Director of the Division of Adjudication or a Utah state district court.14
Mr. Gigena subsequently filed his complaint in this case against DWS, seeking judicial
review of the ALJ’s decision and injunctive relief.15 Mr. Gigena asserts that this court has
6 Id.
7 ECF No. 1 at 3 of 22.
8 Id.; ECF No. 9 at 1 of 6.
9 ECF No. 9 at 1 of 6.
10 ECF No. 1 at 3 of 22.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.; ECF No. 9 at 1, 6 of 6.
14 ECF No. 9 at 1 of 6.
15 See generally ECF No. 1.
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jurisdiction “[a]ccording to United States Title 5 Ch. 7 §§701-706 in conjunction with United
States Code Title 7 Ch. 51 §§2011-2014 and the Code of Federal Regulations Title 7 part 273.”16
DWS moved to dismiss Mr. Gigena’s complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).17
L EGAL S TANDARDS
Under Rule 12(b)(1), the court should “presume no jurisdiction exists,”18 and the burden
of establishing jurisdiction “rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.”19 To establish
jurisdiction, a plaintiff “must allege in [his] pleading the facts essential to show jurisdiction, and
must support those facts by competent proof.”20
A motion 	to 	dismiss 	for 	lack 	of 	subject[-]matter 	jurisdiction
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) may take one of two forms. A
facial attack looks only to the factual allegations of the complaint in
challenging the court’s jurisdiction. A factual attack, on the other
hand, goes beyond the factual allegations of the complaint and
presents evidence in the form of affidavits or otherwise to challenge
the court’s jurisdiction.21
Where, as here, a Rule 12(b)(1) motion’s “only references outside of the complaint are to
administrative documents [that] are subject to judicial notice,” the “motion presents a facial
16 Id. at 2 of 22.
17 ECF No. 8. Along with its motion to dismiss, DWS submitted ECF No. 9, which is the ALJ’s
decision affirming the denial of Mr. Gigena’s SNAP benefits.
18 United States ex rel. Precision Co. v. Koch Indus., Inc., 971 F.2d 548, 551 (10th Cir. 1992).
19 Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994).
20 Koch Indus., Inc., 971 F.2d at 551 (citation modified).
21 Rural Water Dist. No. 2 v. City of Glenpool, 698 F.3d 1270, 1272 n.1 (10th Cir. 2012) (citation
modified); see also Nicholson v. Bessent, No. 1:24-CV-00090, 2025 WL 895079, at *1 (D. Utah
Mar. 24, 2025).
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attack.”22 “In reviewing a facial attack on the complaint, a district court must accept the
allegations in the complaint as true.”23 For the reasons set forth below, Mr. Gigena fails to carry
his burden of demonstrating that this court has subject-matter jurisdiction over his claims.
Therefore, the court should grant DWS’ motion to dismiss.
ANALYSIS
Mr. Gigena cannot sue DWS in federal court over his SNAP benefits. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit—relying upon United States Supreme Court precedent—
has held that “[a]n appeal from a state administrative board is not a ‘civil action’ as required by
28 U.S.C.[] § 1331 or § 1332” and that federal district courts have “no power to consider an
appeal from [a] state administrative tribunal.”24 Indeed, “[a]s one court put it: ‘Permitting the
bypassing of state procedures would lead to federal district courts becoming courts of review for
22 Nicholson, 2025 WL 895079 at *1; see also Kulkarni v. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., No. 2:24-CV-
00210, w025 WL 895356, at *1 (D. Utah Mar. 24, 2025) (“Defendants’ motion presents a facial
attack because its only references outside of the complaint are to administrative documents
which are subject to judicial notice.”); Thurman v. Steidley, No. 16-CV-554-TCK, 2017 WL
2435287, at *4 (N.D. Okla. June 5, 2017) (construing a Rule 12(b)(1) motion as a facial attack
when the motion relied on court records subject to judicial notice).
23 Holt v. United States, 46 F.3d 1000, 1002 (10th Cir. 1995).
24 Trapp v. Goetz, 373 F.2d 380, 383 (10th Cir. 1966); see also Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co. v. Stude,
346 U.S. 574, 581 (1954) (concluding that a federal court “does not sit to review on appeal
action taken administratively or judicially in a state proceeding” and that “[a] state ‘legislature
may not make a federal district court, a court of original jurisdiction, into an appellate tribunal or
otherwise expand its jurisdiction’” (quoting Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 317 (1943));
United States v. New Mexico Env’t Dep’t, No. 19-CV-46 KG/SMV, 2022 WL 3543143, at *5
(D.N.M. Aug. 18, 2022) (“The Supreme Court has found that federal courts do not generally
have jurisdiction over state administrative appeals. The Tenth Circuit faithfully applies that
Supreme Court precedent.” (citation modified) (citing Stude, 346 U.S. at 581; Trapp, 373 F.2d at
383)).
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state administrative agencies and to needless conflict between federal and state governments.’”25
Because Mr. Gigena is seeking judicial review of a state administrative tribunal’s decision, this
court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction over his claims.
Given the foregoing, Mr. Gigena’s citations to statutes and regulations fail to establish
this court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. The first set of statutes upon which Mr. Gigena relies—5
U.S.C. §§ 701-706—apply only to judicial review of agencies “of the Government of the United
States,”26 not state agencies like DWS. The second set of statutes and the set of regulations—7
U.S.C. §§ 2011-2014 and 7 C.F.R. Part 273—create and implement SNAP, but they provide no
jurisdiction to federal courts. Instead, they provide the authority to state courts to hear claims
arising from the implementation of SNAP and the distribution of SNAP benefits.27 Thus, the
statutes and regulations upon which Mr. Gigena relies do not provide this court with
25 New Mexico Env’t Dep’t, 2022 WL 3543143, at *5 (quoting Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v.
Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm’n, 319 F. Supp. 407, 414 (E.D. Pa. 1970)).
26 5 U.S.C. § 701(b)(1).
27 Although SNAP is created by federal law, the originating statutes and their implementing
regulations delegate to participating states the authority to promulgate regulations governing
SNAP benefits determinations and establish a process for challenging those benefits
determinations. 7 U.S.C. § 2020(a), (e); 7 C.F.R. §§ 271.4(a), 272.3, 273.15. To participate in
SNAP, a state must develop and submit a plan of operation for approval by the United States
Secretary of Agriculture. 7 U.S.C. § 2020(d); 7 C.F.R. § 272.2. Once a state’s plan is approved,
that state assumes many of the core administrative responsibilities for SNAP, including the
administration of state-level hearings to review the denial of SNAP benefits and governance of
the right to judicial review of denials. 7 C.F.R. § 273.15. As a participating state, Utah performs
those administrative functions, including developing regulations to govern eligibility
determinations, conducting eligibility determinations for applicant households, and carrying out
procedures for appealing eligibility determinations. Utah Admin. Code R986-900-901, R986-
900-902; see also 7 U.S.C. § 2020(a), (e); 7 C.F.R. §§ 271.4(a), 272.3, 273.15. Utah state district
courts are vested with jurisdiction to review the decisions of hearings determining eligibility,
Utah Code Ann. §§ 63G-4-102(1), -401, -402; 78A-5-102(5)(c), including an administrative law
judge’s final decision. Id. § 63G-4-401(3)(a).
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subject-matter jurisdiction over his claims.28 Because the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction,
the court should grant DWS’ motion to dismiss and dismiss this case without prejudice.29
RECOMMENDATION
For the reasons stated above, the court HEREBY RECOMMENDS:
1. 	DWS’ motion to dismiss30 be GRANTED.
2. 	This case be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
NOTICE TO PARTIES
Copies of this Report and Recommendation are being sent to all parties, who are hereby
notified of their right to object.31 The parties must file any objections to this Report and
28 In his response to DWS’ motion to dismiss, Mr. Gigena raises various other theories of this
court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. ECF No. 13. Because those theories are not contained in his
complaint, the court declines to consider them. Jojola v. Chavez, 55 F.3d 488, 494 (10th Cir.
1995) (“It is well-established . . . that in determining whether to grant a motion to dismiss, the
district court, and consequently this court, are limited to assessing the legal sufficiency of the
allegations contained within the four corners of the complaint.”); Blackmon v. U.S.D. 259 Sch.
Dist., 769 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1276 n.47 (D. Kan. 2011) (“To the extent Plaintiff tried to assert
additional or different claims in her response to Defendant’s motion to dismiss, these claims are
not allowed.”); Ziegler v. Moore, No. CIV-03-1612-C, 2005 WL 1356486, at *4 n.9 (W.D. Okla.
May 25, 2005) (“Because this legal theory was omitted from the complaint, and Plaintiff did not
obtain leave to amend his complaint to include this new legal theory, the undersigned has not
considered the . . . legal theory fleshed out for the first time in Plaintiff’s [responses] to the
Defendants’ motions [to dismiss].”), report and recommendation adopted, No. CIV-03-1612-C,
2005 WL 1563518 (W.D. Okla. June 30, 2005).
29 Brereton v. Bountiful City Corp., 434 F.3d 1213, 1216 (10th Cir. 2006) (“A longstanding line
of cases from this circuit holds that where the district court dismisses an action for lack of
jurisdiction, . . . the dismissal must be without prejudice.”).
30 ECF No. 8.
31 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2).
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Recommendation within 14 days after being served with a copy of it.32 Failure to object may
constitute waiver of objections upon subsequent review.
DATED this 11th day of February 2026.
BY THE COURT:
JARED C. BENNETT
United States Magistrate Judge
32 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2).
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