United Energy Workers Healthcare, LLC v. Cavallaro et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION
UNITED ENERGY WORKERS
HEALTHCARE, LLC, an Ohio limited
liability company,
Plaintiff,
v.
NATALIE CAVALLARO, an individual;
NUCLEAR WORKER SOLUTIONS, LLC, a
New Mexico limited liability company;
JANE AND JOHN DOES 1-10; and DOE
BUSINESS ENTITIES 1-10,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER GRANTING IN PART
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO MODIFY
SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM & FOR
A PROTECTIVE ORDER
(DOC. NO. 31)
Case No. 2:24-cv-00318
District Judge Robert J. Shelby
Magistrate Judge Daphne A. Oberg
In this trade secrets and breach of contract case,1 Natalie Cavallaro and Nuclear
Worker Solutions have moved to quash or modify a subpoena duces tecum United
Energy Workers issued to nonparty Jason Sanchez.2 They have also moved for a
protective order. Among other things, Ms. Cavallaro and NWS claim the subpoena puts
NWS’s own trade secrets at issue, and it seeks information beyond the permissible
scope of discovery.
1 (See Compl. ¶¶ 62–109, Doc. No. 1.)
2 (Defs.’ Mot. to Quash or Modify Subpoena Duces Tecum to Jason Sanchez & for a
Protective Order (Mot.), Doc. No. 31.)
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But procedures can be implemented sufficient to safeguard NWS’s trade secrets,
and the subpoena can be narrowed to prevent the production of irrelevant information.
Accordingly, as noted at the hearing, the motion is granted in part and denied in part.3
The motion is granted to the extent it seeks modification of the subpoena—the
subpoena is modified as outlined below. It is also granted to the extent it seeks
protection of the documents produced. Any responsive production must be handled in
accordance with the protective procedures also detailed below. But to the extent the
motion seeks to quash the subpoena, it is denied.
BACKGROUND
Before forming NWS in 2020,4 Ms. Cavallaro and Mr. Sanchez worked for UEW.
Roughly six months before they resigned from UEW, they entered into noncompete
agreements.5 In relevant part, UEW claims Ms. Cavallaro breached her noncompete
agreement and induced Mr. Sanchez (UEW’s former Chief Operating Officer) to do the
same, by forming NWS to compete directly with UEW.6
3 (See Doc. No. 40.)
4 (Compl. ¶ 42, Doc. No. 1; Ex. 4 to Pl.’s Opp’n to Mot., Doc. No. 33-1 at 44.) Because
UEW filed the opposition’s exhibits in a single document with varying or no page
numbers, this order refers to the document’s CM/ECF pagination.
5 (Compl. ¶¶ 41–42, 45, Doc. No. 1; Exs. 2 & 3 to Pl.’s Opp’n to Mot., Doc. No. 33-1 at
19, 31; Ex. 5 to Pl.’s Opp’n to Mot., Doc. No. 33-1 at 52–53 (Sanchez Interview Tr.
14:12–20, 59:17–22).)
6 (Compl. ¶¶ 42, 44, 90, Doc. No. 1.)
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Separately, UEW claims Ms. Cavallaro and NWS misappropriated its trade
secrets, “including most notably, a confidential patient list” and related data and
information.7 According to UEW, Ms. Cavallaro was required to protect UEW’s trade
secrets after she became an employee, but she instead provided UEW’s patient lists,
patient data, and other confidential information to NWS.8 UEW alleges Ms. Cavallaro
and NWS “have used, are using, and inevitably will continue to use UEW’s trade secrets
without UEW’s consent” and to its detriment.9
In view of the nature of the case, the parties stipulated to a protective order,
which the court entered.10 The protective order applies to parties and nonparties,
provides for confidential and attorney-eyes-only (AEO) designations, and permits
nonparties to designate their production accordingly.11 Other provisions address
inadvertent failures to properly designate information.12 And the order includes
procedures and requirements for the destruction of designated information at the
conclusion of this case.13 But the protective order does not permit a party to weigh in
on a nonparty’s designation decisions prior to production.
7 (Id. ¶ 63.)
8 (Id. ¶¶ 68, 70, 71.)
9 (Id. ¶ 72.)
10 (Stipulated Protective Order, Doc. No. 26.)
11 (Id. § (A)(5).)
12 (Id. §§ (C), (E).)
13 (Id. § (F).)
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Claiming its attempts to obtain documents from Defendants have been
unsuccessful,14 UEW notified NWS and Ms. Cavallaro of its intent to subpoena Mr.
Sanchez for documents.15 The subpoena seeks: (1) all documents and
communications between Ms. Cavallaro and Mr. Sanchez; (2) all documents and
communications relating to UEW, NWS, and any patients of either entity; and (3) all
documents and communications regarding any lawsuits involving Mr. Sanchez and Ms.
Cavallaro, including but not limited to pleadings, discovery materials, motions, orders,
transcripts, and settlement-related records.16 Twelve days after providing notice, UEW
served Mr. Sanchez with the subpoena.17 Defendants now move to quash or modify
the subpoena and for a protective order under Rule 45(d)(3)(B) and Rule 26(c).18
14 Although this dispute is not before the court, it appears that in April 2025, UEW
served Defendants with discovery requests, including RFPs. UEW claims Defendants
have responded to the RFPs while not producing any documents. (Pl.’s Opp’n to Mot.
(Opp’n) 4–5, Doc. No. 33 (citing Exs. 6, 8, 9, & 10 to Opp’n, Doc. No. 33-1 at 57, 97,
110, 113).) UEW calls these responses deficient and has requested supplementation.
(Ex. 8 to Opp’n 8, Doc. No. 33-1 at 105.) For their part, Defendants assert that UEW
has identified no withheld documents and supplementation is unwarranted. (Ex. 10 to
Opp’n 4, Doc. No. 33-1 at 117.)
15 (Ex. A to Mot., Doc. No. 31-1.)
16 (Id. at 4.)
17 (Ex. 13 to Opp’n, Doc. No. 33-1 at 142.)
18 (Mot. 1, Doc. No. 31.) Defendants also cite Rule 37-1(b)(7) of the Local Civil Rules,
which exempts a motion to quash from the Short Form Discovery Motion requirements.
But that rule concerns the motion’s format. It does not create a substantive basis or
confer standing for a motion to quash a Rule 45 subpoena.
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LEGAL STANDARDS
Under Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, courts may quash or
modify a subpoena if it requires “disclosing a trade secret or other confidential research,
development, or commercial information.”19 A party generally “does not have standing
to object to a subpoena issued to a third party, unless the party challenging the
subpoena has a personal right or privilege with respect to the subject matter sought by
the subpoena.”20
Rule 26(b), however, governs the scope of discovery under subpoenas.21
Whether on a “motion or on its own,” the court “must limit the frequency or extent of
discovery” if it “is outside the scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1).”22 That is, the discovery
must be “relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the
case,” considering various factors.23 In addition, Rule 26(c) permits a court to enter a
19 Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(3)(B)(i).
20 Johnson v. USANA Health Scis., No. 2:17-cv-00652, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 198814,
at *6 (D. Utah Nov. 15, 2019) (unpublished) (citation omitted).
21 See Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Integrity Advance, LLC, No. 21-mc-206, 2022
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126523, at *18 (D. Kan. July 15, 2022) (unpublished) (explaining
“Rule 45 does not include relevance as an enumerated reason for quashing a
subpoena” but it is “well settled that the scope of discovery under a subpoena is the
same as the scope of discovery under Rule 26(b)”).
22 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii).
23 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
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protective order “for good cause,” “to protect a party or person from annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.”24
ANALYSIS
Defendants move to quash or modify the subpoena. Defendants also seek a
protective order directing any discovery to them, to permit them to review and designate
documents as confidential or “attorney’s eyes only” in the first instance.25 Defendants
contend they have standing to challenge the subpoena because it seeks confidential
and trade secret information.26 They urge the court to exercise its inherent authority to
modify the subpoena and issue a protective order safeguarding disclosure of this
information.27
In response, UEW contends Defendants lack standing to challenge the subpoena
on overbreadth or proportionality grounds, the subpoena targets relevant and
proportional information, and it is not overbroad.28 UEW also argues any sensitive
documents are safeguarded by the current protective order in this case.29 Ultimately,
though, UEW agrees the scope of the subpoena can be narrowed.30 And Defendants
24 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1).
25 (Mot. 2, Doc. No. 31.)
26 (Id. at 4–5.)
27 (Id. at 5.)
28 (Opp’n 7–11, Doc. No. 33.)
29 (Id. at 10.)
30 (Id. at 12 (proposing modifications).)
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are largely amenable to UEW’s proposed modifications.31 The parties confirmed their
agreements at the hearing on the present motion. Because the scope of the subpoena
must be narrowed, and because Mr. Sanchez is likely to produce confidential and trade
secret information, the motion is granted to the extent it seeks modification of the
subpoena.
Motion to Quash or Modify. As a threshold matter, although Defendants assert
a personal privacy interest in their confidential communications and trade secret
information, it is unnecessary to address whether they have standing to move to quash
or modify the subpoena on overbreadth and proportionality grounds.32 Rule 26(b)
governs the scope of subpoenas. It requires the court to limit (i.e., modify) subpoenas
seeking discovery beyond the scope of Rule 26.33 Because the subpoena to Mr.
Sanchez seeks information outside that scope, as noted at the hearing, it is limited as
follows.
First, the subpoena’s requests are limited to January 1, 2019, to the present.
The subpoena currently is not limited in time. As a result, it seeks information entirely
31 (Reply In Supp. of Mot. (Reply) 4–5, Doc. No. 37 (agreeing to some of UEW’s
proposed modifications but proposing further modifications).)
32 See Moreno v. Unique Plumbing LLC, No. 2:24-cv-0916, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
213282, at *5 (D. Utah Oct. 27, 2025) (unpublished) (“[E]ven in cases where a moving
party lacks standing to challenge a third-party subpoena, the court may exercise its
inherent authority to limit irrelevant or non-proportional discovery requests under
Rule 26(b)(2)(C).”).
33 See Consumer Fin., 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126523, at *18; Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(2)(C)(iii); Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
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unrelated and unimportant to this case. Recognizing this, the parties agree the
subpoena should be limited to documents and communications from January 1, 2019
(when Mr. Sanchez started at UEW) to the present.34 Because this timeframe is
relevant and proportional, the subpoena is limited accordingly.
Second, the subpoena’s requests must exclude purely personal
communications between Ms. Cavallaro and Mr. Sanchez unrelated to NWS or UEW.
Such information is not relevant or proportional. It is unrelated to any claims or
defenses, unimportant to any issues in the case, and would provide no benefit. And the
parties agree purely personal communications should be excluded.35 Accordingly, the
subpoena’s request for documents and communications between Mr. Sanchez and Ms.
Cavallaro is limited to exclude those that are purely personal and unrelated to UEW or
NWS.
Third, the subpoena’s request for documents and communications relating to
UEW, NWS, and either entity’s patients must be limited. Specifically, this request is
limited to documents and communications relating to: UEW, patient information
(including demographic information, medical history, and contact logs) for UEW’s
current and former patients, NWS’s formation, NWS’s operational marketing and referral
materials, and UEW’s current and former employees, contractors, or nurses. These
34 (Opp’n 12, Doc. No. 33; Reply 5, Doc. No. 37.)
35 (Opp’n 12, Doc. No. 33; Reply 5, Doc. No. 37.)
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limitations capture the parties’ overlapping proposed modifications from their briefing36
and the concessions made at the hearing. With these limiting modifications, the
subpoena appropriately seeks relevant and proportional information.
Fourth, the subpoena’s request for documents and communications regarding
lawsuits involving both Mr. Sanchez and Ms. Cavallaro is allowed. (Defendants did not
object to this request in their briefing.)
Motion for Protective Order. The motion for a protective order is granted in
part. According to NWS, Mr. Sanchez has NWS’s confidential or trade secret
information in his possession. Although the protective order in this case includes
provisions regarding confidentiality and “attorneys’ eyes only” (AEO) designations, it
does not include procedures to address this particular circumstance. The protective
order permits nonparties to designate information as confidential or AEO. But it does
not require it. And where the trade secret information at issue belongs to NWS, not Mr.
Sanchez, it is unclear whether Mr. Sanchez will make those designations consistent
with NWS’s perspective. Functionally, a process is needed allowing for Defendants to
weigh in on the designations for Mr. Sanchez’s production before it is shared beyond
counsel.
This process is as follows. Mr. Sanchez must produce his responsive documents
to the parties simultaneously. At the outset, every document in the production is to be
marked as AEO. Counsel for UEW and Defendants must meet and confer regarding a
36 (Opp’n 12, Doc. No. 33; Reply 4–5, Doc. No. 37.)
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viable way to make this happen. If unable to agree on an approach, counsel for both
sides must stamp independently their copies as AEO and immediately destroy any
unstamped or undesignated production by Mr. Sanchez.
Defendants have fourteen days from the date of production to de-designate
documents as appropriate. If UEW disagrees with Defendants’ final designations, the
parties must meet and confer on the issue fully and in good faith. If unable to resolve
any designation disputes, UEW may challenge those designations as permitted under
the current protective order.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons noted above, Defendants’ motion37 is granted in part and denied
in part. To the extent the motion seeks modification of the subpoena or protective
procedures for the documents produced, the motion is granted. To the extent the
motion seeks to quash the subpoena, it is denied.
DATED this 17th day of December, 2025.
BY THE COURT:
_____________________________
Daphne A. Oberg
United States Magistrate Judge
37 (Doc. No. 31.)
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