Castro Avelar v. Bondi et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SAN ANTONIO DIVISION
ALEJANDRO CASTRO AVELAR,
Petitioner,
v. Case No. 5:25-CV-1827-JKP
PAMELA BONDI,
United States Attorney General, et al.,
Respondents.
ORDER GRANTING
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Before the Court is a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1) filed pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2241. Respondents (sometimes referred to as “the Government”) have filed a response
(ECF No. 5). The Court finds no need to wait for a reply to the Government’s response. The peti-
tion is ready for ruling. After reviewing the briefing, provided evidence, and applicable law, the
Court grants the petition for the reasons below.
I. BACKGROUND
When he filed the instant habeas petition, Petitioner was in the custody of Respondents. He
has been detained since about August 28, 2025, charged with being present in the United States
without having been inspected or admitted under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). Petitioner is a citizen
of Mexico who entered the United States without inspection on or about 2016.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) took Petitioner into custody following a
traffic stop in Washington, D.C. He is in full removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a and
was initially detained without an opportunity to post bond or be released on other conditions. He
was denied a bond hearing due to a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) ruling, In re Yajure
Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216, 220 (BIA 2025), in which the BIA adopted a new policy regarding
detention of noncitizens. Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).
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He is currently scheduled for a January 15, 2026 hearing before an immigration judge (“IJ”).
In the instant habeas petition, Petitioner claims that his detention violates (1) the due pro-
cess clause of the Fifth Amendment and (2) statutory provisions of the Immigration and National-
ity Act (“ INA”). His primary argument is that his detention violates the plain language of the INA
because § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to individuals who previously entered and are now resid-
ing in the United States. Instead, such individuals are subject to a different statute, § 1226(a) that
(1) expressly applies to individuals who are charged as inadmissible for having entered the United
States without inspection and (2) allows for release on conditional parole or bond. He contends
that Respondents’ new legal interpretation is plainly contrary to the statutory framework and con-
trary to decades of agency practice applying § 1226(a) to people like him.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Habeas petitioners must show they are “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws
or treaties of the United States.” Villanueva v. Tate, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, ___, No. CV H-25-3364,
2025 WL 2774610, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2025) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3)). They “bear[]
the burden of proving that [they are] being held contrary to law; and because the habeas proceeding
is civil in nature, the petitioner must satisfy [this] burden of proof by a preponderance of the evi-
dence.” Id. (quoting Skaftouros v. United States, 667 F.3d 144, 158 (2d Cir. 2011) and citing Bruce
v. Estelle, 536 F.2d 1051, 1058 (5th Cir. 1976)). Courts “considering a habeas petition must ‘de-
termine the facts and dispose of the matter as law and justice require.’” Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. §
2243).
III. ANALYSIS1
Petitioner argues his continued detention by ICE is based on Respondents’ novel reading
1 In its analysis of the facts, issues, and arguments presented in this case, the Court notes close similarity to that
presented in many recent Petitions for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed in the Western District of Texas, and specifically,
the San Antonio Division. The Court finds the reasoning in these similar cases persuasive and finds the ultimate
determination based upon this reasoning correct. For that reason, and for the sake of expediency, the Court follows
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of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), which was adopted by the Board of Immigration Appeals on Sep-
tember 5, 2025. See In re Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216, 220 (BIA 2025).
Respondents assert that they properly detain Petitioner under § 1225(b)(2)(A), which al-
lows indefinite detention without a bond hearing. They contend that he is properly detained pur-
suant to § 1225(b)(2)(A) for non-expedited removal proceedings under § 1229a. Further, given the
plain language of § 1225(a)(1), Respondents contend Petitioner cannot dispute that he is an appli-
cant for admission, nor can he plausibly challenge the determination that he is “seeking admission”
simply because he is not currently at the border requesting to come into the United States. Re-
spondents also challenge this Court’s jurisdiction. The Court will address the jurisdictional chal-
lenges first.
A. Challenges to Jurisdiction
As a threshold matter, Respondents argue that 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(g) and 1225(b)(4) preclude
review of Petitioner’s claims. The Court addresses each section in turn.
1. Section 1252(g)
Section 1252(g) provides that “no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim
by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to com-
mence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under [Chapter
12 of Title 8 of the United States Code].” The Supreme Court has emphasized that § 1252(g)
“applies only to three discrete actions that the Attorney general may take: her ‘decision or action’
to ‘commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.” Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-
Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999) (emphasis in original) (quoting 8 U.S.C. §
1252(g)). This provision “does not bar courts from reviewing an alien detention order, because
such an order, while intimately related to efforts to deport, is not itself a decision to execute
these opinions closely. See, e.g., Acea-Martinez v. Noem, Case No. 5:25-CV-01390-XR (filed Oct. 28, 2025).
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removal orders and thus does not implicate section 1252(g).” Santiago v. Noem, No. EP-25-CV-
361-KC, 2025 WL 2792588, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 2, 2025) (cleaned up) (quoting Cardoso v.
Reno, 216 F.3d 512, 516–17 (5th Cir. 2000)).
Petitioner does not challenge a decision to commence removal proceedings, adjudicate a
case against him, or execute a removal order. He instead specifically challenges the decision, or
basis, to detain him. For this reason, § 1252(g) does not deprive the Court of jurisdiction under
these facts and specific challenge. See Guevara v. Swearingen, No. 25 C 12549, 2025 WL
3158151, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 12, 2025).
2. Section 1225(b)(4)
Respondents’ arguments under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(4) fare no better. Section 1225(b)(4)
provides:
The decision of the examining immigration officer, if favorable to the admission of
any alien, shall be subject to challenge by any other immigration officer and such
challenge shall operate to take the alien whose privilege to be admitted is so chal-
lenged, before an immigration judge for a proceeding under section 1229a of this
title.
This section is not relevant in cases like this one involving “an ‘applicant for admission’
who has not received a favorable determination of his admissibility.” Erazo Rojas v. Noem, No.
EP-25-CV-443-KC, 2025 WL 3038262, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 30, 2025). Nor does it pose a juris-
dictional bar in such cases. Id.; accord Ordonez-Lopez v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. EP-
25-CV-470-KC, 2025 WL 3123828, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 7, 2025) (rejecting same argument).
While Respondents may have intended to refer to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4), to the extent they
“intended to refer to § 1225(b)(4) as a jurisdictional bar to Petitioner’s claims, the Court finds
nothing in that subsection that bars its jurisdiction here.” Cardona-Lozano v. Noem, No. 1:25-CV-
1784-RP, 2025 WL 3218244, at *1 n.2 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 14, 2025). And “to the extent that Re-
spondents invoke § 1252(b)(4), that section fails to assert a valid jurisdictional bar.” Id. at *2.
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“Because Petitioner does not assert a challenge to an order of removal, nothing in that subsection
bars Petitioner from seeking relief from his continued detention in this case.” Id.
Similarly, to the extent Respondents merely intend to use § 1225(b)(4) to bolster a juris-
dictional argument under § 1252(b)(9), the Court will restate its position on the § 1252(b)(9) ju-
risdictional issue beginning with the next paragraph. But “their appeal to § 1225(b)(4) does not
alter the Court’s prior conclusion that § 1252(b)(9) does not bar it from hearing a habeas peti-
tioner’s challenge to their detention.” Erazo Rojas, 2025 WL 3038262, at *2.
3. Section 1252(b)(9)
To the extent Respondents contend that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) presents a jurisdictional bar,
the Court rejects the contention. Section 1252(b)(9) provides:
Judicial review of all questions of law and fact, including interpretation and appli-
cation of constitutional and statutory provisions, arising from any action taken or
proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States under this subchapter
shall be available only in judicial review of a final order under this section. Except
as otherwise provided in this section, no court shall have jurisdiction, by habeas
corpus . . . or by any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), to review
such an order or such questions of law or fact.
Section 1252(b)(9) “does not present a jurisdictional bar where those bringing suit are not
asking for review of an order of removal, the decision to seek removal, or the process by which
removability will be determined.” Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 591
U.S. 1, 19 (2020) (cleaned up); accord Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392, 402 (2019). This provision
“does not . . . ‘sweep within its scope claims with only a remote or attenuated connection to the
removal of an alien’ . . . [or] preclude review of claims that ‘cannot be raised efficaciously within
the administrative proceedings’ already available.” Duron v. Johnson, 898 F.3d 644, 647 (5th Cir.
2018) (quoting Aguilar v. ICE, 510 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2007)).
Courts have found that “certain claims are excluded from the sweep of section 1252(b)(9)
by virtue of legislative intent and judicial precedent.” Aguilar, 510 F.3d at 11. For example,
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challenging a decision to deny a bond hearing does not present circumstances that manifest a ju-
risdictional bar under § 1252(b)(9). Preap, 586 U.S. at 402. And the provision’s “legislative his-
tory indicates that Congress intended to create an exception for claims ‘independent’ of removal.”
Aguilar, 510 F.3d at 11.
Notably, § 1252(b) merely sets forth nine applicable requirements “[w]ith respect to review
of an order of removal under subsection (a)(1).” Ozturk v. Hyde, 136 F.4th 382, 399 (2d Cir. 2025)
(quoting introductory text of § 1252(b)). The circumstances of this case do not place any order of
removal at issue. “Contrary to the government’s position, the mere fact that a noncitizen is detained
does not deprive district courts of jurisdiction under § 1252(b)(9).” Id. As stated by the Supreme
Court: “The question is not whether detention is an action taken to remove an alien but whether
the legal questions in this case arise from such an action.” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281,
295 n.3 (2018) (plurality op.) (emphasis in original); accord Ozturk, 136 F.4th at 399 (recognizing
that “the discussion of § 1252(b)(9) in Jennings is not part of the plurality opinion of the Court,”
while also recognizing that “the relevant part of Jennings does not support the conclusion that §
1252(b)(9) bars jurisdiction over habeas challenges to detention” and that part “in fact rejected the
government’s ‘expansive interpretation of § 1252(b)(9)’”).
Petitioner specifically challenges Respondents’ legal authority to subject him to mandatory
detention under § 1225, instead of detention with a bond hearing under § 1226(a). This specific
challenge does not constitute “a review [of] an order of removal, the decision to seek removal, or
the process by which removability will be determined.” Beltran v. Noem, No. 25-CV-2650, 2025
WL 3078837, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2025). Thus, § 1252(b)(9) provides no jurisdictional bar in
this case.
In addition, Petitioner does not have the opportunity to “efficaciously” present his claims
“‘within the administrative proceedings’ already available.” Duron, 898 F.3d 647 (quoting
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Aguilar, 510 F.3d at 11). Under these procedural facts, the core of this dispute is whether Petitioner
can be detained with no bond hearing, that is, with no administrative opportunity to contest his
detention pending a removal determination. If § 1252(b)(9) precluded this habeas petition, Peti-
tioner’s detention would be effectively unreviewable, especially considering the BIA’s novel po-
sition that immigration judges lack authority to entertain bond requests. See Jennings, 583 U.S. at
293; In re Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. at 220. “By the time a final order of removal was
eventually entered, the allegedly [illegal] detention would have already taken place. And of course,
it is possible that no such order would ever be entered in a particular case, depriving that detainee
of any meaningful chance for judicial review.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 293.
4. Conclusion Regarding Jurisdiction
For the reasons stated, the Court concludes Respondents’ jurisdictional challenges fail, and
the Court has jurisdiction to consider the arguments presented in the instant habeas petition.
B. Review of Substantive Merits
The question to be determined in this habeas petition is whether § 1225(b)(2) applies to all
noncitizens who, like Petitioner, are already in the country but entered without inspection. If so, §
1225(b)(2) makes detention mandatory for Petitioner. If not, § 1226(a) applies, thereby making his
detention discretionary. “Overwhelmingly, courts have rejected the interpretation offered by Re-
spondents that § 1225(b)(2) requires the detention of all noncitizens living in the country who are
‘inadmissible’ because they entered the United States without inspection.” Belsai D.S. v. Bondi,
No. 25-CV-3682 (KMM/EMB), 2025 WL 2802947, at *5 (D. Minn. Oct. 1, 2025) (collecting
cases).
In the aftermath of In re Yajure Hurtado, this specific issue has been heavily litigated in
courts across the country, generally resulting in a rejection of Respondents’ broad interpretation
of § 1225(b)(2). See, e.g., Mboup v. Field Off. Dir. of N.J. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, No. 2:25-
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CV-16882 (MEF), 2025 WL 3062791, at *1 & n.3 (D.N.J. Nov. 3, 2025) (collecting cases); Lepe
v. Andrews, No. 1:25-CV-01163-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 2716910, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 23,
2025) (same). These opinions rejecting Respondents’ interpretation rely on several rationales, from
statutory language and context to legislative history and longstanding agency practice. See Rodri-
guez v. Bostock, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, ___, No. 3:25-CV-05240-TMC, 2025 WL 2782499, at *1
& n.3 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 30, 2025) (collecting cases). The Court finds these opinions generally
persuasive and, following the reasoning in this majority determination of this specific issue, this
Court also concludes the same and rejects Respondents’ broad interpretation of § 1225(b)(2) under
the facts in this case. Specifically, this Court finds the plain language of § 1225(b)(2) and the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of relevant statutes reveal the flaw in Respondents’ interpretation.
In pertinent part, § 1225(b)(2)(A) states, “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for
admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not
clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for” removal pro-
ceedings under § 1229a. Under the clear terms of this provision, three conditions are necessary to
invoke mandatory detention: (1) the noncitizen must be “an applicant for admission”; (2) the
noncitizen must be “seeking admission”; and (3) “the examining immigration officer” must deter-
mine that the noncitizen “is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” See, e.g.,
Lopez Benitez v. Francis, No. 25 Civ. 5937 (DEH), 2025 WL 2371588, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13,
2025).
The term “applicant for admission” includes a noncitizen “present in the United States who
has not been admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). With respect to a noncitizen, “‘admission’ and
‘admitted’ mean . . . the lawful entry of [such person] into the United States after inspection and
authorization by an immigration officer.” Id. § 1101(a)(13)(A). Because Petitioner is present in
the United States but does not satisfy the definitions within § 1101(a)(13)(A), he is an “applicant
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for admission.” “Under th[e] statutory definition, ‘admission’ is the lawful entry of an alien after
inspection, something quite different, obviously, from post-entry adjustment of status.” Martinez
v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 532, 544 (5th Cir. 2008).
But, under the facts particular to Petitioner’s detention, he was not seeking “admission,” as
that term is defined by § 1101(a)(13)(A), in that he was not seeking entry, much less “lawful entry
. . . after inspection” and authorization. See Martinez, 519 F.3d at 544. Respondents’ interpretation
“would render the phrase ‘seeking admission’ in § 1225(b)(2)(A) mere surplusage.” Lopez Benitez,
2025 WL 2371588, at *6. Because Petitioner is not “seeking admission,” ICE may not detain him
under § 1225(b)(2).
Furthermore, in Jennings, the Supreme Court discussed the relationship between § 1225
and § 1226: “In sum, U.S. immigration law authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens
seeking admission into the country under §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2). It also authorizes the Govern-
ment to detain certain aliens already in the country pending the outcome of removal proceedings
under §§ 1226(a) and (c).” 583 U.S. at 289. Even if this statement might be considered as dicta,
courts in the Fifth Circuit “are generally bound by Supreme Court dicta, especially when it is recent
and detailed.” McRorey v. Garland, 99 F.4th 831, 837 (5th Cir. 2024) (quoting Hollis v. Lynch,
827 F.3d 436, 448 (5th Cir. 2016), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Diaz, 116 F.4th
458 (5th Cir. 2024)); accord Siders v. City of Brandon, 123 F.4th 293, 304 (5th Cir. 2024). Re-
gardless, this Court finds Jennings instructive.
Based upon this interpretation of “seeking admission,” the Court concludes § 1225(b)(2)
applies to noncitizens “seeking admission,” and § 1226 applies to noncitizens such as Petitioner
who are “already in the country.” Consequently, Respondents may not detain Petitioner pursuant
to § 1225(b)(2). Based upon this showing, Petitioner has satisfied his burden of proving he is being
held contrary to law by a preponderance of the evidence. See Villanueva v. Tate, ___ F. Supp. 3d
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___, ___, No. CV H-25-3364, 2025 WL 2774610, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2025); Bruce v. Es-
telle, 536 F.2d 1051, 1058 (5th Cir. 1976).
Because Petitioner cannot be detained under § 1225(b)(2), further detention is permissible
only if there is a valid source of lawful detention. However, Respondents do not assert any other
basis for detaining Petitioner. In fact, they assert that the only relief available to him is release
from custody. Absent an assertion by Respondents that they are detaining Petitioner under § 1226,
the Court has no need to consider whether § 1226 is a valid basis for Petitioner’s current detention.
See Martinez v. Hyde, 792 F. Supp. 3d 211, 223 n.23 (D. Mass. 2025). The same can be said
regarding potential detention under § 1225(b)(1).2 In addition, the Court will not consider any
constitutional or other challenge presented. While the Court recognizes that Respondents’ inter-
pretation and application of §§ 1225(b)(2) and 1226(a) may be the subject of a nationwide class
action in the Central District of California, see Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz, ___ F. Supp. 3d
___, ___, No. 5:25-CV-01873-SSS-BFM, 2025 WL 3288403, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025)
(certifying proposed nationwide bond eligible class), the Court does not view that case as preclud-
ing it from granting habeas relief in this case at this time. There is no reason to delay Petitioner’s
release.
Under the facts and circumstances of this case, this Court must conclude Petitioner’s de-
tention is unlawful, and habeas relief is proper.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the Petition for Habeas Corpus (ECF No.
2 While § 1225(b)(1) provides for detention when the detainee is in expedited removal proceedings, Petitioner here is
undisputedly in full, rather than expedited, removal proceedings. Respondents have conceded in other cases that a
noncitizen cannot simultaneously be in both full and expedited removal proceedings. See Patel v. Tindall, No. 3:25-
CV-373-RGJ, 2025 WL 2823607, at *5 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 3, 2025) (collecting cases). Thus, even if § 1225(b)(1) could
apply, as a general matter, to Petitioner, and Respondents asserted it as a basis for detention, Petitioner is not subject
to expedited removal proceedings and, therefore, is not subject to § 1225(b)(1)’s detention provisions. Respondents
cannot detain Petitioner in connection with expedited removal proceedings that do not exist.
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1). It is ORDERED that:
1. Respondents are DIRECTED to RELEASE Petitioner Alejandro Castro Avelar from
custody, under appropriate conditions of release, to a public place no later than 2:00 p.m., Jan-
uary 7, 2026.
2. Respondents must NOTIFY Petitioner’s counsel of the exact location and exact time of
his release as soon as practicable and no less than two hours before his release.
3. Any possible or anticipated removal or transfer of Petitioner under this present detention
is PROHIBITED.
4. If Petitioner is re-detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226, all applicable procedures must
be followed, including that he be afforded a bond hearing.
5. The parties shall FILE a Joint Status report no later than 2:00 p.m., January 8, 2026,
confirming that Petitioner has been released.
A final judgment will be issued separately.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 5th day of January 2026.
JASON PULLIAM
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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