Hess et al v. Ortman, Badge #1122 et al

5:25-cv-00814Txwd8 dic 2025

Testo completo

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
SAN ANTONIO DIVISION
RUSSELL HESS, BARBARA
WOFFORD, K.H., MINOR DAUGHTER,
H.H., MINOR DAUGHTER, B.H.,
MINOR DAUGHTER, L.H., MINOR
DAUGHTER, R.H., MINOR
DAUGHTER,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
OFFICER LIAM ORTMAN, BADGE
#1122, OFFICER ARON BENOY,
BADGE #1105, SERGEANT BRYAN
HARSHMAN, BADGE#1116, THE
BULVERDE POLICE DEPARTMENT,
THE CITY OF BULVERDE,
Defendants.
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SA-25-CV-00814-FB
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
To the Honorable United States District Judge Fred Biery:
This Report and Recommendation concerns Defendants the City of Bulverde, Bulverde
Police Department, Sgt. Bryan Harshman, Officer Aron Benoy and Officer Liam Ortman’s First
Amended Motion to Dismiss [#14]. All pretrial matters in this case have been referred to the
undersigned for disposition pursuant to Western District of Texas Local Rule CV-72 and
Appendix C. The undersigned therefore has authority to enter this recommendation pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). For the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that Defendants’
motion be granted.
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I. Background
Plaintiffs Russell Hess, Barbara Wofford, and their five minor daughters (H.H., B.H.,
L.H., R.H., and K.H.) filed this civil rights action, proceeding pro se, against the City of
Bulverde, the Bulverde Police Department, and three officers (Liam Ortman, Aron Benoy, and
Bryan Harshman) regarding an alleged unconstitutional traffic stop and the unlawful detention,
warrantless search, and retaliatory arrest of Mr. Hess. According to Plaintiffs’ Complaint, they
were traveling on Highway 281 through Bulverde, Texas, on April 27, 2025, when Officer
Ortman initiated a traffic stop due to the lack of a license plate on the trailer attached to their
vehicle. (Compl. [#1], at ¶¶ 22, 23.) Plaintiffs claim that Mr. Hess invoked his constitutional
right to remain silent and refused to provide identification and was then unlawfully arrested and
detained for approximately 28 hours before being released. (Id. at ¶¶ 26–29, 33.)
Based on these allegations, Plaintiffs assert 20 causes of action. Plaintiffs allege the
individual Officer Defendants are liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because they violated the Fourth
Amendment by engaging in an unlawful seizure, unlawful arrest, and excessive force; violated
the Fifth Amendment by failing to provide Mr. Hess with timely Miranda warnings and
depriving him of his right to procedural and substantive due process; violated the First
Amendment by retaliating against Mr. Hess for asserting his rights; and deprived Plaintiffs of
their constitutional right to familial association. Plaintiffs further claim that the individual
Officer Defendants engaged in a conspiracy to violate their constitutional rights in violation of
42 U.S.C. § 1985 and committed an unlawful kidnapping in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201.
Plaintiffs allege the Bulverde Police Department and City of Bulverde are liable for the
individual Defendants’ constitutional violations under a theory of municipal liability.
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As to their state law claims, Plaintiffs allege all Defendants are liable under Texas law for
false arrest, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and loss of consortium; the individual
Officer Defendants are liable for negligent infliction of emotional distress to bystanders, child
endangerment, and abuse of process; and the municipal Defendants are liable for negligent
hiring, training, and supervision. By their suit, Plaintiffs seek compensatory and punitive
damages and injunctive relief.
All five Defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint for failure to state a
claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.1 Plaintiffs filed a
response to the motion [#15], accompanied by a memorandum of law in support of their response
[#16]. The motion is ripe for the Court’s review.
II. Legal Standard
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. “Although a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations,” the
“allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555. The allegations pleaded must show “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant
has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
1 The motion was filed in compliance with the District Court’s Standing Order in Civil
Cases Assigned to Judge Fred Biery on Rule 12(b)(6) motion practice.
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In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a court
“accepts all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”
Martin K. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004)
(internal quotation omitted). Additionally, this Court liberally construes the pleadings of all pro
se parties, holding them to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). However, a Court need not credit conclusory
allegations or allegations that merely restate the legal elements of a claim. Chhim v. Univ. of
Tex. at Austin, 836 F.3d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 2016) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). “[W]hether the
plaintiff is proceeding pro se or is represented by counsel, conclusory allegations or legal
conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss.”
Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002).
“The ultimate question in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is whether the complaint states a valid
claim when all well-pleaded facts are assumed true and are viewed in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff.” Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir.
2010). “The court’s review is limited to the complaint, any documents attached to the complaint,
and any documents attached to the motion to dismiss that are central to the claim and referenced
by the complaint.” Id. (citing Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498–99 (5th
Cir. 2000)). If matters outside of the pleadings beyond such documents are presented to and not
excluded by the Court, the motion to dismiss must be treated as one for summary judgment
under Rule 56, and all parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material
pertinent to the motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).
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III. Additional Documents Attached to Motion to Dismiss Briefing
Both parties have attached additional documents to their motion to dismiss briefing.
Defendants attached several police records and incident reports to their motion. (Ex. 1 [#14-1],
at 1–5.) The Court may not consider these documents without converting Defendants’ motion
into a motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs do not refer to these reports in their pleadings.
Nor are they central to Plaintiffs’ claims. The undersigned will therefore disregard the evidence
attached to Defendants’ motion in evaluating the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s pleadings under Rule
12(b)(6).
Plaintiffs provided the Court with a video from Ms. Wofford’s cell phone of the police
encounter, as well as a transcript they created of the video [#17]. The Court may consider the
video and transcript without converting Defendants’ motion to one seeking summary judgment,
as Plaintiffs themselves provided the Court with the video to argue Defendants lacked probable
cause for the traffic stop and his arrest. See Robles v. Ciarletta, 797 F. App’x 821, 831–32 (5th
Cir. 2019) (holding that the district court properly considered body camera footage at the
motion-to-dismiss stage where plaintiff relied on video as evidence of lack of probable cause).
See also Blakely v. Andrade, 360 F. Supp. 3d 453, 473 (N.D. Tex. 2019) (considering video of
traffic stop recorded by plaintiffs in ruling on sufficiency of pleadings challenged by motion to
dismiss). Cf. Hodge v. Engleman, 90 F.4th 840, 843–45 (5th Cir. 2024) (finding district court
implicitly converted motion to dismiss to motion for summary judgment when it considered
video evidence attached to the defendants’ motions to dismiss that was not provided by the
plaintiff or referenced in the complaint). Where a plaintiff’s allegations in the pleadings are
contradicted by video evidence Plaintiffs themselves submitted, this Court is not required to
favor the allegations in the pleadings over the facts depicted by the evidence. See Hartman v.
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Walker, 685 Fed. App’x 366, 368 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing Scott for proposition that on a motion to
dismiss a court need not credit pleadings over contradictory video evidence) (citing Scott v.
Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007)).
IV. Analysis
Defendants ask the Court to dismiss all of Plaintiffs’ claims for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted and argue that the individual Defendants are entitled to
qualified immunity. The Court should grant the motion. First, Defendant the City of Bulverde
Police Department is not an entity with jural authority to engage in litigation separate from the
City of Bulverde itself so must be dismissed. As to the individual officer Defendants, the facts
alleged in Plaintiffs’ Complaint and as depicted in the video Plaintiffs submitted for the Court’s
consideration do not give rise to any plausible violation of statutory or constitutional law, let
alone one that is clearly established. The individual Defendants are therefore entitled to
qualified immunity. Because Plaintiffs failed to state a claim for any violation of their
constitutional rights, Defendant the City of Bulverde cannot be liable under a theory of
municipal liability. Because Plaintiffs have not alleged any plausible federal cause of action, the
Court need not evaluate the sufficiency of the pleadings as to Plaintiff’s numerous state-law
claims, as the Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those claims. The
Court also need not address Defendants’ arguments regarding the standing of Mr. Hess and his
wife to represent their minor children in this action.
A. Defendant the City of Bulverde Police Department is not a proper Defendant.
Defendants ask the Court to dismiss the City of Bulverde Police Department because it
lacks jural existence apart from the City of Bulverde itself and cannot be sued as an independent
entity. “In order for a plaintiff to sue a city department, it must enjoy a separate legal existence.”
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Darby v. Pasadena Police Dep’t, 939 F.2d 311, 313 (5th Cir. 1991). The Fifth Circuit has held
that “unless the true political entity has taken explicit steps to grant the servient agency with jural
authority, the agency cannot engage in any litigation except in concert with the government
itself.” Id. Because Plaintiffs have failed to plead that the City of Bulverde granted its police
department the capacity to engage in separate litigation, it must be dismissed from this suit, and
Plaintiffs may attempt to seek relief from the City of Bulverde for the actions of its police
department and officers. See id.
B. The individual officer Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
Defendants ask the Court to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims against all three officer Defendants
on the basis of qualified immunity. Qualified immunity shields federal and state officials from
individual liability and suits for civil damages. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
When considering a qualified-immunity defense in the context of a motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim, a court must determine whether a plaintiff’s pleadings assert facts which, if true,
would overcome the defense of qualified immunity. Backe v. LeBlanc, 691 F.3d 645, 648 (5th
Cir. 2012). To meet this burden, the plaintiff must plead “specific facts” showing (1) that the
official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was “clearly established”
at the time of the challenged conduct. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011) (citing
Harlow, 457 U.S. at, 818). Plaintiffs have not pleaded facts showing the violation of any
statutory or constitutional right, and the video evidence confirms no such violation occurred.
Therefore, the individual officers are entitled to qualified immunity.
i. Plaintiffs have failed to plead a Fourth Amendment violation.
Plaintiffs’ Complaint asserts numerous constitutional violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983. A plaintiff can establish a prima facie case under Section 1983 for the deprivation of civil
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rights by demonstrating: (1) a violation of a federal constitutional or statutory right; and (2) that
the violation was committed by an individual acting under the color of state law. Doe v. Rains
Cnty. Indep. Sch. Dist., 66 F.3d 1402, 1406 (5th Cir. 1995). Plaintiffs allege several theories of a
Fourth Amendment violation: unlawful seizure, false arrest, and excessive force. Plaintiffs have
not pleaded facts showing the violation of the Fourth Amendment.
First, as to the traffic stop, Plaintiffs allege that Officer Ortman initiated a traffic stop of
Plaintiffs’ vehicle for failure to display a license plate on the trailer attached to their vehicle.
(Compl. [#1], at ¶¶ 22, 23.) In Texas, “[a] person commits an offense if the person operates on a
public highway during a registration period a . . . trailer or semitrailer that does not display a
license plate . . . .” Tex. Transp. Code § 504.943(b). A traffic stop is constitutionally reasonable
where the police have probable cause to believe a traffic violation has occurred. Whren v. United
States, 517 U.S. 806, 809–810 (1996). Because Officer Ortman had probable cause to believe
that Plaintiffs were operating a vehicle and trailer in violation of the Texas Transportation Code,
the traffic stop was lawful and cannot form the basis of any claim that Defendants engaged in an
illegal seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Plaintiffs’ allegations and the video evidence also establish that Mr. Hess’s arrest for
refusing to provide identification to the responding officers upon request was lawful because it
was also based on probable cause. Plaintiff pleads and the video establishes that Mr. Hess
refused to provide identification to the responding officers when it was requested. (Compl. [#1],
at ¶ 29.) The Texas Penal Code provides that a person commits an offense if the person is
operating a motor vehicle, is lawfully detained by a peace officer for an alleged violation of law,
and “fails to provide or display the person’s driver’s license on the officer’s request for the
license.” Tex. Pen. Code 38.02(b-1). Probable cause for an arrest exists when the “facts and
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circumstances within the officer’s knowledge . . . are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or
one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has
committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.” Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S.
31, 37 (1979). The officers repeatedly asked Mr. Hess to provide identification throughout the
traffic stop, and he consistently refused to provide his driver’s license or any identification to the
officers. After repeated refusals to comply with the officers’ lawful requests for identification,
Officer Harshman informed Mr. Hess that he was under arrest for failing to provide
identification and directed him to step out of the vehicle. Because there was probable cause for
Mr. Hess’s arrest for a violation of the Texas Penal Code, his arrest cannot form the basis of any
claim that Defendants violated the Fourth Amendment through an unlawful arrest and seizure.
Plaintiffs also assert Defendants violated the Fourth Amendment by engaging in
excessive force when they removed him from the vehicle and took him into custody in front of
his family. To plead a claim of excessive force, a plaintiff must plausibly allege: (1) injury, (2)
which resulted directly and only from a use of force that was clearly excessive, and (3) the
excessiveness of which was clearly unreasonable. Ramirez v. Escajeda, 44 F.4th 287, 291 (5th
Cir. 2022) (quoting Solis v. Serrett, 31 F.4th 975, 981 (5th Cir. 2022)). The injury must be
“more than de minimis.” Tarver v. City of Edna, 410 F.3d 745, 752 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing
Williams v. Bramer, 180 F.3d 699, 703 (5th Cir. 1999)).
Plaintiffs’ Complaint does not contain any facts giving rise to a Fourth Amendment
excessive-force claim. There are no allegations in Plaintiffs’ Complaint regarding the force
Plaintiffs summarily contend was excessive or describing any injuries Mr. Hess suffered. The
undersigned has viewed the video evidence submitted by Plaintiffs, and the video depicts Mr.
Hess voluntarily exiting his vehicle in response to verbal directives from the officers. During the
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moment in which he exits the vehicle, the video depicts the officers and Mr. Hess engaging in a
calm dialogue. Mr. Hess fully cooperated with his handcuffing, and at no point does he appear
in any distress. There is simply no basis for Plaintiffs to allege that he was subjected to
excessive force during his arrest.
ii. Plaintiffs have failed to plead a Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment violation.
Plaintiffs also assert violations of the Fifth Amendment on the basis that the officers
attempted to compel Mr. Hess to incriminate himself and failed to provide him with timely
Miranda warnings. The individual officers are also entitled to qualified immunity as to this
claim. The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination prohibits police custodial
interrogation without a prior warning. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). A person
subject to an investigative detention regarding a traffic violation “is not entitled to Miranda
warnings because he is not in custody.” United States v. Garcia, 77 F.3d 857, 859 (5th Cir.
1996).
The video submitted by Plaintiffs depict Mr. Hess repeatedly asking for the officers to
“read him his rights” during the traffic stop and the officers responding that Mr. Hess was not
under custodial arrest so not entitled to Miranda warnings. These allegations and facts do not
state a claim under the Fifth Amendment because Mr. Hess was not in custody at the time he
believes he was entitled to Miranda warnings. There are no allegations in Plaintiffs’ Complaint
regarding Defendants’ failure to provide Mr. Hess with Miranda warnings after he was placed
under arrest for refusal to provide identification. Nor does the video depict Mr. Hess being
interrogated by the officers during the encounter. Interrogation, in the context of Miranda,
“must reflect a measure of compulsion . . . reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response
from a suspect.” Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300–01 (1980). The video evidence
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establishes that the officers merely asked Mr. Hess for his license and identification. Plaintiffs
have not pleaded facts giving rise to a Fifth Amendment violation.
Plaintiffs have also not pleaded facts that could plausibly constitute a due-process
violation under the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs allege it was a violation of their due-
process rights for the officers to use coercive tactics in the arrest of Mr. Hess because they
threatened to contact CPS. Again, Plaintiffs grossly exaggerate the facts as depicted by the video
evidence they submitted. The Fourteenth Amendment protects a suspect’s right to be free from
coercive questioning. Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 774 (2003). To violate the Due
Process Clause, law enforcement must use a substantial element of coercive conduct that is
“intended to injure in some way unjustifiable by any government interest” rising to the
“conscience-shocking level.” City of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 834 (1998). The video
evidence does not depict any coercive conduct on the part of law enforcement. The only
reference to CPS by the officers was in response to a question posed by Mr. Hess to the officers
as to what his family would do during his arrest for failure to provide identification. Officer
Harshman explained that if there are children present at the time of an arrest, the officers call
CPS to pick up the kids. However, this statement was not accompanied by any coercive element
so as to be actionable under the Fourteenth Amendment. It was clear from the totality of the
encounter that CPS would not be called in this instance because Mr. Hess’s wife was in the
vehicle; provided her driver’s license to the officers; and was released with the vehicle and the
children and instructed to meet Mr. Hess at the jail. Plaintiffs have not alleged coercive conduct,
and the video establishes there was none.
Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants violated the Fourteenth Amendment and their right
to familial association by unlawfully separating Mr. Hess from his wife and their minor
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daughters during his arrest and 28-hour detention. This theory of liability is also unsupported by
the allegations in Plaintiffs’ Complaint. The right of familial association or family integrity “is a
form of liberty guaranteed by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Morris v.
Dearborne, 181 F.3d 657, 667 (5th Cir. 1999). The Fifth Circuit has never recognized a clearly
established violation of the right to family integrity in the context of a temporary separation
during a valid arrest based on probable cause, where the children remained in the custody of the
other parent, as here. “Foundational family integrity cases involved the state’s attempt to sever
permanently the parent-child relationship.” Romero v. Brown, 937 F.3d 514, 520 (5th Cir. 2019)
(internal quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). The Fifth Circuit has observed
that clear violations of substantive due process are found only “when the removal [of children]
measured in months or years.” Id. Plaintiffs cannot overcome the defense of qualified immunity
based on the familial-association claim pleaded in their Complaint.
iii. Plaintiffs have failed to plead a First Amendment violation.
Finally, Plaintiffs have not alleged a First Amendment violation. Plaintiffs claim that
Defendants violated Mr. Hess’s First Amendment rights by retaliating against him for asserting
his rights. The “First Amendment prohibits government officials from subjecting an individual
to retaliatory actions . . . for speaking out.” Hartman v. Moore, 547 U. S. 250, 256 (2006). But a
First Amendment retaliation claim is only available “when non-retaliatory grounds are in fact
insufficient to provoke the adverse consequences.” Degenhardt v. Bintliff, 117 F.4th 747, 758
(5th Cir. 2024) (internal citation and quotation omitted). Because Plaintiffs’ allegations and
video evidence establishes that the offices had a lawful basis to stop Plaintiffs’ vehicle and to
arrest Mr. Hess, Plaintiffs have failed to plead facts sufficient to show that the officers were
substantially motivated by Mr. Hess’s repeated assertions of what he believed to be his legal
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rights. See id. The individual officer Defendants are also entitled to qualified immunity as to
this claim.
iv. Defendants cannot be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1985.
Plaintiffs allege that all three officers named in the Complaint and present during the
police encounter engaged in civil conspiracy to effectuate an unlawful traffic stop and arrest in
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985. To state a claim under § 1985(3), a plaintiff must allege facts
demonstrating (1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving a person of the equal protection
of the laws; and (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4) which causes injury to a person or
a deprivation of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States. Jackson v. City of
Hearne, Tex., 959 F.3d 194, 200 (5th Cir. 2020). Because Plaintiffs fail to allege any plausible
constitutional violation, Defendants cannot be held liable for participation in a conspiracy to
violate their rights. Id. at 206. Accordingly, the District Court should dismiss Plaintiffs’
conspiracy claim on the basis of the individual officer Defendants’ qualified immunity from suit
as well.
C. Plaintiffs have not pleaded any other plausible federal cause of action.
The only other federal causes of action asserted in this case are a claim of municipal
liability against the City of Bulverde and a claim for kidnapping under 18 U.S.C. § 1201.
Municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires proof of (1) a policymaker; (2) an official
policy; and (3) a violation of constitutional rights whose “moving force” is the policy or custom.
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694–95 (1978). As Plaintiffs have not pleaded any
violation of a constitutional right, there can be no liability under Monell. Plaintiffs also cannot
bring a private right of action against any Defendant under 18 U.S.C. § 1201, as it is a criminal
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statute to be enforced by the Government and not a basis for a civil lawsuit. Accordingly, these
claims must also be dismissed.
D. The District Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
Plaintiffs’ state-law claims.
This case purportedly arises under this Court’s federal question jurisdiction, as the parties
are non-diverse, so diversity jurisdiction does not exist. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Plaintiffs allege
numerous violations of state law in their Complaint. The Court need not evaluate the sufficiency
of the pleadings as to these claims, all of which appear equally frivolous. Where a court
dismisses all federal claims, the court has broad discretion to decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over pendent state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). The Court should
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ remaining state-law claims, and to
the extent that any are not frivolous, they can be brought in state court.
E. Plaintiffs should not be afforded an opportunity to amend their pleadings.
Ordinarily, a pro se litigant should be offered an opportunity to amend his complaint
before it is dismissed, but leave to amend is not required where an amendment would be futile,
i.e., an amended complaint would still fail to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Stem v. Gomez,
813 F.3d 205, 215–16 (5th Cir. 2016). As Plaintiffs submitted video evidence confirming their
claims are legally meritless, they should not be permitted an opportunity to amend their
pleadings. Because the Court is recommending the dismissal of all claims, the District Court
need not address Defendants’ additional argument for dismissal based on the lack of standing to
bring claims on behalf of minor children.
V. Conclusion and Recommendation
Having considered Defendants’ motion, Plaintiffs’ responsive filings, the pleadings, the
video and transcript, and governing law, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the First
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Amended Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants the City of Bulverde, Bulverde Police
Department, Sgt. Bryan Harshman, Officer Aron Benoy and Officer Liam Ortman [#14] be
GRANTED.
VI. Instructions for Service and Notice of Right to Object/Appeal
The United States District Clerk shall serve a copy of this report and recommendation on
all parties by either (1) electronic transmittal to all parties represented by attorneys registered as
a “filing user” with the clerk of court, or (2) by mailing a copy to those not registered by certified
mail, return receipt requested. Written objections to this report and recommendation must be
filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of same, unless this time period is
modified by the district court. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). The party shall file
the objections with the Clerk of Court and serve the objections on all other parties. A party filing
objections must specifically identify those findings, conclusions or recommendations to which
objections are being made and the basis for such objections; the district court need not consider
frivolous, conclusive or general objections. A party’s failure to file written objections to the
proposed findings, conclusions and recommendations contained in this report shall bar the party
from a de novo determination by the district court. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149–52 (1985);
Acuña v. Brown & Root, Inc., 200 F.3d 335, 340 (5th Cir. 2000). Additionally, failure to file
timely written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions and recommendations contained
in this report and recommendation shall bar the aggrieved party, except upon grounds of plain
error, from attacking on appeal the un-objected-to proposed factual findings and legal
conclusions accepted by the district court. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415,
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1428–29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), superseded by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1).
SIGNED this 8th day of December, 2025.
ELIZABETH S. ("BETSY") CHESTNEY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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