Burk v. West Texas Detention Facility et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
PECOS DIVISION
LESLIE ROBERT BURK,
No. 32634380, Plaintiff,
v.
HUDSPETH COUNTY, et al.,
Defendants.
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PE:24-CV-00054-DC-DF
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
BEFORE THE COURT is Defendant Hudspeth County’s (“Hudspeth”) Motion to
Dismiss.1 (Doc. 69). This matter is before the undersigned Magistrate Judge through a
standing order of referral pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Appendix C of the Local
Rules for the Assignment of Duties to United States Magistrate Judges. After due
consideration, the Court RECOMMENDS Hudspeth’s Motion to Dismiss be
GRANTED. (Doc. 69).
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Leslie Robert Burk’s (“Burk”) claims involve multiple incidents from
when he was detained at the West Texas Detention Facility (“WTDF”) and Federal
Correctional Institute Bastrop (“FCI Bastrop”). (Doc. 1). Burk’s original Complaint was
muddled and difficult to decipher. Id. The Court ordered Burk to clarify his claims
several times. (Docs. 15, 17). In Burk’s Response to the Court’s Order for More Definite
1. Hudspeth also moves to dismiss to the extent Burk brings a claim against Hudspeth County
Commissioner Andrew Virdell. (Doc. 69 at 1). The Court construes Burk’s pleadings as only bringing a
claim against Hudspeth County for its actions while Commissioner Virdell was Commissioner. Burk does
not name Commissioner Virdell as a Defendant or request any relief from him in his Response to the
Court’s Order for More Definite Statement. (Doc. 17). He also lists Commissioner Virdell as a “Contact”
for Hudspeth in his Complaint rather than a standalone Defendant. (Doc. 1 at 1).
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Statement, Burk clarifies that he is bringing a 28 U.S.C. § 1983 municipality liability
claim against Hudspeth along with what appears to be a supervisory liability claim.
(Doc. 17 at 25).
Hudspeth filed a Motion to Dismiss on September 8, 2025. (Doc. 69). Burk filed
his Response on September 23, to which Hudspeth filed a Reply on September 30.
(Docs. 72, 73). Accordingly, this matter is ripe for adjudication.
LEGAL STANDARD
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) challenges a
complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, plaintiff must plead
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Dismissal is appropriate if a complaint offers merely “labels and conclusions” or “a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Whitley v. Hanna,
726 F.3d 631, 638 (5th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 572 U.S. 1087 (2014) (quoting
Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678). When reviewing a 12(b)(6) motion, the court accepts all facts
as true and construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Fernandez-Montes
v. Allied Pilots Assoc., 987 F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 1993).
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DISCUSSION
A municipality can be held liable under § 1983 if it promulgates an official policy
that causes the deprivation of a constitutional right. Benfer v. City of Baytown,
120 F.4th 1272, 1285 (5th Cir. 2024). But to state this type of claim, the plaintiff must
“allege facts that show an official policy” or otherwise plead “an employee practice that
is so wide-spread and so common that it constitutes a custom representing the policies
of the municipality.” Groden v. City of Dallas, 826 F.3d 280, 283–84 (5th Cir. 2016)
(emphasis omitted); Benfer, 120 F.4th at 1286 (citing Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237
F.3d 567, 581 (5th Cir. 2001)). Burk does not point to an official policy of Hudspeth, so
instead he must have pleaded a pattern or custom. (Docs. 1, 17).
“Showing a pervasive pattern is a heavy burden.” Sanchez v. Young County,
956 F.3d 785, 793 (5th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). “A successful showing of such a
pattern requires similarity and specificity; prior indications cannot simply be for any
and all bad or unwise acts, but rather point to the specific violation in question.” Benfer,
120 F.4th at 1286 (quoting Hicks-Fields v. Harris County, 860 F.3d 803, 810 (5th Cir. 2017)
(cleaned up)). “In addition to similarity and specificity, a pattern must be comprised of
sufficiently numerous prior incidents rather than merely isolated instances.” Id.
(citations and quotations omitted).
“[T]o survive a motion to dismiss . . . [Plaintiff] is required to plead at least
something resembling a pattern of serious deficiencies.” Hogan v. Bexar County, No. 19-
CV-00255, 2021 WL 1667130, at *7 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 27, 2021). Burk’s pleading fails to
meet even this burden, as his assertions regarding a pattern or custom are entirely
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conclusory.2 (Doc. 17 at 25). Burk states only that “there is clear evidence in my case in
particular of a series of non-reporting customs or policies” and “failures to provide
critical and timely medical attention. . . .” Id. He does not to point to anything
resembling a pattern of factually similar deficiencies. Id.; Hogan, 2021 WL 1667130, at *7.
Burk has therefore failed to plead a municipality liability claim against Hudspeth.
To the extent Burk also attempts3 to plead a standalone supervisory liability
claim against Hudspeth, such a claim is not cognizable. (Doc. 17 at 14). Under Monell,
municipalities cannot be held directly liable for the tortious acts of their agents. Monell
v. Dep’t of Social Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Thus, regardless of whether
Hudspeth allowed its agents’ tortious activity, it cannot be held liable. Id.; (Doc. 17 at
14).
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court RECOMMENDS that Hudspeth’s Motion
to Dismiss be GRANTED. (Doc. 69).
2. In his Response, Burk cites to multiple out-of-Circuit cases that he asserts provide the basis for his
claims; but the Court finds them unpersuasive here. (Doc. 72 at 2) (citing Ramos v. Galo, 596 F. Supp. 833
(D. Mass. 1984); Holland v. Breen, 623 F. Supp. 284, 290 (D. Mass. 1985)). Ramos did not involve a claim
against a municipality. 596 F. Supp. at 835. Though Holland did involve a successful claim against a
municipality with some similar facts, it was decided forty years ago in a different Circuit. 523 F. Supp. at
290; Patton v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 910 F. Supp. 1250, 1269 (S.D. Tex. 1995) (finding “reference to other
circuits . . . unpersuasive” and relying on Fifth Circuit precedent).
3. Burk claims Hudspeth “allowed all of the activities” asserted in his Complaint “to happen and go
unreported.” (Doc. 17 at 14).
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SIGNED this 3rd day of December, 2025.
DAVID B. FANNIN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT
In the event that a party has not been served by the Clerk with this Report and
Recommendation electronically, pursuant to the CM/ECF procedures of this District,
the Clerk is ORDERED to mail such party a copy of this Report and Recommendation
by certified mail, return receipt requested. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), any party
who desires to object to this report must serve and file written objections within
fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy unless the time period is modified by
the District Court. A party filing objections must specifically identify those findings,
conclusions, or recommendations to which objections are being made; the District Court
need not consider frivolous, conclusive, or general objections. Such party shall file the
objections with the Clerk of the Court and serve the objections on the Magistrate Judge
and on all other parties. A party’s failure to file such objections to the proposed
findings, conclusions, and recommendations contained in this report shall bar the party
from a de novo determination by the District Court. Additionally, a party’s failure to
file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendations
contained in this report within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy shall
bar that party, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the
unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the District
Court. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428–29 (5th Cir. 1996).
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