ACOSTA DOMINGUEZ v. NOEM et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
EL PASO DIVISION
JULIO ANGEL ACOSTA
DOMINGUEZ,
Petitioner,
v.
KRISTI NOEM, in official capacity,
Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, et al.,
Respondents.
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EP-25-CV-00741-DB
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
On this day, the Court considered Petitioner Julio Angel Acosta Dominguez’s (“Petitioner”)
“Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus” (“Petition”), filed on December 23, 2025, ECF No.1 1. After
due consideration, this Court asserts its jurisdiction over Petitioner’s claims and hereby orders
Petitioner’s bond hearing be held in accordance with the deadlines set forth herein or be released
from custody. For the following reasons, the Petition is granted in part.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a Dominican Republic national who entered the United States without
inspection on December 7, 2022. ECF No. 1 at 1. Petitioner was detained, processed, and released
under 8 U.S.C. 1185(d)(5) under a humanitarian parole. Id. at 2. On November 26, 2025, Petitioner
appeared for a scheduled United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) check-in
at the ICE office in Newark, New Jersey, as he had consistently done for more than (2) years and
1 “ECF No.” refers to the Electronic Case Filing (“ECF”) number for documents docketed in this
matter. When a discrepancy exists between page numbers on filed documents and page numbers
assigned by the ECF system, the Court will use the page numbers assigned by the ECF system.
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eleven months. Id. He was detained that same day. Id. Petitioner was served with a Notice to
Appear, charging him as removable under sections 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) and 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(7)(A)(i). Id. Petitioner is married to a United States citizen. Id. On December 2, 2025,
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) received and issued a receipt
notice for an I-130 (Noncitizen Relative Petition-Spouse) petition for adjustment of status. Id.
On December 23, 2025, Petitioner filed the instant Petition. See ECF No. 1. Therein, he
asks this Court to assume jurisdiction over this matter, declare that his continued detention is
unlawful, and issue a writ of habeas corpus ordering immediate release or a bond hearing. ECF
No. 1 at 26–28. Petitioner avers that “[w]ithout relief from this Court, Petitioner faces continued
detention without the possibility of an individualized bond hearing” in violation of the Fifth
Amendment, among other things. Id. at 4. Pursuant to the Court’s briefing schedule, Respondents
filed their response, ECF No. 3, on January 5, 2025. Petitioner filed a reply, ECF No. 4, on January
7, 2026.
LEGAL STANDARD
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual
detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.
C ONST., Art. I, § 9, cl. 2). This includes immigration-related detention. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533
U.S. 678, 687 (2001). The petitioner seeking habeas relief must demonstrate they are in custody
in violation of the Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Walker v. Johnston, 312
U.S. 275, 286 (1941).
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ANALYSIS
Respondents erroneously assert the Court is without jurisdiction to review Petitioner’s
asserted claims. This Court recently rejected nearly identical arguments in a similar case. Further,
the Court finds Petitioner’s as-applied challenge under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
has merit. Accordingly, Respondents must provide Petitioner with a bond hearing before an
immigration judge in accordance with the orders herein or immediately release them. Lastly,
because the Court finds an as-applied challenge meritorious,2 it declines to address any other
claims.3
A. 	Jurisdiction
As a threshold matter, the Court asserts its jurisdiction over this case. This Court has
already rejected Respondents’ identical arguments related to 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(g) and (b)(9). See
Vieira v. De Anda-Ybarra, No. EP-25-CV-00432-DB, 2025 WL 2937880 at *3 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 16,
2025) (rejecting jurisdictional arguments under Section 1252(g) and Section 1252(b)(9) based on
Supreme Court precedent). Here, because there are no meaningful differences4 in Respondents’
2 The parties argue about Respondents’ novel interpretation regarding mandatory detention under
Section 1225(b) and whether Petitioner falls within it. Even assuming without deciding
Respondents’ reading is correct, the Court will not address these arguments because the Court finds
Petitioner is entitled to procedural due process in her as-applied challenge.
3 Notably, courts across the country have recently held that Respondent’ interpretation is either
incorrect or likely incorrect. See Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 2025 WL 2886346 (S.D. Tex. Oct.
7, 2025), 2025 WL 2886346, at *3 (noting that “almost every district court to consider this issue”
has rejected the Government’s new interpretation); Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, 2025 WL 2496379,
at *8 n.5 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025) (collecting twelve such decisions).
4 The Court further reiterates its warning that Respondents “carefully consider the jurisdictional
legal arguments it continues to present this Court in similar immigration habeas cases.” See
Rodriguez Cortina, v. De Anda-Ybarra, No. EP-25-CV-00523-DB, 2025 WL 3218682 (W.D. Tex.
Nov. 18, 2025).
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arguments under those provisions, the Court rejects them for the reasons stated in Vieira. This
Court therefore asserts its jurisdiction over this case.
B. 	Procedural Due Process
Turning to the merits, Petitioner alleges his detention violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause. ECF No. 1 at 23–26. Respondents argue Petitioner has no procedural due process
claim because he is subject to mandatory detention under Section 1225(b), and he is not entitled
to any more process than the statute gives him. ECF No. 3 at 7.
1. 	Petitioner is entitled to the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protections.
The Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause forbids the government to “depriv[e]” any
“person . . . of . . . liberty . . . without due process of law.” U.S. C ONST. amend V. “Freedom from
imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at
the heart of the liberty that Clause protects.” Zadvydas v. David, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (citing
Foucha 	v. 	Louisiana, 504 	U.S. 	71, 	80 	(1992)). 	The 	Supreme 	Court 	“has 	said 	that
government detention violates that Clause unless the detention is ordered in a criminal proceeding
with adequate procedural protections, see United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987), or,
in certain special and ‘narrow’ nonpunitive ‘circumstances,’ Foucha, 504, U.S. at 80, where a
special 	justification, 	such 	as 	harm-threatening 	mental 	illness, 	outweighs 	the 	‘individual's
constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint.’” Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S.
346, 356 (1997). Id. “Procedural due process rules are meant to protect persons not from the
deprivation, but from the mistaken or unjustified deprivation of life, liberty, or property.” Carey
v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259 (1978).
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Respondents first contend Petitioner has no claim of right under the Fifth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause because he is only entitled to the due process provided to him under the INA.
ECF No. 3 at 8. Respondents cite to Dept. of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103 (2020)
to support their position. Id. at 7–8. But this Court agrees with the line of other courts that have
found Thuraissigiam is not preclusive on the facts of this case. Petitioner is not challenging his
removal, but rather his detention during removal. And he was not detained at the border on the
threshold of initial entry, but rather after living in the United States since 2022. ECF No. 1 at 2.
In Thuraissigiam, the Supreme Court held “[m]ore than a century of precedent establishes
that, for aliens seeking initial entry, ‘the decisions of executive or administrative officers, acting
within powers expressly conferred by Congress, are due process of law.’” Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S.
at 104. The petitioner in that case had been detained after making it 25 yards into U.S. territory,
and the Court made clear that an individual detained shortly after unlawful entry cannot be said to
have “effected an entry.” Id. In declining an as-applied constitutional challenge to Section
1252(e)(2), the Court reasoned 	that “[w]hile aliens who have established connections in this
country have due process rights in deportation proceedings, the Court long ago held that Congress
is entitled to set the conditions for an alien's lawful entry into this country and that, as a result, an
alien at the threshold of initial entry cannot claim any greater rights under the Due Process Clause.”
Id. at 107.
Respondents urge the Court to find Thuraissigiam squarely rejects an as-applied challenge
in this context. ECF No. 3 at 7. Respondents’ position overlooks the well-established “distinction
between an alien who has effected an entry into the United States and one who has never entered
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[that] runs throughout immigration law.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693. “[O]nce an alien enters the
country, the legal circumstance changes, for the Due Process Clause applies to all “persons” within
the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or
permanent.” Id. (collecting cases). Even in Thuraissigiam, the core point of the Court’s analysis in
rejecting an as-applied challenge rested on the fact that as an individual who was on the initial
threshold of entry, he wasn’t entitled to more due process than that afforded by statute. Precedent
and logic tell us that those individuals who have established ties in the country are protected by
constitutional procedural due process. After all, it is a “well established” rule “that the Fifth
Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law.” Trump v. J. G. G., 145 S. Ct. 1003, 1006 (2025).
Here, it is undisputed Petitioner has lived in the United States since his initial entry in 2022 and
was arrested by ICE in Newark, NJ on November 26, 2025. ECF No. 1 at 2. Petitioner is entitled
to the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protections.
2. 	Based on Mathews v. Eldrige, Section 1252(b) is unconstitutional as applied to
Petitioner.
Finding Petitioner is entitled to procedural due process protection under the Fifth
Amendment, 	the 	question 	becomes 	how 	much. 	Petitioner 	argues 	Section 	1252(b) 	is
unconstitutional as applied to him because it violates his due process rights including his right to
a hearing before an immigration judge to determine whether he is a flight risk or a danger to the
community. ECF No. 1 at 23–16. Respondents argue due process does not require Petitioner to be
afforded a bond hearing because Section 1225(b) does not provide one to him during removal
proceedings. ECF No. 3 at 7. For reasons already discussed, Respondents arguments are misplaced.
Further, Respondents argue Petitioner is receiving sufficient process because he is in full removal
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proceedings where “the constitutional protections are built” in. Id. at 8. But that argument misses
the mark because whatever constitutional procedures are required for his removal are separate and
apart from the procedures required for his detention under the Fifth Amendment.
The Supreme Court’s balancing test in Mathews v. Eldrige is dispositive. “The fundamental
requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner.’” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S.
545, 552 (1965)). “[I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires
consideration of three distinct factors”: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official
action”; (2) “the [g]overnment’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail,” and
(3) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards.” Id. at 335.
The first Mathews factor weighs in Petitioner’s favor. Respondents’ position is that
Petitioner does not acquire a protected liberty interest until his detention becomes prolonged, and
Petitioner has no colorable claim here because “he has only been detained a brief period pending
his removal proceedings.” ECF No. 3 at 7–8. This position fails to consider that above all else,
Petitioner has acquired a liberty interest by being present in the United States since 2022. ECF No.
1 at 1. “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of
physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty [the Due Process] Clause protects.” Zadvydas,
533 U.S. at 690. 	One’s physical freedom is a paramount interest secured by statutes and the
Constitution. Martinez v. Noem, No. EP-25-CV-430-KC, 2025 WL 2965859 at *3 (W.D. Tex. Oct.
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21, 2025) (citation omitted). This applies to noncitizens as well, even if only to varying degrees.
Id. “[O]ur immigration laws have long made a distinction between those aliens who have come to
our shores seeking admission . . . and those who are within the United States after an entry,
irrespective of its legality.” Martinez v. Hyde, 792 F.Supp.3d 211 at 222 (D. Mass. 2025)
(quoting Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 187 (1958)). “In the latter instance the Court has
recognized additional rights and privileges not extended to those in the former category who are
merely ‘on the threshold of initial entry.’” Id. (quoting Leng May Ma, 357 U.S. at 187).
Here, Petitioner has been living in the United States since 2022. ECF No. 1 at 1. Like many
courts across the country dealing with similar circumstances, this Court finds Petitioner possess a
strong liberty interest in his freedom from detention because he has established a life here – albeit
without authorization. See, e.g,, Martinez v. Noem, No. EP-25-CV-430-KC, 2025 WL 2965859
(W.D. Tex. Oct. 21, 2025); Sanchez Alvarez v. Noem, No. 25-CV-1090, 2025 WL 2942648, at *1,
7 	(W.D. 	Mich. 	Oct. 	17, 2025); Chogllo 	Chafla 	v. 	Scott, 	Nos. 	25-CV-437, 	438,
439, 2025 WL 2688541, at *1, 10 (D. Me. Sept. 22, 2025). Accordingly, he possesses a cognizable
interest in his freedom from detention that deserves great weight and gravity.
Turning to the second Mathews factor, which also weighs in favor of Petitioner. Here, the
Court considers “the [g]overnment's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.”
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. Respondents, of course, have a general interest in ensuring noncitizens
appear for their removal hearings and do not pose a risk to the communities in which they live.
While it appears from this record that Petitioner would not be a flight risk and has no criminal
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history that would pose a danger to the community, Respondents could certainly vindicate this
interest at a bond hearing. The government’s interest is generally protected by affording bond
hearings like the one Petitioner is requesting. Further, any fiscal or administrative burdens
Respondents may assert by having to provide a bond hearing are diminished given the government
had conducted such hearings until a change in the agency’s interpretation of the law. ECF No. 3 at
5 (“ICE does not dispute that this interpretation differs from the interpretation that the agency has
taken previously, nor does it dispute that the agency’s own regulations necessarily support the prior
interpretation.”). Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of Petitioner.
Lastly, the third Mathews factor also weighs in favor of Petitioner. This calls for the Court
to consider “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and
the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards.” Mathews, 424 U.S.
at 335. Here, Section 1225(b) as applied creates a substantial risk of erroneous deprivation of
Petitioner’s interest in being free from arbitrary confinement pending resolution of his removal
proceedings. The risk lies in the automatic continued deprivation of liberty for a noncitizen who
has lived in the United States since 2022, especially where there are no facts in the record to reflect
Petitioner’s dangerousness or flight risk. Lastly, the value of additional safeguards is high given
that it will allow an immigration judge conducting a bond hearing to make a determination on
specific facts whether continued detention is necessary to ensure presence at removal hearings and
safety for the community. Because all Mathews factors weigh in favor of Petitioner, Section
1225(b) as applied to Petitioner violates his Fifth Amendment Due Process rights.
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C. 	Remedy
While courts grappling with the appropriate remedy in similar cases have ordered
immediate release, this Court will instead order a bond hearing before an immigration judge first.
But should Respondents disclaim the jurisdiction to do so, Petitioner must be immediately
released. Further, at said bond hearing, the government shall bear the burden5 of justifying
Petitioner’s continued detention during the pendency of his removal proceedings by clear and
convincing evidence. Several courts have followed this course of action in similar habeas cases.
See e.g. Lopez-Arevelo, 2025 WL 2691828 at *12–13; Velasquez Salazar v. Dedos, No. 25-CV-
835, 2025 WL 2676729, at *9 (D.N.M. Sept. 17, 2025); Morgan v. Oddo, No. 24-CV-221, 2025
WL 2653707, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 16, 2025); J.M.P. v. Arteta, No. 25-CV-4987, 2025 WL
2614688, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2025); Espinoza, 2025 WL 2581185, at *14; Arostegui-
Maldonado v. Baltazar, 2025 WL 2280357, at *12 (D. Colo. Aug. 8, 2025). Further, considering
multiple instances6 where alleged inadvertent mistakes have caused this Court’s orders to be
violated, the Court issues an expedited timeline for compliance with the instant Order.
5 See Lopez-Arevelo, 25 WL 2691828 at *12 (noting that “as of 2020, the ‘vast majority’—an
‘overwhelming consensus’—of courts granting immigration detainees’ habeas petitions have
placed the burden on the Government to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the detainee
poses a danger or flight risk. Velasco Lopez, 978 F.3d at 855 n.14 (citations omitted). Allocating
the burden in this manner reflects the concern that ‘[b]ecause the alien’s 27 potential loss of liberty
is so severe . . . he should not have to share the risk of error equally.’” Id. (quoting German Santos
v. Warden Pike Cnty. Corr. Facility, 965 F.3d 203, 214 (3d Cir. 2020)).
6 See, e.g., Blandon Raudez v. Bondi, No. 3-25-CV-493-DB, (W.D. Tex. October 30, 2025)
(removing Petitioner to Mexico nearly 14 hours after this Court issued an order not to remove him
from the United States); Pacay Garcia v. Unknown, No. 3-25-CV-00591-DB, (W.D. Tex.
December 9, 2025), “Advisory to the Court,” ECF No. 8 (removing Petitioner from United States
after an order not to remove was issued because, among other things, Respondents’ counsel
“inadvertently failed to forward the Order to Show Cause to ICE agency Counsel”).
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, this Court determines it has jurisdiction over the instant
matter, and Petitioner has established a violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause as
applied to him. Accordingly, the following orders shall issue:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner Julio Angel Acosta Dominguez’s “Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus,” ECF No. 1, is GRANTED IN PART.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Respondents SHALL PROVIDE Petitioner with a bond
hearing before an immigration judge at which the government shall bear the burden of justifying,
by clear and convincing evidence, the dangerousness or flight risk for Petitioner’s continued
detention; or (2) release Petitioner from custody, under reasonable conditions of supervision,
during the pendency of their removal proceedings no later than January 13, 2026.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Respondents SHALL FILE an advisory informing the
Court when the bond hearing will be held in accordance with the preceding order no later than
January 12, 2026.
IT IS FINALLY ORDERED Respondents SHALL FILE an advisory informing the
Court, in detail, of the reasons for the IJ’s bond hearing decision no later than January 16, 2026.
SIGNED this 8th day of January 2026.
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