Hilal v. Mendoza et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
EL PASO DIVISION
MARK HILAL,
Plaintiff,
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v.
EP- 25-cv-00444 -KC-RFC
ENRIQUE D. MENDOZA, R.
MICHAEL MARTINEZ, CITY OF EL
PASO, PHOENIX SECURITY LLC,
REDCAP STAFFING AGENCY, and
FRANKLIN CONSTRUCTION
LIMITED
Defendants.
ORDER AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
On this day, the Court considered Plaintiff Mark Hilal’s Motion to Proceed in Forma
Pauperis [hereinafter “Mot.”], ECF No. 1, and attached Complaint, ECF No. 1-1. The case was
assigned to United States District Judge Kathleen Cardone, who referred the Motion to the
undersigned magistrate. After due consideration, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to
Proceed in Forma Pauperis. However, the Court RECOMMENDS that the claims brought under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as frivolous, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). The Court further RECOMMENDS the remaining state-law claims be
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
I. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis on October 3, 2025. See Mot. In his
attached Complaint, Plaintiff brought the following claims: (1) Section 1983 claims against
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Defendants Mendoza, Martinez, and City of El Paso; (2) negligence claims against Defendants
Redcap Staffing Agency and Franklin Construction Limited; (3) claims for “Unlawful Retaliation
and Interference with Justice” against Defendants Phoenix Security LLC and Redcap Staffing
Agency; and (4) claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress against all Defendants.
Compl. 3–4. Plaintiff asserts that the Court possesses original jurisdiction over his Section 1983
claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Id. at 2.
A. Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis is granted.
“The federal in forma pauperis statute . . . is designed to ensure that indigent litigants have
meaningful access to the federal courts” by allowing them to commence legal actions in federal
court even if they are unable to pay the costs associated with filing. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319, 324 (1989) (citing Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 342–343 (1948)).
To be granted in forma pauperis status, applicants must show that they are “unable to pay such
fees or give security therefor.” § 1915(a)(1). After considering Plaintiff’s income, assets, and
financial circumstances, see Mot., the Court finds that Plaintiff lacks sufficient resources to cover
the costs of filing. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis is GRANTED.
B. The Court recommends Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims be dismissed as frivolous.
Recognizing that litigants proceeding in forma pauperis “lack[] economic incentive to
refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits,” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 324, Congress
requires district courts to dismiss a claim brought in forma pauperis at any time if the court
determines the claim is “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may
be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief,” §
1915(e)(2)(B). A frivolous claim is one which “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”
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Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325. A claim lacks an arguable basis in law if “it is based on an indisputably
meritless legal theory, such as if the complaint alleges the violation of a legal interest which clearly
does not exist.” Berry v. Brady, 192 F.3d 504, 507 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Harper v. Showers,
174 F.3d 716, 718 (5th Cir. 1999)). In determining whether dismissal is proper, the court must
assume each of the plaintiff’s factual allegations are true. Bradley v. Puckett, 157 F.3d 1022, 1025
(5th Cir. 1998) (citing Ashe v. Corley, 992 F.2d 540, 544 (5th Cir.1993)).
“By its text, [Section] 1983 provides redress to persons who have suffered a deprivation of
their constitutional rights at the hands of a government official.” Ramirez v. Escajeda, 298 F. Supp.
3d 933, 941 (W.D. Tex. 2018). The statute “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely
provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Albright v. Oliver, 510
U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144, n.3 (1979)). “To state a
[S]ection 1983 claim, ‘a plaintiff must (1) allege a violation of a right secured by the Constitution
or laws of the United States and (2) demonstrate that the alleged deprivation was committed by a
person acting under color of state law.’” Whitley v. Hanna, 726 F.3d 631, 638 (5th Cir. 2013)
(quoting James v. Tex. Collin Cnty., 535 F.3d 365, 373 (5th Cir.2008)).
In support of his Section 1983 claims, Plaintiff alleges that on October 4, 2023, he was the
victim of a “felony theft of his replacement U.S. Naturalization Certificate and other critical
identification documents.” Compl. 2. Plaintiff contends the investigation of the theft was
constitutionally deficient, specifically claiming (1) Defendant Mendoza, the responding officer,
violated both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clause by deliberately misclassifying the
offense; (2) Defendant Martinez, the detective assigned to the case, violated the same clauses by
intentionally failing to reclassify the theft or “conduct a good-faith investigation”; and (3)
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Defendant City of El Paso promulgated “policies, practices, and customs” which resulted in or
exacerbated the purported violations. Compl. 2–4.
Even assuming the truth of all factual allegations, Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims are not
legally viable because they rest on the false premise that the Constitution confers crime victims
with a right to an investigation. The Supreme Court has long held that there is no “judicially
cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.” Linda R.S. v. Richard D.,
410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973). By extension, private citizens “do not enjoy a constitutionally protected
right to have wrongdoers criminally investigated . . ., even if [they are] the victim[s] of an alleged
wrongdoer’s criminal acts.” Rivens-Baker v. Riley, No. SA-22-CV-01167-OLG, 2024 WL
1173045, at *7 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 15, 2024), appeal dismissed, No. 24-50181, 2024 WL 4185992
(5th Cir. May 9, 2024) (citing Merritt v. City of Ennis, No. Civ.A.3:04CV2606-G, 2005 WL
440408, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 24, 2005)) (citation modified). Thus, Plaintiff claims a constitutional
violation that does not exist as a matter of law.
Because Plaintiff alleges a violation of a legal interest that does not exist, the Court
RECOMMENDS Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as
frivolous.
C. The Court recommends Plaintiff’s remaining claims be dismissed because the Court
lacks subject-matter jurisdiction.
A court must dismiss an action if it “determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). A case falls outside the jurisdiction of the court where the
federal judiciary “lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.” Home
Builders Ass’n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison, Miss., 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting
Nowak v. Ironworkers Loc. 6 Pension Fund, 81 F.3d 1182, 1187 (2d Cir. 1996)).
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Plaintiff contends that Section 1367 supplies a basis for the Court’s exercise of
supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims. Compl. 1. However, “[a] federal
court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim based on state law only if it has original
jurisdiction over a related claim.” Harrison v. Reid, No. 1:23-CV-01316-RP-SH, 2023 WL
8792169, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 19, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:23-CV-
1316-RP, 2024 WL 201366 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 18, 2024) (citing § 1367(a)). Because Plaintiff’s
Section 1983 claims should be dismissed as frivolous, there is no jurisdictional anchor to support
supplemental jurisdiction. In the absence of an alternative grant of jurisdiction, the Court lacks
statutory authority to consider the state-law claims.
Thus, the Court RECOMMENDS Plaintiff’s remaining claims be DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
II. CONCLUSION
As to Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis, ECF No. 1, the Court enters the
following ORDERS:
1. The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis, ECF No. 1; and
2. The Court ORDERS the Clerk of the Court to docket the Complaint, ECF No. 1-1, and
Civil Cover Sheet, ECF No. 1-2.1
The Court further RECOMMENDS:
1. Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as frivolous,
pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii);
1 Given that the Court finds dismissal is warranted, the Court declines to order service of process on Defendants
at this time.
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2. Plaintiff’s remaining claims be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, in accordance
with Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
SIGNED and ENTERED this 16th day of December, 2025.
ROBERT F. CASTAÑEDA
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
NOTICE
FAILURE TO FILE WRITTEN OBJECTIONS TO THE PROPOSED FINDINGS,
CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS CONTAINED IN THE FOREGOING
REPORT, WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS OF SERVICE OF SAME, MAY BAR DE NOVO
DETERMINATION BY THE DISTRICT JUDGE OF AN ISSUE COVERED HEREIN AND
SHALL BAR APPELLATE REVIEW, EXCEPT UPON GROUNDS OF PLAIN ERROR,
OF ANY UNOBJECTED-TO PROPOSED FACTUAL FINDINGS AND LEGAL
CONCLUSIONS AS MAY BE ACCEPTED OR ADOPTED BY THE DISTRICT COURT.
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