Ramos v. Taylor et al

1:20-cv-01256Txwd5 dic 2025

Testo completo

1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AUSTIN DIVISION
BRENDA RAMOS, §
§
Plaintiff, §
§
v. § 1:20-CV-1256-RP
§
CHRISTOPHER TAYLOR and §
CITY OF AUSTIN, §
§
Defendants. §
ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant Christopher Taylor’s (“Taylor”) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s
Third Amended Complaint, (Dkt. 124), Plaintiff Brenda Ramos’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion to Strike
Defendant Taylor’s Motion to Dismiss, (Dkt. 126), Defendant Taylor’s Motion to Stay Discovery
Pending a Ruling on Qualified Immunity, (Dkt. 134), and Plaintiff’s Motion to Convert Defendant
Taylor’s Motion to Dismiss to a Rule 56 Motion for Summary Judgment, (Dkt. 141). Having
considered the parties’ briefs, the record, and the relevant law, the Court will deny Taylor’s second
motion to dismiss, dismiss as moot Plaintiff’s motion to strike Taylor’s second motion to dismiss,
dismiss as moot Taylor’s motion to stay discovery, and dismiss as moot Plaintiff’s motion to convert
Taylor’s second motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
This case arises out of the April 24, 2020, police shooting of Mike Ramos (“Ramos”), a
Black and Hispanic resident of Austin. His mother, Plaintiff Brenda Ramos, filed this suit against the
City of Austin and Austin Police Department (“APD”) Officer Christopher Taylor.1 On December
19, 2022, the Court denied Taylor’s first motion to dismiss, (Dkt. 49), finding that Plaintiff had
1 A thorough discussion of this case’s factual background is provided in the Court’s Order denying Taylor’s
first motion to dismiss. (Order Denying Mot. to Dismiss, Dkt. 73, at 1–5).
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plausibly alleged that Taylor violated Ramos’s constitutional rights and acted with unreasonable and
excessive force. (Order Denying Mot. to Dismiss, Dkt. 73, at 12–13). The Court therefore held that
Plaintiff had sufficiently pleaded facts to overcome qualified immunity at the motion-to-dismiss
stage. (Id. at 13). Taylor did not appeal the Court’s denial of his qualified immunity defense.
On July 13, 2023, the Court subsequently granted Defendant City of Austin’s motion to stay
the case pending the underlying criminal trial of Taylor. (Order Staying Case, Dkt. 90). On April 1,
2025, the Court granted via text order the parties’ joint motion to lift the stay, (Dkt. 102), as the
criminal case against Taylor was dismissed. (Text Order on April 1, 2025). On August 21, 2025, the
Court granted via text order Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a third amended complaint, which
was unopposed.2 (Text Order on August 21, 2025). Plaintiff represented in her motion for leave that
her Third Amended Complaint “does not add additional Parties or claims. Plaintiff has simply added
additional allegations regarding her Monell claim and has edited her claims against Defendant Taylor
for clarity.” (Mot. for Leave, Dkt. 113, at 1).
On September 24, 2025, Taylor filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Third Amended
Complaint. (Second Mot. to Dismiss, Dkt. 124). Plaintiff filed a motion to strike Taylor’s second
motion to dismiss, (Dkt. 126); Taylor filed a motion to stay discovery pending a ruling on his
qualified immunity defense within his second motion to dismiss, (Dkt. 134); and Plaintiff filed a
motion to convert Taylor’s motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment, (Dkt. 141).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
The law of the case doctrine “is based on the salutary and sound public policy that litigation
should come to an end.” Matter of AKD Investments, 79 F.4th 487, 491 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting White
v. Murtha, 377 F.2d 428, 431 (5th Cir. 1967)). The doctrine applies “only to issues that were actually
2 Though the motion was originally designated as opposed, Plaintiff filed an amended certificate of
conference confirming that both Defendants were unopposed to her motion for leave to file a third amended
complaint. (Am. Cert. of Conference, Dkt. 116).
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decided, rather than all questions in the case that might have been decided, but were not.” Af-Cap,
Inc. v. Republic of Congo, 462 F.3d 417, 425 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting Alpha/Omega Ins. Servs. v. Prudential
Ins. Co. of Am., 272 F.3d 276, 279 (5th Cir. 2001)). Generally, “when a court decides an issue, that
decision should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages of the same case.” Matter of
AKD Investments, 79 F.4th at 491 (quoting Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 (1983) (citation
modified).
III. DISCUSSION
As discussed in Section I, supra, Plaintiff filed her Third Amended Complaint, (Dkt. 117), to
add allegations related to her Monell allegations against Defendant City of Austin. (See Second Mot.
to Amend Compl., Dkt. 113, at 1). She also edited her claims against Taylor “for clarity.” (Id.).
Plaintiff has now moved to strike Taylor’s motion to dismiss to her Third Amended Complaint,
arguing that the motion is barred by the law of the case doctrine and that denial of the motion is
“require[d].” (Pl.’s Mot. to Strike, Dkt. 126, at 3). She also argues that the second motion to dismiss
is prohibited by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(g). (Id. at 4).
Taylor argues in response that “[s]ignificant information was added about Officer Taylor
himself,” and cites generally to pages 12–13 of Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint. (Taylor’s Resp.
to Mot. to Strike, Dkt. 131, at 3). He also asserts that the law of the case doctrine does not bar this
Court from granting his motion to dismiss. (Id. at 3–4). Taylor, relying on the factors set forth by the
Fifth Circuit for “revisit[ing] the determinations of an earlier court,” see In re Ford Motor Co., 591 F.3d
406, 411 (5th Cir. 2009), arguing that he has “offered fully authenticated videos as
new evidence
that Plaintiff incorporated by reference into her Third Amended Complaint” and that controlling
authority has changed since the Court’s Order denying his first motion to dismiss. (Id. at 4–6).
Finally, Taylor argues that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(g) does not bar his subsequent motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim. (Id. at 6).
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First, the Court agrees with Taylor that it has the discretion to not apply the law of the case
doctrine. See Zarnow v. City of Wichita Falls, 614 F.3d 161, 171 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding that the law of
the case doctrine “does not operate to prevent a district court from reconsidering prior rulings” and
that the doctrine is “designed to prevent unnecessary reconsideration of previously decided issues”).
The Court has discretion to revisit its prior holding that Plaintiff plausibly alleged unreasonable and
excessive use of force.
Second, the Court has compared Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint, (Dkt. 45), and
Third Amended Complaint, (Dkt. 117). The Court agrees with Plaintiff that the changes to the
allegations regarding Taylor, including the allegations pleaded by Plaintiff to overcome qualified
immunity, are trivial. Compare Second Am. Compl., Dkt. 45, at 24–25 (“By ordering Officer Pieper to
impact [Ramos], Taylor escalated the situation, causing [Ramos] to further fear for his life,
provoking him to seek safety by getting in the car.”), with Third Am. Compl., Dkt. 117, at 34 (“By
ordering Officer Pieper to impact [Ramos], Taylor escalated the situation, causing [Ramos] to further
fear for his life, triggering his impulse to flee to safety by getting in the car and slowly pulling
away.”). Plaintiff has not changed any allegations substantially enough such that the Court’s qualified
immunity analysis would be different. Though Taylor vaguely claims that significant information was
added about him, he does not point the Court to any specific allegations that are new and that
should change the Court’s analysis. Thus, the Court has already determined that Plaintiff sufficiently
pleaded an unreasonable and excessive use of force under these facts. The Court chooses to exercise
its discretion under the law of the case doctrine and will deny Taylor’s second motion to dismiss;
ruling otherwise would result in “unnecessary reconsideration of previously decided issues.” See
Zarnow, 614 F.3d at 171.
Even if the Court reached Taylor’s arguments regarding new evidence and intervening law,
its decision would be the same. In its Order denying Taylor’s first motion to dismiss, the Court
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provided lengthy reasoning regarding its decision to decline to consider Taylor’s video exhibits at
this stage of the pleadings. (Order Denying Mot. to Dismiss, Dkt. 73, at 6–11). The Court held that
Plaintiff’s inclusion of screenshots and a hyperlink had not sufficiently referenced the videos to meet
the standard of the videos being “attached” to her Second Amended Complaint. (Id. at 7–9). The
Court then reasoned that, even if the videos had been sufficiently referenced, concerns regarding
authenticity make it premature to introduce the exhibits prior to discovery. (Id. at 10–11). For
instance, the videos attached by Taylor were screen-recordings of the videos themselves; Plaintiff
plausibly alleged that the videos had been altered; and Plaintiff plausibly alleged that the attached
videos do not contain all APD perspectives of the event. (Id.).
Taylor now attaches to his second motion to dismiss Exhibits 1-9, which are media exhibits
authenticated by the City of Austin’s Custodian of Records; they include audio of a 911 call, multiple
body-worn camera videos, dash cam videos, and a helicopter video. (Decl. of Custodian, Dkt. 124, at
23–24). He argues that (1) a ruling by the Fifth Circuit in 2024 has made it so the videos are
sufficiently referenced in the Third Amended Complaint and (2) the Court’s authenticity concerns
are now resolved due to the exhibits being authenticated by the Custodian of Records.
The Court’s concerns in its first Order declining to rely on Taylor’s videos have not been
assuaged. As Plaintiff points out in her Reply, five of the eight videos attached by Taylor are never
referred to in her complaint in any form—screenshot or otherwise. (Reply to Mot. to Strike, Dkt.
132, at 10). Moreover, the Court disagrees that the Fifth Circuit’s holding in Winder mandates the
Court’s review of Taylor’s videos. In Winder, the appellants had “referenced the video in their
complaint and brief” and “included several screenshots from the video in their complaint.” Winder v.
Gallardo, 118 F.4th 638, 643 (5th Cir. 2024). In this case, though Plaintiff’s Third Amended
Complaint—like her Second Amended Complaint—includes screenshots from certain videos, its
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only reference to the video footage is to criticize the accuracy of the videos’ timestamps.3 Plus,
Taylor does not and cannot cite any language that a district court is required to review videos attached
to a motion to dismiss, even if the exhibit may be viewed. See Hodge v. Engleman, 90 F.4th 840, 844
(5th Cir. 2024) (stating the rule that a district court “may rely on documents that the pleadings
incorporate by reference” and then reviewing a district court’s consideration of body camera footage
at the motion-to-dismiss stage as an implicit conversion to a motion for summary judgment)
(emphasis added); Villarreal v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 814 F.3d 763, 766 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting
Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 2000)) (“The court may, however,
also consider ‘[d]ocuments that a defendant attaches to a motion to dismiss . . . if they are referred to
in the plaintiff’s complaint and are central to her claim.”) (emphasis added); Salinas v. Loud, No. 22-
11248, 2024 WL 140443, at *1 (5th Cir. Jan. 12, 2024) (per curiam) (citing Jackson v. City of Hearne,
959 F.3d 194, 204–05 (5th Cir. 2020)) (“However, when the pleadings incorporate evidence, such as
documents or videos, those items can also be considered.”) (emphasis added).
Additionally, the Court’s concern that only some videos in the City of Austin’s possession
have been produced remains. Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint notes that “[f]ootage is
unavailable for officers Krycia, Morgan, or Ratcliff. No bodycam has been made publicly available
from Officers Krycia, Morgan, Tavarez, or Ratliff.” (Third Am. Compl., Dkt. 117, at 25 n.10). The
exhibits provided by Taylor include body camera footage and dash cam footage from Officers Hart,
Taylor, Cantu-Harkless, Pieper, and Tavarez. (Decl. of Custodian, Dkt. 124, at 23–24). Plaintiff has
therefore plausibly alleged that videos from Officers Krycia, Morgan, and Ratliff exist but have yet
to be produced, such that the attachments still “do not contain all APD perspectives of the event.”
3 See Order Denying Mot. to Dismiss, Dkt. 73, at 9 (quoting Slippi-Mensah v. Mills, No. 1:15-CV-07750-NLH-
JS, 2016 WL 4820617, at *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 14, 2016)) (“As one district court noted, ‘Simply because a video
that captured the events complained of in the complaint exists does not transform that video into a
“document” upon which the complaint is based.’”).
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(See Order Denying First Mot. to Dismiss, Dkt. 73, at 11). And relatedly, Plaintiff continues to allege
that timestamps on available videos are “inconsistent,” which weighs against the Court considering
the videos at this early stage.4 (See id. at 10–11).
Finally, the Court disagrees that intervening precedent would change its qualified immunity
analysis. Taylor cites to Estevis v. Cantu, 134 F.4th 793 (5th Cir. 2025) and Barnes v. Felix, 152 F.4th
669 (5th Cir. 2025). In Estevis, the Fifth Circuit held that the officers did not violate clearly
established law where they shot at an individual who had “suddenly reversed and rammed [an
officer’s] cruiser,” then “lurched [his car] forward over the curb and into fence.” Estevis, 134 F.4th at
797. The Fifth Circuit distinguished this case from Lytle v. Bexar County, 560 F.3d 404 (5th Cir. 2009),
a case this Court relied upon in denying Taylor’s first motion to dismiss. In Lytle, the suspect was
“fleeing down an open road and already ‘three or four houses’ away when the officer fired.” Estevis,
134 F.4th at 797–98. In Estevis, the individual “was boxed in by police, had just rammed a police car
and driven into a fence, and showed no signs of giving up. On these facts . . . the officers had good
reason to believe they were still under threat from an erratic suspect who seconds earlier had
decided to use his truck as a 5,000-pound weapon.” Id. at 798.
Estevis is far from controlling in this case. Plaintiff pleaded that Ramos was boxed in by
officers but drove his car slowly—not erratically—and in a direction away from the officers, rather
than towards them. (Third Am. Compl., Dkt. 117, at 24). She also alleged that “[a]ny reasonable
officer observing the scene unfold knew [Ramos] was driving away from the officers, not toward
them, towards a dead end, not a threat to drive through or into a line of heavily armed police
vehicles.” (Id. at 25). The Court must take these pleaded facts as true, and Estevis does not change
4 The Court also notes that Taylor does not argue the videos he attached “blatantly contradict” Plaintiff’s
alleged facts. See Winder, 118 F.4th at 643 (explaining that a court should not accept all well-pleaded facts as
true where video footage before the court blatantly contradicts those allegations).
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the Court’s prior holding that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged facts to support that Taylor’s use of
force was excessive and unreasonable under clearly established law.
Similarly, Barnes does not change the Court’s conclusion. In Barnes, the Fifth Circuit
explained that the officer “faced a split-second decision between only bad options.” Barnes, 152
F.4th at 676. The car in that case had been pulled over on the shoulder of “Houston’s busiest toll
road,” and when the individual began to flee, the Fifth Circuit held that the officer reasonably feared
the suspect “start[ing] a perilous high-speed chase during rush hour” or “seriously injur[ing]” the
officer. Id. In the instant case, however, Plaintiff has pleaded that Ramos was “inch[ing] away from
officers toward the dead end blocked by dumpsters.” (Third Am. Compl., Dkt. 117, at 24). Taking
these facts as true, there was no risk of a dangerous high-speed chase nor a risk of injury to the APD
officers. Unlike in Barnes, Taylor was not forced to make a split-second decision between “only bad
options.” See Barnes, 152 F.4th at 676. Barnes is therefore not instructive in this case.
Thus, in conclusion, the Court will use its discretion under the law of the case doctrine to
decline to revisit its Order denying Taylor’s first motion to dismiss, as the reasons put forth by
Taylor to do so are unavailing. The Court will deny the motion to dismiss rather than strike it,
however, as the Court is not convinced that it has the power to strike the motion to dismiss. Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) provides that a court may “strike from a pleading an insufficient defense
or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f) (emphasis
added). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7 states which types of filings are “pleadings,” and a motion
to dismiss is not included in that list. Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(a); see also Vega v. City of El Paso, No. EP-21-
CV-00116-DCG, 2022 WL 22412865, at *1 (W.D. Tex. June 24, 2022) (declining to strike a motion
to dismiss after finding that motions to dismiss do not qualify as pleadings). The Court will therefore
deny Taylor’s second motion to dismiss under the law of the case doctrine and dismiss as moot
Plaintiff’s motion to strike. As a result, Taylor’s motion to stay discovery pending a ruling on his
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qualified immunity defense is moot. Finally, the Court will dismiss as moot Plaintiff’s motion to
convert Taylor’s second motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Taylor’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Third Amended
Complaint, (Dkt. 124), is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike Defendant Taylor’s
Motion to Dismiss, (Dkt. 126), is DISMISSED AS MOOT.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Taylor’s Motion to Stay Discovery Pending a Ruling
on Qualified Immunity, (Dkt. 134), is DISMISSED AS MOOT.
IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Convert Defendant Taylor’s
Motion to Dismiss to a Rule 56 Motion for Summary Judgment, (Dkt. 141), is DISMISSED AS
MOOT.
SIGNED on December 5, 2025.
_____________________________________
ROBERT PITMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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