Agbese et al v. University of Texas Rio Grande Valley

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
MCALLEN DIVISION
AJE-ORI AGBESE, §
MINHEE EOM, and §
WAN-LIN CHANG, §
§
Plaintiffs, §
§
v. § Civil Action No. 7:25-CV-00239
§
UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS RIO GRANDE §
VALLEY, §
§
Defendant. §
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs Aje-Ori Agbese, Minhee Eom, and Wan-Lin Chang are professors at the
University of Texas Rio Grande Valley (“UTRGV”). They allege that they were
discriminated against when they were denied promotion and tenure. According to them,
UTRGV’s focus on becoming a “B3 institution” that aimed to promote Spanish
bilingualism, biculturalism, and biliteracy disadvantaged them in the application process
because of their ethnic and racial backgrounds and because they do not speak Spanish.
They also claim that they were discriminated against based on their sex because women
were disproportionately denied promotion and tenure in the application period in which
they applied.
Pending before the Court is Defendant UTRGV’s Motion to Dismiss. (Dkt. No. 9).
For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the Motion and DISMISSES Plaintiffs’
Title VII discrimination claims without prejudice.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
March 31, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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I. BACKGROUND1
Plaintiffs Aje-Ori Agbese, Minhee Eom, and Wan-Lin Chang are professors at
UTRGV. (Dkt. No. 1 at 2). Plaintiff Agbese, a Nigerian-born woman, was hired in 2006
and is currently an Associate Professor of Communications in the College of Arts and
Humanities. (Id. at 4–5). She has received numerous awards during her time at UTRGV
and has published over 14 books, book chapters, and articles in addition to mentoring
students and serving on shared governance committees. (Id.). Plaintiff Eom is a Korean-
born woman that has also been employed at UTRGV since 2006. (Id. at 11). She currently
serves as an Associate Professor of Writing and Language Studies in the College of
Liberal Arts. (Id.). Plaintiff Chang is a Taiwanese woman employed by UTRGV as an
Assistant Professor of Communication Studies. (Id. at 14).
Beginning in 2023, all three women applied for promotions at the University. (Id.
at 2). Agbese and Eom applied for promotions to Full Professor and Chang applied for
tenure and promotion to Associate Professor. (Id.). Throughout the application process,
Plaintiffs received high marks from the UTRGV committees that oversaw hiring. Plaintiff
Agbese was told that she “exceeds expectations” in all areas, that she had a “fine record
as a teacher,” and that “her record demonstrates that she is well above the minimum
quantity of publications necessary” for promotion. (Id. at 5–6). She also received
unanimous recommendations for promotion from the Department, College, and
1 The Court accepts all factual allegations in the Complaint, (Dkt. No. 1), as true and views
them in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, see White v. U.S. Corrs., LLC, 996 F.3d 302, 306–
07 (5th Cir. 2021).
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University Committees. (Id.). Plaintiff Eom, like Agbese, received “glowing reviews at
every step of the review process” and was told that she “exceeded expectations.” (Id. at
11). Similarly, Plaintiff Chang was told that she “exceeded expectations” and was
unanimously recommended during the review process. (Id. at 14).
The review process next required Provost Zayas to approve Plaintiffs’
applications. (Id. at 7). In each case, despite the glowing reviews Plaintiffs received
throughout the process, Provost Zayas denied their applications for promotion and
tenure. (Id. at 7, 11–12, 14). His stated reasons for denying Agbese’s application were
that she was not adequately “contributing to the university’s aspiration to R1
classification,” did not have a “robust record of scholarship”—despite meeting the
University’s guidelines for minimum publications—and had misrepresented her
involvement in a United States Department of Education grant. (Id. at 7–8). Plaintiffs
Eom and Chang had their applications denied for similar reasons; Zayas allegedly used
“vague generalizations devoid of any specific critique or explanation as to alleged
deficiencies” in Plaintiffs’ work and ignored established departmental criteria used to
evaluate applications for promotion. (Id. at 11–12, 14). Plaintiffs’ grievances and appeals
of Provost Zayas’s decisions were rejected or ignored by Zayas and the University’s
President, Guy Bailey. (Id. at 8–9, 12, 14). Provost Zayas’s decisions were therefore made
final. (Id. at 8–9, 12).
Plaintiffs believe that Provost Zayas’s reasons for denying their applications were
a pretext for discrimination. To support this, they assert that UTRGV aimed to transform
itself into a bilingual institution where faculty would teach courses or portions of courses
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in Spanish. (Id. at 3). Specifically, they point to a speech given by Provost Zayas in
February 2024 in which he stated that his goal was for UTRGV to “become an
authentically bilingual, bicultural and biliterate institution. Our students, faculty and
staff can learn and teach in both Spanish and English.” (Id.). This vision was allegedly
put into practice when UTRGV announced that it was authorizing two new tenure-track
lines for an undergraduate program in Spanish Language Media/Journalism/Mass
Communication. (Id.). Because Plaintiffs are not Hispanic and do not speak Spanish,
they assert that they are at a disadvantage for promotion and advancement. (Id. at 3–4).
Likewise, they claim that their status as women also disadvantage them because “[m]ost
of the faculty denied tenure/promotion at UTRGV during the 2023–2024 academic year
were women.” (Id. at 4).
Plaintiffs filed the instant lawsuit alleging race, national origin, ethnicity, color,
and sex discrimination under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act on May 20, 2025. On
August 18, 2025, UTRGV filed a Motion to Dismiss. (Dkt. No. 9). Plaintiffs responded,
(Dkt. No. 11), and UTRGV replied, (Dkt. No. 12).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a defendant to move
to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6). Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a pleading to
contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
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“[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual
allegations,’ but it demands more than . . . ‘labels and conclusions . . . .’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964–65, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). “Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do
not suffice.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. at 1965). “The defendant, as
the moving party, bears the burden of proving that no legally cognizable claim for relief
exists.” Flores v. Morehead Dotts Rybak, Inc., No. 2:21-CV-00265, 2022 WL 4740076, at *2
(S.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2022) (citing 5B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 1357 (3d ed.)).
In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court must accept the plaintiff’s
factual allegations as true and view those allegations in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff. White v. U.S. Corrs., LLC, 996 F.3d 302, 306–07 (5th Cir. 2021). The court must
evaluate whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. at 1974). “A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at
556, 127 S.Ct. at 1965). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability
requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. at 1965). “Dismissal . . . is
appropriate where the plaintiff fails to allege ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
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plausible on its face’ and thus does not ‘raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’”
Montoya v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 614 F.3d 145, 148 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570, 127 S.Ct. at 1965, 1974).
III. DISCUSSION
UTRGV challenges Plaintiffs’ Title VII discrimination claims and argues that
Plaintiffs fail to meet their burden to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under
the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting paradigm. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973); (Dkt. No. 9 at 5–10).2 Specifically,
UTRGV disputes that Plaintiffs successfully plead the fourth prong: that they were
treated less favorably than others outside of their protected classes who were similarly
situated to them. (Id. at 5–6). UTRGV argues that Plaintiffs fail to point to any
comparators who were treated more favorably in the same promotion or tenure cycle.
(Id.). Further, UTRGV argues that even if Plaintiffs did plead a prima facie case, their
Complaint still fails under the McDonnell Douglas standard because their Complaint fails
to rebut UTRGV’s nondiscriminatory justification for the denial of promotion and tenure.
(Id. at 6–10). Without facts to support a reasonable inference that Provost Zayas denied
promotion or tenure to Plaintiffs because of their race, national origin, sex, or inability to
2 See also Alkhawaldeh v. Dow Chem. Co., 851 F.3d 422, 426 (5th Cir. 2017). Under the
McDonnell Douglas test, a plaintiff must first make a prima facie showing of employment
discrimination by demonstrating that she: (1) is a member of a protected class; (2) was qualified
for the position that she held; (3) was subject to an adverse employment action; and (4) was
treated less favorably than others similarly situated outside her protected class. Id. Once the
employee makes a prima facie case, the burden “shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.” Id. If the employer can articulate
such a reason, the burden shifts back to the employee to demonstrate that the employer’s
proffered reason is just a “pretext for discrimination.” Id.
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speak Spanish, UTRGV asserts that Plaintiffs fail to plead that Provost Zayas’s facially
neutral explanations were pretextual. (Id.). Plaintiffs respond that the McDonnell Douglas
framework is inappropriate at the motion-to-dismiss stage and that they have met their
burden under the correct standard by pleading that they were denied promotion and
tenure due to discrimination by Provost Zayas. (Dkt. No. 11 at 4–6). Further, they assert
that they have pled more than conclusory facts to support an inference of discrimination.
(Id. at 6–8).
The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that UTRGV places too high a burden on them.
“At the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, [a court’s] analysis of [a] Title VII claim is governed by
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002)—and not the
evidentiary standard set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green . . . .” Olivarez v. T-
Mobile USA, Inc., 997 F.3d 595, 599 (5th Cir. 2021). Under Swierkiewicz, “there are two
ultimate elements a plaintiff must plead to support a disparate treatment claim under
Title VII: (1) an adverse employment action, (2) taken against a plaintiff because of her
protected status.”3 Id. (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis in original).
Despite this lowered standard, however, Plaintiffs still fail to meet their burden.
Their Complaint does allege that they suffered adverse employment actions—the denials
of their promotions and tenure requests—but it does not allege sufficient facts to draw
3 “Disparate-treatment discrimination addresses employment actions that treat an
employee worse than others based on the employee’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
In such disparate-treatment cases, proof and finding of discriminatory motive is required.”
Cicalese v. Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch, 924 F.3d 762, 766 (5th Cir. 2019) (internal quotations and
citation omitted).
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an inference of discrimination based on their race, national origin, ethnicity, color, or sex.
The allegation that Provost Zayas made public comments that he hoped UTRGV would
become bilingual and bicultural by embracing Spanish language and culture, while more
than mere conclusory allegations, is insufficient for the Court to draw the inference that
Plaintiffs suffered discrimination. It does not automatically follow that, by promoting
inclusion of Spanish speakers, Provost Zayas and UTRGV intended to discriminate
against those that speak other languages or belong to other cultures (or that they actually
did so for that matter). Plaintiffs do not sufficiently plead, for example, how Provost
Zayas’s focus on being a B3 institution led to them being denied promotion and tenure,
nor do they plead any facts demonstrating a possibility that they were treated less
favorably because of their protected characteristics.4 The Complaint bases its conclusion
of discrimination on nothing more than Provost Zayas’s comments and Plaintiffs’ own
beliefs that their promotions were denied due to discrimination.5 Those allegations,
standing alone, do not state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
4 While Plaintiffs do plead that UTRGV “preferentially hir[ed] faculty who speak Spanish,
and den[ied] advancement to faculty, including Plaintiffs, who cannot,” (Dkt. No. 1 at 3), this,
standing alone, is nothing more than a “mere conclusory statement[]” that is inadequate at the
Rule 12(b)(6) stage, Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127
S.Ct. at 1965).
5 Plaintiffs’ Complaint also alleges that UTRGV, through Provost Zayas, authorized two
new tenure-track lines for the creation of an undergraduate program in Spanish Language
Media/Journalism/Mass Communication. (Dkt. No. 1 at 4–5). This allegation does nothing to
help Plaintiffs, however, as the Complaint acknowledges that the approval of these new lines
“did not mean they could not get other lines, including one for which the department had actually
prepared.” (Id.).
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Plaintiffs’ allegations of sex discrimination likewise fail. The Complaint alleges
that “[m]ost of the faculty denied tenure/promotion at UTRGV during the 2023–2024
academic year were women, underscoring a stark gender disparity in opportunities for
advancement at UTRGV.” (Dkt. No. 1 at 4). The mere fact that more women were denied
tenure is not enough to prove a “stark gender disparity” as Plaintiffs claim. The
allegations do not state how many men applied for tenure, what percentage of the faculty
at the time were male, or whether those that were denied tenure came from programs
that lacked sufficient space or funding. Without these facts—or other similar
allegations—one can draw few, if any, inferences from Plaintiffs’ statement. Because that
statement is the sole basis for Plaintiffs’ sex-discrimination claims—aside from their own
beliefs that they were discriminated against—they have failed to meet their burden under
Rule 12(b)(6).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, UTRGV’s Motion to Dismiss, (Dkt. No. 9), is
GRANTED. Plaintiffs’ Title VII discrimination claims are DISMISSED without
prejudice.
Plaintiffs may file an Amended Complaint no later than April 17, 2026, addressing
the issues raised in this Memorandum Opinion and Order. No additional 12(b)(6)
motions will be considered. Defendants may file a summary judgment motion, if
appropriate, after the Parties have had the opportunity to engage in discovery.
It is SO ORDERED.
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Signed on March 30, 2026.
___________________________________
DREW B. TIPTON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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