Ybanez v. Garza

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
VICTORIA DIVISION
RUBEN ANTONIO YBANEZ,
Plaintiff,
VS.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 6:26-CV-00042
ELI GARZA,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
TO DISMISS CASE
Plaintiff Ruben Antonio Ybanez, a former Texas inmate appearing pro se and in
forma pauperis, has filed this prisoner civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Plaintiff’s case is subject to screening pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act. See
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A.
For purposes of screening and the reasons set forth below, the undersigned
respectfully recommends that Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Eli Garza be
DISMISSED with prejudice as frivolous and/or for failure to state a claim for relief
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)(1). The undersigned further
respectfully recommends that the dismissal of this case counts as a “strike” for purposes of
28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).1
1 Plaintiff is WARNED that if he accumulates three strikes, he will not be allowed to proceed in forma pauperis in
any civil action or appeal filed while he is incarcerated or detained in any facility unless he is under imminent danger
of serious injury. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
July 21, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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I. JURISDICTION
The Court has federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This case
has been referred to the undersigned magistrate judge for case management and making
recommendations on dispositive motions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636.
II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
At the time Plaintiff filed this action, he was a prisoner in the Texas Department of
Criminal Justice, Criminal Institutions Division (TDCJ-CID) and was assigned to the
Duncan Unit in Diboll, Texas. A review of the TDCJ website reflects that Plaintiff is no
longer in TDCJ custody. On July 9, 2026, the Court received Plaintiff’s Notice of Change
of Address indicating that he currently resides at a private address. (D.E. 11).
Plaintiff sues Victoria County District Judge Eli Garza in this action. (D.E. 1, pp.
1, 3). Judge Garza presided over Plaintiff’s criminal case in Victoria County for which he
recently completed his sentence of imprisonment. He alleges Judge Garza persists in
refusing to credit Plaintiff’s pretrial jail credit to his sentence. (D.E. 1, pp. 3-4). Plaintiff
alleges that his two-year prison term expired on May 24, 2026. Id. at 4. In addition to
monetary relief, Plaintiff seeks unspecified injunctive relief should his imprisonment term
extend past May 24, 2026. Id.
The undersigned is familiar with Plaintiff as Plaintiff’s application for a writ of
habeas corpus on related matters was recently summarily dismissed. See Ruben Antonio
Yanez v. Eric Guerrero, No. 6:25-cv-00078 (S.D. Tex. filed Dec. 29, 2025) (“Habeas
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Action”). As noted in the Habeas Action, Plaintiff’s release date from imprisonment was
July 11, 2026. (Habeas Action, D.E. 13, p. 2).
In an Order entered on June 3, 2026, the undersigned cautioned Plaintiff “his case
is subject to dismissal because his claims are either frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted and/or are raised against a defendant who is immune
from suit[]” under the doctrine of judicial immunity. (D.E. 7, p. 2). The undersigned
further detailed that Plaintiff’s complaint contained several deficiencies and included a
warning that the Court would not relitigate matters raised in his Habeas Action in this case.
Id. In giving Plaintiff an opportunity to present his best case, the undersigned ordered
Plaintiff to file an amended complaint on or before July 6, 2026. Id. at 3. Several
instructions were provided in the June 3 Order for Plaintiff to follow in preparing and
submitting his amended complaint. Id.
On July 9, 2026, the Court received Plaintiff’s one-page Amended Complaint. (D.E.
10). Plaintiff essentially restates his claim that Judge Garza violated his rights by refusing
to credit Plaintiff’s pretrial jail credit to his two-year sentence. Id. While failing to comply
with all of the instructions set forth in the June 3 Order, the undersigned will nevertheless
screen Plaintiff’s case below with respect to the claims raised in his Amended Complaint
against Judge Garza.
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III. LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Legal Standard for Screening of Plaintiff’s Action
When a prisoner seeks to proceed in forma pauperis the Court shall evaluate the
complaint and dismiss it without service of process if the Court finds the complaint
frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (providing that a court shall review an in forma pauperis
complaint as soon as practicable and dismiss it if it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from an immune
defendant). A claim is frivolous if it has no arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989). A claim has no arguable basis in law if it is based on an
indisputably meritless legal theory, “such as if the complaint alleges the violation of a legal
interest which clearly does not exist.” Davis v. Scott, 157 F.3d 1003, 1005 (5th Cir. 1998).
A claim has no arguable basis in fact if “after providing the plaintiff the opportunity to
present additional facts when necessary, the facts alleged are clearly baseless.” Talib v.
Gilley, 138 F.3d 211, 213 (5th Cir. 1998).
“In analyzing the complaint, [the Court] will accept all well-pleaded facts as true,
viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d
322, 324 (5th Cir. 1999). “The issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but
whether he is entitled to offer evidence to support his claim. Thus, the Court should not
dismiss the claim unless the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any set of facts
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or any possible theory that he could prove consistent with the allegations in the complaint.”
Id. (citations omitted). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported
by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). Plaintiff must allege sufficient facts in support of its legal conclusions that give
rise to a reasonable inference that Defendant is liable. Id.; Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). The factual allegations must raise Plaintiff’s claim for relief
above the level of mere speculation. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. As long as the complaint,
taken as a whole, gives rise to a plausible inference of actionable conduct, Plaintiff’s claim
should not be dismissed. Id.
Pleadings filed by pro se litigants like Plaintiff are construed using a less stringent
standard of review. Documents filed by pro se litigants are to be liberally construed, and
pro se complaints, however inartfully drafted they might be, are held to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. See Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 740
(5th Cir. 2002) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)); see also Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). A plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual allegations in the
complaint are to be taken as true for purposes of screening, but such deference does not
extend to conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal conclusions.
DeMarco v. Davis, 914 F.3d 383, 386-87 (5th Cir. 2019).
B. Heck v. Humphrey
Plaintiff claims that Judge Garza violated his rights by refusing to credit Plaintiff’s
pretrial jail credit to his two-year sentence. (D.E. 10). While not restating the relief he
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seeks in his Amended Complaint, the undersigned assumes that Plaintiff continues to seek
monetary relief and unspecified injunctive relief as set forth in his original complaint.
Plaintiff’s claims seeking monetary and injunctive relief related to the denial of pretrial
credits, however, are subject to dismissal pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477
(1994).
In Heck, the Supreme Court held:
in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or
imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness
would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove
that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged
by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make
such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a
writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Id. at 486-87. The Heck rule applies specifically to claims based on the improper
calculation of state sentences. See Jackson v. Unknown Records Personnel, No. 23-55-
BAJ-EWD, 2024 WL 6964847, at *2 (M.D. La. Sep. 27, 2024), adopted, 2024 WL
3709954 (M.D. La. Dec. 22, 2025) (applying Heck to bar claims that the inmate’s sentence
and credits were incorrectly calculated); Mathis v. Collier, No. 5:17-cv-173, 2019 WL
5608274, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 16, 2019), adopted, 2019 WL 5596828 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 30,
2019) (“The rule in Heck applies to computations of a prisoner’s sentence and the validity
of parole proceedings, where a favorable outcome would result in accelerated release from
confinement); Gonzalez v. Thaler, No. H-10-2042, 2010 WL 2487569, at *3 (S.D. Tex.
Jun.15, 2010) (“The rule in Heck bars Gonzalez’s complaint because his allegations about
the calculation of his sentence would, if true, necessarily imply the invalidity of his
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continued incarceration.”). Lastly, the Heck rule applies where a plaintiff seeks injunctive
or declaratory relief, which, if granted, would necessarily imply that a conviction or
sentence is invalid. Mann v. Denton Cnty., Tex., 364 F. App’x 881, 883 (5th Cir. 2010);
Warren v. United States, No. 5:15-cv-2707, 2016 WL 3748977, at *3 (W.D. La. Feb. 16,
2016), adopted, 2016 WL 3748554 (W.D. La. Jul. 11, 2016).
Here, any ruling in Plaintiff’s favor on his claims against Judge Garza would result
in an accelerated release date based on the application of pretrial jail credits sought by
Plaintiff. Since no court has reversed or otherwise invalidated Plaintiff’s sentence, or
otherwise determined he was entitled to his requested credits impacting his release date,
his claims seeking monetary relief and unspecified injunctive relief are barred by Heck.
See Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. Because Plaintiff’s claims against Judge Garza are barred by
Heck as premature, they should be dismissed with prejudice as frivolous until such time as
Plaintiff satisfies the conditions set forth in Heck.2
The undersigned next considers whether Plaintiff’s action should be construed as a
federal habeas corpus action. The exclusive remedy for a prisoner who challenges the fact
or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release is through a habeas
corpus petition. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 488-90 (1973). Plaintiff, however,
cannot seek such relief in a federal habeas corpus petition until after he has exhausted his
2 The Fifth Circuit has held that Heck-barred claims must be “dismissed with prejudice to their being asserted again
until the Heck conditions are met.” Johnson v. McElveen, 101 F.3d 423, 424 (5th Cir. 1996). Given that Plaintiff has
now served his sentence and has been released from custody, any attempt to satisfy the Heck conditions going forward
and seek pretrial jail credits on his expired sentence has been effectively foreclosed.
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available state court remedies. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b); Alexander v. Johnson, 163 F.3d
906, 909 (5th Cir. 1998).
The Court previously denied Plaintiff’s Habeas Action in which he also challenged
the calculation of his sentence by seeking pretrial jail credits. The Court specifically
determined that Plaintiff had failed to exhaust his state judicial remedies. (Habeas Action,
D.E. 13, p. 7; D.E. 16). Plaintiff offers no allegations to suggest that he exhausted such
remedies during the short duration between the date the Habeas Action was closed and the
filing date of this action. Accordingly, the undersigned declines to construe Plaintiff’s case
as another habeas corpus action to the extent he may seek relief in the form of a speedier
release.
C. Judicial Immunity
Even if any or all of Plaintiff’s claims were not Heck-barred, they are subject to
dismissal on alternative grounds. Plaintiff only sues Judge Garza in this action,
complaining about the actions taken by him in refusing to award him with pretrial jail credit
in his Victoria County criminal proceeding. “Judges enjoy absolute judicial immunity for
judicial acts performed in judicial proceedings.” Hobbs v. United States, 73 F. App’x 54,
55 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (citing Mays v. Sudderth, 97 F.3d 107, 110-11 (5th Cir.
1996)); Boyd v. Biggers, 31 F.3d 279, 284 (5th Cir. 1994) (“Judicial officers are entitled to
absolute immunity from claims for damages arising out of acts performed in the exercise
of their judicial functions.”).
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Plaintiff’s claims against Judge Garza involve decisions made as a judicial officer
presiding over Plaintiff’s criminal proceeding. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims seeking
damages against Judge Garza should be barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity.
D. Leave to Amend
The undersigned recommends Plaintiff not be granted leave to amend because he
cannot cure the defects in his Amended Complaint. Plaintiff cannot overcome the Heck
bar or Judge Garza’s entitlement to judicial immunity supporting the dismissal of his
claims. Ordinarily, a pro se plaintiff should be granted the opportunity to amend his
complaint prior to a dismissal but leave to amend is not required when a plaintiff “has
already pleaded his ‘best case.’” Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 767-68 (5th Cir. 2009).
The undersigned finds that Plaintiff has been given an opportunity to file his best case and
has done so in his Amended Complaint. Allowing him further amendments would only
delay the inevitable dismissal of this action.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and
1915A(b)(1), the undersigned respectfully recommends that Plaintiff’s claims against
Judge Garza be DISMISSED with prejudice as frivolous and/or for failure to state a claim
for relief. The undersigned respectfully recommends further that this dismissal count as a
“strike” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), and that the Clerk of Court be
INSTRUCTED to send notice of this dismissal to the Manager of the Three Strikes List
for the Southern District of Texas at Three_Strikes@txs.uscourts.gov.
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Respectfully submitted on July 21, 2026.
_______________________________
Jason B. Libby
United States Magistrate Judge
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NOTICE TO PARTIES
The Clerk will file this Memorandum and Recommendation and transmit a copy to
each party or counsel. Within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy of
the Memorandum and Recommendation, a party may file with the Clerk and serve on the
United States Magistrate Judge and all parties, written objections, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 72(b), 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), General Order No. 2002-13, United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas.
A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and
recommendation in a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation within FOURTEEN
(14) DAYS after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of
plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal
conclusions accepted by the District Court. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto Ass’n, 79 F.3d
1415 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
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