Garcia Segui v. Cole et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
LAREDO DIVISION
JUAN MANUEL GARCIA SEGUI,
Petitioner,
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v. 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:26-CV-00395
DAVID COLE, ET AL.,
Respondents.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Petitioner is currently detained in federal custody at the Rio Grande Processing
Center in Texas. Before the Court is Petitioner’s First Amended Petition for Habeas
Corpus and Temporary Restraining Order, (Dkt. No. 15), and Respondents’ Response to
the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Motion for Summary Judgment, (Dkt. No. 9).
The Court finds that Petitioner’s deprivation of liberty without constitutionally
adequate procedures is a violation of his due process rights, and the failure to provide
due process warrants his release. For the reasons stated below, Petitioner’s Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus is granted in part. Respondents are ordered to release Petitioner
by June 30, 2026, at 5:00 p.m. The parties are ordered to notify the Court of the status
of Petitioner’s release by July 1, 2026, at 5:00 p.m.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
Petitioner, a citizen of Cuba, challenges his ongoing detention without a bond
hearing. Petitioner entered the United States without inspection in April 2022 and has
remained continuously present in the country since then. (See Dkt. No. 15 at 5; Dkt. No.
9 at 2). Shortly after entering the United States, Petitioner was apprehended by
immigration officials. (See Dkt. No. 15 at 5). He was served a Notice to Appear on April
21, 2022, and released on an order of recognizance. (Dkt. No. 9 at 2; Dkt. No. 15-2).
Petitioner was re-detained in February 2026 following a routine reporting appointment.
(Dkt. No. 9 at 2; Dkt. No. 15 at 6). Respondents have not alleged that Petitioner has any
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
June 29, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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criminal history. (See Dkt. No. 9 at 2).
B. Legal Background
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Department of Justice (DOJ)
released interim guidance in July 2025, announcing a new legal position on detention
authorities for noncitizens. The guidance interpreted the mandatory detention provision
of Section 235 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), or 8 U.S.C. § 1225, as
applying to the detention of all “applicants for admission,” including all noncitizens who
have not been admitted, whether they arrive at a port of entry or enter without
inspection. This position was adopted by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) in
September 2025. Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025).
In the months following the shift in policy, federal district courts across the
country found the Government’s interpretation at odds with the text of the statute and
ordered bond hearings, or release, for noncitizens subject to mandatory detention under
the policy. See, e.g., Barco Mercado v. Francis, No. 25-CV-6582, 2025 WL 3295903, at *4,
n.22 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025) (collecting cases). In February 2026, the Fifth Circuit held
that Section 1225(b)(2) applies to all applicants for admission, regardless of whether they
are actively “seeking admission” when they are detained. Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi,
166 F.4th 494, 502 (5th Cir. 2026). However, Buenrostro did not address the validity of
due process claims such as those raised by Petitioner in this case. See, e.g., Bonilla Chicas
v. Warden, No. 5:26-CV-131, 2026 WL 539475, at *4–5 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 20, 2026); see also
Padron Covarrubias v. Vergara, No. 5:25-CV-112, 2025 WL 2950097 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 8,
2025), overruled by Buenrostro-Mendez, 166 F.4th 494 (explaining the Court’s prior
statutory interpretation of Section 1225).
C. Procedural Background
Petitioner raises the following claims for relief: Violation of Substantiative Due
Process Under the Fifth Amendment, Violation of Procedural Due process Under the
Fifth Amendment, Violation of the Fourth Amendment, and Ultra Vires Agency Action
and Violation of Binding Regulations. (See Dkt. No. 15 at 7, 10, 13–14). Petitioner’s due
process claim is that Respondents have deprived him of his liberty interest to be free from
detention without due process of law in violation of the Fifth Amendment. (See id. at 16).
Petitioner argues that he has a strong liberty interest because he has resided in the
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United States for four years and has established a life and community ties in the United
States, including obtaining employment authorization, a Texas driver’s license, and
raising two young children with his spouse. (Id. at 6). Petitioner requests, among other
things, that the Court grant the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and order Petitioner’s
immediate release from custody no later than forty-eight hours after entry of this Order,
declare that Respondent’s continued detention of Petitioner violates the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments and federal law, declare that Petitioner’s continued detention is unlawful,
and award all other relief that Petitioner is justly entitled to that the Court deems as just
and proper. (Id. at 16–17).
II. DISCUSSION
Respondents move for summary judgment, asserting that Petitioner is subject to
mandatory detention pursuant to Buenrostro and that his detention does not violate due
process. The Court principally addresses Petitioner’s due process claim and finds that his
detention violates due process. The Court incorporates the legal standards and analysis
applied in its prior order granting a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under similar
facts. Lopez Moncebais v. Bondi, No. 5:26-CV-268, slip op. (S.D. Tex. Mar. 27, 2026).
There, this Court found that Buenrostro does not foreclose due process challenges
to mandatory detention, a noncitizen subject to mandatory detention may bring an as-
applied due process challenge to 8 U.S.C. Section 1225(b)(2), Supreme Court precedent
does not foreclose that type of challenge, and liberty interests in freedom from detention
must be protected by due process of law, including individualized justification for civil
detention. See id. The Court then applied the balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge
and found that the petitioner’s procedural due process rights had been violated. Id. at 13
(citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)). The Court ordered immediate
release for the due process violation. Id. at 17.
The Court finds that the same reasoning applies to these facts, though Petitioner’s
length of presence in the United States is factually distinct from Lopez Moncebais.
Petitioner has resided in the United States since 2022. The Court’s reasoning in Lopez
Moncebais relied on the petitioner’s length of residence in the United States in evaluating
his liberty interest. Here, the Court finds that Petitioner’s residence in the United States
since 2022 still creates a sufficient liberty interest to require that his detention is
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safeguarded with constitutionally adequate procedures, including an individualized
determination of whether he should be detained.
Additionally, the Court has previously found that a prior release like Petitioner’s
strengthens the liberty interest of a noncitizen because their release created an
expectation that they would be free from detention during the pendency of their removal
proceedings. Bonilla Barrios v. Noem, No. 5:26-cv-172, slip op. at 4 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 2,
2026). As the Court explained there, liberty interests “may arise from an expectation or
interest created by state laws of policies.” Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005).
In this case, Petitioner had an expectation, in addition to his residence since 2022, that
he would be free from detention or at least entitled to seek bond while his removal
proceedings were pending. He was released from detention in 2022 and spent nearly four
years out of custody before he was re-detained. Respondents do not assert that Petitioner
violated any conditions of his release. That expectation interest strengthens his liberty
interest. The Court also notes that several cases analyzed for their persuasive authority
in Lopez Moncebais similarly considered prior release as a factor strengthening the
liberty interest of noncitizens detained under Section 1225(b)(2) without a bond hearing.
See Lopez Moncebais, No. 5:26-CV-268, slip op. at 7 n.6 (collecting cases).
For these reasons and the reasons discussed in the Court’s analysis in Lopez
Moncebais, the Court finds that Petitioner’s detention violates his rights under the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, he is entitled to relief, and the appropriate
remedy is to order Petitioner’s immediate release from custody.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner’s First Amended Petition for Habeas Corpus
and Temporary Restraining Order, (Dkt. No. 15) is GRANTED in part and DENIED
in part. Respondents’ Response to the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Motion
for Summary Judgment, (Dkt. No. 19) is DENIED.
Respondents are ORDERED to RELEASE Petitioner from custody by June 30,
2026, at 5:00 p.m., under his prior conditions of release, and to submit a status report to
the Court confirming Petitioner's release by July 1, 2026, at 5:00 p.m. Respondents
must notify Petitioner’s counsel of the exact time and location of Petitioner's release no
less than two hours prior to Petitioner’s release from custody. Respondents are ordered
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to return Petitioner’s identity documents and personal effects upon his release.
All other relief requested by Petitioner is DENIED.
If Petitioner is re-detained, Petitioner must be afforded procedural due process as
guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
A final judgment will follow.
It is so ORDERED.
SIGNED on June 29, 2026.
______________________________
John A. Kazen
United States District Judge
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