Carrera Figueredo v. Field Office Director et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
LAREDO DIVISION
YANELSY CARRERA FIGUEREDO,
BY NEXT FRIEND JUAN ALBERTO
ZAMBRANO FONSECA,
Petitioner,
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v. 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:26-CV-00360
U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT, ET AL.,
Respondents.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Petitioner is currently detained in federal immigration custody in Texas. Before
the Court is Petitioner’s pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241, (Dkt. No. 1), and Respondents’ Motion for Summary Judgment, (Dkt. No. 29).
The Court finds that Petitioner’s deprivation of liberty without constitutionally
adequate procedures is a violation of her due process rights, and the failure to provide
due process warrants her release. For the reasons stated below, Petitioner’s Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus is granted in part. Respondents are ordered to release Petitioner
by June 3, 2026, at 5:00 p.m. Respondents are ordered to notify the Court of the status
of Petitioner’s release by June 4, 2026, at 5:00 p.m.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
Petitioner, a citizen of Cuba, challenges her ongoing detention without a bond
hearing through her next friend and husband. Petitioner entered the United States
without inspection in 2022. (See Dkt. No. 29 at 2).1 Shortly after entering the United
States, 	Petitioner 	was 	apprehended 	by 	immigration 	officials. 	(See 	id.). 	She 	was
1 When citing to the page numbers of any document in the record, the Court will cite to the page
numbering of the Court’s internal CM/ECF docket system, and not to the page numbers in the underlying
documents.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
June 02, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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subsequently released into the United States on an Order of Recognizance. (See Dkt. No.
1-1 at 5). Petitioner appears to have no criminal history. (Dkt. No. 1 at 5; see also Dkt.
No. 1-1 at 24).
On August 13, 2025, Petitioner was re-detained at a routine ICE check-in
appointment. (Dkt. No. 1 at 3). Petitioner has not received a bond hearing while she’s
been detained. (Id. at 2). She has been ordered removed by an Immigration Judge. (Dkt.
No. 29-1 at 4). However, she appealed the decision to the BIA and the appeal remains
pending, so her order of removal is not final. Automated Case Information, Exec. Off.
Immigr. Rev., https://acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/caseinformation (last visited May 31, 2026);
8 C.F.R. § 1241.1.
B. Legal Background
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Department of Justice (DOJ)
released interim guidance in July 2025, announcing a new legal position on detention
authorities for noncitizens. The guidance interpreted the mandatory detention provision
of Section 235 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), or 8 U.S.C. § 1225, as
applying to the detention of all “applicants for admission,” including all noncitizens who
have not been admitted, whether they arrive at a port of entry or enter without
inspection. This position was adopted by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) in
September 2025. Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025).
In the months following the shift in policy, federal district courts across the
country found the Government’s interpretation at odds with the text of the statute and
ordered bond hearings, or release, for noncitizens subject to mandatory detention under
the policy. See, e.g., Barco Mercado v. Francis, No. 25-CV-6582, 2025 WL 3295903, at *4,
n.22 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025) (collecting cases). In February 2026, the Fifth Circuit held
that Section 1225(b)(2) applies to all applicants for admission, regardless of whether they
are actively “seeking admission” when they are detained. Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi,
166 F.4th 494, 502 (5th Cir. 2026). However, Buenrostro did not address the validity of
due process claims such as those raised by Petitioner in this case. See, e.g., Bonilla Chicas
v. Warden, No. 5:26-CV-131, 2026 WL 539475, at *4–5 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 20, 2026); see also
Padron Covarrubias v. Vergara, No. 5:25-CV-112, 2025 WL 2950097 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 8,
2025), overruled by Buenrostro-Mendez, 166 F.4th 494 (explaining the Court’s prior
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statutory interpretation of Section 1225).
C. Procedural Background
Petitioner filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus, maintaining that
she is entitled to release from detention. In her pro se petition, Petitioner raises several
claims: prolonged detention without bond violates due process; detention without a bond
hearing is unconstitutional; her detention is disproportionate; and various conditions of
confinement have led to physical and emotional deterioration. Petitioner requests
immediate release under bond, supervision, or recognizance while her BIA appeal is
pending.
Pro se litigants’ pleadings are construed liberally and held to “less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972). The Court liberally construes Petitioner’s claims about the constitutionality of
her detention as a procedural due process challenge to her continued detention without
a bond hearing.
II. DISCUSSION
Respondents move for summary judgment, asserting that Petitioner is subject to
mandatory detention pursuant to Buenrostro and that her detention does not violate due
process. The Court finds that her detention violates due process.2 The Court incorporates
the legal standards and analysis applied in its prior order granting a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus under similar facts. Lopez Moncebais v. Bondi, No. 5:26-CV-268, slip op.
(S.D. Tex. Mar. 27, 2026).
There, this Court found that Buenrostro does not foreclose due process challenges
to mandatory detention, a noncitizen subject to mandatory detention may bring an as-
applied due process challenge to 8 U.S.C. Section 1225(b)(2), Supreme Court precedent
does not foreclose that type of challenge, and liberty interests in freedom from detention
must be protected by due process of law, including individualized justification for civil
detention. See id. The Court then applied the balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge
and found that the petitioner’s procedural due process rights had been violated. Id. at 13
2 Because the Court grants Petitioner’s requested relief without consideration of her other claims,
the Court will decline to address the merits of those claims.
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(citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)). The Court ordered immediate
release for the due process violation. Id. at 17.
The Court finds that the same reasoning applies to these facts, though Petitioner’s
length of presence in the United States is factually distinct from Lopez Moncebais.
Petitioner has resided in the United States since 2022. The Court’s reasoning in Lopez
Moncebais relied on the petitioner’s length of residence in the United States in evaluating
his liberty interest. Here, the Court finds that Petitioner’s residence in the United States
since 2022 still creates a sufficient liberty interest to require that her detention is
safeguarded with constitutionally adequate procedures, including an individualized
determination of whether she should be detained.
Additionally, the Court has previously found that a prior release like Petitioner’s
strengthens the liberty interest of a noncitizen because their release created an
expectation that they would be free from detention during the pendency of their removal
proceedings. Bonilla Barrios v. Noem, No. 5:26-cv-172, slip op. at 4 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 2,
2026). As the Court explained there, liberty interests “may arise from an expectation or
interest created by state laws or policies.” Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005).
In this case, Petitioner had an expectation, in addition to her residence since 2022, that
she would be free from detention or at least entitled to seek bond while her removal
proceedings were pending. She was released from detention in 2022 and spent over three
years out of custody before she was re-detained. Respondents do not assert that
Petitioner violated any conditions of her release. Petitioner appeared for a standard ICE
check-in appointment and was taken into custody without any advance warning or
explanation. That expectation interest strengthens her liberty interest. The Court also
notes that several cases analyzed for their persuasive authority in Lopez Moncebais
similarly considered prior release as a factor strengthening the liberty interest of
noncitizens detained under Section 1225(b)(2) without a bond hearing. See Lopez
Moncebais, No. 5:26-CV-268, slip op. at 7 n.6 (collecting cases).
For these reasons and the reasons discussed in the Court’s analysis in Lopez
Moncebais, the Court finds that Petitioner’s detention violates her rights under the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, she is entitled to relief, and the appropriate
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remedy is to order Petitioner’s immediate release from custody.3
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Under
28 U.S.C. § 2241, (Dkt. No. 1), is GRANTED 	in 	part and DENIED 	in 	part.
Respondents’ Motion for Summary Judgment, (Dkt. No. 29), is DENIED.
Respondents are ORDERED to RELEASE Petitioner from custody by June 3,
2026, at 5:00 p.m., under reasonable conditions of release, and to submit a status report
to the Court confirming Petitioner’s release by June 4, 2026, at 5:00 p.m. Petitioner
should be released in a public place during daytime hours. At the time of her release from
custody, Respondents must return to Petitioner any and all identification documents
taken from her at the time of her apprehension or during her detention. Additionally,
upon her release, Respondents must provide Petitioner with a printed copy of this Order
granting her habeas petition and ordering her release from custody.
All other relief requested by Petitioner is DENIED.
If Petitioner is re-detained, Petitioner must be afforded procedural due process as
guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
A final judgment will follow.
3 A district court has equitable discretion in determining the appropriate remedy “as law and justice
require” for unlawful detention in a habeas petition. See Brown v. Davenport, 596 U.S. 118, 127–28 (2022).
The Court finds that the specific harm Petitioner suffered—unlawful deprivation of liberty without due
process—is remedied by granting her immediate release, rather than ordering a bond hearing. As explained
in Lopez Moncebais, “[t]he Court recognizes the weight of its decision to order Petitioner’s release from
custody .” No. 5:26-CV-268, slip op. at 16. Though, the Court reaches this conclusion for several reasons.
First, the Fifth Circuit has held that Section 1226(a), which provides for a bond hearing, does not apply
to any applicants for admission. Buenrostro-Mendez, 166 F.4th 494. Additionally, a hearing after
Petitioner’s unjustified deprivation of liberty does not cure the deprivation. See Bonilla Chicas, No.
5:26 CV-131, 2026 WL 539475, at *12. Finally, the Court finds that an Immigration Judge would be
unlikely to hold the bond hearing if ordered because the BIA’s position is that there is no jurisdiction
to hold bond hearings for all applicants for admission detained under Section 1225(b)(2). Matter of
Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216; see also Rojas v. Noem, No. EP-25-CV-443, 2025 WL 3038262, at
*4, n.2.
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It is so ORDERED.
SIGNED on June 2, 2026.
______________________________
John A. Kazen
United States District Judge
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