Singh v. Warden et al

Page 1 of 8
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
LAREDO DIVISION
HARDEEP SINGH,
Petitioner,
VS.
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:25-CV-282
WARDEN OF THE PORT ISABEL
SERVICE DETENTION CENTER, et al.,
Respondents.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Before the Court is the question of whether to impose sanctions on Petitioner’s
counsel, Gurpreet Kaur, for filing an identical habeas petition despite the Court having
previously transferred Petitioner’s original case to the Brownsville Division. (Dkt. No. 1).
United States District Judge Marina Garcia Marmolejo ordered Ms. Kaur to show cause why
she should not be sanctioned, and Ms. Kaur filed a written response (Dkt. Nos. 8, 10). The
Undersigned conducted a hearing on February 12, 2026, to determine whether Ms. Kaur
should be sanctioned pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Local Rule
5.2 for the Southern District of Texas, or the Court’s inherent authority.
After reviewing the response and conducting the hearing, the Undersigned finds that Ms.
Kaur violated Rule 11(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by submitting a filing
without conducting a reasonable inquiry, premised on a legal contention warranted by
neither existing law nor a non-frivolous argument for a change in the law. The Undersigned
also finds that Ms. Kaur violated Local Rule 5.2 for the Southern District of Texas by failing
to advise the court about the original case. As such, the Court RECOMMENDS imposing
sanctions.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
February 25, 2026
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
Case 5:25-cv-00282 Document 13 Filed 02/25/26 in TXSD Page 1 of 8

Page 2 of 8
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On November 13, 2025, Ms. Kaur filed a habeas petition in the Laredo Division, before
United States District Judge John A. Kazen, on Hardeep Singh’s behalf. See Singh v. Warden
of the Port Isabel Service Detention Center, 5:25-cv-218 (S.D. Tex. filed Nov. 13, 2025), Dkt.
No. 1; see also Singh v. Warden of the Port Isabel Service Detention Center, 1:25-cv-281 (S.D.
Tex. filed Nov. 13, 2025), Dkt. No. 1. On November 18, 2025, United States Magistrate Judge
Christopher Dos Santos entered an order transferring the case to the Brownsville Division
because Petitioner was detained at the Port Isabel Service Detention Center in Los Fresnos,
Texas. Singh, 1:25-cv-281, Dkt. No. 13. On November 19, 2025, the day after transfer, United
States District Judge Rolando Olvera ordered a scheduling conference set for March 17, 2026.
Singh, 1:25-cv-281, Dkt. No. 14.1 The next day, November 20, 2025, Ms. Kaur filed a
certificate of service in the Brownsville case. Singh, 1:25-cv-281, Dkt. No. 15. Then, on
November 21, 2025, Judge Olvera ordered the government to respond to the petition by
December 5, 2025. Singh, 1:25-cv-281, Dkt. No. 16.
On December 9, 2025, Ms. Kaur filed a request for an immediate ruling in the original
Laredo case because the government had failed to respond to Judge Olvera’s order in
Brownsville. Singh, 5:25-cv-218, Dkt. No. 14. The same day, Judge Kazen issued an order
explaining that the Laredo division would not consider Petitioners request because the case
had been transferred to Brownsville, was pending there, and had been terminated in Laredo.
Singh, 5:25-cv-218, Dkt. No. 15.
On December 24, 2025, Ms. Kaur filed the present petition on Hardeep Singh’s behalf.
(Dkt. No. 1). Six days after that, on December 30, 2025, Judge Garcia Marmolejo ordered
1 Ms. Kaur claimed that she was unaware of the case in Brownsville at this time. However, the Court’s
electronic filing system indicates that this, and every other subsequent docket entry in Brownsville,
was e-mailed to Ms. Kaur.
Case 5:25-cv-00282 Document 13 Filed 02/25/26 in TXSD Page 2 of 8

Page 3 of 8
Petitioner to file an advisory by January 5, 2026, addressing whether the Petitioner named
in this case is identical to the one pending in the Brownsville Division. (Dkt. No. 6). That
same day, Ms. Kaur filed a motion in Brownsville identical to the request she filed in Laredo
on January 9, 2026. Compare Singh, 5:25-cv-218, Dkt. No. 14, with Singh, 1:25-cv-281, Dkt.
No. 17. On January 6, 2026,—one day after the deadline for her to respond—Ms. Kaur filed
an advisory affirming that the Petitioner named in this case is the same as the Petitioner in
Brownsville. (Dkt. No. 7). In her advisory, Ms. Kaur stated that, because of Judge Kazen’s
Order on December 9, she “believed that no habeas petition remained pending in the
Southern District of Texas.” (Id. at 2). But see Singh, 5:25-cv-218, Dkt. No. 15 (“Magistrate
Judge dos Santos transferred the case to the Brownsville Division, and the case appears to
be pending before the court there.”).
On January 28, 2026, Judge Garcia Marmolejo ordered Ms. Kaur to show cause why
she should not be sanctioned pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
Local Rule 5.2 for the Southern District of Texas, and the Court’s inherent authority, and
referred the matter to the Undersigned for a hearing and a report and recommendation (Dkt.
No. 8). On February 4, 2026, Ms. Kaur filed a response to the Show Cause Order. (Dkt. No.
10). In her response, she stated she was confused by the “extraordinary similarity of the case
numbers involved—5:25-cv-218 and 1:25-cv-281—which differ only by transposed digits.”
(Dkt. No. 10 at 2). She further explained it was this confusion that led her to believe only one
docket existed when the case was terminated in Laredo. (Id.).
On February 12, 2026, the Undesigned conducted a show cause hearing. At the
hearing, Ms. Kaur explained that, as an attorney who primarily practices in California, she
did not know that the Southern District of Texas used a single digit to indicate divisions at
the beginning of case numbers. In both her written response and at the hearing, Ms. Kaur
Case 5:25-cv-00282 Document 13 Filed 02/25/26 in TXSD Page 3 of 8

Page 4 of 8
repeatedly argued that, because of the similarity of the case numbers and the language
contained in Judge Kazen’s order, the decision to file a new petition was objectively
reasonable. (Dkt. No. 10 at 2). The Undersigned disagrees.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b)(2) requires attorneys presenting legal filings to
the Court to certify that “the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by
existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing
law or for establishing new law.” The rule requires the signing attorney “to satisfy himself
that the filed paper is factually and legally responsible,” and by signing, he indicates “that
he personally has applied his own judgment.” Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Ent. Grp., 493 U.S.
120, 125 (1989). This is a “nondelegable responsibility.” Id. at 126. An attorney’s subjective
good faith is no shield against Rule 11 sanctions. Jenkins v. Methodist Hosps. of Dall., Inc.,
478 F.3d 255, 264 (5th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). The same is true for local rule violations.
In re Goode, 821 F.3d 553, 559 (5th Cir. 2016) (Prado, J.).
After finding a Rule 11 violation, district courts retain “considerable discretion in
determining the ‘appropriate’ sanction to impose upon the violating party.” Thomas v. Cap.
Sec. Servs., 836 F.2d 866, 877 (5th Cir. 1988) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)). However, “the
sanction imposed should be the least severe sanction adequate to the purpose of Rule 11,”
which is “deterrence, punishment, and compensation.” Id. at 878– 79; see also Fed. R. Civ. P.
11(c)(4) (“A sanction imposed under this rule must be limited to what suffices to deter
repetition of the conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated.”).
A duplicative complaint may be summarily dismissed. Pittman v. Moore, 980 F.2d 994,
995 (5th Cir. 1993); Wilson v. Lynaugh, 878 F.2d 846, 849 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
969 (1989). This principle applies to habeas petitions. See Massaquoi v. U S Immigr. &
Case 5:25-cv-00282 Document 13 Filed 02/25/26 in TXSD Page 4 of 8

Page 5 of 8
Customs Enf’t, No. 1:25-CV-00371, 2025 WL 2252594, at *1 (W.D. La. July 15, 2025)
(recommending dismissal of a § 2241 petition as duplicative), report and recommendation
adopted sub nom., Massaquoi v. US Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, No. 1:25-CV-00371 SEC P,
2025 WL 2248943 (W.D. La. Aug. 6, 2025); see also Brock v. Cockrell, No. CIV.A.
303CV0340M, 2003 WL 21418792, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 2003) (recommending dismissal
when petitioner challenges the same claim that is pending in a different division within the
same district).
III. FINDINGS
The Undersigned finds that Ms. Kaur’s filing of this duplicate petition constitutes a
Rule 11 violation. Because she did not distinguish case numbers, adequately review Judge
Dos Santos’s or Judge Kazen’s orders, or survey readily available information through the
Court’s electronic filing system, Ms. Kaur failed to conduct a reasonable inquiry.
The Undersigned is troubled by Ms. Kaur’s statements at the hearing concerning the
absence of such an inquiry. Ms. Kaur acknowledged that, if instead of being transferred, the
original petition had been terminated for cause, it would be improper to file an identical
petition with the same court. However, when asked whether she had any idea why the case
was terminated in Laredo at the time she filed the duplicate petition, Ms. Kaur stated that
she did not.
It is evident that her failure to conduct this basic inquiry is what caused Ms. Kaur to
file the present petition while an identical petition was pending in a different division. Under
existing law these circumstances would, immediately upon filing, subject the present petition
to dismissal. Pittman, 980 F.2d at 995; Wilson, 878 F.2d at 849; Brock, 2003 WL 21418792,
at *1. Despite this, Ms. Kaur makes no argument in her petition, nor any subsequent filing,
that a duplicate habeas petition filed in a sister division is warranted by either existing law
Case 5:25-cv-00282 Document 13 Filed 02/25/26 in TXSD Page 5 of 8

Page 6 of 8
or a non-frivolous argument for a change in the law. (See generally Dkt. Nos. 1, 2, 3, 7, 10).
This violates Rule 11(b)(2) and warrants sanctions.2
Ms. Kaur also failed to advise the Court about her previous petition in violation of the
local rules. Instead, the Court discovered this issue independently. (Dkt. No. 8 at 3). Ms. Kaur
may counter that she only failed to comply with this requirement because she was unaware
of the pending case in Brownsville. However, even if her incorrect belief was true, Local Rule
5.2 requires parties to advise the court not just of “related current litigation” but also “recent
litigation”. See S. Dist. of Tex. Loc. R. 5.2. This failure also warrants sanctions under the
Court’s inherent authority.
To Ms. Kaur’s credit, the Undersigned acknowledges her apology and finds her
assertions of good faith credible. (Dkt. Nos. 7, 10). However, good faith does not relieve an
attorney of their obligation to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the local
rules. Jenkins, 478 F.3d at 264; Goode, 821 F.3d at 559. The Undersigned also appreciates
Ms. Kaur’s implementation of additional safeguards to prevent this from reoccurring, which
she addressed in her written advisory and at the hearing. (Dkt. No. 10 at 5; Minute Entry
Dated February 12, 2026). But ultimately, the Undersigned is of the opinion that these
safeguards, on their own, do not suffice to deter repetition of the conduct. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
11(c)(4).
Lastly, the Undersigned believes it important to impress upon Ms. Kaur that
substantial judicial resources were expended because of her mistakes. Because of the original
filing 	and 	subsequent 	duplicate 	petition, 	this 	matter 	has 	already 	necessitated 	the
involvement of four of the six judges in the Laredo Division, multiple different orders, and
2 The Undersigned finds Ms. Kaur’s statements that the duplicate petition was not filed for any
improper purpose to be credible. For that reason, Sanctions for violation of Rule 11(b)(1) are not
warranted.
Case 5:25-cv-00282 Document 13 Filed 02/25/26 in TXSD Page 6 of 8

Page 7 of 8
the hearing before the Undersigned. At a time when the district is inundated with potentially
meritorious, time-sensitive habeas petitions, the Court cannot allow such a lapse in due
diligence to pass without consequence.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
For the foregoing reasons, the Court RECOMMENDS that the District Judge
SANCTION Gurpreet Kaur as follows:
1. 	Completion of a minimum of two hours of Continuing Legal Education on case
administration or management, within forty-five days of the adoption of this
Order, with proof of compliance filed on the docket.
2. 	Completion of a minimum of one hour of Continuing Legal Education on Federal
Court practice, within forty-five days of the adoption of this Order, with
proof of compliance filed on the docket.
3. 	Completion of a minimum of one hour of Continuing Legal Education on federal
petitions for habeas corpus, within forty-five days of the adoption of this
Order, with proof of compliance filed on the docket.
V. WARNINGS
The parties may file objections to this Report and Recommendation, unless they waive
the right to do so. A party filing objections must specifically identify those findings or
recommendations to which objections are being made. The District Court need not consider
frivolous, conclusive, or general objections. Battle v. United States Parole Comm’n, 834 F. 2d
419, 421 (5th Cir. 1987) (quoting Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F. 2d 404, 410 n.8 (5th Cir. 1982)
(en banc)). Unless the District Judge directs otherwise, the objecting party must promptly
arrange for transcribing the record, or whatever portions of it the parties agree to or the
Magistrate Judge considers sufficient. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b)(2).
A 	party’s 	failure 	to 	file 	written 	objections 	to 	the 	proposed 	findings 	and
recommendations contained in this Report within fourteen (14) days after being served with
a copy of the Report shall bar that party from de novo review by the District Court of the
Case 5:25-cv-00282 Document 13 Filed 02/25/26 in TXSD Page 7 of 8

Page 8 of 8
proposed findings and recommendations and, except upon grounds of plain error, shall bar
the party from appellate review of proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted
by the District Court to which no objections were filed. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Crim.
P. 59(b); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150–53 (1985); Douglass v. United States Auto Ass’n,
79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).
The Clerk of Court is directed to send a copy of this Report and Recommendation to
all parties.
SIGNED on February 25, 2026, at Laredo, Texas.
___________________________________
Brian C. Bajew
United States Magistrate Judge
Case 5:25-cv-00282 Document 13 Filed 02/25/26 in TXSD Page 8 of 8