Martinez-Rodriguez v. The United States Of America

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
LAREDO DIVISION
JUAN DIEGO MARTINEZ-RODRIGUEZ, §
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Petitioner, 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:25-CV-107
CRIM. ACTION NO. 5:22-CR-1052-S-15
VS.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF
THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Before the Court is Petitioner Juan Diego Martinez-Rodriguez’s Motion Under
28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal
Custody. (Civ. Dkt. No. 1; Crim. Dkt. No. 982). United States District Judge Marina
Garcia Marmolejo referred this case to the Undersigned on August 27, 2025, for a
report and recommendation. (Civ. Dkt. No. 2; Crim. Dkt. No. 999).1 Petitioner’s
counsel, Mr. Javier Guzman (“Mr. Guzman”), responded to the motion, and the
Government filed a motion for summary judgment. (Civ. Dkt. Nos. 8 and 11). Upon
review of the submissions, the record of the proceedings before the District Court in
the 	underlying 	criminal 	case, 	and 	the 	applicable 	case 	law, 	the 	Undersigned
RECOMMENDS 	that 	the 	District 	Judge 	DENY 	Petitioner’s 	motion. 	The
1 Unless otherwise indicated, citations refer to the criminal docket. Although the referral in
Civil Action No. 5:25-CV-107 was ordered on August 27, 2025, the referral in Crim. Action No. 5:22-
CR-1052-S-15 was ordered on October 22, 2025.
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
December 15, 2025
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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Undersigned further RECOMMENDS that a certificate of appealability should be
DENIED as jurists would not find the Court’s ruling debatable.
I. BACKGROUND
On April 2, 2024, Petitioner pleaded guilty before District Judge Garcia
Marmolejo to Count Seven of his Superseding Indictment. (Min. Ent. April 2, 2024;
Dkt. No. 692). Pursuant to his plea agreement, Petitioner preserved his right to
assert a post-conviction claim for ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”). (Dkt. No.
692 at 4). However, Petitioner waived all other appellate rights and the right to
collaterally attack his conviction and sentence. (Id.).
At his re-arraignment, Petitioner confirmed that he reviewed the terms of the
entire plea agreement with his attorney, Mr. Guzman, and that he understood the
terms of the agreement and signed it freely and voluntarily. (Hr’g, April 2, 2024 at
10:40:11-10:40-31). Petitioner additionally affirmed under oath that he understood
the waiver of his appellate right and the right to collaterally attack his conviction
and sentence. (Hr’g, April 2, 2024 at 10:45:32-10:46:13).
The Court sentenced Petitioner on September 25, 2024, to a 37-month term of
imprisonment. (Min. Ent. Sept. 25, 2024; Dkt. No. 865). At the end of the sentencing
hearing, the Court noted Petitioner waived his right to appeal. (Hr’g, September 25,
2024 at 11:49:30).
On July 2, 2025, Petitioner filed the instant 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. (Civ. Dkt.
No. 1; Dkt. No. 982). His motion is therefore timely within the one-year statute of
limitations period. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (f)(1) (providing the applicable one-year
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statute of limitations period commencing “the date on which the judgment of
conviction becomes final”). In his motion, Petitioner broadly argues Mr. Guzman: (1)
failed to suppress evidence as requested which induced Petitioner to plead guilty; (2)
was ineffective as counsel due to five enumerated failures which induced Petitioner
to plead guilty; (3) failed to move for a hearing to claim Petitioner’s property seized
by the Government; (4) and failed to argue that the Court did not have jurisdiction
over Petitioner. (Civ. Dkt. No. 1; Dkt. No. 982).
Mr. Guzman responded to the motion on September 26, 2025, and the
Government filed a motion for summary judgment on December 8, 2025. (Civ. Dkt.
Nos. 8 and 11).
II. Legal Standard
After a defendant has been convicted and has exhausted or waived any right
to appeal, a court is normally “entitled to presume that [he] stands fairly and finally
convicted.” United States v. Willis, 273 F.3d 592, 595 (5th Cir. 2001) (citations
omitted). “As a result, review of convictions under [28 U.S.C. § 2255] ordinarily is
limited to questions of constitutional or jurisdictional magnitude, which may not be
raised for the first time on collateral review without a showing of cause and
prejudice.” United States v. Cervantes, 132 F.3d 1106, 1109 (5th Cir. 1998). In other
words, relief under § 2255 is “reserved for transgressions of constitutional rights and
for a narrow range of injuries that could not have been raised on direct appeal and
would, if condoned, result in a complete miscarriage of justice.” United States v.
Vaughn, 955 F.2d 367, 368 (5th Cir. 1992). If the reviewing court concludes that the
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prisoner’s motion is meritorious, it must “vacate and set the judgment aside and shall
discharge the prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial or correct the sentence
as may appear appropriate.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b).
Petitioner is representing himself throughout his proceedings under § 2255. It
is a court’s “duty to construe pro se [filings] liberally so that a litigant will not suffer
simply because he did not attend law school or find a suitable attorney.” United States
v. Ayika, 554 F. App’x 302, 308 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam). As a result, a pro se
litigant’s pleadings are entitled to a liberal construction and are subject to “less
stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam).
Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance is highly deferential. Wilkerson v.
Collins, 950 F.2d 1054, 1065 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 509 U.S. 921 (1993). On
post-conviction review, trial counsel are entitled to a strong presumption that they
“rendered adequate assistance and that the challenged conduct was the product of
reasoned trial strategy.” Id. (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690
(1984)). To overcome the presumption of competence, the petitioner must establish
(1) that counsel’s performance was deficient”; and (2) “the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense.” Id. at 687. “An error by counsel, even if professionally
unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding
if the error had no effect on the judgment.” Id. at 691. Constitutionally effective
assistance of counsel under Strickland is not errorless counsel. Ultimately, the
determination of whether counsel has rendered reasonably effective assistance turns
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on the totality of facts in the record. Id. at 695.
As a general rule, “[a] voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty made by an
accused person, who has been advised by competent counsel, may not be collaterally
attacked.” Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 508, 104 S.Ct. 2543, 81 L.Ed.2d 437
(1984). A plea’s validity may not be collaterally attacked because the defendant made
what turned out, in retrospect, to be a poor deal. Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 535 U.S. 175,
186, 125 S.Ct. 2398, 162 L.Ed.2d 143 (2005). By pleading guilty to an offense, a
defendant waives all non-jurisdictional defects preceding the plea. United States v.
Owens, 996 F.2d 59,60 (5th Cir. 1993). This includes claims for ineffective assistance
of counsel except when the ineffectiveness is alleged to have rendered the guilty plea
involuntary. United States v. Glinsey, 209 F.3d 386, 392 (5th Cir. 2000).
Any challenge to a district court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines in
a § 2255 motion is not cognizable on collateral review. See Kinder v. Purdy, 222 F.3d
209, 211 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1132 (2001); United States v.
Williamson, 183 F.3d 458, 462 (5th Cir. 1999); Cervantes, 132 F.3d at 1109; Vaughn,
955 F.2d at 368. To show prejudice related to counsel’s performance at sentencing, a
defendant 	must 	demonstrate 	that 	but 	for 	counsel’s 	alleged errors, 	there 	is 	a
reasonable probability that he would have received a lower sentence. United States
v. Grammas, 376 F.3d 433, 439 (5th Cir. 2004).
“’A motion brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 can be denied without a hearing
only if the motion, files, and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner
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is entitled to no relief.” United States v. Bartholomew, 974 F.2d 39, 41 (5th Cir. 1992).
III. Discussion
A. The Claims in the § 2255 motion are not meritorious.
The District Judge should dismiss Petitioner’s § 2255 claims because they lack
merit. The Undersigned will briefly address the merits of each claim in turn.
1. 	Petitioner waived his Fourth Amendment claims by pleading guilty.
Liberally construed, Petitioner’s first claim asserts that his counsel should
have filed a motion to suppress evidence. (Dkt. No. 982 at 4). Specifically, Petitioner
claims that law enforcement searched his home and seized vehicle and other items
without 	first 	obtaining 	a 	search 	warrant, 	in 	violation 	of 	Petitioner’s 	Fourth
Amendment rights. (Id.)
Even if these allegations were true, Petitioner’s claim is meritless because he
waived any claims based on the allegations by knowingly and voluntarily pleading
guilty. “A voluntary and unconditional guilty plea waives all non-jurisdictional
defects” in the criminal proceedings. United States v. Scruggs, 714 F.3d 258, 261–62
(5th Cir. 2013). Such defects include any claims regarding lack of probable cause or
Miranda violations. See United States v. Guzman-Hernandez, 392 Fed. App’x 321, 322
(5th Cir. 2010) (explaining that the defendant’s guilty plea waived his claims for
alleged violations of his Miranda rights); United States v. Hewitt, 326 Fed. App’x 756,
758 (5th Cir. 2009) (concluding that the defendant’s guilty plea waived any claim of
illegal seizure); United States v. Allen, 250 F. App’x 9, 12 (5th Cir. 2007) (affirming
the denial of a § 2255 petition because the defendant’s guilty plea waived any claims
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based on the government conducting an illegal search). At his plea hearing, Petitioner
stated to District Judge Garcia Marmolejo that no one was forcing, threatening, or
coercing him to plead guilty. (Hr’g, April 2, 2024 at 10:52:40-10:52:48). In his signed
plea agreement, Petitioner “acknowledges that no threats have been made against
him/her and that he/she is pleading guilty freely and voluntarily because he/she is
guilty.” (Dkt. No. 692 at 10).
Further, Mr. Guzman noted in his response that Petitioner never requested
the filing of a motion to suppress, and that even if he had, Mr. Guzman would not
have filed a frivolous motion. (Dkt. No. 994 at 1).
As held in Owens, by pleading guilty to an offense, a defendant waives all non-
jurisdictional defects preceding the plea, including claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel except when the ineffectiveness is alleged to have rendered the guilty plea
involuntary. Petitioner cannot claim that his attorney was ineffective due to his
decision to not file a motion to suppress. Rather, Petitioner voluntarily chose to accept
a plea agreement and plead guilty.
Petitioner’s first claim fails.
2. 	Unsupported 	allegations 	don’t 	overcome 	the 	presumption 	that
sworn declarations in court are true.
Similarly, Petitioner’s second claim asserts that his attorney failed to discuss
discovery with the Petitioner and failed to file various pre-trial motions, to include
the aforementioned motion to suppress evidence. (Dkt. No. 982 at 5). However,
Petitioner provides no facts to support these bare and inconsistent assertions.
First, the record unambiguously undermines Petitioner’s allegation that his
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attorney 	didn’t 	provide 	or 	review 	discovery 	with 	him. 	At 	his 	re-arriagnment,
Petitioner stated that he was satisfied with Mr. Guzman’s legal representation. (Hr’g,
April 2, 2024 at 10:38:27-10:38:36). Petitioner agreed under oath that his attorney,
Mr. Guzman, had reviewed the evidence in the case and discussed possible options
and 	defenses 	with 	Petitioner. 	(Hr’g, 	April 	2, 	2024 	at 	10:38:37-10:38:47). 	At
sentencing, Petitioner confirmed under oath that he had an opportunity to review the
PSR with his attorney. (Hr’g, September 25, 2024 at 10:22:04-10:22:15). These
assertions are consistent with Mr. Guzman’s response that he reviewed all discovery
materials with Petitioner. (Dkt. No. 994 at 1). Petitioner now argues that his attorney
didn’t review discovery with him. But “[s]olemn declarations in open court carry a
strong presumption of verity.” Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977). And
unsupported allegations do not satisfy a petitioner’s “heavy burden” to overcome this
presumption. See DeVille v. Whitley, 21 F.3d 654, 659 (5th Cir. 1994); see also United
States v. Jimerson, 754 Fed. App’x 275, 277 (5th Cir. 2018) (explaining that a
defendant “must wield specific factual allegations” to repudiate statements made
under oath when entering a plea of guilty). Here, Petitioner presents mere conclusory
statements when arguing that his attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel.
Those unsupported allegations are insufficient to overcome the heavy burden that the
law imposes.
Second, as noted in the previous section, Petitioner’s claims that his counsel
was ineffective because he should have filed a motion to suppress or other pre-trial
motions has no merit because Petitioner voluntarily chose to accept a plea agreement
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and plead guilty.
Petitioner’s second claim fails.
3. Forfeiture claims aren’t cognizable in a §2255 motion.
Petitioner argues that the Government should have held a forfeiture hearing
if it intended to keep Defendant’s Mercedes Benz, wallet, and other U.S. currency.
(Dkt. No. 982 at 7). In its response, the Government argues that a §2255 motion is
not the proper mechanism to raise such a claim. (Dkt. No. 1002 at 23). The
Undersigned agrees.
First, in Paragraph 23 of his plea agreement, Defendant agreed to “waive any
and all interest in any asset which is the subject of a related administrative or judicial
forfeiture proceedings, whether criminal or civil, federal or state.” (Dkt. No. 692 at
10). Additionally, he “waives the right to challenge the forfeiture of property in any
matter, including by direct appeal or in a collateral proceeding.” (Id.). Additionally,
Mr. Guzman notes in his response that the property seized in Austin, Texas was
“subject to a separate Western District of Texas proceeding,” of which Mr. Guzman
was not assigned counsel. (Dkt. No. 994 at 2).
Second, cognizable claims under §2255 are limited to those related to unlawful
custody, as opposed to financial penalties or allegations related to forfeiture. See
United States v. Segler, 37 F.3d 1131 (5th Cir. 1994) (A claim challenging the court’s
imposition of a fine lies outside the scope of §2255.); United States v. Hatten, 167 F.3d
884, 887 (5th Cir. 1999) (“[C]omplaints concerning restitution may not be addressed
in §2255 proceedings.”); Urista v. United States, No. 7:10-cr-009, 2015 WL 4588352,
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at *8 (N.D. Tex. July 30, 2015) (“As correctly observed by the United States in its
Response, 	[c]laims 	of 	ineffective 	assistance 	of 	counsel 	based 	upon 	restitution
and forfeiture are not cognizable in a § 2255 action because they do not relate to
unlawful custody.”).
Accordingly, Petitioner cannot raise such a claim in a §2255 motion.
4. Petitioner’s venue and jurisdiction claim is frivolous.
Finally, Petitioner argues that the Court in Laredo, Texas, did not have
jurisdiction over his case, as his property was seized and he was arrested, in Austin,
Texas. (Dkt. No. 982 at 8). This argument is frivolous.
As the Government notes, 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) provides that “[e]xcept as
otherwise expressly provided by enactment of Congress, any offense against the
United States begun in one district, may be inquired of and prosecuted in any district
in which such offense was begun, continued, or completed.” Additionally, the Fifth
Circuit has held that, “[i]n conspiracy cases, venue is proper in any district where the
agreement was formed, or an overt act occurred.” United States v. Lee, 966 F.3d 310,
319 (5th Cir. 2000).
The factual basis in support of Petitioner’s plea agreement indicates that the
human smuggling organization (“HSO”) “used drivers to pick up UDAs near the
U.S/Mexico border and transport them to residence in or around the Laredo, Texas
area, and elsewhere.” (Dkt. No. 694 at 2). Additionally, the “HSO illegally harbored
and transported UDAs, including unaccompanied minors, at various locations in the
Laredo and Austin, Texas areas.” (Id.). Petitioner conspired with others to “engage in
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financial transactions designed to conceal the nature and source of the ill-gotten
proceeds the HSO received through the illegal transportation and harboring of the
UDA.” (Id.). By signing and accepting the plea agreement, Petitioner stipulated that
these facts are true. (Dkt. No. 694 at 1).
Petitioner’s final claim is frivolous.
IV. Conclusion
The Undersigned RECOMMENDS that no hearing on Petitioner’s § 2255
motion is necessary because the record conclusively shows that Petitioner is not
entitled to any relief. 	Bartholomew, 974 F.2d at 41. Based on the foregoing, the
Undersigned RECOMMENDS that the District Judge DENY Petitioner’s § 2255
motion and GRANT summary judgment in favor of the Government. (Civ. Dkt. Nos.
1 and 11; Crim. Dkt. Nos. 982 and 1002).
V. Certificate of Appealability
Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Cases in the United States
District Courts requires a district court to issue or deny a certificate of appealability
when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant. A certificate of appealability will
not issue unless the petitioner makes “a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). In order to make that showing, a
petitioner must demonstrate “that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s
assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Tennard v. Dretke, 542
U.S. 274, 282 (2004) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)). Where
denial of relief is based on procedural grounds, the petitioner must show not only that
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“jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of
the denial of a constitutional right,” but also that they “would find it debatable
whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack, 529 U.S. at
484.
The Undersigned concludes that reasonable jurists would not debate whether
the pending motion to vacate under § 2255 should be denied. The Undersigned
therefore 	RECOMMENDS 	that 	the 	District 	Judge 	DENY 	a 	certificate 	of
appealability in this case.
VI. Notice of Right to Object
Within fourteen days after being served with a copy of this Report and
Recommendation, 	the 	parties 	may 	file 	written 	objections 	to 	the 	findings 	and
recommendations proposed above. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The District Judge will
review de novo those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or
recommendations to which the party objects. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Thomas v.
Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150–53 (1985); Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415,
1428–29 (5th Cir. 1996). The District Judge may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or
in part, the findings or recommendations made by this Court, and may also receive
further evidence or recommit the matter to this Court with instructions. 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1)(C). The District Court need not consider frivolous, conclusive, or general
objections. Battle v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 834 F.2d 419, 421 (5th Cir. 1987). If a party
does not object within fourteen days, the party forfeits its right to District Court
review. Thomas, 474 U.S. at 150.
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Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and
recommendations contained in this report within fourteen days after service shall bar
an aggrieved party from de novo review by the District Court of the proposed findings
and recommendations and from appellate review of factual findings accepted or
adopted by the District Court, except on grounds of plain error or manifest injustice.
Douglass, 79 F.3d at 1428.
The Court DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to mail Petitioner a copy of this
Report and Recommendation by certified mail return receipt requested at the address
on file.
SIGNED on December 15, 2025.
Christopher dos Santos
United States Magistrate Judge
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