Torres Sanchez v. United States Citizenship Immigration Services et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
LAREDO DIVISION
FILEMON TORRES SANCHEZ 	§
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§
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VS. 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:25-cv-93
UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP
IMMIGRATION SERVICES et al.
ORDER
Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Petition for Writ
of Mandamus (see Dkt. No. 4). Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, neglected to timely oppose
Defendants’ motion. For the following reasons, the Court DENIES Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Petition for Writ of Mandamus (Dkt. No. 4) and
REMANDS this action to United States Citizenship Services with instructions to
render a decision on Plaintiff’s naturalization application within thirty (30) days of
the entry of the Order.
I. 	BACKGROUND1
In 1991, Plaintiff, a Mexican citizen, enlisted in the United States Army
Reserve through the Delayed Entry Program (Dkt. Nos. 1 at 4, ¶ 9; 1-3 at 14–15, 45).
When Plaintiff entered the armed forces, the nation was in a designated period of
hostility marked by the United States’s involvement in the Persian Gulf War (Dkt.
No. 1 at 4, ¶ 9; 1-3 at 30). Eventually, Plaintiff was honorably discharged (Dkt. Nos.
1 In considering Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court accepts all well-pleaded
factual allegations in the complaint as true and views them in Plaintiff’s favor. See Tellabs, Inc. v.
Makor Issues & Rts., Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007) (citation omitted); Sewell v. Monroe City Sch. Bd.,
974 F.3d 577, 581–82 (5th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). For the Rule 12(b)(1) inquiry, the Court may
also consider “the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record” or “the
complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts.” Ramming v.
United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).
United States District Court
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
November 18, 2025
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
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1 at 4, ¶ 9; 1-3 at 16).
Based on his honorable military service during a period of hostility, Plaintiff
applied 	to 	United 	States 	Citizenship 	Immigration 	Services 	(“USCIS”) 	for
naturalization under 8 U.S.C. § 1440 in both 1994 and 2013 (Dkt. No. 1 at 14, ¶ 10).
Both 	applications 	were 	stymied 	(Dkt. 	No. 	1 	at 4, 	¶ 10). 	Plaintiff 	refiled 	his
naturalization application on November 24, 2021 (Dkt. No. 1 at 5, ¶ 11). USCIS
interviewed 	Plaintiff 	on 	April 	26, 	2022, 	ultimately 	recommending 	approval 	of
Plaintiff’s application (Dkt. Nos. 1 at 5, ¶ 12; 1-3 at 46). More than three years elapsed
without any further action.
At the time Plaintiff initiated this action, his naturalization application was
still pending (Dkt. No. 1 at 5, ¶¶ 12–13). He thus sought judicial intervention to
compel USCIS to adjudicate his application (see Dkt. No. 1). On August 8, 2025, fifty-
six days after Plaintiff filed this lawsuit, USCIS denied Plaintiff’s application (Dkt.
Nos. 1, 4-1). Then, on August 12, 2025, Defendants jointly filed the present motion,
asserting that Plaintiff’s lawsuit is moot because USCIS has already adjudicated the
application (see Dkt. No. 4). Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se in this action, did not
respond to Defendants’ motion.2 The matter is now ripe for the Court’s decision.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a party may move for dismissal
of a suit, arguing the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. “The party asserting
jurisdiction ‘constantly bears the burden of proof that jurisdiction does in fact exist.’”
2 Standing alone, Plaintiff’s failure to oppose the motion is not grounds to grant it. See, e.g.,
Webb v. Morella, 457 F. App’x 448, 452 n.4 (5th Cir. 2012).
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Morris v. Thompson, 852 F.3d 416, 419 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Ramming, 281 F.3d
at 161). “The motion should be granted only if it appears certain the plaintiff cannot
prove any set of facts that would entitle [them] to recovery.” Id. (citing Home Builders
Ass’n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998)). If a party
invokes both Rules 12(b)(1) and (b)(6), the Court must “start with the jurisdictional
challenge before addressing the challenge on the merits.” Fort Bend County v. U.S.
Army Corps of Eng’rs, 59 F.4th 180, 188 (5th Cir. 2023) (citing Ramming, 281 F.3d
at 161).
B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible when the complaint’s factual
content “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). While courts
must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and view them in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff, they “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a
factual allegation.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555); see also Sewell v. Monroe
City Sch. Bd., 974 F.3d 577, 582 (5th Cir. 2020).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Resting their motion solely on the mootness doctrine,3 Defendants advance
3 Defendants set forth several legal principles, including mandamus relief generally (see Dkt.
No. 4 at 5–6). It appears as if Defendants intended to advance a Rule 12(b)(6) argument regarding
Plaintiff’s petition; however, specifics are cabined to the mootness doctrine under Rule 12(b)(1).
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that Plaintiff’s mandamus action “is not available to compel action which has already
been taken” (Dkt. No. 4 at 6). They claim the August 8, 2025 denial rendered
Plaintiff’s application moot, divesting the Court of subject matter jurisdiction (Dkt.
No. 4 at 2, 5–7). Construing Plaintiff’s petition liberally, the Court disagrees and finds
that USCIS lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate Plaintiff’s application at the time it did.
See Tucker v. Gaddis, 40 F.4th 289, 292 (5th Cir. 2022) (“The filings of a pro se litigant
are to be ‘liberally construed’ and a ‘pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded,
must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’”
(quoting Coleman v. United States, 912 F.3d 824, 828 (5th Cir. 2019))).
A. Construction of Plaintiff’s Pleading
Though he framed it as a writ of mandamus and a claim of right under the
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), at the crux of Plaintiff’s complaint lies
USCIS’s 1,144-day delay4 to adjudicate his naturalization application (see generally
Dkt. No. 1). To cure the delay, he asks the Court to compel USCIS to decide his
application or “grant further relief as deemed just” (Dkt. No. 1 at 7–8). In so
requesting, he cites relevant 8 U.SC. § 1446, which designates the investigatory
process for determining naturalization applications (Dkt. No. 1 at 6, ¶ 17). Because
the statutory framework plainly bestows Plaintiff recourse, the Court interprets
Plaintiff’s pro se filing as a request for a hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b). See
Jackson v. Gautreaux, 3 F.4th 182, 189 (5th Cir. 2021) (“[C]onstruing a request for X
4 The examination process is complete only upon USCIS’s interview of the applicant. Walji v.
Gonzales, 500 F.3d 432, 439 (5th Cir. 2007). Thus, the relevant date began to run once USCIS
interviewed Plaintiff on April 26, 2022.
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as an implied request for Y—is normally reserved for pro se litigants.”).
Indeed, § 1447(b) reads:
If there is a failure to make a determination under section 1446 of this
title before the end of the 120-day period after the date on which
the examination is conducted under such section, the applicant may
apply to the United States district court for the district in which the
applicant resides for a hearing on the matter. Such court has jurisdiction
over the matter and may either determine the matter or remand the
matter, with appropriate instructions, to the Service to determine the
matter.
Importantly, Plaintiff’s adequate § 1447(b) remedy would preclude review of his
naturalization application under both the Mandamus Act and the APA. See, e.g.,
Tankoano v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 652 F. Supp. 3d 812, 817–18 (S.D.
Tex. 2023) (detailed discussion); see also Walji, 500 F.3d at 433–34 (discussing
§ 1447(b) as remedying delays caused under § 1446 when CIS has conducted an
examination but fails to rule on the application within 120 days). That bolsters the
Court’s interpretation of Plaintiff’s pleading as a request for a hearing under
§ 1447(b), and the Court turns to that issue.
B. Deprivation of USCIS’s Jurisdiction
Once a naturalization applicant pursues a § 1447(b) hearing before the district
court, the district court acquires “exclusive jurisdiction over the matter.” Agarwal v.
Napolitano, 663 F. Supp. 2d 528, 532 (W.D. Tex. 2009); see also Ogunfuye v. Acosta,
210 F. App’x 364, 366 (5th Cir. 2006) (noting, without expressly deciding, that
§ 1447(b) “strip[s] the CIS of the ability to deny or approve an application” upon a
plaintiff’s filing of a suit). This finding is grounded not only in the weight of the
authority but also in the statute’s text. Agarwal, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 532–33
(discussing a clear majority of courts finding § 1447(b) vests the district court with
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exclusive jurisdiction and underscoring the statute’s use of the term “remand”). Any
USCIS action taken after a § 1447(b) suit is filed is ultra vires, and, therefore, is null
and void. See id. at 534 (purported adjudications of naturalization applications issued
during the pendency of a 1447(b) suit are ultra vires); Martinez v. Johnson, 104 F.
Supp. 3d 835, 838 (W.D. Tex. 2015) (denial of an application is void if the alien has
filed suit under § 1447(b)).
Here, Plaintiff filed the instant suit on June 13, 2025 (Dkt. No. 1). USCIS
issued its denial of Plaintiff’s naturalization application on August 8, 2025—fifty-six
days later (Dkt. No. 4-1). Because the agency lacked jurisdiction on August 8, 2025,
its denial of that application is void, and Plaintiff’s § 1447(b) action is not moot.
Agarwal, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 534.
Plaintiff has a valid § 1447(b) action, so the Court has two options: (1) conduct
a hearing on the merits of Plaintiff’s application; or (2) remand the case to USCIS to
adjudicate Plaintiff’s application. § 1447(b) (“Such court has jurisdiction over the
matter and may either determine the matter or remand the matter, with appropriate
instructions, to the Service to determine the matter.”). In this regard, the Supreme
Court has advised that “[g]enerally speaking, a court . . . should remand a case to an
agency for decision of a matter that statutes place primarily in agency hands.” I.N.S.
v. Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16 (2002). Under that directive, district courts
ordinarily “remand lawsuits filed under § 1447(b) for USCIS to decide in the first
instance whether to grant or deny an application for naturalization.” Bathija v. U.S.
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 3:24-CV-0526-D, 2024 WL 2854271, at *2 (N.D. Tex. June
5, 2024) (quoting Kaliuzhna v. DHS, SA-19-cv-01252-OLG, 2019 WL 13136762, at *2
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(W.D. Tex. Dec. 17, 2019)); see also Megahed v. Holder, No. 8:11-CV-2785-T-27TBM,
2012 WL 920423, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 19, 2012) (“USCIS is better-equipped to
evaluate the information in Plaintiff’s application in the first instance and to develop
the record.”); Kaliuzhna, 2019 WL 13136762, at *2 (same).
Although USCIS’s delay was egregiously lengthy, the Court will follow suit and
remand the action to the agency. In doing so, the Court makes clear that it does not
condone the 1,144-day delay; rather, USCIS “has the experience and expertise in
making [the initial] assessment—and, more generally, in determining whether an
applicant meets all of the various criteria for naturalization.” Khelifa v. Chertoff, 433
F. Supp. 2d 836, 844 (E.D. Mich. 2006); see also Kaliuzhna, 2019 WL 13136762, at *2.
Moreover, remand to the agency does not foreclose Plaintiff’s opportunity for
judicial or administrative review. If USCIS denies Plaintiff’s application, Plaintiff
“may request a hearing before an immigration officer.” 8 U.S.C. § 1447(a). If that
hearing does not alter the outcome, Plaintiff “may seek review of such denial before
the United States district court.” 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c); Saba-Bakare v. Chertoff, 507
F.3d 337, 340 (5th Cir. 2007). At that point, Plaintiff would be entitled to de novo
review of his application. Kaliuzhna, 2019 WL 13136762, at *3. The Court’s de novo
review—should it become necessary—“would be considerably aided by an agency
analysis and explanation as to why it acted as it did on Plaintiff’s application.”
Khelifa, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 844. Therefore, the Court finds that remanding the matter
for prompt adjudication is appropriate here.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Petition for Writ of
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Mandamus 	(see 	Dkt. 	No. 	4) 	is 	DENIED. 	Defendants’ 	denial 	of 	Plaintiff’s
naturalization application (Dkt. No. 4-1) was ultra vires and is hereby rendered
NULL and VOID.
This 	action 	is 	REMANDED 	to 	USCIS 	to 	allow 	it 	to 	make 	an 	initial
determination on Plaintiff’s naturalization application. USCIS must adjudicate
Plaintiff’s naturalization application within thirty (30) days of the entry of the
Order. 	The parties shall promptly inform the Court upon the adjudication of
Plaintiff’s application.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court reserves jurisdiction over this
matter as necessary to (1) enforce the above Order; and (2) adjudicate Plaintiff's
naturalization application in the first instance in the event Plaintiff’s application has
not been ruled on within thirty (30) days of the entry of this Order.
It is so ORDERED.
SIGNED November 18, 2025.
_______________________________
Marina Garcia Marmolejo
United States District Judge
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